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Edwam

ty Sea, Air, and Lan

AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE U.S. NAVY
AND THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Edward J. Marolda

NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
1994

'59 The paper used in this publication meets the requirements for permanence estab-
lished by the American National Standard for Information Sciences "Permanence of
Paper for Printed Ubrary Materials" (ANSI Z39.48-1984).

Library of Congress Catcdoging-in-Publication Data

Marolda, Edward J.

By sea, air, and land : an illustrated history of the U.S. Navy
and the war in Southeast Asia / Edward ]. Marolda.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-945274-09-2 (pbk.). — ISBN 0-9452774-10-6 (hard)

1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975— Naval Operations, American.

2. United States. Navy— History— Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975.

3. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 — Naval operations, American —
Pictorial works. 4. United States. Navy — History — Vietnamese
Conflict, 1961-1975— Pictorial works. I. Title.

DS558.7.M36 1992

959.704'345— dc20 91-33197

To the U.S. Navy veterans of the war in Southeast Asia

''Home is the sailor, home
from the sea.

And the hunter home from the
hill"

Robert Louis Stevenson

Contents

Foreword / xi
Preface / xiii
Acknowledgments / xv

Chapter 1

TheEarly Years, 1950-1959 / 1

Passage to Freedom / 6
Development OF THE Vietnamese Navy / 10

Chapter 2

The Era of Growing Conflict, 1959-1965 / 1

The Crises in Laos / 13
U.S. Naval Advisors and the Vietnamese Navy / 20

COUNTERINSURGENCY and THE Navy / 31

U.S. Navy Direct Support / 36
Expanding Operations into North Vietnam and Laos / 45
Gulf of Tonkin Incidents / 48
The Conflict in Transition / 56

Chapter 3

The Years OF Combat, 1965-1968 / 63

The Naval Command in Southeast Asia / 65
The Carrier Force / 70

Rolling Thunder / 86
Amphibious Landings in South Vietnam / 119
Bombardment from the Sea / 137
Coastal Interdiction / 143

The Naval Command in South Vietnam / 162
River Patrol / 163
RrvERiNE Assault Force / 198
The Naval Advisory Effort / 215
Civic Action / 229
The Navy's Logistic Support of the War / 233
Naval Support AorivrriES / 251

Chapter 4

WindingDownthe War, 1968-1973 / 263

The SEALORDS Campaign / 263
Allied Navies on the Offensive / 274
Vietnamization of Naval Operations / 284
Task Force 77 Operations / 300
Allied Surface Warfare / 307
Vietnamization Completed / 318
Countering the Easter Offensive / 326
Linebacker / 333
Withdrawal from the War / 346

Chapter 5

The Final Curtain, 1973-1975 / 355

Naval Evacuation of I Corps and II Corps / 355
Eagle Pull / 358
The Fall of South Vietnam / 362

Appendixes / 369

A. U.S. Navy Medal of Honor Recipients / 370
B. Secretaries of the Navy and Key U.S. Naval Officers / 385
C. Carrier Deployments to Southeast Asia / 387

D. Aircraft Tailcodes / 390
E. Enemy Aircraft Shot Down by Naval Aviators
IN Southeast Asia / 391

Glossary of Abbreviations and Terms / 394
Selected Bibliography / 397
Photo Credits / 399
Index / 401

Maps and Charts

Southeast Asia / 2
Mainland Southeast Asia / 14
South Vietnamese Coastal Force Dispositions, January 1965 / 29
The Coast of North Vietnam / 44
The Panhandles of North Vietnam and Laos / 45
Naval Engagement of 2 August 1964 / 50
Carrier Stations off Indochina / 67
Command Arrangements for the Rolling Thunder Campaign / 68

Route Packages / 85
South Vietnam / 145
The Mekong Delta / 165
The Rung Sat Swamp / 176
The SEALORDS Operational Theater / 265
End Sweep Clearance Areas / 351

Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Committee

ON Naval History

William D. Wilkinson, Chairman
CAPT Edward L. Beach, USN (Retired)
David R. Bender
John C. Dann
RADM Russell W. Gorman, USNR (Retired)

Richard L. Joutras
VADM William R Lawrence, USN (Retired)
Vera D. Mann
Ambassador }. William Middendorf II
VADM Gerald E. Miller, USN (Retired)
Clark G. Reynolds
Daniel R Stella
Betty M. Unterberger

Foreword

This volume depicts the United States Navy's contribution to the twenty-five-
year American and Vietnamese campaign to defend the Republic of Viet-
nam. The dimension of that effort is suggested by the fact that two million U.S.

naval personnel, more than 2,551 of whom lost their lives, served their country in
Southeast Asia.The text and photographs in By Sea, Air, and Land cover all naval
aspects of this prolonged campaign, particularly the operations of carrier, surface,
amphibious, logistic, riverine, coastal, and mine forces. Assessments of the Navy's
overall experience in counterlnsurgency, civic action, and the advisory effort are
provided. Coverage extends to naval forces assigned to the Seventh Fleet as well
as to units based ashore that reported to the Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam.

Edward J. Marolda, who heads the Naval Historical Center's Contemporary
History Branch, is a recognized authority on the U.S. involvement in Southeast
Asia. For more than twenty yeors, as a member of the Center's historical staff, he
has concentrated his attention on the maritime aspects of the Vietnam War. Pre-
viously, he had first-hand experience in Vietnam, where he served as a U.S. Army
officer. Dr. Marolda is the author of three books and a number of shorter works
on the conflict in Southeast Asia.

Special recognition needs to be given to several individuals who worked with
the author. Charles R. Haberlein, head of the Naval Historical Center's Photo-
graphic Section, offered his expert advice on the selection of photographs for this
volume. Sandra }. Doyle and Akio J. Stribling of the Editorial Section and Charles
Cooney of the Naval Aviation News staff capably prepared the book for publication
and oversaw the printing process. As is true for oil publications of the Naval His-
torical Center, the opinions and conclusions expressed in this work are solely
those of the author. Those views do not reflect the position of the Department of
the Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

This volume presents a much needed overview of a complex subject. The
Navy's historians trust that By Sea, Air, and Land will be of value to naval profes-
sionals and to all other readers interested in the Navy's experience in Southeast
Asia.

Dean C. Allard
Director of Naval History

The Author

Edward J. Marolda heads the Contemporary History Branch of the Naval
Historical Center, on whose staff he has served since 1971. He earned the B.A.
and M.A. degrees in history from Pennsylvania Military College and Georgetown
University and received a Ph.D. in American History at the George Washington
University. His doctoral dissertation is entitled "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese
Civil Wor, 1945-1952." As a 1st Lieutenant with the U.S. Army's 4th Transporta-
tion Command in the Republic of Vietnam during 1969 and 1970, Dr. Marolda
commanded combat resupply convoys. He is the coauthor with Dr. Oscar P.
Fitzgerald of From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965, Volume 2 in the official
series, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict. His other works include Car-
rier Operations, a volume in the Bantam series, The Illustrated History of the Vietnam
War, and A Short History of the United States Navy and the Southeast Asian Conflict,
1950-1975, coGUthored with G. Wesley Pryce III. Dr. Marolda has lectured on mili-
tary and naval history and published a number of articles and book reviews in the
Journal of Military History, Naval War College J?eview, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
Naval History, foumal of Strategic Studies, and other scholarly journals.

Dr. Marolda resides in Montclair, Virginia, with his wife, Beverly, and their
three sons.

Preface

When many Americans think of the Vietnam War, they visuahze Army in-
fantrymen warily inching their way along a jungle trail or slogging
through endless rice paddies under a mercilessly hot sun. Troops fighting house to
house through the streets of Saigon during the catoclysmic Tet Offensive of 1968
is another scene that comes readily to mind. Others may picture an Air Force ot-
tack jet dropping napalm bombs on a Viet Cong position or B-52s releasing
strings of bombs high above the clouds.

The aim of this illustrated history is to shed light on the significant involve-
ment of the U.S. Navy, over a period of 25 years, in the struggle for Southeast
Asia. The Navy was there from 1950, when the French Union Forces battling the
Viet Minh were supplied with American aircraft and naval vessels, to 1975, when
helicopters and ships of the Seventh Fleet evacuated the last Americans from
Saigon. During the years fi-om 1964 to 1973 alone, 2,636,000 sailors and Marines
served in the Southeast Asian operational theater. Even before 1965, when sub-
stantial U.S. ground and air forces deployed to Southeast Asia, the fleet main-
tained a powerful presence in the waters off troubled Indochina. The Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Johnson administrations repeatedly brandished the fleet weapon to
deter Chinese and North Vietnamese military activism and to influence the politi-
cal-military struggle ashore. Once battle was joined in Southeast Asia, Washing-
ton used U.S. naval forces positioned in the waters around Japan, Okinawa, and
the Philippines to dissuade the Soviets and the Chinese from providing their Viet-
namese comrades with naval support. Accomplishing one of its primary wartime
responsibilities, the Navy deterred air and naval threats against the 7,000-mile
logistic lifeline between the United States and the operational theater.

The fact that the Navy operated on a broad geographical scale was true not
only with regard to its Pacific-wide sea control duty but with its combat mission.
The Vietnam War is a term that does not accurately reflect the Navy's role in the
conflict, for naval forces fought not only in South Vietnam, but North Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia, and mounted operations from the South China Sea, the
Gulf of Siam, the Philippines, Thailand, and from shore bases throughout the
Western Pacific.

In none of America's modern wars has the sea service operated by itself. The
war in Southeost Asia was no exception. Reflecting that reality, this illustrated

history depicts the Navy in action with the other U.S. Armed Forces. The Navy was
Q major partner with the Air Force during the oir compaigns in North Vietnam
and Loos and with the Army during riverine operations in the Mekong Delta. U.S.
naval forces comprised not only fleet units but also Marine and Coast Guard
forces. Just as Army and Air Force planes spotted naval gunfire, rescued downed
naval aviators, and bombed Viet Cong coastal positions, Navy SEAL and heli-
copter units struck at enemy troops deep in the jungle and resupplied forward
Army and Marine battalions by river convoy. Joint doctrine, command and control
procedures, and tactical practices did not always mesh, but the services demon-
strated a remarkable ability to adapt and adjust to changing combat conditions.

The Navy also fought its battles side by side with forces firom the other na-
tions of the anti-Communist coalition. The birth, growth, and death of the Viet-
namese Navy and the U.S. Navy's major role in that tragic story constitute a sig-
nificant portion of this history. The first naval personnel assigned to South
Vietnam and the last to leave the country were advisors. This work also recounts
the U.S. Navy's actions with Royal Australian Navy ships on the gunline and with
South Korean marines in amphibious landings.

This history illustrates not only the naval, oir, and ground combat in which
the Novy took part but all significant aspects of the war. The development and
operation of the command structure, the trans-Pacific logistic lifeline, the massive
port and bose complex in South Vietnam, and the ships, aircraft, weapons, and
equipment of the fleet are treated in these pages. Even more important, By Sea,
Air, and Land illuminates the wartime experience of Navy men and women serv-
ing in aircraft carriers, destroyers, and hospital ships on the often stormy South
China Sea, on the muddy tributaries of the Mekong River, along the rocky and
forested central Vietnam coast, in the skies over Laos, and in the teeming ports of
Saigon and Danang. It is also a story of their dedication to duty and country, per-
severance in the face of great adversity, and sacrifice for the common good. The
long struggle for Southeast Asia sorely tested the men and women of the U.S.
Navy, but it was a test they passed with distinction.

Edward J. Marolda

Acknowledgments

Many more individuals than are mentioned in this short space supported the
effort to relate the U.S. Navy's experience in Southeost Asia. Navy Vietnam
veterans, both active and retired, inspired this work, provided helpful advice and
information, and stimulated the author to action whenever the spirit flagged.
That was appropriate, for this is their story, one that needs to be told.

I must offer my deep appreciation to Dr. Dean C. Allard, Director of Naval
History, who wholeheartedly supported the project from its inception, reviewed
the manuscript, and facilitated its timely publication. A number of my colleagues
at the Naval Historical Center are especially worthy of thanks for their contribu-
tion to the multiyeor effort. Dr. William S. Dudley, Senior Historian; Charles R.
Haberlein, Head of the Curator Branch's Photographic Section; Sandra J. Doyle,
Senior Editor; Dr. Oscar P. Fitzgerald, Director of the Navy Museum; and Dr. Mark
H. Jacobsen and Dale W. Andrade, historians of the Contemporary History
Branch, formed a panel that critiqued the manuscript, proffering valuable advice
about its preparation and presentation.

Other staff members who brought their special expertise to the review process
included Mark T. Weber of the Navy Museum, Lieutenant Commander Richard R.
Burgess, USN, of the Naval Aviation News Branch, Roy A. Grossnick of the Naval Avi-
ation History Branch, Glenn E. Helm of the Navy Department Library, and Robert J.
Cressman of the Ships Histories Branch. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Com-
modore Dinh Manh Hung of the former Republic of Vietnam Navy, who reviewed
the manuscript and helped me see the wor from the Vietnamese perspective.

Staff members of the Center who helped to gather photographs, art, and his-
torical information include Dr. Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr., of the Contemporary
History Branch; Mr. Haberlein and Edwin C. Finney, Jr., of the Photographic Sec-
tion; John Barnett, S. Gail Munro, and Catherine Ziurella of the Navy Art Gallery;
Maxine Wore of the Contemporary History Branch; and Mr. Helm, John E. Vajda,
and Jean Hort of the Navy Department Library. The history would never have
come to fruition without conscientious and. skillful editing and layout work by
Ms. Doyle, Akio J. Stribling, Wendy E. Karppi, and Charles Cooney and the type-
setting and design by John Grier of the Typography and Design Section of the U.S.
Government Printing Office.

I would be remiss if I did not express my appreciation to those individuals who
provided us with visually striking and sometimes unique photographs from their
personal collections. Included in this group ore Shelby L. Stanton, noted historian
of the Vietnam War; Rear Admiral Joseph W. Williams, USN (Retired); Captain
Peter M. Swartz, USN (Retired); Captain Kenneth L. Coskey, USN (Retired); Captain
Paul Gray, USN (Retired); Arthur C. Davidson III; Charles A. Thompson; Glenn E.
Helm; Captain Charles J. Smith, USN (Retired); Peter Mersky; and Bruce Roberts.

Captain Swartz, his lovely wife Thuy, and Ngo Dinh Hoa came to the rescue
of the non- Vietnamese-speaking author and graciously translated the stirring
saga of "Navy Warrior Iran Hong Van" found on pages 222-24. Several photo
archives outside the Center were combed to locate the illustrations presented in
this work and the ready assistance of their staff members certainly deserves recog-
nition. Special mention should go to Russ Egnor of the Navy OfQce of Informa-
tion, Dottie McConchie of the Naval Imaging Command, Mory Beth Stroight of
the Naval Institute Press, Alice Creighton of the U.S. Noval Academy's Nimitz Li-
brary, Regina Strother of the U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, and Dale Con-
nelly of the National Archives and Records Administration's Still Media Branch.

I am grateful to all those individuals who helped to place this finished prod-
uct before you, but any misinterpretations or factual errors that appear on the
following pages are my own. Further, the views expressed do not reflect or repre-
sent those of the Department of the Navy or any other U.S. Government agency.

Edward J. Marolda

By Sea, Air, and Land

CHAPTER ONE

THE

EARLY YEARS

1950-1959

JL ROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT
in Southeast Asia, the Navy played a key role in support of American strategic
objectives. With the Communist seizure of China in 1949 and the invasion of
South Korea by North Korean and Chinese forces the following year, U.S. leaders
concluded that the Indochina Peninsula and possibly all Southeast Asia soon
might also sink under the rising Communist tide.

To prevent this loss, the administration of President Harry S.Truman provided
military aid and advisory assistance to France, then fighting to retain control of
its Indochinese possessions against an indigenous Communist movement, the
Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh.

On 3 August 1950, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG),
Indochina, arrived in Saigon to administer the material assistance program. The
MAAG's Navy Section, comprised of Commander John B. Howland and seven
other officers and men, was on hand at the end of October to process the first
shipment of naval material, which consisted of Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters, to
French forces. During the next four years, as part of the Mutual Defense
Assistance Program, the United States delivered military aid totaling $2.6 billion,
including two light aircraft carriers, renamed by the French Bois Belleau and La
Fayette; 438 amphibious landing ships and craft; armored river patrol boats and
other vessels; and 500 aircraft. In addition, the Navy Section of MAAG oversaw

the provision of spare parts and the development of
base facilities such as the Naval Shipyard in Saigon
and the Naval Amphibious Base in Haiphong.

The fleet complemented these efforts with port
calls and task force deployments intended to high-
light American support for the anti-Communist stand
of France and its Indochinese allies of the French
Union. As early as March 1950, the Seventh Fleet
commander, with destroyers Stickell (DD 888) and
Richard B. Anderson (DD 786), visited Saigon while 60
planes from aircraft carrier Boxer (CVA 21) overflew
the city. In October 1953, the four ships of Destroyer
Division 30 conducted a similar show-the-flag voyage
up the Saigon River.

In the spring of 1954, the fleet's presence took
another form in Southeast Asian waters when the
French military effort in Indochina reached a climax

Curtiss SB-2C Helldivers and
Grumman F6F Hellcats, supplied by
the United States, nil the flight deck of
French aircraft carrier Arromanches
steaming in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Nearby are a Sikorsky helicopter and
an escort ship, both U.S.-bwlt.

French naval vessels patrol a river in
Vietnam. Control of Vietnam's myriad
inland waterways was one of the few
advantages French Union Forces had over
their determined foe.

at the battle of Dien Bien Phu. Responding to pleas
from the French, who were fighting desperately to
hold on to their isolated bastion in the mountains of
Tonkin, the administration of President Dwight D.
Eisenhower deployed an aircraft carrier task force
and supporting units into the South China Sea. At
various times Wasp (CVA 18), Essex (CVA 9), Boxer,
and Philippine Sea (CV 4 7) steamed off the
Indochinese Peninsula prepared to launch their air-
craft against Communist forces besieging the French
base. Awaiting a possible order from Washington to
enter the conflict, naval leaders dispatched carrier
reconnaissance planes to fly over the area around
Dien Bien Phu. The aircraft gathered intelligence on
Viet Minh troop movements and logistic buildup.
Finally, President Eisenhower, concluding that the
risks of unilateral U.S. intervention might far out-
weigh the gains, decided against any action. On
7 May 1954, Viet Minh forces overwhelmed the last
French defenders of the surrounded outpost. Two

Ho Chi Minh, the leader of
Vietnam's Communists until
his death in 1969.

months later, hard on the heels of this defeat, France
surrendered its interests to Indochina at an interna-
tional conference in Geneva, Switzerland.

Passage to Freedom

The Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostilities divided Vietnam into two zones for

the regroupment of the contending Viet Minh and
French forces. Ho Chi Minh's troops concentrated
north of a provisional military demarcation line
established along the Ben Hai River at the 17th par-
allel while French and allied indigenous forces
regrouped to the south of it. At the same time,

Vietnomese civilians were allowed to emigrate to
the zone of their choice. The U.S Navy answered the
French government's call to assist in evacuating the
hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese and ethnic
Chinese who chose to live in the predominately
non-Communist South. From August 1954 to May
1955 the Navy mounted a massive sea lift between
the ports of Haiphong and Saigon. To carry out the
operation, named Passage to Freedom, the Pacific
Fleet concentrated 74 tank landing ships (LST),
transports, attack cargo ships, dock landing ships
(LSD), and other vessels in the South China Sea
under Rear Admiral Lorenzo S. Sabin, Commander

Amphibious Force, Western Pacific and Commander
Amphibious Group 1.

The Navy's Military Sea Transportation Service
(MSTS) provided an additional 39 transports. This
large group of ships, shuttling between North and
South Vietnam, was supplied and replenished by the
Logistic Support Force, Western Pacific, whose oiler,
cargo, provision, repair, salvage, and hospital ships
were stationed at the midway point in Danang Bay.
Fleet medical units and Naval Beach Group 1 ele-

ments helped ease the plight of the Vietnamese
refugees encamped ashore at both ends of the transit
route. By 20 May 1955, the Navy had transported
293,000 immigrants, many of them Catholics, who
soon formed the core of the anti-Communist segment
of the population in South Vietnam. In addition to
17,800 Vietnamese military personnel, the American
flotilla carried south 8,135 vehicles and 68,757 tons
of cargo, much of it material provided to the French
under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

General Paul Ely, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, meets in Washington with President Dwight D. Eisenhower
and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to push for American intervention into the
Indochina War. Although Radford wanted to assist the French, the President feared it was already too late to preserve
France's military position in the region and decided against the proposal.

Vietnamese refugees crowd the dock in Haiphong as they board U.S. naval vessels for the voyage south to Saigon.

The ardent anticommunism exhibited by immigrants from the North strengthened the conservativism of many Vietna-
mese native to the South.

Flanked by U.S. Ambassador Donald R. Heath and Rear Admiral Lorenzo S. Sabin and backed by soon-to-be President
Diem, the mayor of Saigon welcomes the 100,000th northern refugee.

Development of the Vietnamese
Navy

In succeeding years, the Navy continued its support
of the new Republic of Vietnam as the United
States filled the vacuum left by the French. The
Eisenhower administration, guided by Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles, was instrumental in forming
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a
coalition of non-Communist states concerned with
preventing the further extension of Conmiunist influ-
ence in the region. In addition, the United States
undertook the task of equipping and training an
indigenous South Vietnamese armed force capable of
defending the country during the initial phases of
attack by an external power.

Because Ho Chi Minh's regime was concerned
with consolidating control over North Vietnam in the
years following the end of its war with France, the
threat to President Ngo Dinh Diem's South Vietnam
was temporarily limited. Thus, the U.S. military mis-

sion in the country had a grace period in which to
prepare South Vietnam for the enemy's expected
offensive. From 1954 to 1959, the Navy Section of the
Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, worked
to develop a viable navy for South Vietnam. The
number of advisors allowed in-country at any one
time was limited by the Geneva Accord restriction
on the reintroduction of military personnel. In this
period there were never more than 79 naval advisors
assigned to MAAG or to the Temporary Equipment
Recovery Mission, created to salvage American aid

President Diem prepares to go ashore after
inspecting a ship of the navy in the early
years of his rule. The uniforms of these offi-
cers and men clearly reflect the French influ-
ence on the fledgling naval service. This
would soon change.

material left in Vietnam by the French. But these

Navy and Marine Corps advisors were important in
the development of the Vietnamese Navy, which
grew from a force of 1,500 men and a small number
of ships and croft to a force of 5,000 men and 119
ships and craft. Controlled by the Chief of the
General Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, the
navy was orgonized into a Naval Staff; Sea Force,
River Force, and Marine Corps operating forces; and
a shore establishment. The latter group comprised
the Naval Stations and Schools and the Naval Supply
Center, Saigon.

The American naval advisors concentrated on
providing material assistance to the Vietnamese
Navy. Many vessels were left behind by the French,
but the advisory group designated additional materi-

al aid that was needed and odministered the deliver-
ies. Patrol craft, escorts, minesweepers, and landing
craft were acquired so that the South Vietnamese
could carry out the priority mission of supporting the
army with coastal patrol, escort and transportation,
harbor defense, limited minelaying and minesweep-
ing, and antisubmarine warfare. In addition, the
naval trainers taught gunnery, navigation, and other
subjects at the Nha Trang Naval School and worked
to improve management skills at the Saigon Naval
Shipyard. The Navy Section also served as the field
office for the evaluation of new weapons, boats, and
equipment for future use in the special environment
of Southeast Asia. These relatively modest efforts to
prepare the South Vietnamese Navy for combat
would soon be tested.

Confident and relaxed after their 1955 defeat of the Binh Xuyen sect in the swamps south of Saigon, Diem and his sailors
enjoy the passage in a river patrol vessel. American and British military observers can be seen at the stem of the boat.

CHAPTER TWO

THE

ERA OF GROWING
CONFUa

1959-1965

JLn 1959 NORTH VIETNAM INITIATED A
long-term campaign aimed at destroying the government of South Vietnam
through political subversion and armed action. The goal was to unify Vietnam
under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. To achieve this end, the North Vietnamese
directed Communists in the South to spark unrest, infiltrated guerrilla reinforce-
ments, and began preparing a logistical line of communication, soon labeled the
Ho Chi Minh Trail, through neighboring Laos. To ease the threat to this supply
system, the North Vietnamese exacerbated existing political tensions in Laos.
They supported with troops and supplies the indigenous Pathet Lao Communists,
who were attempting to overthrow the pro-Western Royal Laotian Government.

The Crises in Laos

The Navy was called upon to demonstrate American determination to oppose
these actions. One of the means adopted was a show of force by the fleet.
During September 1959, in the autumn of 1960, and again in January 1961, the
Seventh Fleet deployed multiship carrier task forces into the South China Sea to
deter Communist guerrilla attacks on pro-American forces in Laos and to reassure

Mainland Southeast Asia

friendly governments of U.S. resolve to stand by them.
Although the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese sup-
porting forces withdrew in each crisis, in the spring of
1961 their offensive appeared on the verge of over-
whelming the Royal Laotian Army. Once again the
fleet sortied into Southeast Asian waters. By the end of
April most of the Seventh Fleet was deployed off the
Indochinese Peninsula preparing to initiate opera-
tions into Laos. The force consisted of Coral Sea (CVA
43) and Midway (CVA 41) carrier battle groups, anti-
submarine support carrier Kearsarge (CVS 33), one
helicopter carrier, three groups of omphibious ships,
two submarines, and three Marine battalion landing
teams. At the same time, shorebased air patrol
squadrons and another three Marine battalion land-
ing teams stood ready in Okinawa and the Philip-
pines to support the afloat force. Although the admin-
istration of President John F. Kennedy already had
decided against American intervention to rescue the

Laotian government. Communist forces halted their
advance and agreed to negotiations. The contending
Laotian factions concluded a cease-fire on 8 May
1961, but it lasted only a year.

Fleet training exercises also highlighted Ameri-
con strength and purpose in Southeast Asio. Exercise
Pony Express, conducted on the northern coast of Bor-
neo by 60 ships and 26,000 personnel from SEATO
member states between late April and early May
1961, prominently displayed U.S. naval power and
allied military solidarity.

Aircraft carrier Coral Sea fates on fuel from oiler Nava-
sota (AO 106) in the South China Sea. On numerous oc-
casions during the late 1 950s and early 1 960s, Seventh
Fleet task forces deployed off Indochina to deter Commu-
nist actions in the region.

An F-8U fighter is launched from carrier Lexington (CVA 16) in the spring of 1961 as U.S. naval forces once again con-
centrate off the Indochinese hot spot.

Commander Everette A. Parke, U.S. Naval Attache in Saigon (right), and officers of Mine Division 93 call on Cambodian
Defense Minister Lon Nol during the unit's visit to Phnom Penh in August 1961.

Commander Seventh Fleet Vice Admiral
Charles D. Griffin points to Indochina, a
region he and his superiors in Washing-
ton believe in 1961 to be under increas-
ing threat from the Communist bloc.

Warships of the Seventh Fleet at anchor in Hong Kong harbor during the spring of 1 961. U.S. naval forces operated off
the southern coast of China with greater frequency in this era.

Guided missile frigate Mahan (DIG 11) during her October 1962 visit to Saigon for South Vietnam 's Independence Day cele-
bration. Such port calls were meant to demonstrate U.S. support for the non-Communist governments of Southeast Asia.

Commander Ivor A. Johnson, Commanding Officer of Mohan, escorts President Diem and U.S. Ambassador Frederick E.
Molting on a tour of the ship.

In response to growing hostilities in Laos,
carrier Hancock (CVA 19) steams off the
coast of Vietnam in April 1962. The fol-
lowing month, President John F. Kennedy
deployed major ground and air forces to
Thailand to deter Communist activities in
neighboring Laos.

President Kennedy, increasingly con-
cerned about Southeast Asia, confers
with Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral
John H. Sides.

Throughout this period, the Navy took other
steps to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to friendly gov-
ernments. Heavy cruisers Toledo (CA 133) in October
1959 and Saint Paul (CA 73), the flagship of Com-
mander Seventh Reet, in October 1960 visited Saigon
to participate in Vietnamese Independence Day cele-
brations. On 27 August 1961, Commonder Mine Di-
vision 93, with ocean minesweepers Leader (MSO 490)
and Excel (MSO 439), made the first official visit by
ships of the U.S. Navy to Phnom Penh, the capital of
Cambodia.

In addition, less visible actions were taken to
aid the anti-Communist cause in Laos. During 1959
several detachments from naval mobile construc-
tion battolions (NMCB), known as Seabees, im-
proved strategically important roads and the coun-
try's main airfield, Wattay, at the capital of
Vientiane. In June and July of the following year,
men of Naval Beach Group 1 and Underwater De-
molition Team (UDT) 12 pushed 430 miles up the
unpredictable, rapid-strewn Mekong River to deliver
10 landing craft to the Laotian armed forces. During
the 1961 spring crisis, antisubmarine support carrier
Bennington (CVS 20) carried 14 Sikorsky H-34 heli-
copters to the Gulf of Siam where they were flown
off and transferred to friendly forces in Laos, then
preparing to meet the next Pathet Lao assaults.
However, relative calm settled over the country dur-
ing the latter half of 1961 and early 1962. This lull
was shattered when the Communists overran the
pro-American defenders of Nam Tha on 6 May
1962, renewing fears for the survival of a non-Com-
munist Laotian government.

Determined to preserve the status quo and at the
same time reassure American allies. President Kermedy
again ordered the Seventh Fleet into the South China
Sea. The Hancock (CVA 19) carrier group and the Ben-
nington submarine hunter-killer group steamed to a
position off Danang, and the fleet's Amphibious Ready
Group (ARG) carried the Marine Special Landing Force
(SLF) into the Gulf of Siam. Then, in mid-May, U.S.
ground, air, and naval forces deployed to Thailand.
On the 17th, the Amphibious Ready Group landed a
Marine ground-air team, which quickly moved for-
ward to Udorn on the Thai-Laotian border. Other
units, including elements of Naval Mobile Construc-
tion Battalion 10, joined this force in succeeding days

to form the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade. With the
forces in the area now more in balance, political com-
promise was possible. On 23 July 1962, the various
Laotian parties formally agreed at the Geneva Confer-
ence to form a coalition government headed by the
neutralist. Prince Souvarma Phouma.

U.S. Naval Advisors and the
Vietnamese Navy

Even as the Laotian crisis subsided. Southeast Asia
remained an area of concern because of develop-
ments in the Republic of Vietnam. That country was
increasingly threatened by Communist insurgents
who wreaked havoc on the political, economic, and
military infrastructure. Bedeviled by the enemy's
guerrilla attacks and political proselytizing, the South
Vietnamese government looked to the United States
for assistance. After a fact-finding mission to South
Vietnam in October 1961 by the President's chief mil-
itary advisor. General Maxwell D. Taylor, the Kennedy
administration responded by (1) increasing military
aid and the number of advisors in-country, (2) adopt-
ing specialized counterinsurgency measures, and (3)
deploying American support forces to Southeast Asia.
The U.S. Navy played an important role in each of
these three major programs.

Paralleling the overall rise in MAAG strength, the
Navy Section increased from 79 men in 1959 to 154 in
early 1964. In addition, the naval advisors began to
accompany South Vietnamese ships, river assault
groups, and other units on combat operations. An-
other small naval contingent served on the staff of the
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), es-
tablished on 8 February 1962 to coordinate the total
U.S. effort in the Republic of Vietnam. The command
function was centralized when the MAAG was dises-
tablished on 15 May 1964, and its resources were ab-
sorbed by MACV. Thereafter, the Naval Advisory
Group (NAG) continued the work of the old Navy Sec-
tion. By the end of the year, 235 sailors were assigned
to the 4,889-person military assistance command.

This increase in strength reflected the growth of
the Republic of Vietnam Navy from 5,000 officers
and men in 1959 to 8,162 in late 1964. During this
same period the naval service doubled to a force of
44 seagoing ships and over 200 landing craft, patrol
boats, and other vessels.

South Vietnamese Lieutenant Can communicates with headquarters from his vessel underway between Saigon and Vung
Tau as American Lieutenant Commander Linden Major, Senior Advisor to the Coastal Force, observes operations.

Among the ships and craft provided between
1961 and 1964 by the United States to the Viet-
namese Navy's Sea Force were an additional 5 escorts
(PCE), 12 motor gunboats (PGM), 3 medium landing
ships (LSM), 3 LST, 1 fuel barge (YOG), and 12
minesweeping launches (MLMS). These vessels gave
the oceangoing force a greater capability to carry out
its responsibility for patrol and transport along the
1,200-mile Goastline, gunfire support of troops
ashore, amphibious landings, minesweeping, and
open sea operations.

A similar burgeoning of resources enabled the
River Force to create additional commands in support
of its primary mission of aiding the South Viet-
namese Army with river transportation, escort, pa-
troling, minesweeping, and waterborne assaults. New
infusions of specially configured American landing
craft enabled the establishment of two 19-boat, 250-
man, river assault groups (RAG) at Saigon. The exist-
ing river assault groups were based at My Tho, Vinh
Long, Can Tho, and Long Xuyen. In addition, in Oc-

tober 1960, the navy formed the River Transport Es-
cort Group as protection for the vital foodstuffs being
convoyed through the Mekong Delta to Saigon. Later
in the period, the navy created the River Transport
Group to move army forces in the delta.

Recognizing that the sea was a likely avenue of
approach for Communists infiltrating from North
Vietnam or moving along the South Vietnamese lit-
toral, in April 1960 the navy established the paramili-
tary Coastal Force. In line with its emphasis on coun-
terinsurgency warfare, the Kennedy administration
wholeheartedly endorsed the development of this junk
fleet, providing the force with American naval advi-
sors, boat design and construction funds, and stocks of
small arms. By the end of 1964, the 3,800-man, 600-
junk force patrolled the offshore waters firom 28 bases
along the coast. To coordinate the operations of these
28 separate divisions, U.S. advisors helped set up
coastal surveillance centers in Danang, Cam Ranh,
Vung Tau, and An Thoi, the respective headquarters
of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Coastal Districts.

General Paul D. Harkins, USA, Com-
mander U.S. Military Assistance Com-
mand, Vietnam, tours a training facility
at the Saigon Naval Shipyard with
American and Vietnamese naval offi-
cers. Harkins, the top U.S. military
leader in South Vietnam, had little un-
derstanding of the special nature of the
conflict there.

Vietnamese Navy ship Nguyen Ngoc Long (HQ 230), a large landing support ship (LSSL) formerly owned by the United
States, operates in the Mekong Delta.

Captain foseph B. Drachnik, head of the
Navy Section of the Military Assistance
Advisory Group from 1961 to 1964, is
presented with the model of a junk being
built for the paramilitary Coastal Force.
He would find advisory duty sometimes
rewarding but often frustrating.

South Vietnamese patrol vessel Kim Quy (HQ 60S), formerly American PGM 59, steams off the coast. Thanks to U.S. mil-
itary aid, the Vietnamese Navy operated 44 ships by late 1964.

Ex-American fleet minesweeper Sentry as Vietnamese Navy ship Ky Hoa (HQ 09).

The advisory team also persuaded the Viet-
namese Navy to create, on 16 October 1963, four
naval zone commands, from the 1st Naval Zone in
the north to the 4th Naval Zone in the Gulf of Siam.
Thereafter, operations of the Sea Force, River Force,
and Coastal Force in a particular zone were con-
trolled by an overall commander whose area of re-
sponsibility now corresponded with that of an army
corps commander.

The Navy's advisors undertook other specialized
measures to strengthen the Vietnamese Navy, such as
streamlining supply management at the Naval Sup-
ply Center in Saigon and improving repair proce-
dures at the Saigon Naval Shipyard. Training in
seagoing-ship and small-boat operation, gunnery,
and proper maintenance routines were important
parts of the advisory mission.

Temporarily deployed American mobile training
teams complemented the advisory effort. These small
detachments accomplished such specialized tasks as
helping to develop a full-fledged intelligence depart-

ment on the Vietnamese Naval Staff, reactivating an
old French boat repair yard adjacent to the Saigon
Naval Shipyard, and teaching courses in radar tech-
nology. In addition, the mobile training teams in-
structed Vietnamese Air Force mechanics in the
maintenance of 63 Douglas A-IH Skyraiders and 15
North American T-28 Trojan aircraft that were trans-
ferred to the allied air service from 1960 to 1964. Also
during this period, many Vietnamese novel person-
nel received training at facilities in the United States,
including the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode
Island, and the Naval Postgraduate School in Mon-
terey, California. Other Vietnamese sailors served
short tours in Seventh Fleet ships or benefited from
combined antisubmarine warfare exercises with U.S.
submarines Bluegill (SS 242), Queenfish (SS 393), and
Capitaine (AGSS 336).

A U.S. Marine advisor demon-
strates a flame thrower to trainees
of the South Vietnamese Marine
Corps in early 1962.

The standard patrol vessel of the Vietnamese River Force was the French-made STCAN/FOM, whose V-shaped bow and
sturdy construction sometimes helped it survive mine damage.

The 55-foot-long STCAN/FOM normally operated at 10-knot speeds and carried .50- and .30-caliber machine guns.

After nearly ten years of work, the naval advi-
sory team had helped build a promising South Viet-
namese naval arm. But the nature of the advisory
role limited what Americans could do to effect
change. The naval service was troubled with prob-
lems thot continually resisted solution. The rela-
tively few advisors were generally unable to speak
the Vietnamese language or fully understand the
culture. Between 1959 and 1964, poor leadership
constituted the greatest hindrance to an effective
Vietnamese Navy. Political intrigue, cultural differ-
ences, and seemingly petty personal disputes trou-
bled the officer corps. Because of the navy's short
existence, senior officers were relatively young and
inexperienced. Its small size in comparison with the
Vietnamese Army and the consequent domination
by the ground force stifled the naval command's ini-
tiative. In the enlisted ranks, lack of motivation, low
pay, austere living conditions, and inadequate
training for navy life caused some to desert. Poor
maintenance of obsolete World War Il-vintage ships

and craft and the inefficient repair and supply sys-
tems reflected a lack of modern technological her-
itage in South Vietnam. All of these factors resulted
in the mediocre operational performance of the
naval service. Many of the problems identified by
Rear Admiral Henry S. Persons during his inspection
of the Vietnamese Navy in November 1961 for the
Commander in Chief, Pacific remained when Cap-
tain Phillip S. Bucklew made a similar visit in early
1964. Indeed, the disruption in the officer corps
caused by the coup d'etat against President Diem in
November 1963 and the Communist exploitation of
the subsequent political and military chaos in South
Vietnam even lessened the Vietnamese Navy's abil-
ity to carry out its mission at the end of 1964.

The crew of a Vietnamese Navy patrol ves-
sel scans the shoreline for signs of enemy
guerrillas. The primary mission of the River
Force was to assist the army with escort,
transportation, patrolling, minesweeping,
and waterbome assault support.

A South Vietnamese armored monitor, armed with 40- and 20-miUimeter guns, a .50-caliber machine gun, and a mortar. The infii-
sion into the Vietnamese River Force of American mechanized lancing aaft (LCM) hulls led to an increase in river assault groups.

American-made personnel and vehicle landing aaft (LCVP) and a Vietnamese Navy monitor of River Assault Croup 25 based
at Can Tho.

South Vietnamese Coastal Force Dispositions, January 1965

While one member of the paramilitary Coastal Force stands ready with his Thompson submachine gun, others try to dis-
cover if the crew of a coastal junk is attempting to supply the Viet Cong.

The rudimentary and lightly defended base of Coastal Division 24 at Tuy Hoa was typical of most Coastal Force bases.

Counterinsurgency and the Navy

The Kennedy administration concluded early thot
in addition to providing military aid and advice
to friends in their fight against Communist "wars of
national liberation," specially trained American
units might be necessary to combat the enemy's po-
litical-military offensive. The Taylor mission to South
Vietnam in October 1961 invigorated the American
effort to develop specialized counterinsurgency units
in the U.S. Armed Forces.

Stimulated by the Kennedy administration's di-
rect interest, on 1 January 1962 the Navy established
in the Atlontic and Pacific Fleets 60-man naval spe-
cial warfare units called SEAL teams (the name re-
flects o capability to fight on the sea, in the air, and
on land). Their chief purpose was to carry out guer-
rilla and antiguerrilla operations in rivers, canals,
harbors, and on adjacent land areas. The units were
also charged with training American and allied
forces for special operations. Throughout 1963 and

1964, detachments from SEAL Team 1 (the Pacific
Fleet unit) deployed to South Vietnam and instructed

American advisors, South Vietnamese "frogmen," or
LDNN (Lien Doi Nguoi Nhai), and Coastal Force Biet
Hai commandos in related skills.

On 19 February 1962, Admiral George W. Ander-
son, the Chief of Naval Operations, authorized estab-
lishment of another type of unit designed to counter
Communist insurgencies through civic action pro-
grams. The 13-man Seabee Technical Assistance
Teams (STAT), formed to help win the support of in-
digenous populations for their governments, also
constructed traditional military posts for American
and friendly forces.

The first of these specially configured construc-
tion units to deploy to South Vietnam arrived in-
country on 25 January 1963. Fourteen teams were
operating or had completed their six-month tours by
the end of 1964. During the first deployments,
Seabees took part in the Civilian Irregular Defense
Group (CIDG) Program, building or improving forti-

President Kennedy reviews men of Un-
derwater Demolition Team 21. UDT
sailors would soon form the core
of the Navy's elite SEAL (sea, air,
and land) corps, established in
no small part because of Kennedy's
personal interest.

The Kennedy administration's focus on
counterinsurgenq^ warfare led to the devel-
opment of the paramilitary Coastal Force
and its naval commandos, or Biet Hai.
Here, a South Vietnamese Army general, a
Coastal Force officer, and two American
advisors observe Biet Hai training.

Under the watchiul eye of American advisors, Biet Hai commandos train with rubber Zodiac craft.

fied outposts for U.S. Army Special Forces detach-
ments and their Vietnamese and Montagnard (hill
tribesmen) allies. After October 1963, a number of
STAT teams deployed to South Vietnam for "nation
building" work. They were assigned to the Strategic
Hamlet Program, designed to separate the Viet Cong
from the civilian population by grouping the latter in
defended hamlets. The Seabees aided this effort by
building houses, schools, hospitals, roads, and
bridges. A separate Seabee contingent, dispatched to
South Vietnam from March 1964 to February 1965,
dug deep wells at locations where fresh water was un-

available to villagers. To control the entire Seabee
program in-country, on 30 September 1963 the Pa-
cific Fleet commander established the billet of Com-
mander Naval Construction Battalions, U.S. Pacific
Fleet Detachment, Republic of Vietnam. The detach-
ment worked under MACV.

The Navy took other steps to prepare its forces for
counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla conflict. In
late 1962, two Korean War-era motor torpedo boats
were reactivated and armed with 40-millimeter and
20-millimeter guns. Soon afterward, the Navy ac-
quired two modern, Norwegian-built PT boats of the

The U.S. Army Special Forces camp at Binh Thanh Than, located in the Mekong Delta only a few miles from Cambodia.
U.S. Navy Seabees helped build this and other camps from which the Green Berets and their Asian irregulars patrolled the
border areas of South Vietnam.

This Special Forces camp, constructed by Seabees at Cai Cai in the seasonally inundated Plain of Reeds, could be held
only with allied control of its air and water approaches.

These armed arid ready Seabees of a well-drilling team were an integral part of the Kennedy administration's "nation-
building" effort in South Vietnam.

PTF 1, one of two American motor torpedo boats reactivated and reconditioned in 1 962 for special operations in Southeast
Asia, underway at the naval base in Little Creek, Virginia. These boats were joined by modem Norwegian "Nasty" -class PTi

Army Green Berets train with the crew of transport submarine Perch (APSS 313), recommissioned with Sealion (APSS
315) in the early 1960s for special operations missions.

"Nasty" class ond refitted them with American equip-
ment. The dlesel-powered, fiberglass-hulled, 80-foot-
long craft were capable of 41 knots and were consid-
ered ideal for the Southeast Asian environment. The
fast patrol boat (PTF) force, numbering eight craft
with the procurement of four additional Nastys at the
end of 1964, was developed to carry out hit-and-run
operations along enemy coasts and to support raids
ashore by SEAL units. At the same time, the Navy
recommissioned transport submorines Perch (APSS
313) and Sealion (APSS 315) to land and supply
SEALS, collect intelligence, and perform rescue opera-
tions in enemy waters. To centralize administrative
and logistic support of the growing number of SEAL,
PT boat, underwater demolition team, and other spe-
cial units, the Navy created Naval Operations Sup-
port Group commands in the Pacific and Atlantic
Fleets on 10 October 1963.

Training was reoriented to reflect the new strate-
gic emphasis. Chief of Naval Operations George W.
Anderson, Jr, mandated a Navy-wide effort to prepare
personnel for the political-military environment in
areas such as Southeast Asia. After he issued a for-
mal instruction on 19 July 1962 establishing the
Counterinsurgency Education and Training Program,
the Navy's major schools provided orientation
courses in the military, economic, political, social,
and psychological aspects of Communist revolution-
ary warfare. SEAL and STAT units, prospective advi-
sors, selected fleet staff officers, and mobile training
team personnel received rigorous, specialized train-
ing. All officers and men were encouraged to better
their awareness and understanding of the causes,
characteristics, ond possible solutions to insurgency
movements. Thus, by the end of this period, most
naval personnel were at least familiar with the situa-
tion in Southeast Asia and the American approach to
the region's problems.

Although developing a limited and specialized ca-
pability for guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency,
primarily with the SEAL and STAT units, the Navy con-
tinued to stress that its forces were designed to fulfill
many diverse roles. Thus, amphibious units, with their
attached Marines, were believed to be as able to carry
out small raiding operations along rivers in the heart
of the Mekong Delta as to take part in major amphibi-
ous assaults on enemy coastlines. Many of the aircraft

in the fleet were prepared to carry out reconnaissance
or air strikes against the Soviet fleet, should that be-
come necessary, and at the same time to find and at-
tack Communist junks infiltrating munitions into
guerrilla-held areas of South Vietnam.

U.S. Navy Direct Support

As a result of President Kennedy's decision in
November 1961 to expand the use of American
support units in South Vietnam, in "limited partner-
ship" with the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, the
U.S. Navy deployed major fleet units to the increas-
ingly hostile region. Beginning in December 1961,
Seventh Fleet and Vietnamese Navy units conducted
combined surface and air patrol operations from the
17th parallel eastward to the Paracel Islands. The
purpose of the patrols was to train the South Viet-
namese Sea Force in open sea deployments and to de-
termine the extent of any waterborne infiltration of
munitions from North Vietnam. Aided in their
surveillance mission by Martin SP-5B Marlin sea-
planes based on Taiwan, five minesweepers of
Minesweeping Division 73 carried out the first pa-
trols. Faster and more seaworthy destroyer escort
ships soon relieved the minesweepers on patrol.

Seeking to verify any Communist infiltration of
arms and supplies from Cambodia into the Ca Mau
Peninsula and adjacent areas, U.S. and South Viet-
namese naval forces mounted o similar effort in the
Gulf of Siam. Training the Vietnamese Navy in blue-
water surveillance operations also became a goal in
this area. Destroyer escorts Wiseman (DE 667) and
Walton (DE 361) initiated the combined patrol when
they steamed into the gulf on 27 February 1962. For
the next three months, U.S. ships' radar vectored
South Vietnamese ships toward suspicious contacts for
boarding and search. Nonetheless, the gulf's shallow
waters precluded combined operations by U.S. and
Vietnamese ships, thus allowing little opportunity for
training. At the same time, the forces found no appre-
ciable infiltration. U.S. participation in the gulf patrol
was ended on 21 May, when the ships of Escort Divi-
■ sion 72 departed South Vietnamese waters for their
scheduled return to the United States.

Training was more effective on the simultane-
ously conducted 17th paroUel patrol. But there too,
the allies did not discover significant infiltration.

Ocean minesweepers, like Excel (MSO 439), and destroyer escorts mounted patrols along the 1 7th parallel and in the
GulfofSiam during late 1961 and 1962 to help the Vietnamese Navy discover Communist seaborne infiltration of muni-
tions into South Vietnam. The allies found no signiiicant enemy movement by sea.

A Martin SP-5B Marlin patrols along
South Vietnam's 1, 200-mile coast. Dur-
ing the 1961-1962 patrol, these sea-
planes covered the waters between the
northern coast of South Vietnam and the
Paracel Islands.

UH-34 troop transport helicopters of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 362 operating in the Mekong Delta in May
1962, soon after the squadron was deployed ashore to Soc Trang from amphibious assault ship Princeton (LPH 5).

Guided missile Ught cnuser Oklahoma Qty (CLG 5), flagship of the Seventh Fleet, maSoes a shaw-the-fiag visit to Saigon in fufy 1964.

even after boarding and searching or seizing thou-
sands of suspicious vessels. On 1 August 1962,
Minesweeping Division 71 sailed from the area, thus
ending the 7-month-long combined patrol.

Other Seventh Fleet ships gathered information on
the suitability of South Vietnamese beaches for amphibi-
ous landings. During [anuary 1962, high-speed trans-
port Cook (APD 130) conducted beach surveys along the
South Vietnomese coast from Quang Tri in the north to
Vung Tau in the south. In February and March of the fol-
lowing year, Weiss (APD 135) made a similar transit
along the South Vietnamese littoral. On several occa-
sions, the Viet Cong fired on shore parties from the ship.

Fleet units also transported American support
forces to South Vietnam. On 11 December 1961. air-
craft ferry Core (T-AKV 13) of the Navy's Military
Sea Transportation Service arrived in Saigon and of-
floaded two Army helicopter transportation compa-
nies. At the end of January 1962, Card (T-AKV 40)
carried another such unit to Subic Bay. There, it was
transferred to amphibious assault ship Princeton
(LPH 5), 157 629, and LST 630 for the last leg of the
journey to Danang. Soon afterward, on 15 April
Princeton steamed with Marine Medium Helicopter
Squadron (HMM) 362 to a point south of the
Mekong Delta. Under cover of Hancock's air group,

These Douglas RA-3B Skywarrior recon-
naissance planes of Heavy Photographic
Squadron (VAP) 61, flying from U.S.
bases in the Philippines during 1962
and 1 963, photographed large seg-
ments of South Vietnam to update allied
maps. Other naval aircraft patrolled
over South Vietnam to detect any Com-
munist air intrusions.

the squadron flew off Princeton to the unit's subse-
quent base at Soc Trang.

Throughout this period, other Seventh Fleet ships
carried out traditional show-the-flag visits to South Viet-
nam. The units included guided missile cruisers Provi-
dence (CLG 6) and Oklahoma City (CLG 5), guided missile
destroyer Mahan (DLG 1 1), and submarine Bluegill.

The Seventh Fleet's air units also supported the
Republic of Vietnam in its struggle with the Commu-
nist foe. During the 1961 fall crisis, planes from Ticon-
deroga (CVA 14) conducted photographic reconnais-
sance over the Central Highlands. In September and
October, Douglas A3D-2P Skywarriors and Vought
F8U-1P Crusaders flew random missions over sus-
pected infiltration routes. During May of the following
year and then from November 1962 to February 1963,
Douglas RA-3B Skywarriors of Heavy Photographic
Squadron 61 photographed large segments of the
country for use in a crash mapmaklng program.

Responding to South Vietnamese reports of air
intrusions by unidentified aircraft in August 1962,
the Navy dispatched an AD-5Q (EA-IF) Skyraider de-
tachment of Air Early Warning Squadron 13 to Tan
Son Nhut Airfield near Saigon. From that location,
the five-aircraft interceptor team, alternating deploy-
ments to South Vietnam with a similar Air Force unit,
practiced how to discover and identify aerial intrud-
ers. During the deployments of August-September
1962, January-February 1963, and November 1963,
the naval air detachment, under the operational con-
trol of COMUSMACV, protected South Vietnamese air
space from Communist violation.

The growing American military presence in
South Vietnam demanded expansion of the logistic
and administrative support establishment. Because
the Navy had been charged in 1958 with the respon-
sibility for the unified commands in the Pacific area,
on 1 luly 1962 the naval service established the

■ ^^^^^^^

Army military police jeeps exit the main gate of the Navy's Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (HSAS). The command,
responsible for most of the administrative and logistic support of U.S. military units in the capital region, operated bache-
lor and enlisted quarters, dental and medical facilities, and post exchanges.

Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (HSAS), under
the operational control of MACV. By the end of 1964,
the headquarters was staffed by 600 mostly naval
personnel who provided the MACV and MAAG head-
quarters and the American forces in the Saigon area
with a wide range of support. This included medical
and dental services from the Saigon Station Hospital,
commissioned on 1 October 1963; accounting and
disbursing of funds; religious activities by service
chaplains; morale improvement through rest and re-
cuperation (R&R) flights to Asian cities, moving pic-
tures, and USO shows; and management of 32 bache-
lor officer, enlisted, and transient quarters. In

addition, HSAS was responsible for the unloading,
storage, and transportation to outlying ports of sup-
plies required by the services. The 100 in-country ex-
change stores also came under HSAS purview. The
physical security of this burgeoning logistic establish-
ment (a difficult task during the dangerous and
chaotic months of 1964) was another responsibilitv' of
the naval command. By the end of the year, HSAS
was the primory logistic command for an American
military contingent in South Vietnam that totaled
23,000 men and women.

The worsening situation in South Vietnam dur-
ing 1963 prompted measures to evacuate Americans

Lieutenant Frances L Crumpton (NC), one of eight Navy nurses who staffed the Saigon Station Hospital in this period,
and a Thai nurse attend a Vietnamese military patient. Three American nurses were awarded Purple Heart medab for
wounds they received while caring for personnel injured during the Viet Cong sabotage of the Brink Bachelor Officers

Quarters on Christmas Eve, 1 964.

in the event of a general emergency. Saigon street
demonstrations by Buddhists and other Vietnamese
disaffected with the Diem government occurred
throughout the summer. The pubhc self-immola-
tion of several Buddhist monks drew world atten-
tion, as did the government's heavy-handed coun-
teractions. When the political turmoil in the capital
reached a peak at the end of August 1963, the Sev-
enth Fleet deployed the Amphibious Ready Group
and the Marine Special Landing Force to a point off
Vung Tau, where they prepared to take out the

4,600 American noncombatants in the Saigon area.
Although the crisis in the capital abated, the relief
was only temporary. In response to the overthrow
of the Diem government on 1 November, U.S. naval
forces again concentrated off South Vietnam and
prepared to ferry evacuees by helicopter from
Saigon or to transport them by boat from the
nearby Vung Tau Peninsula. When the political un-
rest in the capital once again quickly subsided, the
fleet steamed from the South Vietnamese coast and
resumed normal operations.

The Saigon Station Hospital, staffed by 9 Navy medical officers, 2 medical service corps officers, 1 6 American and Thai
nurses, 90 hospital corpsmen, 2 Vietnamese specialists, and 50 Vietnamese support personnel, handled over 55,000 in-
patients and out-patients by early 1966.

American naval advisors inspect a Viet-
namese Navy LCM sunk by a Viet Cong
mine. In 1964, the Communists savaged
South Vietnamese military forces with in-
creasing regularity, prompting U.S. lead-
ers to take action against the North Viet-
namese who directed the enemy war
effort.

1/ ^'

■21'

Hanoi '

106°

Phuc Yen

107°

[^Gia Lam'

Haiphong '

^Qcay^
'Cat Bi

North Vietnam

Fai Tsi Long
Archipelago

•'212-

— 20°

Thanhv
Hoa ,\

20°—

Rtl

Phu Qui
•

,«o Phu

.Van

Lach Chao Estuary

0 Hon l\Ae

Gulf of Tonkin

Ben Thuy

Cape Ron

—18"

Quang Khi^^hanh Hoa
\ Dong Hoi^

Kien River^^\Chap Mach
"'V XomV-!^.^ Nuoc

-17"

Laos

^ Bangj, vu»2^Cape Lai
VitThu Lu'^.Con
I

• Gio Island

106"

18°—

17°—

[^anang

109°

The Coast of North Vietnam

A Norwegian-built "Nasty"-class fast patrol boat, en route Southeast Asia, exercises at high speed off Pearl Harbor in Oc-
tober 1963. The PTF and five others based at Danang in South Vietnam soon began landing commandos on the coast of
North Vietnam and bombarding targets ashore as part of34A maritime operations.

Expanding Operations into
North Vietnam and Laos

Despite material aid, advisory assistance, and di-
rect support by American military units, by
1964 the failure of the counterinsurgency struggle in
South Vietnam was apparent. The Communists ex-
ploited the crisis with attacks on South Vietnamese
regular and paramilitary forces and with stepped-up
infiltration of reinforcements and supplies, primarily
through Loos. To curtail this external direction and
armed support, the new administration of President
Lyndon B. Johnson adopted a different strategy. Its
intention: to signal the North Vietnamese leadership,
through increasingly severe military pressure applied
in Laos and North Vietnam, that the United States
would not abide the Communist efforts against the
South Vietnamese and Laotian governments.

The Navy was a key component of this broader
counterinsurgency effort. One of the initial measures

The Panhandles of North Vietnam and Laos

A Vought F-8 Crusader of Fighter Squadron (VF) 53 from Ticonderoga (CVA 14) in flight over Indochina. The F-8 and its
photo intelligence variant, the RF-8A, were the mainstays of the Yankee Team reconnaissance program in Laos during 1964.

was Q series of maritime harassment operations in
North Vietnam begun in February 1964 under Opera-
tion Plan 34A. South Vietnamese "frogmen" and boat
crews carried out the action using the American PTFs
reactivated or bought in 1963. A U.S. Naval Advisory
Detachment established in Danang maintained the
boats and trained the Vietnamese Navy personnel. Be-
ginning in May a major part of the Seventh Fleet was
deployed off the South Vietnamese coast to show U.S.
determination to preserve South Vietnam and the now
pro-American Laotian government of Souvanna
Phouma. For the remainder of the year, up to three car-
rier task groups steamed at the soon-to-be famous Yan-
kee Station, the operational staging area at 16°N 110°E.
Aside from a naval presence, carriers supported U.S.
policy with low-level aerial reconnaissance of suspected

Communist infiltration routes in eastern and southern
Laos. The Navy's participation in this joint Navy-Air
Force operation, designated Yankee Team, was inaugu-
rated on 21 May by two Chance- Vought RF-8A Cru-
sader photo reconnaissance planes from Kitty Hawk
(CVA 63). The aircraft discovered a Communist military
presence in the Ploin of Jars region, from both a photo-
graphic record and a direct hit on one plane by antiair-
craft fire. Between 21 May and 9 June, 130 Navy and
Air Force flights over Laos confirmed the existence of a
North Vietnamese infiltration system in the southern
panhandle. On the 6th, Lieutenant Charles F Klus-
mann became the first American aviator taken pris-
oner in the long Southeast Asian conflict when his Cru-
sader was shot down over eastern Laos. Held captive by
the Pathet Lao for 86 days, Klusmann managed to es-

cape and make his way to friendly forces. The day after
Klusmann's shoot-down, escort aircraft were added to
reconnaissance missions with orders to retaliate against
antiaircraft guns that opened fire on American planes.
In spite of this protection, on 7 June enemy gunners
downed the F-8D of Commander Doyle W. Lynn, who
was rescued the next day after a well-executed search
and rescue (SAR) effort. Although Air Force aircraft hit
enemy antiaircraft installations at Xieng Khouang in
retaliation on 9 June, the Yankee Team operation was
temporarily called off to assess the situation.

When resumed on the 14th, reconnaissance
flights were conducted from a higher altitude and
away from the more lethal areas of Laos. These steps
limited losses to two Air Force planes for the next six

months, but also muted the intended message of U.S.
resolve and lessened the quality of the intelligence.
RF-8A Crusaders, RA-3B Skywarriors, and newly de-
ployed North American RA-5C Vigilantes carried out
the aerial reconnaissance of Laos from carriers in the
South China Sea. The Navy's aircraft flew more than
half of the 198 photographic, 171 escort, and 81
weather missions of the Yankee Team program. In
addition to acquiring useful intelligence of enemy ac-
tivity in the Plain of Jars and on the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, the officers and men of the Seventh Fleet task
force gained practical experience in the command,
conduct, and support of intended operations. This ex-
perience would prove beneficial as the fleet was in-
creasingly drawn into the Southeast Asian conflict.

Commander Doyle W. Lynn, following the shoot-down of his F-8D in Laos and his miraculous recovery by American
search and rescue aircraft, relates the experience to the task force commander, Rear Admiral William F. Bringle, and the
crew of Kitty Hawk (CVA 63). The next year Lynn was killed over North Vietnam.

Gulf of Tonkin Incidents

Even Qs the fleet shows of force and
armed reconnaissance operations
were initiated, steps were taken to im-
prove the prospects of the 34A mar-
itime program against North Viet-
nam. Lack of information on North
Vietnamese coostal defenses, includ-
ing the enemy's patrol vessel disposi-
tion, bases, and coastal radar sites,
frustrated operations by the South
Vietnamese raiders during eorly 1964.
Accordingly, the U.S. Navy was di-
rected to focus its longstanding patrol
along the Chinese Communist, North
Korean, and North Vietnamese coast-
lines (named the Desoto Patrol) on
the collection of intelligence relevant
to the 34A program. Authorized to
approach no closer than four miles to
islands off the North Vietnamese lit- Midway (CVA 41) cuts through the South China Sea ofTVietnam during 1 964.

An advanced design RA-5C Vigilante photo reconnaissance plane prepares for catapulting from Ranger (CVA 61).

Destroyer Moddox (DD 731) on patrol in Far Eastern waters during the spring of 1964. The ship's presence off the coast
of North Vietnam in August gave the Hanoi leadership an opportunity to demonstrate their resistance to the military pres-
sure then being applied by the Johnson administration.

Naval Engagement
of 2 August 1964

Lieutenant Commander Dempster M.
Jackson, Executive Officer of Moddox,
kneels next to the hole made by the one
enemy round that hit the destroyer's
Mark 56 fire director pedestal on
2 August.

toral, destroyer John R. Craig (DD 885) cruised along
the coast from 25 February to 6 March 1964. Foggy-
conditions in the coastal waters hindered the patrol
mission, so Commander in Chief, Pacific ordered sub-
ordinate navol commands to dispatch another de-
stroyer to the patrol area. Maddox (DD 731), with
Captain John J. Herrick, Commander Destroyer Divi-
sion 192, embarked, was directed to obtain intelli-
gence on coastal geography and hydrography, defen-
sive installations, naval forces, and junk traffic,
especially in the area around the Hon Me, Hon Nieu,
and Hon Matt islands and off Vinh Son.

As Maddox prepared to enter the Gulf of Tonkin
at the end of July, the 34A boat force for the first time
was authorized to conduct offshore bombardment of
targets in North Vietnam. Shortly after midnight on
the 30th, local time, four PTFs shelled the sites on the
islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu. Their mission com-
pleted, the PTFs returned to Danang the following
morning, passing Maddox between 0820 and 0845,
then refueling near the 17th parallel. Observers in
Maddox sighted the unidentified boats.

During 31 July and 1 August Maddox cruised un-
eventfully along a predesignated track in interna-
tional waters off the North Vietnamese coast. How-
ever, in the early morning hours of 2 August,
Captoin Herrick learned from intelligence that North

Vietnamese naval forces planned to attack his de-
stroyer that day. Directed to continue the patrol,
Maddox reached a point east of Thanh Hoc about
1045. Two hours later, lookouts and radars on Mad-
dox picked up five North Vietnamese naval craft
north of Hon Me. Even though the destroyer headed
away from the area in a northeasterly direction, at
about 1400 the enemy force was ordered to carry out
a torpedo attack on the ship. Between 1500 and
1600, North Vietnamese boats closed on the ship as
Captain Herrick increased speed, headed for the
mouth of the gulf, called General Quarters, and ra-
dioed for air support. At 1608, after firing three
warning shots with her 5-inch, 38-coliber guns at the
fast-approaching vessels, by then identified as three
P-4 motor torpedo boats in column, Maddox opened
fire. For the next 20 minutes the ship maneuvered to
avoid torpedoes and raked the still closing PTs with
gunfire. Passing astern of the ship, all three P-4s
were hit. Struck by only one 14.5-millimeter round,
Maddox headed out to sea as four F-8 Crusaders from
Ticonderoga arrived overhead and attacked the now
retiring North Vietnamese craft. One of the P-4s, al-
ready slowed by damage, was set afire and left dead
in the water; the boat later sank. This short, sharp
naval action was only the first round in a new con-
frontation with North Vietnam.

A Chinese-made Swatow motor gunboat of the North Vietnamese Navy underway at high speed. These vessels carried 37-
millimeter and 14.5-millimeter guns, depth charges, and surface search radar and were capable of28-knot speeds.

A Swatow and a trailing P-4 motor
torpedo boat. Hanoi's first-line naval
combatants, under attack by U.S. car-
rier aircraft in the Pierce Arrow retalia-
tory strike of 5 August 1964. The sep-
arate Swatow and P~4 units routinely
operated in contact with one another.

A Swatow, dead in the water and leak-
ing fuel, burns after attack by U.S.
naval aircraft off North Vietnam's
coast on 5 August. Seventh Fleet car-
rier planes destroyed or damaged a
total of 33 Swatows and P-4s for the
loss or damage of four planes during
the Pierce Arrow operation.

Within hours of the engagement, Maddox, ac-
companied by destroyer Turner Joy (DD 951), was or-
dered to resume the interrupted patrol in interna-
tional waters around Hon Me. Washington wished
to reassert traditional freedom of the seos and to
avoid any appearance of backing down in the face
of the Communist challenge. This decision wos
made despite intelligence reports from various
sources that the North Vietnamese, who apparently
linked the Desoto Patrol with the 34A operation,
again might attack.

The two destroyers headed back into the Gulf of
Tonkin toward the North Vietnamese coast at first
light on 3 August. Between 1600 and 1727 the ships
turned north, passed by Hon Me, and retired to the
east for a nighttime steaming area in the middle of
the gulf. During that time, 240 miles to the south in
Danang, the 34 A maritime force got underway for
another operation in North Vietnamese waters.
Around midnight on 3 August, three South Viet-
namese-crewed Nastys reached their operating area
off Cape Doc, 95 miles south of Hon Me. The PTFs
shelled a radar facility at Vinh Son and a security
post on the south bank of the Ron River. Their mis-

sion accomplished, the boats withdrew and made for
Danang, the last PTF putting in at 0715 on 4 August.

Having spent a routine night out in the gulf,
Maddox and Turner Joy changed course to the west
and headed for North Vietnamese coastal waters at
0700 on the 4th. All that afternoon the destroyers
cruised to the north and south of Hon Me along a
track that came no closer than 16 miles to the North
Vietnamese coast. Meanwhile, the enemy's naval
forces were ordered to prepare for military operations
that night. As they had the previous night, Maddox
and Turner Joy retired to an area in the middle of the
gulf to awoit the dawn.

Beginning at 2041, the ships picked up fast ap-
proaching contacts on their radars. Captain Herrick
ordered his destroyers to change course in order to
avoid what he believed were hostile surface craft.
At 2239, when a contact closed to 7,000 yards, Cap-
tain Herrick directed Turner Joy to open fire. For the
next two hours the American destroyers, covered
overhead by carrier aircraft, evaded what lookouts
and sonar rated as torpedoes and fired on contacts,
visually identified by Turner Joy crewmen as P-4
motor torpedo boats. Thereafter, the ships headed

for the Ticonderoga carrier task group near the en-
trance to the gulf.

As they had been on 2 August, American civil-
ian and mihtary decision makers were kept in-
formed of developments on the 4th. Reports of a
North Vietnamese attack streamed into Washington
along with a message from Herrick that doubted the
validity of some of that information. Since 1964,
severol other witnesses to the events in the Gulf of
Tonkin, including Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale,
have expressed their belief that no North Viet-
namese attack took place on the night of 4 August.

However, once they received additional infor-
mation from Herrick's command and important in-
telligence from other sources, U.S. leaders were con-
vinced that North Vietnamese naval forces had
attacked U.S. ships in international waters. Accord-
ingly, President Johnson ordered U.S. naval forces to
prepare for a retaliatory air strike against North
Vietnam and that it be carried out at 0800 local
time on 5 August. Although the short warning time
and operational difficulties delayed the launch of
aircraft from Ticonderoga and Constellation (CVA 64),
both positioned in the South China Sea, 16 aircraft
from the first carrier struck the petroleum storage
complex near Vinh at 1320. Other Ticonderoga
flights attacked the enemy Swatow gunboats and
P-4 PT boats at Quang Khe and Ben Thuy. A-1
Skyraiders and A-4 Skyhawks from Constellation's
Carrier Air Wing 14 then bombed and strafed the
North Vietnamese naval craft near their bases at
Hon Gai and in the Loch Chao Estuary.

The results were impressive. At Vinh, North
Vietnam's chief fuel facility, 90 percent of the stor-
age capacity went up in flames. At the nearby Ben
Thuy naval base, three craft were sunk. The naval
aviators sank one boat and damaged five others at
Quang Khe. Under intense antiaircraft fire, the
Skyraiders and Skyhawks from Constellation sank or
disabled six Swatows and P-4s in Hon Gai's inner
harbor. Unfortunately, the A-4 of Lieutenant (jg) Ev-
erett Alvarez, Jr., was shot down, ond he became the
first naval aviator interned in North Vietnamese
prisons, where he spent the next eight and a half
years. Other Constellation attack aircraft en route
the Loch Chao Estuary sank or damaged five enemy
croft near Hon Me. The two-carrier, 67-plane attack

destroyed 7 enemy vessels, severely damaged 10
more, and inflicted lesser damage to another 16.
Lieutenant (jg) Richard C. Sather went down with
his crippled aircraft, the first of many naval aviators
who died in the line of duty over Southeast Asia.

Soon after these actions in the Gulf of Tonkin,
the United States Congress took a step that would
have long-term influence on the role of the United
States in Southeast Asia. On 7 August, the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution, as proposed by the Johnson admin-
istration, was passed unanimously in the House of
Representatives and approved in the Senate by an 88
to 2 margin. Based upon the events in the Gulf of
Tonkin, this measure authorized the President to use
the U.S. Armed Forces to assist in the defense of the
non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia. Tliis reso-
lution served as the legal basis for the armed support
provided by the United States to South Vietnam
throughout the war.

Soon after these incidents, concern grew in
Washington that U.S. actions in the gulf might un-
necessarily escalate the conflict. Thus, despite recom-
mendations from Pacific naval leaders to maintain
pressure on the North Vietnamese, the Johnson ad-
ministration gradually decreased American presence
in those waters. The 34A maritime operations along
the North Vietnamese coast were postponed until
early October 1964 and then conducted only sporadi-
cally through December. Operationol problems and
foul weather negated the program's effectiveness.

Not until mid-September did American leaders
authorize another Desoto Patrol into the gulf. On the
17th and 18th, Morton (DD 948) and Richard S. Edwards
(DD 950) cruised along a track no closer than 20
miles to the North Vietnamese mainland without in-
cident. On the night of 18 September, however, both
destroyers opened fire on what their crews believed to
be attacking high-speed surface vessels. While a sub-
sequent naval investigation concluded that at least
one unidentified, hostile-acting fast craft was in the
area, the validity of an attack was called into ques-
tion by the lack of firm evidence. Following this inci-
dent, never again were Desoto Patrols conducted in
the Gulf of Tonkin. Thus, from a military standpoint,
the naval actions in August initiated a temporary
downturn rather than an escalation in the Southeast
Asian aisis.

One Douglas A-4 Sl^hawk attack plane
after another catapults from a Task Force
77 carrier during the August 1964 opera-
tions in the Gulf of Tonkin. Lieutenant
(jg) Everett Alvarez, Jr., an A--4 pilot of
Constellation's Attack Squadron (VA)
144, was the first naval aviator shot
down and imprisoned in North Vietnam,
where he remained until 1973.

Carrier Ticonderogo turns into the wind to launch aircraft.

A-4C Skyhawks on Constellation's starboard elevator, which will lift the planes from the hangar deck to the flight deck.

War leaders (left to right): U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam Maxwell D. Taylor, Secretary of State Dean C.
Rusk, President Lyndon B. Johnson, and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara

The Conflict in Transition

During the fall of 1964, the Johnson administra-
tion refrained from actions that might precipi-
tate a broader confrontation. When the Viet Cong
mortared the American military barracks at South
Vietnam's Bien Hoa Airbase on 1 November, killing 4
men and wounding 72 others, a preplanned reprisal
air strike against North Vietnam was not authorized.
Similarly, the President denied permission for a retal-
iatory air strike when the enemy sabotaged the
American Bachelor Officers Quarters in Saigon's
Brink Hotel on Christmas Eve. Over one hundred
Americans, Australians, and Vietnamese were in-
jured and two Americans were killed. In each of these
instances, major Seventh Fleet units had sortied into
the South China Sea prepared to launch air strikes,
evacuate American dependents in danger, or take
any number of contingent actions.

Despite the relative lull in active military opera-
tions, U.S. naval leaders anticipated an intensifica-

tion of the conflict in Southeast Asia. They acceler-
ated preparation of the fleet for the limited conven-
tional war that national strategists had long studied
as the logical response to localized aggression. Dur-
ing late 1964 and early 1965, 15 ships (1 attack car-
rier, 3 submarines, 10 destroyer types, and 1 LSI)
augmented the Seventh Fleet. Another 10 ships were
scheduled for deployment. Early in 1965 the Navy
shifted MSTS passenger, cargo, and tanker ships to
the Western Pacific; reactivated National Defense Re-
serve Fleet auxiliary ships; and chartered U.S. and
foreign merchantmen to establish an efficient logistic
pipeline to Southeast Asia.

The number of aircraft in the fleet replacement
pool was doubled and a patrol squadron, equipped
with Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft, was relocated to
the Western Pacific. The latest material, including im-
proved Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles,
the new antiradar Shrike air-to-ground missile, and
modernized 20-millimeter cannon, were rushed to the
fleet. Stocks of bombs, missiles, and other ordnance

Vietnamese and American civilians, injured when
the Viet Cong sabotaged the U.S. Embassy in
Saigon on 30 March 1965, await emergency medi-
cal treatment in the adjacent street. Communist at-
tacks on U.S. military and civilian personnel in
South Vietnam increased dramatically during late
1964 and early 1965.

A Navy hospital corpsman cares for a wounded man about to be transported to the Navy 's Saigon Station Hospital, which
treated 80 people injured in the embassy bombing.

A Shrike air-to-ground, antiradar missile
in testing at the Naval Ordnance Test
Station, China Lake, California, during
1963. In late 1964 and early 1965,
state-of-the-art missiles, guns, and other
munitions were rushed to the fleet as it
prepared for war in Southeast Asia.

Naval ordnancemen load a Bullpup air-
to-ground missile, which carried a 1,000-
pound bomb, onto an A-4 Skyhawk.

On the bridge of carrier Ranger, Rear Ad-
miral Henry L. Miller, Commander Task
Force 77 (right), and his chief of staff
optimistically await the onset of combat.

were increased and the replacement process stream-
lined. Naval communications were upgraded. Intelli-
gence and information on enemy forces and targets
in North Vietnam were updated and provided to the
fleet. Construction of additional fuel storage tanks,
ammunition magazines, warehouses, hangars, and
ship berthing facilities was begun at the U.S. Navy's
installations on Guam, Okinawa, and especially at
Subic Bay in the Philippines.

While naval forces prepared for extended combat,
the Johnson administration reinvigorated its program
to dissuade the North Vietnamese from supporting in-
surgency in Southeast Asia and chose Laos as the
locus of this effort. As part of this renewed campaign,
on 17 December 1964 A-IH Skyraiders escorted by
McDonnell-Douglas F-4B Phantoms and followed by
RF-8A photo reconnaissance aircraft from Ranger
(CVA 61) conducted the Navy's firet armed reconnais-
sance mission over eastern Laos. In this joint Navy-Air
Force program, named Barrel Roll, American aircraft
flew over likely infiltration routes and attacked Com-
munist supply vehicles or other targets of opportunity.
If none was sighted, the flight was authorized to strike
preselected storage buildings, antiaircraft emplace-

ments, and related facilities of a military nature. The

military objective, however, was considered secondary
to the political one of sending Hanoi a message of
U.S. determination to prevail in Southeast Asia.

Analyzing the program at the beginning of 1965,
U.S. leaders concluded that the small-scale military ef-
fort had failed to deter the enemy. As a result, the
joint Barrel Roll force was redirected toward key trans-
portation bottlenecks or "choke points." On 28 Febru-
ary, Skyraiders and Skyhawks from Coral Sea carried
out the first such attack with a concentrated strike on
Mu Gia Pass near the North Vietnamese-Laotian bor-
der. After an Air Force attack on critical Nape Pass,
early in March, Hancock planes again struck Mu Gia.
In both operations the logistic routes were cut at criti-
cal points and delayed-action bombs made the areas
difficult for the enemy to traverse. Still, the North Viet-
namese soon managed to repair the roads, construct
bypasses, and maintain the logistic flow. By 23 March
1965, Seventh Fleet aircraft had carried out half of the
43 Barrel Roll missions with 134 strike, 28 flak sup-
pression, 56 combat air patrol, 32 aerial photo-
graphic, and 25 escort sorties. Nonetheless, American
military and civilian leaders concluded that the over-

Tens of thousands of bombs, rockets,
missiles, and other munitions were
stockpiled in ships of the fleet and at
ammunition magazines throughout
the Far East for the war to come.

The four carriers and their escorting cruisers and destroyers of the Seventh Fleet's Task Force 77, concentrated in the Gulf
of Tonkin in March 1965, prepare to kick off the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign against North Vietnam. This phase
of the air war would last three years.

riding political objective of the campaign, to deter
North Vietnamese subversion of South Vietnam and
Loos, hod not been achieved.

Now convinced that even stronger actions were
required, the Johnson administration reacted vigor-
ously to Viet Cong mortaring of an American advi-
sors' compound at Pleiku, South Vietnam, on 7
February 1965. Johnson ordered a one-time, "tit-for-
tat" reprisal strike on enemy barracks in North Viet-
nam. That same day Coral Sea's Air Wing 15 and
Hancock's Air Wing 21 conducted Flaming Dart I, a
multiplane attack on Dong Hoi.

On the 10th, carrier forces were ordered to re-
spond to yet another Communist attack, this time the
sabotage of the American quarters in Qui Nhon,
which resulted in 54 casualties. The following day, as
the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces hit Vu Con,
95 aircraft from Ranger, Hancock, and Coral Sea, in
Flaming Dart II, bombed and strafed enemy barracks
at Chanh Hoa.

But even as the Flaming Dart operations were un-
derway, U.S. leaders decided that continued Commu-
nist resistance demanded resort to the last stage in the
program of military persuasion, a sustained and in-
creasingly intensive bombing effort in North Vietnam.
Accordingly, on 2 March, three weeks after Flaming

Dart II, the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces
opened the Rolling Thunder campaign with strikes on
Xom Bang and Quang Khe. Because of heavy weather,
international concerns, and the unstable political situa-
tion in South Vietnam, the second operation was de-
layed for cmother 12 days. Then, on the 15th, the Navy
joined the fray when 64 Skyhawks and Skyraiders and
30 supporting planes from Task Force 77 carriers Han-
cock and Ranger hit the Phu Qui ammunition depot.

The Rolling Thunder bombing campaign and the
34A operation in North Vietnam, the Yankee Team
and Barrel Roll programs in Laos, and the fleet's pres-
ence in the South China Sea would continue for
years. By mid-March of 1965, however, American
leaders concluded that these actions would not com-
pel the North Vietnamese and the subordinate Viet
Cong and Pathet Lao to forego their drive for control
of Southeast Asia. Indeed, the enemy attacks on the
Desoto Patrol, stepped up Communist activity in
South Vietnam and Laos, and infiltration of regular
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units southward re-
vealed Hanoi's intention to turn up the heat. Having
exhausted most of the options in the campaign of co-
ercion initiated in early 1964 without achieving the
desired result, the Johnson administration sought a
new strategy in Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER THREE

THE

YEARS OF COM

1965-1968

Y MARCH 1965, THE GOVERNMENT

and aimed forces of South Vietnam were on the verge of collapse under the weight of the
enemy's political-military offensive. Since the year-long American punitive campaign failed
to deter the North Vietnamese, the Johnson administration decided that a massive effort was
required to strengthen the South's stand against its Communist foe. The regular and
poiamilitaiy units were especially in need of increased American assistance. But in a depar-
ture from previous assumptions, U.S. leaders concluded that a rebuilding program would
succeed only behind a shield of American military power. At the same time, they intended to
make the cost of continued military action increasingly prohibitive for the Communists. In
practical terms, this meant the use of the American Armed Forces to (1) interdict the infiltra-
tion of enemy supplies and reinforcements into the South and (2) destroy Viet Cong and
North ^^etnamese units in-oountiy so that a renewed nation-building effort could proceed
and, it was hoped, prosper.

This new direction in American strategy Jelled during a meeting in Woshington on
15 March 1965 of the U.S. foreign policy and military establishment. The President au-
thorized the Pacific Command to carry out a systematic bombing campaign against
North Vietnamese lines of communication, military installations, and logistic facilities
south of the 20th parallel. Thereafter, the Rolling Thunder program focused less on in-
fluencing the enemy's wUI than on hurting his actual physical capability to support
the military venture in the South. Much the some occurred with the Yankee Team and
Barrel Roll operations in Loos. The Seventh Fleet's naval air forces were given some-

A landing craft of the Seventh Fleet's
Amphibious Task Force lands Marines of
the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines on the
beach at Danang, South Vietnam. This
was the first deployment ashore of a siz-
able American ground combat unit in
the Vietnam War. By 1969, the U.S. mili-
tary contingent in the Republic of Viet-
nam would total over a half-million men
and women.

An F-4B of Fighter Squadron 21 drops a
load of bombs on the enemy in South
Vietnam. Other aircraft from Midway,
as well as a complement from Coral
Sea and Yorktown (CVS 10), inaugu-
rated air strike operations in the South
on 15 April 1965 when they hit a Viet
Cong base near Nui Ba Den, a moun-
tain northwest of Saigon better known
as the "Black Virgin."

what greater latitude in target, ordnance, and aircraft
selection; in operational control; and in other tactical

considerations. Reflecting the desire to concentrate
greater resources against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, on 3
April the U.S. command separated the southern Lao-
tian Panhandle from the Barrel Roll operational area
in northeastern Laos and designated it Steel Tiger.

Even as carrier air squadrons moved to staunch the
flow of men and supplies through southem North Viet-
nam and Laos, other fleet units moved to cut the enemy's
seabome infiltration into South Vietnam. This measure
initially was motivated by discovery of a 100-ton North
Vietnamese trawler unloading munitions on a beach in
South Vietnam's Vung Ro Bay on 16 February 1965. Later
evidence confirmed that since late 1963 the enemy had
mounted a significant coastal infiltration effort. Meeting
in Saigon from 3 to 10 March, representatives from
MACV, the U.S. Navy, and the South Vietnamese Navy
hammered out detoils of the establishment of a com-
bined coastal patrol. The operation, named Market Time,
was intended to complete the cordon being drawn
around the South >^etnamese battleground.

The decision for American forces to join in combat
with the enemy in South Vietnam was also reached
during this period. At first, ground troops were consid-
ered only as protection for the vital American air and
naval installations at Danang against Viet Cong and
regular North Vietnamese attock. For this purpose, on
26 February President Johnson authorized the deploy-
ment to Danang of two Marine battalion landing
teams, a medium helicopter squadron, and headquar-
ters elements of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

At 0600 on 8 March 1965, Rear Admiral Donald
W. Wulzen, commander of the Seventh Fleet's Am-
phibious Force, issued the traditional order to "land the
landing force." Soon afterward, Vancouver (LPD 2),
Mount McKinley (AGC 7), Henrico (APA 45), and Union
(AKA 106) began disembarking Marines for the move-
ment ashore. When the 3d Battalion, 9th Morines
crossed the beach between 0902 and 0918, it became
the first battalion-size American ground combat unit
deployed ashore in the extended Southeast Asian con-
flict. Even before the full 9th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade had been deployed to Danang, American lead-
ers were considering the use of these Marine and fol-
lowing Army units in active operations against the Viet
Cong. The passive defense mission was shelved on 1
April 1965 when President Johnson authorized the

Marines at Danang to move out and engage Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese forces in combat.

Coupled with this decision was approval during
March for U.S. carrier aircraft to strike enemy forces in
South Vietnam. On 15 April planes from Midway, Coral
Sea, and Yorktown (CVS 10) conducted the first such at-
tack against Viet Cong positions northwest of Saigon.
The ships sailed in a new carrier operating area south-
east of Cam Ranh Bay, at ITN 110°E, known as Dixie
Station. An aircraft carrier was constantly stationed at
Dixie Station between Jime 1965 and August 1966.

The Naval Command in South-
east Asia

As the Navy entered heavy combat in Southeast
Asia between 1965 and 1968, a chain of com-
mand evolved which reflected the complex character
of the war. In theory. Commander in Chief, Pacific was
the commander of all American forces in Asia, includ-
ing those assigned to Commander U.S. Military Assis-
tance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). However,
as the conflict in South Vietnam intensified, COMUS-
MACV came to exert the greatest influence over in-
country operations. At the same time, CINCPAC's at-
tention was occupied by the need to control and
coordinate the bombing campaign in North Vietnam
and Laos, the massive frans-Pacific logistic effort, and
other American military activities in the Far East.

The U.S. Pacific Fleet was the naval component of
the Pacific Command ond as such directed the Navy's
activities in that ocean. Subordinate to Commander in
Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) was Comman-
der Seventh Fleet, who conducted those naval opera-
tions in Southeast Asia primarily external to South
Vietnam. The fleet's Attack Carrier Striking Force (Task
Force 77) mounted from the South China Sea the
aerial interdiction campaign in Laos and North Viet-
nam. Commander Seventh Fleet's cruiser and destroyer
units hunted the enemy's logistic craft along the North
Vietnamese coast, bombarded targets ashore, and pro-
vided naval gunfire support to allied forces in South
Vietnam. The Amphibious Force (Task Force 76) and its
attached Marine units conducted numerous over-the-
beach and helicopter landings in South Vietnam in
search of the elusive Viet Cong. The Mobile Logistic
Support Force (Task Force 73) labored to keep the fleet's
combatants on station and engaged with the enemy.

Vice Admiral Paul P. Blackburn, Commander Seventh Fleet, is flanked by Rear Admiral William F. Bringle (foreground),
Commander Task Force 77, and Rear Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, Commander Carrier Division 9, as they stride across the
flight deck of Midway early in the war. The Navy's air commanders were conlident that the carrier force would be a major
contributor to victory over the Communists in Indochina.

Carrier Stations off Indochina

Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific, in his Camp
Smith headquarters near Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii. In theory, CINCPAC commanded
all U.S. military forces in the vast Pacific
theater, but during the war in Southeast
Asia, American leaders in Washington,
Saigon, and even Vientiane, Laos, ex-
erted significant influence on the direc-
tion of military operations.

Command Arrangements for the ROLLING THUNDER
Bombing Campaign

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT

CINCPACAF

Commander

Seventh Fleet

Liaison- 7

Commander
Task Force 77

2nd Air

Division

Liaison'-*

Attack
Carriers

U.S. Air Force
Squadrons in
South Vietnam/
Tliaiiand

COIMUSMACV

Coordination

South
Vietnamese
Air Force

South

Vietnamese
Air Force
Squadrons

F4 Air Strike 250 LB Frags" by folm Steel

The Carrier Force

From the South China Sea, the Seventh Fleet's At-
tack Carrier Striking Force mounted the Rolling
Thunder bombing and Blue Tree tactical reconnais-
sance operations in North Vietnam; the Barrel Roll,
Steel Tiger, and Tiger Hound bombing and Yankee
Team reconnaissance efforts in Laos; and the ground
support mission in South Vietnam. Except during the
period in 1965 ond 1966 when the aircraft carrier
supporting operations in the South sailed at Dixie
Station, the carrier task force was deployed at Yankee
Station (after April 1966 at WSO'N lOB'SO'E). Gener-
ally, before August 1966, two or three carriers oper-
ated in Task Force 77, and after that date the number
was often three or four. On each ship o carrier air
wing controlled 70 to 100 aircraft, usually grouped in
two fighter and three attack squadrons ond smaller
detachments. However, the number depended on the
size and class of the carriers, which varied from the
large-deck, 65,000-ton Forrestal-class ships to the
27,000-ton, World War II Es5e^-class ships.

The Navy's first-line aircraft for strike operations
included the maneuverable A-4 Skyhawk, A-1

Skyraider, A-7 Corsair II, and the all-weather, day-
night Grumman A-6 Intruder. The workhorse F-4
Phantom II, in addition to its attack role, flew fighter
escort, as did the F-8 Crusader. Aerial reconnaissance
missions were carried out by the heavy RA-5 Vigi-
lante, the older RA-3B Sk57warrior, and reconfigured
Crusaders and Phantoms. Intruder, Skyraider, and
Skywarrior variants also provided electronic counter-
measure support in an enemy air defense environ-
ment that became increasingly lethal. Detection of
enemy MiG's approaching the fleet, guidance of U.S.
aircraft to and from their targets, and airborne com-
munications support were all functions of the versa-
tile Grumman E-2 Hawkeye. Ship-based helicopters
such as the Sikorsky SH-3 Seo King and Kaman UH-2
Sea Sprite were key components of the search and
rescue (SAR) system established to retrieve downed
fliers both at sea and in enemy territory. Helicopters

An armed and ready A-7 A Corsair 11

awaits the catapult officer's launch sig-
nal. These aircraft were equipped to carry
15,000 pounds of bombs, missiles, and
rockets.

The flight deck control room on board Enterprise (CYAN 65). Skillful work by these men enhanced safety on the flight deck.

"Enterprise on Yankee Station" by Robert G. Smith

An EA-IF Skyraider is readied for operations over Indochina. This propeller-driven plane, durable veteran of the Korean
War, proved to be well-suited to fighting guerrillas in the vast jungles of Vietnam and Laos.

A pair of all-weather, day-night A-6A Intruders head for North Vietnam. These aircraft carried state-of-the-art navigation
and targeting systems that dramatically improved bombing accuracy.

An Air Force F-4C takes on fuel from a KC-1 35 tanker as other Phantoms await their him. Rolling Thunder was a jomt-
service campaign in which the U.S. Air Force played a major role.- While the Navy concentrated its air effort m the coastal
regions of North Vietnam, the Air Force focused on Hanoi and the western segment of the country.

Naval ordnancemen affix the first of four Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to a Crusader jet. These lethal weapons accounted
for more than two-thirds of the enemy MiGs that naval aviators shot down in the war.

A Kitty Hawk crewman positions 250-pound bombs for later loading on attack aircraft. The carrier force carried a wide
array of ordnance, including general purpose and napalm bombs; Zuni and 2.75-inch rockets; and Bullpup, Sidewinder,
Sparrow, Standard, and Shrike missiles.

also transported ammunition and supplies from logis-
tic ships to the combatants on station in a relatively
new procedure called vertical replenishment. The
UH-34 Seahorse, CH-46 Sea Knight, ond Sikorsky
CH-53 Sea Stallion troop-carrying helicopters pro-
vided essential mobility to the fleet's Marine units.

Fleet aircraft corried a vast array of ordnance,
from Korean-era bombs to advanced missiles and
precision-guided munitions. For their strikes in North
Vietnom, Laos, and South Vietnam, attack aircraft
dropped 250-, 500-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound general
purpose bombs, napalm bombs, and magnetic
mines, and fired 5-inch Zuni and 2.75-inch high-ex-
plosive rockets. The carrier aircroft used Bullpup air-
to-ground weapons, the newly developed Walleye TV-
guided bomb, and the Shrike antiradar missile to
great effect. Fighters were equipped with highly effec-

tive Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles and
20-millimeter machine guns. This array of ordnance
helped to restrict enemy movement on the ground
and to achieve strategic air superiority over coastal
North Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin.

Although air power was the cutting edge of Task
Force 77, surface ships were essential to the interdic-
tion campoign in North Vietnam and Laos. In Opera-

The forward 8-inch guns of heavy cruiser
Saint Paul (CA 73) fire a salvo at the
enemy ashore. In Operation Sea Dragon,
a complement to the air campaign, bat-
tleship New Jersey (BB 62), American
and Australian cruisers, and destroyers
shelled North Vietnamese roads, bridges,
and coastal defenses.

Shells from North Vietnamese coastal guns bracket cruiser Saint Paul.

Damage to destroyer O'Brien fDD 725)
caused by Communist shellfire. The two
North Vietnamese shells that hit the ship
in December 1966 also killed two sailors
and wounded four more. Coastal batter-
ies, often firing from impenetrable caves,
hit 19 allied ships through 1970. The
enemy sank no vessels but did kill 6 Navy
men and wound at least 30.

tion Sea Dragon, begun in October 1966, cruisers, de-
stroyers, and for one month battleship New Jersey (BB
62) ranged the North Vietnamese littoral sinking
Communist supply craft, shelling coastal batteries
and radar sites, and complementing the aerial inter-
diction effort by bombarding the infiltration routes
ashore. While at first restricted to coastol waters
south of 17°31'N, by February 1967 the Sea Dragon
force was authorized to operate as far north as the
20th parallel. This area was constricted in April 1968
when the bombing halt ended American combat ac-
tivity north of the 19th parallel.

Steaming generally in pairs, the two to four Amer-
ican and Australian destroyers and one cruiser worked
with carrier-based spotter planes, such as the A-1
Skyraider and Grumman S-2 Tracker, to find, identify,

and destroy infiltrating vessels and shore targets.
Often, North Vietnamese coastal batteries fired back.
Although several of the 19 ships that were hit required
repairs at shipyards in Japan and the Philippines, no
vessel was sunk during the two-year-long Sea Dragon
operation. Damaged ships were quickly replaced on
the gun line and the coastal deplojmient was moin-
tained. Periodically, this group reinforced the Seventh
Fleet cruisers and destroyers providing naval gunfire
support to allied forces in South Vietnam. The naval
surface group conducted the Sea Dragon effort until
the end of October 1968, when American combat op-
erations in North Vietnam ceased.

The carrier task force at Yankee Station was as-
sisted by other surface combatants as well. Around
each aircraft carrier, two to four destroyers steamed

Wainwright's main Terrier surface-to-air
missile battery stands ready to knock
down any MiGs heacUng for the fleet.

Only a few minutes after ejecting from his crippled Cnisader and parachuting into the water, Lieutenant Ronald F. Bull is hoisted
up to an SH-3A Sea King helicopter of the Seventh Fleet's SAR force. The men operating Navy and Air Force SAR helicopters,
fixed-wing aircraft, and surface ships routinely displayed great skill and courage in their efforts to rescue downed allied ftiers.

in Q protective screen to defend the ship from any
submarine or oir threat. To provide the deployed task
force with distant warning of air attack, beginning in
April 1965 the fleet created a radar picket station be-
tween the Communist mainland and Task Force 77 in
the Gulf of Tonkin. Normally, two destroyers stayed
on alert at this forward station. In July of the follow-
ing year, this deployment was formalized with estab-
lishment of PIRAZ (positive identification radar advi-
sory zone), which entailed locating and tracking all
planes over the eastern regions of North Vietnam and
the gulf by a positioned surface ship equipped with
advanced radar and communications. The unit also
vectored naval aircraft to and from their targets and
warned them of approaching MiGs.

Throughout the Rolling Thunder campaign, the
Navy maintained units in the Gulf of Tonkin to re-
trieve downed fliers from the sea and from North
Vietnam and Laos. Normally, two destroyers were
deployed to the forword. North SAR Station (20°N
107°E) and another two to the South SAR Station
(19°N 106°E). To carry out rescues in North Viet-

nam's lethal environment, one UH-2 Sea Sprite heli-
copter equipped with self-sealing fuel tanks, ma-
chine guns, and armor was nested on board a ship
at each station. Another four similarly armed and
armored SH-3A Sea Kings (the primary rescue heli-
copter) were based in one of the Yankee Station carri-
ers. During major air operations, one or two SH-3As
orbited over the destroyers. Each of the other aircraft
carriers carried a detachment of three unreconfig-
ured UH-2 helicopters devoted to sea rescues. Air
Force Sikorsky HH-3E helicopters, Grumman HU-16
amphibian aircraft, and A-1 Skyraider escorts also
operated in the gulf. To provide the SAR helicopters
with enemy ground fire suppression, communica-
tions, and other support during operations, the fleet
kept four A-1, A-4, or A-7 attack aircraft airborne
and ready for action. Under the overall control of
Commander Task Force 77, the SAR Coordinator di-
rected the Navy's effort from a North SAR Station de-
stroyer. This officer guided the actions of the air-
borne on-scene commander and arranged for
additional support when it was needed.

A UH-2 Sea Sprite helicopter of the SAR force flies off the starboard side of carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA 42).
80

Guided missile frigate Woinwright (DIG 28) on a lonely vigil as the PIRAZ (positive identification radar advisory zone)
ship in the northern Gulf of Tonkin during August 1967. Ships carrying out the PIRAZ mission monitored the skies over
eastern North Vietnam and the gulf to help naval aviators fly to and from their targets and to warn ofapproachmg MiGs.

The fleet's search and rescue forces saved many
American aviators from death or captivity. From 6
June 1964 to 1 November 1968, 458 of the 912
naval air crewmen downed as a result of combot or
noncombat operations in North Vietnam, Laos, or
at sea were recovered. While the retrieval of avia-
tors from crash sites on land, when at all possible,
took somewhat longer, the rescue at sea usually oc-
curred within 20 to 30 minutes of the aircraft loss.
The effort was not without cost, however, for 26
men were killed, wounded, missing, or captured; 33
aircraft were destroyed. SAR operations, however,
returned valuable air crews to the fleet and im-
proved the morale of naval aviators, who knew the
Novy would do its utmost to rescue them from hos-
tile territory or woters.

This psychological support was crucial because
the air units of Task Force 77 carried out their mis-
sions in one of the world's most difficult operational
environments. During the winter Northeast Monsoon
from November to March, the weather in the Gulf of
Tonkin and over most of North Vietnam is character-
ized by dense clouds and heavy rainfall. Conditions
are especially harsh during a weather phenomenon
known as the Crachin. Thick clouds with ceilings as
low as 500 feet blanket the areo and are accompa-
nied by fog and persistent drizzle. Conversely, during
the summer Southwest Monsoon from May to
September, the skies are usually clear and dry. These
general weather patterns are almost reversed in
South Vietnam and Laos. This situation allowed shift-
ing of air resources to more favorable areas. Still,
throughout the year high temperatures and humid-
ity, typhoons, tropical storms, and thundershowers
increased the difficulty and danger of operating in
Southeast Asia. The enemy also were able to use foul
flying weather to their advantage.

Enemy air defenses caused aviators more concern
for by 1968 the Communists had developed a defen-

sive system that was well-armed, coordinated, and
supported. On the ground throughout North Viet-
nam, South Vietnam, and Laos, the enemy trained
skyward thousands of small arms, automatic
weapons, and antiaircraft artillery. North Vietnam
olone contained 8,000 weapons of many calibers,
concentrated around key targets. Beginning in early
1965, surface-to-air missiles (SAM) were added to this
defensive arsenal, and by early 1968 over 300 SAM
sites dotted the North Vietnamese countryside. The
entire defensive system was tied together with a so-
phisticated network of communications, air alert sta-
tions, and early warning, ground control-interceptor,
and fire control radars. New and replacement
weapons and ommunition were amply supplied by
sympathetic Communist countries. The loss in South-
east Asia of 421 fixed-wing aircraft between 1965
and 1968 attested to the strength of these defenses.
The aviators killed, missing, or made prisoner totaled
450. The operating environment was especially dan-
gerous in North Vietnam, where 382 Navy planes
were shot down, 58 of them by SAMs.

Although only accounting for eight of the Navy's
aircraft during this three-year period, the North Viet-
namese air units posed a constant threat to U.S. oper-
ations, thus requiring a diversion of vital resources
for protection. The enemy air force varied from 25 to
100 MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, and MiG-21 jet fight-
ers. The country's jet-capable airfields included Gia
Lam, Phuc Yen, Cat Bi, Kep, Kien An, Yen Bai, Son
Toy, Bai Thuong, Hoa Lac, and Vinh. The U.S. Navy
engaged in its first air-to-air encounter of the war on
3 April 1965, when several MiG-15s unsuccessfully
attacked a flight of F-8 Crusaders near Thanh Hoa.
On 17 June, two Midway F-4 Phantoms registered the
first kills in the long conflict when they downed two
MiG-17s south of Hanoi. By the end of the Rolling
Thunder effort on 1 November 1968, navdl aviators
had destroyed 23 MiG-17s and 8 MiG-21s.

Aerographers prepare to release a
weather balloon from the flight deck of
carrier Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31).
Because changing weather in Southeast
Asia often had a significant impact on
operations, skilled forecasting by fleet
meteorologists was essential.

A low-level photo taken by an Air Force reconnaissance plane in August 1965 reveals a fully operational North Viet-
namese SA-2 surface-to-air missile battery.

Soviet-made MiG 1 7 jets parked behind protective berms at Phuc Yen Airfield northwest of Hanoi. MiC 17s and the more
modem MiG 21s formed the core of the North Vietnamese fighter force.

Route Packages

Following an "alpha strike" by 70 air-
craft from carrier Midway, a Navy recon-
naissance plane braved enemy ground
fire to capture this low-level, bomb dam-
age assessment of the Communist supply
depot at Linh Dong.

Rolling Thunder

Already underway in early 1965, the naval air
campaign in Southeast Asia gradually grew in
scope and intensity. The specific objectives of the
Rolling Thunder bombing program against North
Vietnam were to (1) interdict the enemy's lines of
communication into Laos and South Vietnam, (2) de-
stroy their physical ability to support the wqr in
Southeast Asia, and (3) deprive them of external mili-
tary assistance without triggering Soviet or Chinese
Communist military intervention. Throughout 1965
the air operations of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force,
as authorized by Washington, progressed northward to-
ward Hanoi and then northwest of the capital. Ameri-
can aircraft were prohibited from entering restricted

Officers and men in Ranger's primary flight control obserx'e operations on the flight deck as Task Force 77 prepares to
launch Operation Rolling Thunder in March 1965.

Coral Sea'5 catapult officer signals a "go" as an A-4C Skyhawk prepares to join other fleet aircraft for an attack against
targets in North Vietnam during late March 1965.

An A-IJ Skyraider fires two S-inch Zuni rockets at a defense site on the North Vietnamese coast.

A strike by naval aircraft on 9 April 1965 dropped one span of the steel-truss Phuong Can highway bridge, disrupting
logistic traffic on North Vietnam's vital north-south Route 1.

zones within 30 nautical miles of the Chinese border,
30 nautical miles of the center of Hanoi, and 10 nau-
tical miles of the port of Haiphong. Within autho-
rized zones, U.S. air units mounted two types of at-
tacks: (1) multicarrier "alpha" and smaller strikes on
key military and transportation targets that U.S.
planners had identified the previous year; and (2)
searches by aircraft along infiltration routes for tar-
gets of opportunity such as trucks, trains, ferries, river
craft, transportation and supply facilities, small
bridges, radar installations, and antiaircraft sites.
Other carrier aircraft supported these operations with
Blue Tree tactical reconnaissance flights and anti-
SAM strikes called Iron Hand.

Until late 1965, the Navy and the Air Force were
authorized to carry out operations every three hours
on an alternating basis. For the fleet's part, each day
one carrier launched strikes in the 12 hours before
1200 and another one in the 12 hours afterward. This
complicated system was changed in November when
the Navy and Air Force designated six geographical

areas, or route packages, in which each service alter-
nated strikes on a weekly basis.

Between 2 March and 24 December 1965, when Pres-
ident Johnson ordered a tem.porary bombing halt in
North Vietnam, the Seventh Fleet's earner aircraft flew
31,000 combat and combat support sorties, dropped
64,000 bombs, and fired 128,500 rockets in an effort to in-
terdict the enemy's lines of communication to tl^e South.

Although North Vietnam was the main theater
of action. South Vietnam had first priority on the call
for the fleet's air resources. During 1965 and 1966,
owing to the scarcity of the jet-capable airfields
ashore for Air Force squadrons, the Navy flew one-
third of the sorties in South Vietnam. The missions in-
cluded strikes on Viet Cong rear areas, close air sup-
port of friendly ground troops, reconnaissance, and
cover for amphibious operations. The Dixie Station
deployment also prepared naval air units under com-
bat conditions for the more dangerous environment
in the North. Still, 14 aircraft were lost over South
Vietnam when carriers operated from Dixie Station.

Once Midway aircraft knocked out the
railroad bridge in the path of this Com-
munist supply train, it literally became
a "sitting duck" for later flights from
the ship.

Naval aviators exude a devil-
may-care attitude toward
the damage inflicted on one
of Bon Homme Richard's
A-4s by North Vietnamese
gunners in October 1 965.
Such insouciance would fade
as the enemy's air defenses
took an increasing toll of
U.S. aircraft and air crews.

The 37-millimeter guns manned by
North Vietnamese crewmen on Swatow
motor gunboats complemented the
weapons positioned ashore.

The enemy's attempt to camouflage this Swatow failed to keep it hidden from Midway's attacl< squadrons.

Although the enemy in the North used the
bombing pause, which lasted until 30 January 1966,
to strengthen defenses, reestablish supply facilities,
and disperse resources, Task Force 77 also made use
of the lull. Naval air units bombed and strafed Com-
munist forces and infiltration routes in Laos. More
sorties were conducted in Laos during January 1966
than in the last six months of 1965. On one such op-
eration, Lieutenant (jg) Dieter Dengler, flying a
Skyraider, was shot down and imprisoned for five
months by the Pathet Lao. Finally escaping, he
evaded his pursuers for 23 doys before an Air Force
helicopter rescued him near the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ). He and Lieutenant Klusmann, who broke out

The A-4E of Commander Robert R. King,
Commanding Officer of VA-2 3, drops a
1,000-pound bomb on Viet Cong posi-
tions in the Republic of Vietnam during
October 1965.

An RA-5C Vigilante photo intelligence plane refuels from an A-4C Skyhawk specially configured for that purpose. Aerial
refueling was essential for operations over the vast land and water spaces of Southeast Asia.

F-4B Phantoms jettison excess fuel as they lower their tail hooks and prepare for landing, or recover}', on board Enterprise.

An F-8 Crusader fires a Zuni rocket at a
Communist target in South Vietnam.
Missions in the South and in Laos consti-
tuted a sizable proportion of the carrier
force's total effort.

in 1964, were the only two naval aviators to escape
from captivity during the war.

Strikes on fixed targets and armed route recon-
naissance were resumed in North Vietnam during the
first half of 1966. Operational control was improved
on 1 April when the Air Force was assigned responsi-
bility for strikes in Route Packages 5 and 6A, the
areas closest to that service's airfields in Thailand.
COMUSMACV assumed control of operations in
Route Package 1, adjacent to the critical northern
provinces of South Vietnam. The Navy handled the
heavily populated, militarily vital coastal Route
Packages 2, 3, 4, and 6B. This measure enabled
American aviators to become thoroughly familiar
with the special characteristics of their operating
areas and lessened command confusion.

In June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed concen-
tration on North Vietnam's vital petroleum storage
and distribution system. Between 29 June and mid-
July, planes from Ranger, Constellation, and Hancock

Smoke billows skyward from a petroleum facility in Hanoi that was hit on 29 June 1966, the first day of a massive
Navy-Air Force operation to destroy North Vietnam's petroleum storage capability. American planners believed the mea-
sure would badly hurt the enemy's war effort.

hit the major tank forms of Haiphong, Hanoi, and
Bac Giang, destro5ang more than half of the enemy's
oil stocks and forcing dispersion of the remainder
throughout the country.

In what seemed a replay of the August 1964 at-
tack on Maddox, on 1 July 1966 an F-4B pilot on
combat air patrol spotted three North Vietnamese
motor torpedo boats making for guided missile
frigate Coontz (DLG 8) and destroyer Rogers (DD 876).
The American ships then steamed at the North SAR
Station 55 miles east of Haiphong. Within 30 min-
utes of the sighting, around 1600 local time, Phon-
tom lis from Constellation began a rocket, bomb, and
gun attack on the boats. The North Vietnamese inef-
fectually launched torpedoes against the ships, then
10 miles away, and turned for home. Hancock aircraft
soon joined the fray, sinking all three enemy craft.
The destroyers rescued 19 North Vietnamese Navy

survivors who were interned in Danang and then re-
turned to their homeland in 1967 and 1968 in ex-
change for U.S. prisoners.

From July to December 1966, the enemy at-
tempted to disperse their pefroleum resources. Naval
aviators then went after fuel-laden trucks, railroad
cars, barges, and smaller storage facilities. At the
same time, multicarrier strikes devastated critical
North Vietnamese railyards at Thanh Hoa, Phu Ly,
Ninh Binh, and Vinh.

On 26 October, during this intense period of bat-
tle action, the carrier force suffered a fragic mishap. A
seaman on board Oriskany (CVA 34) improperly han-
dled a flare that ignited other mimitions, soon setting
the forward half of the carrier ablaze. By the time the
fire was extinguished, after a three-hour sfruggle, 25
naval aviators and 19 other officers and men were
dead. Knocked out of action, the ship sailed to Subic

A North Vietnamese vessel used to lighter
oil is ablaze following an attack by Con-
stellation (CVA 64) aircraft in August
1 966. The American anti-POL campaign
failed because the enemy had already
dispersed much of their petroleum stor-
age throughout the North.

Bay for personnel replacements and repairs: however,
Coral Sea soon replaced her on station.

Bombing halts in North Vietnam for the New Year
and Tet holidays, which the enemy exploited to rush
supplies south, marked the opening days of 1967. At the
same time, American air forces shifted their effort to the
Laotian Panhandle. By 1967 the Navy had concen-
trated its strikes on two operational areas of southern
Laos, designated Steel Tiger and Tiger Hound, while the
Air Force shared this responsibility' and also dealt with
the Barrel Roll zone to the north. Task Force 77 focused
again on North Vietnam at the end of January when it
was authorized to attack the Communist industrial
heartland in the northeastern part of the country. Naval
air squadrons hit critical iron and steel plants, thermal
power plants, cement factories, ship and rail repair
shops, ammunition depots, and warehouses. In April,
the airfields at Kep and Hoa Lac were struck. During
this new phase, the Naw-Air Force team attacked rail-
road yards, highway and railroad bridges, and rolling
stock in an effort to stem the flow of military supplies on
the rail lines from China and from the port of
Haiphong. The transportation routes radiating from
Hanoi also were the focus of considerable attention.

An aerial reconnaissance plane of Light
Photographic Squadron (VFP) 63 took
this photo of an enemy supply train
caught by fleet aircraft north of Nam
Dinh in September 1966.

Constellation air wing personnel, sta-
tioned at the landing signal officer's con
sole, help an A-4C pilot to touch down
on the ship's flight deck.

In Q new approach to interdiction, in February
1967 carrier aircraft had begun dropping bottom-lay
mines in the mouths of key North Vietnamese rivers.
Later in the year advanced mines were laid in addi-
tional inland waterways and on land approaches to
bridges and other crossing points. This measure to di-
minish the enemy's growing use of coastal and in-
land waterways for movement south complemented
the ongoing armed route reconnaissance operations
against road traffic, antiaircraft sites, and other tar-
gets of opportunity. Although normally prohibited
from operations within 10 miles of the center of ei-
ther Hanoi or Haiphong and 20 miles from the bor-
der with China, naval air units were authorized on
several occasions to bomb critical targets within the
restricted zones. For instance, in May Bon Homme
Richard (CVA 31) aircraft penetrated the enemy's
heavy defenses around the capital and knocked out
the Hanoi electrical power plant.

Another catastrophic carrier fire, this time in For-
restal, occurred during these successful operations.
The ship had only been at Yankee Stotion for several
days in July when a Zuni rocket was accidently
touched off on deck. The rocket set off a chain reac-
tion of explosions and fire among 750-pound bombs,
fuel, and other inflammable materials. Firefighting
parties from the ship and from destroyers Rupertus
(DD 851), Samuel N. Moore (DD 747), and George K.
Mackenzie (DD 836) extinguished the fire on deck in
little over an hour, but the conflagration below decks

Oriskany crewmen battle the fire that

swept the forward half of the carrier on
26 October 1966, killing 44 officers and
men, many of them aviators.

When the fleet stood down for the New Year's
bombing halt at the end of December 1967, it had
completed a year of intense combat. The Navy's
77,000 combat and support sorties far surpassed
previous periods. While the enemy continued to
supply and reinforce his units in South Vietnam
and Laos, the effort required a significant diversion
of military resources and heavy importation of
vital munitions.

The enemy's Tet Offensive, which began on 30
January 1968 in South Vietnam, demonded the im-
mediate attention of Task Force 77. Communist forces
threatened most of the country's major population
centers and the isoloted Marine outpost at Khe Sanh.

Bob Hope, renowned comedian and long-
time supporter of American service men
and women overseas, performs with fel-
low entertainers Vic Damone, Anita
Bryant, and Joey Heatherton for the ap-
preciative crew of carrier Bennington
(CVS 20).

102

Fast combat support ship Sacramento refuels carrier Hancock via hose lines as the logistic ship's UH-46 helicopter
delivers dry cargo.

"Destroyer Pulling Alongside for Replenishment" by John Steel

103

With both ships underway off Vietnam, Sacramento crewmen ready a pallet of ammunition for transfer to earner Enterprise.
104

A plane captain pours a can of lubricant into one ofVA-25's Skyraiders. These men were an indispensable part of the
team that kept carrier aircraft armed, fueled, and in the air.

105

Ordnancemen trundle general-purpose
bombs across Kitty Hawk'5 flight deck to
waiting attack planes.

The night deck is a busy, dangerous place as catapult men, fuel handlers, pilots, and other aviation personnel prepare air-
craft for operations over Southeast Asia early in 1 967.

106

Bombs from Navy attack planes explode in the railroad yard at Phu Ly during a June 1967 strike.

The destroyed hulks of Navy aircraft litter the flight deck of carrier Forrestal (CV 59) following a tragic fire on 29 July 1967.

Task Force 77 steaming in the Gulf of Tonkin. Carrier Constellation is trailed by Orlskany, destroyers George K.
MocKenzie (DD 836) and Rogers (DD 876), and ammunition ship Mount Katmai (AE 16).

Vigilante pilots of Constellation's Reconnaissance Attack Squadron (RVAH) 12 check maps of the target area before a mission.

108

Bombs from a diving Skvhawk hit the enemy army barracks at Dong Hoi, North Vietnam, in October 1 96/.

An A-4C Skvhawk "catches a ivzre " during recovery on board Bennington. A carrier pilot faced this dangerous phase of
every mission, even if he vms wounded or liis plane was damaged.

A naval aviator heads for his squadron's spaces below decks after surviving one more mission over North Vietnam in De-
cember 1967. By that time, the air war had lasted almost three years and no end appeared in sight.

110

in Operation Niugaru, the Inqw lOined the omer sei"-
vices in massive air strikes against North Vietnamese
units besieging Klie Sanh and heiped turn the tide on
the enemy. The crises in South Vietnam and abysmal
flying weather over the North severeh" limited opera-
tions there during the first three months of 196S.
Whenever possible, aircraft from Coral Sea. Kittv
Hawk, Enterprise. Tkonderoga. Ranger, Bon Homme
Richard, and Oriskany dropped mines in river mouths
and at vital choke points south of Vinh and uttocked
targets of opportunity along infiltration routes. In
one instance at the end of March, carrier attack air-
Crewmen, wearing the multicolored uniforms ^'^^ pounced on a large enemy convoy suddenly ex-

thal denote their flight deck duties, position posed by a break in the weather. Of the hundred or

an .4-4 C on Kittv Hawk's flight deck. more trucks in the convoy, 98 were destroyed or dam-

111

aged. In addition, Tosk Force 77 attack squadrons hit
selected torgets, such as the rail and highway bridges
along vital Route lA at Long Ngoc, Thanh Hoa, and
Dong Phong; those at Haiphong and Kien An; and
the Vinh, Ke Sat, Cat Bi, and Bai Thuong airfields.
Other key targets included power plants, railroad
yards, naval facilities, barracks, and heavy industrial
plants at Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dinh, Hai Duong,
Hon Gai, and Cam Pha.

When President Johnson halted bombing in the
northern two-thirds of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam in early April 1968, the Seventh Fleet
mounted a concentrated interdiction effort between
the 18th and 19th parallels. Diminishing the flow
to the south of North Vietnamese forces and sup-
plies now was the sole objective of the Rolling
Thunder program, and naval planners selected the
targets. In this new phase, carrier air units mined

and bombed traffic control points, which included cement plant in Haiphong smokes

ferry crossing sites, railway and highway bridges, lUriously aner a strike by Kitty Hawk'5

. . , , ^. , J • , J Carrier Air Wing 11.

storage areas, truck parks, fuel dumps, mland wa-

112

terwQvs, and rooas where tiiev wert

ronstnc

surrounding geography. Sea Dragon cruisers and
destroyers steaming along the coast sheiled many
of the same types of targets, as well as enemy wa-
terborne logistic craft and coastal defenses south of
the 19th parallel.

To focus the effort even further, in May, Vice .A.d-
miral William F. Bringle, the Seventh Fleet comman-
der, designated three areas containing the most im-
portant choke points in the vicinity of Ha Tinh,
Vinh, and south of Phu Dien Chau. Each area re-
ceived the full attention of separate carrier task
groups, which carried out round-the-clock strikes
against the resourceful enemy. Then in August, Task
Force 77 concentrated the major part of its air and
surface strength against the southern traffic control
area around Ha Tinh. This was the turning point of
the campaign. Unceasing day and night air strikes,
armed route reconnaissance, and shore bombard-
ment caused the North Vietnamese truck traffic to
back up so that it became prey to further attack.
During August, American naval forces destroyed or
damaged over 600 trucks, the highest total of the

campau
on coastal an

"and waterwQ'

scons ond the resulting muddy conditions on land
also played a part in this shift. U.S. air una surface
forces destroyed or damaged almost 1,000 water-
borne logistic craft in September, the greatest num-
ber during the six-month interdiction operation.

When all bombing in the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam ceased on 1 November 1968, the North
Vietnamese logistic flow through the panhandle and
along the coast had been reduced to a trickle. That
the enemy's post-Tet offensive in South Vietnam dur-
ing the fall of 1968 was weak and of short duration
can be ascribed in part to the success of the interdic-
tion effort miounted by the Seventh Fleet.

However, the entire Rolling Thunder antiinfiltra-
tion program was only partially successful. Heavy
weather, operational restrictions, and Communist
determination to win in the South made prosecution
of the air campaign difficult. As a result, the enemy
was able to receive foreign support, supply his forces
in the field, and launch large-scale offensives
against U.S. and allied armies. Nonetheless, the

Conmiander Lowell R. Myers relates how
his F-8 Crusader downed a MiG-21
with a Sidewinder missile over Vinh Son,
North Vietnam. Crusaders were respon-
sible for 18 of the 34 North Vietnamese
aircraft shot down by the Navy during
Rolling Thunder.

113

Aerial victors. Each of these aviators
assigned to Bon Homme Richard shot
down a North Vietnamese MiG in May
1967 (left to right): Lieutenant Com-
mander J. R. Swartz, Commander Paul
H. Speer, Lieutenant Commander Mar-
shall O. Wright, Lieutenant (jg) Joseph
M. Shea, Lieutenant Commander Bobby
C. Lee, and Lieutenant Phillip R. Wood.

three-year campaign by Task Force 77 forced the
North Vietnamese to divert tens of thousands of reg-
ular and paramihtary troops, critical civilian work-
ers, and untold material resources to keep open
their lines of communication. Because of the fleet's
air and surface operations in Laos and North Viet-
nam, the enemy's attacks in the South were long-de-
layed, under strength, and short-lived. Rolling
Thunder was essential to the success of American
arms on the battlefields of South Vietnam.

114

Mission Accomplisi-ied" by john Steel

115

Tracers crisscross the nighttime sfy over North Vietnam. This dramatic reconnaissance photo gives some idea of the
deadly threat that U.S. aviators faced from the 37-, S7-, 8S-, and 100-millimeter guns manned by North Vietnamese
troops and Chinese "volunteers."

A Soviet-made surface-to-air missile fired
by a North Vietnamese missile battery
has just exploded under a U.S. F-4
Phantom II fighter, causing the jet to
catch fire.

116

Armed with Sidewinders, an F-4 B Phantom I! fighter of VF-1 1 4 flies a combat air patrol over the North. By 1968. the
Phantom had become the Navy's preeminent MiG killer.

A 500-pound bom.b dropped by an A-6
Intruder scores a direct hit on this high-
way bridge northwest ofVinh in North
Vietnam. Navy-Air Force actions to inter-
dict enemy supply and troop movements
in early 1968 helped make the Jet Offen-
sive a costlv ntilitary effort for the Com-
munists. But Hanoi seemed prepared to - ,
pay any price for ultimate victory.

■

117

North Vietnamese trucks carrying supplies
to Communist troops in South Vietnam
during the bombing pause of December
1967 easily bypass a road cratered by
American aircraft. The Rolling Thunder
campaign slowed the enemy's resupply ef-
fort but could not stop it.

A carrier ordnanceman fuses a 500-
pound bomb to be dropped on North
Vietnam in May 1968. While President
Johnson had ordered a halt to bombing
north of the 20th parallel in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam, on 31 March
1968, the Rolling Thunder campaign
continued until 31 October

118

Amphibious Landings in iouth
Vietnam

""T'he fleet provided even more direct support to the
M. campaign in South Vietnam with its long-estab-
lished Amphibious Ready Group and Special Landing
Force (ARG/SLF). The powerixil, versatile, and mobile
formation was capable of striking along the length of
the South Vietnamese littoral and far inland.

During this period, the AR.G usually consisted of
three or four ships, including an omphibious assault
ship (LPH), a dock landing ship (LSD), an attack
transport (APA'i or an amiphibious transport dock
(LPD), and a tank landing ship (LST). Other amphibi-
ous vessels often augm.ented this force. The Kiarine
SLF was composed of a medium helicopter squadron
equipped with 24 UH-34s and embarked in the LPH.
An infantry battalion landing teomi, reinforced with
artillery, armiOr, engineer, and other support units.

Amphibious commanders. Seventh Fleet
Navy and Marine leaders plan for an
amphibious assaull against Viet Cong
forces on the central coast of South Viet-
nam. Left to right: Colonel Harry Wort-
man. Comnmnder Marine Special
Landing Force; Captain William J. Mad-
docks, Commander Amphibious Ready
Group; Vice .Admiral John J. Hvland.
Commander Seventh Fleet; and an
unidentified officer

■ J ia iil liilllagiit.

119

The Seventh Fleet Amphibious Ready Croup turns to starboard during operations off South Vietnam. In the van is
amphibious assault ship Iwo fima (LPH 2) with a Marine UH-34 helicopter squadron embarked, dock landing ship
Thomaston fISD 28), and amphibous transport dock ship Vancouver (LPD 2). The latter vessels carry a 2,000-man
Marine infantry battalion landing team with supporting weapons and equipment.

120

comprised the ground combat element. These men
and their equipment were divided among the ships,
enabling landings on shore by helicopter, by the
force's 41 organic tracked landing vehicles (LVT), or
by both methods. The fleet provided additional assis-
tance for amphibious operations, including carrier
Qir cover, naval gunfire support, supply by the Logis-
tic Support Force (Task Force 73), and medical sup-
port by hospital ships Repose (AH 16) and Sanctuary
(AH 17) positioned close offshore. Noval personnel
also served in Marine units as medical corpsmen,
chaplains, and spotters, the latter in 1st Air and
Navol Gunfire Lioison Company detachments. Fur-
thermore, underwater demolition team, SEAL, beach-
master, and special communications beach jumper
units supported operations on shore. At various times
during the war, transport submarines Perch (APSS
313), Tunny (APSS 282), and Grayback (LPSS 574) car-
ried Navy underwater demolition teams, SEALs, and
South Vietnamese marines to points off prospective

Marine Sikorsky UH-34 Seahorse heli-
copters, loaded with troops, lift off am-
phibious assault siiip Princeton during
operations on the coast of South Vietnam.

121

Tracked landing vehicles loaded with Ma-
rine infantry exit the well deck of Point
Defiance (LSD 31) and head for the
coast of South Vietnam.

Navy landing craft carrying M-48 tanks prepare to hit the beach near Tarn Quan on Vietnam's central coast
ation Dagger Thrust in December 1965.

122

As preparatorv fire from naval gunfire
support ships strikes targets ashore,
Marines get ready to hit the beach with
their "Ontos" antitank weapons carriers.
Sailors man a .50<aliber machine gun to
suppress any enemy return fire.

landing beaches. Once there, the naval speciui vvar-
fore men silently exited the boats, swdm or rowed
rubber raits through the surf, and curried out \"itul rir-
connaissonce or other special opcratioris ashore.

The Seventh Fleet's Commander Amphibious
Force (Commander Task Force 76) exercised opera-
tional control of the ARG (Task Group 76.5 ) and the
SLF (Task Group 79.5) at sea. With the depiovment of
another ARG/SLF, assigned the designations 76.4 and
79.4, to the South China Sea in April 1967. the am-
phibious flotilla vvQs divided into ARG^SLF Alpha and
ARG/SLF Bravo. '

Follovving the landing on 8 March 1965 ol Marine
forces at Donong, which marked the beginning of a
new era in America's Southeast Asian involvement,
naval leaders awaited additional amphibious shippinci
and prepared plans for emplo^hng the ARG/SLF ogainst
the enemv. In the interim, the task group protected Qui
Nhon until Armv units arrived, and covered the land-
ing in II Corps of the Arm\''s 1st Cavalry Division.

During this preparation, the U.S. command took
advantage of good intelligence to launch Operation

■■fcisi/J

-J"

mm
1¥

•'<:

123

Troopers of the Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) spread out after being landed by lielicopter on the beach during Op-
eration Pershing. Amphibious operations in Vietnam routinely involved troops of other services and other allied nations.

Marines debouch from Navy landing craft and push through the surf to set up a perimeter on a beach south ofDanang.

124

Starlite, perhaps the greatest amphibious success of the
war. Discovering that the 1st Viet Cong Regiment
planned to ottack the Marine enclave at Chu Lai from
o coastal village 12 miles to the south. General
William C. Westmoreland directed the III Marine Am-
phibious Force, tiie chief Marine commond in South
Vietnam, to preempt the assault and destrov the
1.500-man enemy unit. Between 18 and 25 August, a
cruiser and two destroyers poured accurate naval gun-
fire on the enemy concentration as the Seventh Fleet
Amphibious Ready Group landed Marine units on the
beach. Other elements were helicoptered inland from
Iwo lima (LPH 2) and Chu Lai. By the end of the week-
long battle, the 1st Viet Cong Regiment was pushed up
to the sea by three Marine and two South Vietnamese
battalions and then pounded by air and naval gun-
fire. At the cost of 45 Marines killed and 203 wounded,
the allied force inflicted 623 casuolties on the enemy
unit, putting it out of action for some time.

Seeking to complete the destruction of the Viet
Cong unit that had withdrawn further south to the
Batangan Peninsula, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine, and

Marines site-in a lOS-millinieter howitzc;
on tiie beach as naval amphibious ships
stand by in support. Command of an
amphibious operation normally passed
from a Navy officer to a Marine officer
once the ground force was esialnistied
ashore.

125

Equipped and dressed for rapid jungle
movement, Marines climb out of a Seventh
Fleet landing craft that has just pushed
into a riverbank heavy with ibliage.

South Vietnamese forces, including Coastal Force ele-
ments, conducted Operation Piranha in September.
Having learned from the costly setback in Starlite,
however, the Communists now avoided pitched bat-
tles on the coast and evaded the allied search. Al-
though 178 enemy soldiers were reported killed, con-
tact was light throughout the action.

By the end of September 1965, U.S. leaders were
prepared to initiate an amphibious campaign
against Communist forces along the entire South
Vietnamese coast. COMUSMACV and fleet comman-
ders planned a series of ARG/SLF raids, designated
Dagger Thrust, in support of the Market Time antiin-
filtration effort against Viet Cong bases, supply
points, and small units. The first three raids were car-
ried out in rapid succession between 25 September
and 1 October as the force struck at target areas near

126

War in the tropics. Sweat-soaked Marines
slowly make their way, under a merci-
lessly hot sun. through a dense mangrove
swamp in South Vietnam.

Vung Mu, Ben Goi, and Tom Ouun in II Corps, but
without finding any significant sign of the enemy. On
30 November the Nuvy-Marine leam first struck at a
suspected Viet Cony infiltration base on Cune Ke Gu
southwest of Phan Tliiet and then at Phu Thu in
northern 11 Corps on 5 and 6 December. Neither
strike was successful. The program was hamijered by
dated inlelligence, some enemy foreknowledge of U.S.
intentions, and prolonged prcparcitions.

The focus on destroying the enemy's main force
units ulso continued as naval amphibious foi'ces con-
dncied operations Blue Marlin i and 11 near Tdm Ky and
Hoi An in November. Again, the results were negligible.
Then from 9 to 19 December III Marine Amphibious
Force units and the fleet's ARG,/SLF combined with
South Vietnamese troops to strike at their old nemesis,
the 1st Viet Cong Regim.ent. again up to strength and

located in the hills west of Chu Lai. Although the 3 Ma-
rine and 3 South Vietnamese battalions killed 407 and
captured 33 of the enemy and seized over 100 weapons
and 60 tons of ammunition, the cost was very high.
Ambushes and other tactics left 181 South Vietnamese
troops killed or missing and 141 wounded. The Marines
suffered 45 dead and 218 wounded.

In Double Eagle, the largest amphibious opera-
tion to date in South Vietnam, the ARG/SLF forces
joined Marine and South Vietnamese units in a
lengthy sweep for enemy regiments near Quang Ngai
City and Tam Ky in I Corps. From 28 Januory to 1
March 1966, the allied force searched for Viet Cong
units, but the enemy's good intelligence network en-
abled them to avoid significont contact.

Again in March and April the allies mounted a
multiunit effort to find and destroy Communist forces.
In Operation Jackstay, which lasted fi-om 26 March to 7
April, the Navy-Marine ARG/SLF combined with other
U.S. and South Vietnamese units to attack the Viet

With its mission accomplished, a mecha-
nized landing craft and an empty tracked
landing vehicle return to the well deck of
dock landing ship Catamount (LSD 1 7).
Soon, the ship's personnel will raise the
stem gate and drain sea water from the
well deck.

128

Under the watchful eye of Chief Gunner's
Mate Alexander Martinez, crewmen of
transport submarine Perch inflate rubber
boats that South Vietnamese marines will
use for operations ashore.

Cong in the Rung Sat swamp that surrounded the vital
shipping channel to Saigon. Although most enemy
units evaded the search, the allies, at least temporarily,
disrupted operations in the Viet Cong base area.

Following the unproductive Operation Osage in
April and May 1966, U.S. leaders concluded that the
growing allied strength in coastal areas would keep the
enemy from concentrating large units there in the fu-
ture. Thus, amphibious raids and sweeps along the
shore were no longer considered valid tactics. From
June through September, in a series of operations la-
beled Deckhouse, the ARG/SLF joined Army or III Ma-
rine Amphibious Force troops in lengthy multibattalion
combat actions inland. Still, the results were disap-
pointing for the Navy-Marine team as the enemy, ex-
cept during Deckhouse IV, declined to stand and fight.

Beginning in October 1966, the growing menace
from North Vietnamese Army units moving south

1 W

129

As Commanding General, III Marine Am-
phibious Force, Lieutenant General Lewis
W. Walt commanded all I Corps Tactical
Zone Marine forces, including the 1st
Marine Division, 3d Marine Division, and
1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

Marine infantry; armor, and helicopter units move out against the 1st Viet Cong Regiment during Operation Starlite. In this
action, the first major amphibious operation of the war, the allies killed, wounded, or captured over 600 enemy soldiers.

130

In search of the elusive Viet Cong, Marines of the 3d Division move inland through a swampy area near the "Street With-
out Joy," northwest of Hue. The watery terrain found in much of South Vietnam often made it hard going for American
ground troops.

131

"V.C. Harvest— Danang" by John Steel

Trip Grenade — Jackstay" by John Steel

132

through the DMZ drew the ARG/SLF to the northern-
most reaches of the Republic of Vietnam. Before the
end of the year Vice Admiral John J. Hyland, Com-
mander Seventh Fleet, temporarily established an ad-
ditional amphibious task group positioned just off-
shore for quick reaction. While Deckhouse V was
undertoken during the early part of 1967 in the
Mekong Delta, the year's other 24 amphibious opera-
tions took place in I Corps. Further, most ARG/SLF
combat actions were in support of the Marine stand
against the fierce thrusts of the North Vietnamese
Army at Dong Ha, Con Thien, and Quang Tri City
and in the DMZ itself. The amphibious force, perma-
nently augmented by another ARG/SLF after April
1967, was often used to extend the allied flank at sea,
block Communist movements, land troops in the
enemy's rear, or reinforce front-hne units. Troops de-

Their faces reflecting fear, a wounded
Marine and a Navy corpsman focus on a
Viet Cong machine gun firing on the
medical evacuation helicopter trying to
whisl< them to safety.

ployed by helicopter or amphibious craft, cruisers,
and destroyers provided this ready, mobile, and pow-
erful assistance. Noteworthy actions included land-
ings in the southern half of the DMZ in May and op-
erations in August and September to prevent the
Communists from disrupting South Vietnam's na-
tional elections. While the ARG/SLF accounted for
over 3,000 enemy killed during the year, the force's
support enabled other allied units to inflict even
greater damage on the North Vietnamese Army.

During January 1968, the ARG/SLF Marines car-
ried out four heliborne operations ashore in I Corps.

The enemy's massive Tet Offensive, launched on the
30th, soon demanded the suspension of amphibious
landings and long-term commitment ashore of the
fleet's Marine forces. During the next four months, the
ships of both ARGs served as havens for the Navy's
riverine combat and logistic craft deployed to the area
for the emergency. This sea-based supp9rt was crucial
to the eventual allied military success in the northern
reaches of South Vietnam. From June to the end of the
year, the amphibious task forces took part in nine I
Corps operations that decimated Communist forces
fighting to hold Hue and the surrounding region.

Hospital ship Repose (AH 16) prepares to get underway. This fully equipped floating hospital and her sister ship, Sanctu-
ary (AH 18), were deployed off I Corps, scene of some of the bloodiest fighting in Vietnam.

134

Navy medical personnel rush a wounded
man to an emergency room on board Re-
pose. In most cases, medical evacuation
helicopters could transport wounded men
from the battlefield to the hospital ships
in 30 minutes or less.

Navy doctors in the triage room of a hospital ship evaluate the condition of a newly arrived casualty.

135

A Navy nurse cares for a wounded American. During the war, approximately 425 female nurses served in the two hospital
ships, the naval hospitals at Danang and Saigon, and in other medical facilities. Other female naval officers did tours of
duty on the staff of Naval Forces, Vietnam, and at other stations in South Vietnam.

136

An Army pilot and a Marine spotter flying in a Cessna 0-lE Bird Dog communicate with Navy surface ships to adjust
naval gunfire in support of allied ground troops.

Bombardment from the Sea

In addition to mounting amphibious operations,
the fleet aided the allied ground campaign in
South Vietnam with naval gunfire support. The
1,200-mile coastline allowed the Navy to take advan-
tage of the mobility and firepower of its surface ships.
Because the waters off the northern and central re-
gions of South Vietnam were deep, the guns on many
Seventh Fleet cruisers and destroyers could reach tar-
gets in one-third of the land area of I Corps. Also cov-
ered were large segments of the coastal provinces of II
and III Corps. Shallow-draft vessels bombarded many
additional areas in the Mekong Delta. Relatively safe
from the enemy, the gunfire support ships operated
by day or night and often in the foul weather that
swept the South China Sea.

Throughout this period, the Seventh Fleet's gun-
fire support ships off South Vietnam formed the
Cruiser-Destroyer Group (Task Group 70.8). The sub-
ordinate Navol Gunfire Support Unit (Task Unit
70.8.9), in coordination with MACV, actually directed
operations along the coast. Ships were assigned to the
group from the fleet's cruiser-destroyer command and

from the Royal Australian Navy, but were also tem-
porarily attached from carrier escort units, from the
Sea Dragon force steaming off North Vietnam, and
from the amphibious force. U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast
Guard combat craft conducting inshore coastol and
river patrols also provided gunfire support for allied
operations. Typically, one cruiser, four destroyers, one
inshore fire support ship (IFS), and two medium
rocket landing ships (LSMR) comprised Task Unit
70.8.9. However, the number varied and totaled as
many as 2 cruisers, 18 destroyers, and 2 rocket ships
during the heavy combat in 1968.

The ships and the weopons they carried were di-
verse. Heavy cruisers like Saint Paul were armed with
8-inch/55-caliber guns, able to fire 26,000 yards, and
shorter range 5-inch/38-caliber guns, accurate at
15,000 yards. Guided missile light cruisers Topeka
(CLG 8) and Oklahoma City carried 6-inch/47-caliber
guns, effective at 22,000 yards. While many of the
fleet's destroyers carried the shorter range gun, the
more modem ships were armed with 5-inch/54-cal-
iber weapons capable of hitting targets at 22,000
yards. The IFS and the LSMR carried both the shorter
range guns and rocket launchers, able to propel 380

137

Destroyer Orleck (DD 886) of the Seventh Fleet's Naval Gunfire Support Unit pours fire into Viet Cong positions near
Vung Tau in South Vietnam.

138

Crewmen in the main battery plot room
of guided missile cruiser Canberra (CAG
2) work out the solution for a fire mis-
sion. The skill of these sailors was critical
if the ship was to provide units ashore
with timely and accurate gunfire support.

The 6-inch/47-caliber guns of guided missile light cruiser Galveston (CLC 3) loft their shells toward the coast of Vietnam.

Concentrated for a lire mission, medium rocket landing ships Clarion River (LSMR 409), St. Francis River (LSMR 525), and
White River (LSMR 536) and inshore fire support ship Carronode lIFS 1) steam near Danang in 1967. Rocket launchers in
these shallow-draft vessels could propel hundreds of 5-inch rockets 10,000 yards inland in a matter of minutes.

140

5-inch rockets a minute up to 10,000 yards. These
shallow-draft vessels were especially useful off the
Mekong Delta shore.

Naval bombardment operations generally took two
forms: (1) unspotted fire on preselected areas where the
enemy was thought likely to be fovmd and (2) fire re-
quested for and directed on specific troop formations,
fortifications, and supply facilities by aerial spotters
and fire control parties on land. The airborne observers
were usually U.S. Army or U.S. Air Force forward air
controUers flying O-IE Bird Dog oiKiaft, while ground
personnel were naval officers serving with detachments
of the Fleet Marine Force's 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Li-
aison Company. These men often saved an allied
ground imlt fi"om being overrun or helped destroy a
Communist force before it could present a real threat.

Beginning in May 1965, individual Seventh Fleet
cruisers and destroyers ranged the South Vietnamese
coast, initially bombarding Viet Cong supply caches
used to support the Communist seaborne infiltration
effort. These coastal missions were the norm until Au-
gust, when guided missile light cruiser Galveston (CLG
3) and destroyers Prichett (DD 561) and Orleck (DD
886) joined in support of amphibious Operation Star-
lite. At one point during the battle, the ships' fire
killed or wounded 100 Viet Cong soldiers caught on
the open beach. On another occasion, in October,
Ozboum (DD 846) steamed into the Rung Sat to pour
fire into a Viet Cong attacking force. Throughout the
year, 72 Seventh Fleet ships fired close to 90,000 large-
coliber rounds, which destroyed or damaged 4,000
enemy structures and 66 small craft and killed or
wounded 753 Communist troops.

Augmented by Carronade (IFS 1) and 5f. Francis
River (LSMR 525) in April 1966 and Clarion River (LSMR
409) and White River (LSMR 536) the following month,
the Naval Gunfire Support Unit increased its bombard-
ment of the enemy. This assistance was especially wel-
come in I Corps during the latter half of the year, when
main force NVA units attacked south through the DMZ.
Indeed, fixjm mid- 1966 on, the naval command concen-
trated the majority of the gunfire support ships off I
Corps where combat was heaviest and the geography
most favorable for inshore bombardment. In one ac-
tion, on 13 September, the shelling fix)m Stormes (DD
780) killed over 200 enemy troops in three hours of fir-
ing. By November almost 40,000 rounds were expended

each month by the surface group off South Vietnam.
Throughout the year the force killed 3,000 of the enemy
and damaged or destroyed 35,000 structures.

As they had the previous year, in 1967 the cruiser-
destroyer rocket ship group provided preparatory bom-
bardment for amphibious landings, such as Operation
Deckhouse V in January, and direct fire support. Be-
cause of the increasing demands of the Sea Dragon ef-
fort off North Vietnam, however, in March 1967 the
Naval Gunfire Support Unit temporarily lost its one
cruiser and two destroyers. The arrival of Australian
guided missile destroyer HMAS Hobart (D 39) in South
Vietnamese waters partially offset this loss. But, acciden-
tal explosions in the 5-inch/54-caliber mounts in Manl^
(DD 940) and Bigelow (DD 942) during the spring
again reduced the number of ships on the gun line.

Reflecting the ease with which fleet units moved
between operational theaters. Sea Dragon and Task
Unit 70.8.9 combined forces in May off the DMZ in the
strongest concentration of American surface gunfire
ships since the Korean War. Cruisers Providence and
Saint Paul and five destroyers took part in Operation
Beau Charger, an amphibious landing and sweep into
the southern half of the DMZ.

The fleet's surface ships were essential for dealing
with the many Communist artillery batteries that
fired into South Vietnam from positions in the north-
em half of the DMZ and southern North Vietnam. In
addition, enemy coastal guns menaced allied ships
and craft offshore. On 29 August 1967, Du Pont (DD
941) lost one sailor killed and nine wounded when
one of the 40 Communist shells that straddled the
ship hit home. The following month, on the 25th,
Communist fire struck Mansfield (DD 728) killing one
bluejacket and wounding another two men. The
naval force, however, returned this Aire many fold.
With six or seven destroyers continuously deployed
offshore in I Corps by November, enemy coostal gun
emplacements and field artillery positions often were
blanketed with naval gunfire. Indeed, the surface
ships fired 500,000 rounds in 1967, approximately
twice as many as they had the previous year, with
the great majority of them falling on I Corps targets.

The enemy's Tet Offensive in the first half of 1968
engaged the Naval Gunfire Support Unit in its heoviest
combat actions of the war. Drawing on resources from
all areas and commands, but especially ft'om Operation

141

White phosphorous shells from de-
stroyers Mansfield (DD 728) and
Hanson (DD 832) explode among
enemy boats on the coast of Vietnam.
This type of direct fire sometimes dev-
astated Communist units caught in
the open, as during Operation Starlite.

The 8-inch guns of heavy cruiser Newport News (CA 148) rest after firing multiple salvos in support of Marines near the
DMZ in late 1967.

Sea Dragon, Commander Task Unit 70.8.9 concentrated
as many as 22 ships at one time on the gun line. These

ships maintained high rates of fire during this crisis pe-
riod, with the heavy cruisers firing an average of 800
rounds each day. In February, guided missile heavy
cruiser Canberra (CAG 2), guided missile light cruiser
Providence, and seven other surface ships poured fire
into enemy targets in Hue, including the fortified
Citadel. This naval support was critical to the allied re-
capture of the old Imperial City. The following month,
Newport News (CA 148) reduced the flow of ammunition
to desperately fighting enemy units when it destroyed an
NVA logistic complex north of the Cua Viet. In another
instance, in May Henry B. Wilson (DDG 7) decimated a
North Vietnamese battalion, killing 82 of the unit's
troops. In similar actions during the first eight months of
1968, naval bombardments inflicted over 2,000 casuol-
ties on the reeling Communist forces. Thus, during more
than three years of deployment offshore, the Naval
Gunfire Support Unit had become a valuable compo-
nent of the allied forces defending South Vietnam.

A ashing junk, typical of the tens of thou-
sands that plied the waters off South
Vietnam.

Coastal Interdiction

The primary objective of the Market Time coastal
patrol was to prevent the enemy fi-om strengthen-
ing his forces in South Vietnam through seaborne infil-
tration of supplies and munitions. The U.S.-South Viet-
namese effort was established on 11 March 1965.
North Vietnamese Naval Transportation Group 125
used steel-hulled, 100-ton trawlers and seagoing junks
to infiltrate the South. The Viet Cong operated smaller
junks, sampans, and other craft within South Viet-
namese coastal woters, and limiting this movement
also became a responsibility of the Market Time forces.

The coastol surveillance operation was organized
around nine (initially eight) patrol sectors covering
the 1,200-mile South Vietnamese coast from the 17th

143

Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward, Chief of
the Naval Advisory Group and the first
Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, dis-
cusses with his staff Communist
seaborne infiltration into the Ca Mau
Peninsula at the southern tip of South
Vietnam.

parallel to the Cambodian border and extending 40
miles out to sea. Within these areas, ships and craft
of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the South
Vietnamese Navy searched for contraband. American
aircraft operating from ships offshore and from bases
in South Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines flew
search patterns over the Market Time area. By 1968
the patrol generally was divided into three zones: (1)
an air surveillance sector farthest out to sea; (2) an
outer surface barrier patroled by large U.S. ships; and
(3) an inner, or shallow-water, barrier patrolled by
U.S. and South Vietnamese boats and craft and
Coastal Force junks. Mobile units of Inshore Undersea
Warfare Surveillance Group 1, Western Pacific De-
tachment, deployed to South Vietnam in April 1966
to form an additional screen.

Market Time forces aided the allied cause in
other ways. The naval gunfire support offered by

144

Cape Camau

South Vietnam

Radar picket escort ship Lowe (DER 325) makes way with difficulty while patrolling part of South Vietnam's 1,200-mile coast.
A U.S. Coast Guard WPB 82-foot cutter, one of 26 deployed to Vietnam, cuts through the sea in search of Communist vessels.

146

Aj the workhorse of the Market Time patrol,

the 50-foot Swift fast patrol craft (PCF),
armed with .50-caliber machine guns and
an 81-millimeter mortar and capable of
23-knot speeds, formed the core of the
Navy's Coastal Surveillance Force.

these American and Vietnamese ships and craft often
was of vital importance to ground units locked in
combat. The naval units also served as blocking
forces in encirclement operations conducted near the
coast and on large rivers. The transportation of
friendly troops and the evacuation of civilians consti-
tuted other important tasks. And, as with most Amer-
ican forces in South Vietnam, the Market Time units
worked to win friends for the allied cause by building
schools, donating food and clothing, and performing
other civic actions.

During the first half of 1965, the Seventh Fleet
operationally controlled the Vietnam Patrol Force
(Task Force 71), the American component of Market
Time. The Naval Advisory Group, headquartered in
Saigon, served as the liaison between the fleet, COM-
USMACV, and the South Vietnamese Navy. The five

The austere Swift boat base at An Thai on isolated Phu Quoc Island off South Vietnam's southwestern coast.

Boat Division 101, redesignated Coastal Division 11 in January 1967, based at An Thoi sorties into the GulfofSiam.

148

The harbor entrance control post at Cam
Rank Bay. This facility, and others like it
at Vung Tau, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and
Vur\g Ro, coordinated allied port security.

U.S.-Vietnamese coastal surveillance centers set up at
Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, and An
Thoi coordinated actual operations. To improve mu-
tual understanding and communication, U.S. and
Vietnamese naval officers sailed in the vessels of the
other service.

On 31 July 1965, formal control of the American
Morket Time force passed from the Seventh Fleet to
the Naval Advisory Group, which in turn activated
the Coastal Surveillance Force (Task Force 115). The
fleet continued to provide logistic and administrative
support. The command function was further refined
on 1 April 1966 when Naval Forces, Vietnam, was es-
tablished, relieving the NAG of responsibility for Mar-
ket Time operations. In addition, the naval support
activities at Danang ond Saigon took over logistic
and administrative duties. The next year, in July,
Commander Task Force 115 moved his headquarters
from Saigon to Cam Ranh Bay.

The years 1965 to 1968 witnessed a great in-
crease in Market Time resources and the full develop-
ment of potrol tactics and operating procedures. Dur-
ing the first months of the patrol in 1965 an average
of 15 destroyers or minesweepers steamed off South
Vietnam, with at least one ship assigned to each of
the sectors. Soon, however, radar picket escorts (DER),
with better fuel efficiency and electronic equipment,
replaced the destroyers. Furthermore, to help the Viet-
namese Navy's Coastal Force and Sea Force (Ameri-

can naval leaders were dissatisfied with their opera-
tional performance), in June the U.S. Coast Guard
began dispatching 82-foot cutters (WPB), eventually
totaling 26, to Southeast Asia. The operational chain
of command extended from Commander Task Force
115 through Commander Coast Guard Activities,
Vietnam (established on 3 February 1967) to Coast
Guord Squadron 1. This letter command controlled
Coast Guard Division 11 stationed at An Thoi, Coast
Guard Division 12 at Danang, and Coast Guard Divi-
sion 13 at Cat Lo. To augment the inshore patrol, the
Navy bought 84 Swift (PCF) boats designed by the
Louisiana-based Stewart Seacraft Company and de-
ployed them to South Vietnam. These 50-foot, 23-
knot vessels, armed with .50-caliber machine guns
and an 81 -millimeter mortar, became the mainstays
of the Navy's Coastal Surveillance Force. Under Boat
Squadron 1 (later Coastal Squadron 1), Boat Divi-
sions 101-105 (redesignated Coastal Divisions 11-15
on 1 January 1967) operated from bases at An Thoi,
Danang, Cat Lo, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon, re-
spectively. In June 1967 the Navy activated an addi-
tional Swift boat unit. Coastal Division 16, at Chu
Lai in I Corps.

The harbor defense and surveillance units in the
ports of Vung Tau, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, Nha
Trang, and Vung Ro, Inshore Undersea Warfare Units
(lUWU) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operated a total of 16 large
personnel landing craft, 25 Boston Whalers, and 8

149

picket boats in Operation Stable Door. The 45-foot
picket boats, which began to reach Vietnam in June
1967, carried a crew of one officer and five men and
two .50-caliber machine guns, twin-mounted. In each
port the units constructed harbor entrance control
posts and equipped them with radios and surface
search radars.

During 1967 and 1968, the continuing demand for
Market Time vessels resulted in the deployment of 15
Coast Guard high endurance cutters (WHEQ to South
Vietnam. Operating under Coast Guard Squadron 3,
activated with the first deployments in the spring of
1967, the WHECs added their search radars, one 5-
inch/38-caliber gun, six .50-caliber machine guns, and
two 81-millimeter mortars to the patrol's firepower.

Beginning in 1967, the newly built Ashevz'Zie-class
patrol gunboat (PG), designed specifically for coastal
operations in the Third World, made its first appear-
ance in Southeast Asia. That Morch, Commander
Coastal Squadron 3 began surveillance of South

Vietnam's coast with Gallup (PG 85). Coastal Flotilla
1 was then created to direct the operations of this
unit and the new Coastal Squadron 1, with Asheville
(PG 84) and Crockett (PG 88). The 165-foot PGs, ca-
pable of 37-knot speeds, carried one 3-inch/.50-cal-
iber gun forward, one 40-millimeter gun aft, and
four .50-caliber machine guns. At first plagued by
mechanical and repair part replacement problems,
the shallow-draft and well-armed PGs became a use-
ful Market Time resource. But hydrofoil gunboats
Flagstaff (PGH 1) and Tucumcari (PGH 2), assigned to
Task Force 115 later in the war, proved not as satis-
foctory in operation. These revolutionary vessels were
unsuited to patrols in the rough seas off Vietnam and
were too mechanically complex for the repair facili-
ties in the combat theater.

Various aircraft flew aerial surveillance of South
Vietnam's coastal waters. For a brief time in 1965,
A-1 Skyraiders operating from carriers at Dixie Sta-
tion covered the central Vietnam coast. This mission

Smoke billows from a North Vietnamese trawler run aground by the Market Time patrol forces.

150

was shored and then token over by o patrol squadron
based at Sangley Point in the Philippines and
equipped with the advanced P-3 Orion aircraft.
Throughout this period, five to seven P-2 Neptunes
stationed at Tan Son Nhut near Saigon ranged up
and down the South Vietnamese littoral along desig-
nated patrol tracks. In addition, from May 1965 to
April 1967, Martin P-5 Marlin seaplanes operated
from seaplane tenders Currituck (AV 7) and Salisbury
Sound (AV 13), periodically anchored at Condore and
Cham islands and at Cam Ranh Bay. To compensate
for withdrawal of the older seaplanes in early 1967,
the Navy stationed o squadron of 12 P-2s ashore at
Cam Ranh Bay and a detachment of P-3s at Utapao
in Thailand. The P-3s patrolled the Gulf of Siam. On
an intermittent basis, U.S. Army Bird Dog observa-
tion aircraft and South Vietnamese Douglas C-47s
watched over several critical coastal sectors.

To improve the effectiveness of the antiinfiltration
system, the Navy emplaced surface search radars on
Son and Obi islands south of the Mekong Delta and on
Re Island east of Chu Lai and upgraded communica-
tions between headquarters, coastal surveillance cen-
ters, surface ships and craft, and aircraft. Greater use of
junk and sampan identification manuals, South Viet-
namese identity papers, and passes for fishermen tight-
ened the coostal net. MACV intelligence also focused
more attention on the Communist maritime effort.

There was scant evidence in 1965 of Communist
seaborne infiltration. After the Vung Ro incident in
February, the allies detected not one trawler closing
the shore. Relatively few of the junks and smaller
craft stopped and searched in shallow water were
found to carry enemy personnel or contraband. Dur-
ing this period, however, the patrol was not function-
ing with maximum effectiveness because the Ameri-
cans and the South Vietnamese concentrated on
refining patrol responsibilities, search sectors, opera-
tional tactics, command and communications proce-
dures, and other essential matters. Furthermore,
while the number of vessels in the command in-
creased, the total still was insufficient for complete
coverage of South Vietnam's coastal waters.

On the evening of 31 December 1965, however,
Hissem (DER 400) detected a small trawler heading
for shore off the Ca Mau Peninsula. When the
trawler's master knew the allies hod spotted his ship,

he turned it around and headed north, aborting the
mission. The first concrete success of the new pro-
gram occurred in May 1 966 when Market Time forces
intercepted and destroyed another infiltrating trawler
on the coast of An Xuyen Province. The vessel's recov-
ered cargo consisted of mortar and small arms am-
munition manufactured in the People's Republic of
China during 1965. Again in June, Task Force 115
units tracked a steel-hulled vessel that fired on Coast
Guard cutter Point League (WPB 82328) before run-
ning aground on the south coast of the Mekong
Delta. In addition to the damaged ship, the Viet-
namese-American defense force captured over 100
tons of munitions destined for the Viet Cong. In De-
cember 1966, the Coastol Surveillance Force detected
another trawler headed for Binh Dinh Province and
forced it to abandon its mission. On the first day of
the new yeor, Swift boats from Coastal Division 13
and Coast Guard cutter Point Gammon (WPB 82304)
gave chase to a Communist vessel, compelling the
crew to blow up their ship near the mouth of the Bo
De River. Completing the year's tally, in March and
then in July, Market Time aircraft, ships, and craft
prevented two steel-hulled trawlers from landing
their cargo on the beaches near Quang Ngai.

During this lucrative period of the Market Time
patrol from January 1966 to July 1967, many enemy
junks and sampans were destroyed, captured, or
forced to abort their missions. Most American and
Vietnamese patrol vessels now were deployed to
coastal waters and functioned with relative efficiency.
The combined patrol force inspected or boarded over
700,000 vessels in South Vietnamese coastal waters.

From July to the end of 1967, the allies detected no
trawlers attempting infiltration. Then, in February
1968, in an apparently desperate attempt to supply
Viet Cong forces fighting for survival in the aftermath
of the Tet Offensive, the enemy dispatched five ships
into South Vietnamese waters. Nearing his destination,
the master of the first ship gave up the attempt and
shaped course for home. Task Force 115 units forced
another ship aground near Danang, where the crew
scuttled her. Under fire from American vessels off Ca
Mau, a third trawler exploded and sank. The allies
forced another ship to beach northeast of Nha Trang
and then destroyed her with gunfire. The last ship,
spotted from the air out to sea, reversed course and

151

Crewmen of a large personnel landing craft (LCPL) assigned to Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit 51, based at Vung Ro on
the central coast, question Vietnamese civilians about their cargo.

A Navy explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) diver of the Stable Door operation surfaces after searching for enemy swimmers
who might attempt to mine one of the allied merchant vessels anchored behind him.

152

The merchant ship Green Bay lies on her starboard side at the pier in Qui Nhon after mining by a Communist sapper.
The threat to the allied logistic lifeline from enemy saboteurs was real.

PaM gunboat AshevTOe (PG 84) was the lead ship in a new class designed by the Navy espedaify fbroperaOcms in the Tlmd WML

HydwMgmboatTuomiccaA (PGM 2), me oftwosudivessels that deployed to Vietnam for patrol duty, cruises over and through
the water at high speed.

154

An SP-5M Marlin seaplane fuels from its

tender Currituck (AV 7). Until 1967,
when naval leaders decided that the
planes were unsuited to Vietnam opera-
tions, they patrolled large coastal areas.

Seaplane tenders Currituck and Salisbury Sound {AV 13), periodically moving to new sites off the South Vietnamese
coast, provided their charges with a fiill range of repairs and supplies.

A Vietnamese sailor and his American
counterpart in a Market Time patrol
plane scan the sea below to discover any
North Vietnamese vessels with contra-
band making a run for the coast.

A Lockheed SP-2H Neptune patrol plane, based at Tan Son Nhut Airfield near Saigon, passes over two junks offVung Tau.

156

Armed with a Thompson submachine gun and sidearms, U.S. and Vietnamese sailors prepare to board and search a fish-
ing junk. Thousands of such investigations occurred before the patrol force discovered Communist war material.

"Swift Boat 16" by John Steel

157

The jackpot. Lieutenant Robert T. Nelson,
Commanding Officer of Coast Guard cut-
ter Point Glover (WPB 82307), displays
rifles and ammunition confiscated from a
Viet Cong junk that his unit sank in
September 1965.

A South Vietnamese command junk retrieves guns and ammunition from the remains of a North Vietnamese trawler
blown apart by allied naval gunfire off the Ca Mau Peninsula in May 1966.

158

The cost. The deck of Coast Guard cutter Point Grey (WPB 82324) bears the shrouded body of an Army Special Forces soldier
Mled by a sniper's bullet during an allied raid on Phu Quoc Island.

Navy and Coast Guard patrol vessels rake the shore with gunfire as sailors salvage equipment from the hulk of PCF 4, mined and
sunk by the Viet Cong north of Rack Cia early in 1966. The enemy kiUed four crewmen and wounded two others in the attack

159

The operating environment caused other
American losses. The hulk of Swift boat
PCF 77 wrecked by heavy seas in Novem-
ber 1966.

Swift boat sailors open up on enemy positions ashore.

160

This ship, one of five intercepted by Market Time forces during early 1968, was later sunk near Nha Trang.

returned north. Following this serious setback for the
enemy, the Market Time patrol did not discover an-
other infiltrating trawler until August 1969.

Aside from this crisis-related gamble at Tet, by
1968 the North Vietnamese were deterred from the
use of this avenue of seaborne infiltration as a major
means of supply. The Coastal Surveillance Force was
increasingly effective at intercepting larger vessels
and even the more numerous but low cargo capacity
junks and sampans.

Other factors contributed indirectly to the suc-
cess of Market Time. From November 1966 on, the
Sea Dragon operation off North Vietnam reduced
the enemy's coastal traffic. At the same time, the
Communists developed less costly and more effi-
cient means for supplying their forces in the South.

Beginning in December 1966, and with the tacit
agreement of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cam-
bodian head of state, the enemy began using the
port of Sihanoukville in the supposedly neutral
country as a secure transshipment point for muni-
tions destined for the Mekong Delta battleground.
Not wanting to widen the war, President Johnson
refused to authorize any allied operation to close
the port to Communist shipping. In addition, the
Ho Chi Minh Trail had become a well-established
supply complex that sustained Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese units in the I and II Corps Tacti-
cal Zones. Nonetheless, the Market Time patrol ac-
complished its primary mission by deterring the
enemy's use of the sea to support the political-mili-
tary offensive against South Vietnam.

161

The Naval Command in South
Vietnam

In contrast to the carrier, amphibious, and naval
gunfire support forces and, at least during early
1965, the coastal patrol force, which Commander
Seventh Fleet directed, the Navy's forces within South
Vietnam were operationally controlled by COMUS-
MACV. Initially, General Westmoreland exercised this
command through the Chief, Naval Advisory Group.
But the increasing demands of the war required a dis-
tinct operational rather than an advisory headquar-
ters for noval units. As a result, on 1 April 1966,
Naval Forces, Vietnam, was established to control the
Navy's units in the II, III, and IV Corps Tactical
Zones. This eventually included the major combat
formotions: Coastal Surveillance Force (Task Force
115), River Patrol Force (Task Force 116), and Riverine
Assault Force (Task Force 117). The latter unit formed

the naval component of the joint Army-Navy Mobile
Riverine Force. Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam
(COMNAVFORV) also controlled the Naval Support
Activity (NSA), Saigon, which supplied naval forces
in the II, III, and IV Corps areas. Naval Support Ac-
tivity, Danang, provided logistic support to all Ameri-
can forces in I Corps, where the predominant Marine
presence demanded a naval supply establishment.
NSA Danang was under the operational control of
Commander III Marine Amphibious Force.

COMNAVFORV also commanded the Naval Advi-
sory Group and the Seabees of the 3d Naval Construc-
tion Brigade; the Military Seo Transportation Service Of-
fice, Vietnam, which coordinated the gargantuan sealift
to Southeast Asia; the Officer in Charge of Construction,
Vietnam, who handled in-country construction by
civilian contractors; the Naval Research and Develop-
ment Unit, Vietnam, which tested new equipment in the
field; and Commander Coast Guard Activities, Vietnam.

A slow-moving river meanders through rice fields and a palm-shaded village in South Vietnam's fertile Mekong Delta.
162

River Patrol

The great strategic and economic importance of
South Vietnam's extensive inland waterways
made it clear from the beginning of the war that the
Navy would be in the front ronk of the allied forces.
Laced by 3,000 nautical miles of rivers, canals, and
smaller streams, the fertile Mekong Delta south of
Saigon, where the largest segment of South Vietnam's
population lived, constituted the country's rice bowl.
Northward along the coast to the DMZ, sizable rivers
stretched inland past vital population centers such as
the old imperial capital of Hue. Throughout the coun-
try the road ond rail system was rudimentary while
the waterways provided ready access to the most im-
portant resources. The side that controlled the rivers
and canals controlled the heart of South Vietnam.

U.S. naval leaders were determined that allied
forces would command these waterways when they
established the River Patrol Force on 18 December
1965. From then until March 1966, the Navy procured
river patrol boats (PBR) in the United States, prepared
the crews at the Coronado, California, and Mare Is-
land, California, training centers, and deployed the

imits to Southeast Asia for Operation Game Warden.
On 15 March 1966, the River Patrol Force was also
designated River Patrol Squadron 5 for administrative
and supply purposes. By 31 August 1968, the force
consisted of five river divisions, each controlling two
10-boat sections that operated from combat bases
along the major rivers or from ships positioned in the
rivers. The Navy reconditioned each of the ships so
they could serve as floating base facilities for a PBR
section and a helicopter detachment.

River Patrol Force Dispositions

River Division 51 Can Tho/Binh Thuy
River Division 52 Sa Dec (later Vinh Long)
River Division 53 My Tho
River Division 54 Nha Be River
River Division 55 Danang

Support Ships, 1966

Belle Grove (LSD 2)
Comstock (LSD 19)
Floyd County (LST 762)
Jennings County (LST 846)
Tortuga (LSD 26)

A river in the heavily forested and hilly terrain northeast of Saigon.

163

Vice Admiral John J. Hyland, the Seventh Fleet commander, temporarily sports the distinctive black beret of the River Pa
trol Force, also worn by its commander, Captain Paul N. Gray.

Task Force 116 sailors contemplate patrol operations in the Rung Sat swamp.

164

Cambodia

Vinh Chau

South China Sea

Cua Lon
River <
Ong Trang-

Cape Camau

Bo De River

Son Island

The Mekong Delta

165

A river patrol boat (PBR), the mainstay of
Task Force 116, speeds along a South Viet-
namese river. A civilian pleasure boat
bought in the United States and milita-
rized, the PBR was powered by Jacuzzi jet
pumps that enabled it to maneuver at 25
to 29 knots. It carried machine guns, a
grenade launcher, a surface radar, and two
radios. Four bluejackets crewed the boat.

Support Ships, 1967-1968
Garrett County (LST 786)
Harnett County (LSI 821)
Hunterdon County (LST 838)
Jennings County (LST 846)

The PBR, the ubiquitous workhorse of the River
Patrol Force, was manned by a crew of four bluejack-
ets, equipped with a Pathfinder surface radar and
two radios, and commonly armed with two twin-
mounted .50-caliber machine guns forward, M-60
machine guns (or a grenade launcher) port and star-
board amidship, and a .50-caliber aft. The initial ver-
sion of the boat, the Mark I, performed well in river
patrol operations but was plagued with continual
fouling of its water-jet engines by weeds and other
detritus. When Vietnamese sampans came along-
side for inspection they often damaged the fragile
fiberglass hull of the PBRs. New Mark lis, first de-
ployed to the delta in December 1966, brought im-
proved Jacuzzi jet pumps, which reduced fouling and

166

Garrett County (LST 786) and other tank landing ships positioned at the mouths of large rivers served as floating bases
for a 10-boat section ofPBRs and a two-helicopter section from the Navy's HALS.

increased speed from 25 to 29 knots, and more
durable aluminum gunwales.

Task Force 116 also employed the experimental
patrol air cushion vehicle (PACV), three of which op-
erated in the Mekong Delta during 1966 and 1967 as
PACV Division 107. During 1968, the PACVs de-
ployed to the Danang area as Coastal Division 17.
Although able to move with great speed over shallow,
marshy areas, such as the Plain of Reeds, the PACVs
proved to be too noisy and too mechanically sophisti-
coted for riverine war in South Vietnam. After the Tet
emergency, the craft were shipped back to the United
States for reevaluation.

A key component of the Game Warden operation
was its air support element. Initially, the Army de-
ployed detachments of two Bell UH-IB Iroquois heli-
copters and their aews to PBR bases and river-based

LSTs. Beginning in August 1966, however, air crews
ft-om the Navy's Helicopter Support Squadron 1 re-
placed the Army personnel. Then on 1 April 1967, the
Navy activated Helicopter Attack Light Squadron (HAL)
3 at Vung Tau with responsibilit}^ for providing Task
Force 116 with aerial fire support, observation, and
medical evacuation. By September 1968, the 421-man
"Seawolf" squadron controlled detachments of two he-
licopters each at Nha Be, Binh Thuy, Dong Tom, Rach
Gia, Vinh Long, and on board three LSTs stationed in
the larger rivers of the Mekong Delto. The UH-IB
"-Hueys," armed voriously with 2.75-inch rockets; .50-
caliber, 60-millimeter, and 7.62-millimeter machine
guns; grenades; and small arms, were a powerful and
mobile complement to the Game Warden surface units.

The River Patrol Force commander led other
naval forces, including the highly trained and skilled

167

A Navy patrol air cushion vehicle ofPACV Division 107 races on a cushion of air through the Plain of Reeds.

Troops of the Army's 101st Airborne Division prepare to mount an operation with a Navy PACV unit.

168

SEALS. By mid-1968, the 211-mQn SEAL Team 1,
based at Coronado, fielded twelve 14-man platoons,
each composed of two squads. Generally four or five
of the platoons at any given time were deployed to
South Vietnam, where one or two of them served with
the special operations force in Danang and another
three operated from Nha Be as Detachment GOLF in
support of the Task Force 116 campaign in the Rung
Sat Special Zone. Beginning in early 1967, the At-
lantic Fleet's SEAL Team 2 provided another three
platoons, two of which were stationed with the Game
Warden units at Can Tho. These units launched SEAL
operations in the central delta area. Although fo-
cused primarily on the areas to the south and west of

169

A Navy UH-IB ofHAL-3, called the
"Seawolf squadron, lifts offVinh
Long Airfield to provide overhead cover
to PBR units nearby. The "Huey" heli-
copters were armed with rocket launch-
ers, various machine guns, and grenade
launchers.

"Coverage From Above" by John Steel

Saigon, the SEALs also mounted operations in the I
and II Corps Tactical Zones.

These elite naval commando units carried out
day and night ambushes, hit and run raids, recon-
naissance patrols, salvage dives, and special intelli-
gence operations. Normally operating in six-man
squads, the SEALs used landing craft, SEAL team as-
sault boats (STAB), 26-foot armored trimarans, PBRs,
sampans, and helicopters for transportation to and
from their target areas. Mobile, versatile, and ex-
tremely effective in their dangerous work, the SEALs
were a valuable fighting force in the riverine environ-
ment of Vietnam.

Mine clearance forces also were essential to the
security of Vietnam's waterways. Nowhere was this
more crucial than on the rivers near Saigon, the
country's most vital port. Viet Cong mining of the
main shipping channel, the Long Tau River, which

wound its way through the Rung Sat Special Zone
south of the capital, could have had a devastating ef-
fect on the war effort. Consequently, on 20 May 1966,
the Navy established Mine Squadron 11, Detachment
Alpha (Mine Division 112 after May 1968) at Nha Be,
under Commander Task Force 116. From 1966 until
mid-1968, the minesweeping detachment operated
12 or 13 minesweeping boats (MSB) reactivated in
the United States and shipped to Southeast Asia. The
57-foot, fiberglass-hulled vessels were armed with
machine guns and grenade launchers and carried
surface radars and minesweeping gear for clearing
explosives from the key waterways. The Navy also
deployed three-boat subordinate units to Danong
and Cam Ranh Bay. Detachment Alpha's strength in-
creased in July 1967 when the first of six mechanized
landing craft (LCM(M)) that were specially config-
ured to sweep mines orrived at Nha Be.

170

Rounds from a Seawolf helicopter impact in a group of huts flying the Viet Cong flag. The quick response by these air
units often tipped the balance in favor of allied river patrol forces locked in combat with the enemy

Game Warden operations got underway in early
1966. Naval leaders set out to secure the vital water
passages through the Rung Sat and to establish pa-
trols on the large Mekong Delta rivers. On these latter
waterways, the Viet Cong transported arms and sup-
plies brought in from Cambodia, shifted guerrilla
units, and taxed the population. The Navy created
two separate task groups to direct operations in the
respective areas.

On 26 March 1966, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine, and
South Vietnamese forces kicked off Operation Jack-
stay, the war's first major action in the Rung Sat. PBR
units (including one section from Tortuga),
minesweeping boats from Nha Be, SEALs, and heU-
copters operated together to sweep the area. At the
end of the 12-day effort, the allies had killed or cap-
tured 69 of the enemy; destroyed Viet Cong supply
bases, training sites, and other logistical facilities;

171

A Navy SEAL signals the patrol behind him to stop while his comrades listen intently for sounds of the enemy. These men,
members of a highfy trained and motivated force, were especially valuable in the guerrilla warfare setting of Vietnam.

172

A SEAL team assault boat (STAB) speeds a squad of these naval commandos down the Bassac River, a major arm of the Mekong.

"Mekong Delta — SEAL Team Dropoff— Night Ambush" by John Steel

173

These SEALS, camouflaged from head to foot for jungle operations, enjoy the view from the overhead of a Navy river boat.

Heavily armed SEALs emerge from the bush with a Viet Cong prisoner. The naval commandos specialized in such
"snatch" operations, raids, ambushes, and intelligence collection actions.

174

One of the Nasty PTFs crewed by South Vietnamese special forces that attacked targets along the coast of North Viet-
nam. SEALS and other Navy personnel in Danang trained the boat crews, repaired the vessels, and coordinated these
special operations with MACV headquarters.

Some SEALS made the ultimate sacrifice. The officers and men of radar picket escort ship Camp (DER 251) extend full hon-
ors during the burial at sea off Cam Ranh Bay of Warrant Officer 1st Class Eugene Tinnin, killed in action during 1968.

175

Saigon

Nha Be •

Phuoc Hoa

• Go Cong

South China Sea

30 Miles
to Tuan Bien

176

The Rung Sat Swamp

A U.S. Navy 57-foot minesweeping boat
(MSB) of Mine Squadron 1 1 's Detach-
ment Alpha trails her gear on the Long
Tau, the main shipping channel between
Saigon and the South China Sea.

MSBs carry out a sweep of the 45-mile river to Saigon.

The price for failure. A merchant
freighter mined and sunk by the Viet
Cong rests stem down on the shallow
bottom of the Long Tau River.

and, at least for a time, restricted enemy movement
in the zone.

The enemy, however, remained a potent threat.
In one month, August 1966, Viet Cong mines in the
Long Tau heavily damaged SS Baton Rouge Victory, a
Vietnamese Navy motor launch minesweeper, and
MSB 54. In November, a Viet Cong mine sank MSB
54. And on the last day of the year, American forces
discovered a Soviet-made contact mine in the ship-
ping channel. The Americans and the South Viet-
namese intensified minesweeping operations and the
enemy continued to fight back. In February 1967
Communist recoilless rifle fire and mines destroyed
MSB 45 and heavily damaged MSB 49.

By the spring of 1967 the rapid buildup of aUied
forces in the Rung Sat area, the refinement of tactics,
and improvement of weapon systems began to re-
duce enemy effectiveness. During the year Viet-
namese Regional Force and U.S. Army 9th Division

As u§ty as it is deadly. A 1,000-pound,
Sow^made contact mine recovered by
the MSB force before the weapon could
do any damage.

As he successfully neutralizes a floating
mine, Chief Petty Officer Donald F.
McMahon displays the skill and fearless-
ness common to the men ofEOD 1 based
in Saigon.

179

The enemy fought hard to interdict the allied logistic line to Saigon. In February 1967 Viet Cong recoilless rifle fire and
mines heavily damaged MSB 49.

troops conducted aggressive sweeps ashore in coordina-
tion with the helicopter, PBR, and MSB units; the better
equipped LCM(M)s augmented the minesweeping force
ot Nha Be. SEALs begon sowing mines throughout
enemy-held areas, and both PBRs and MSBs added
ropid-fire, 40-millimeter grenade launchers to their ar-
mament. From mid-1967 to mid-1968, the Viet Cong
continued to ambush shipping on the Long Tau with
mines, 122-millimeter rockets, rocket-propelled
grenades, recoilless rifles, machine guns, and small
arms. Quick response by allied reaction forces, however,
often cut short these assaults. Thus, ship damage and
persormel casualties were relatively light. Other ottacks
never occurred because PBR and SEAL patrols upset
enemy plans or the MSBs and LCM(M)s swept up mines.
Consequently, the Communists were unable to sever
the vital lifeline to Saigon, even when their forces

were fighting for survival during the Tet and post-Tet
battles of 1968.

Game Warden operations in the central reaches
of the Mekong Delta began on 8 May 1966 when PBR
River Section 511 of River Division 51 at Can Tho pa-
trolled a stretch of the Bassac River. Soon ofterward,
other units initiated surveillaiice of the upper Mekong
and the My Tho, Ham Luong, and Co Chien arms of
the mighty river that emptied into the South China Seo.

In two-boat random patrols Task Force 116
sailors checked the cargo and identity papers of junks
and sampans plying the waterways, set up night am-
bushes at suspected enemy crossing points, supported
the SEALs with gunfire and transportation, and en-
forced curfew restrictions in their sector, usually no
more than 35 nautical miles from the base.

Game Warden operations in the central delta
registered only modest success from 1966 to 1968.

180

Only 140 PBRs were on station to patrol many miles
of river and canal. As a result, they could canvass
only the larger waterways. Still, the Task Force 116
patrol forced the Viet Cong to divert troops and other
resources to defense and to resort to less efficient
transportation on smaller rivers and canals. During
1966 the task force refined its tactics, evaluated the
performance of its boats and weapons in combat,
and regularized its operational procedures. At the
same time naval leaders repositioned the LSD and
LST support ships inland because heavy seas at the
river mouths made operations from there difficult.
The year 1967 opened with the accidental loss of a
PBR during launching operations from Jennings
County and the first combat loss of a river patrol boat.

A Navy minesweeping boat, displaying a
full suite of weapons and minesweeping
gear, heads home to Nha Be south of
Saigon after finishing another day oper-
ating on the Long Tau.

181

Vietnamese youngsters watch as a PBR sets out from its base at Moc Hoa for a 16-hour patrol on the Vam Co Tay.
With crewmen at their stations and ready for action, a PBR makes good speed along the Long Tau River south of Saigon.

182

starlight scopes used by the
Navy in Vietnam helped lighten
the night, when the Viet Cong
often chose to attack.

ELEVATION ADJUSTMENT
KNOB

OSCItLATOR CAP

OBiECTIVE ASSEMBLY

CONTROL SWITCH
BATTERY CAP
HAIN HOUSING

MJECTIVE FOCUSINO
KNOB

f OCUS RiNG

LOCKING LEVER

TELESCOPE MOUNT
ASSEMBLY

EYEPIECE ASSEMBLY

The Navy was not the only service to make use of Vietnam's watery highways. Here, troops of the U.S. Army's 199th Light
Infantry Brigade use a captured sampan to cross a river.

183

Sometimes fire was a weapon in this guerrilla war. Harkening back to an earlier age, a PBR sailor prepares to loft a fire arrow into
a hut concealing a Viet Cong bunker.

A hand-held ftame thrower destroys a thatched-roofhut used by the enemy as a position from which to ambush river patrol units.

184

A Jennings County (LST 846) gun crew pumps 40-millimeter rounds into Viet Cong positions on the Bassac River,
are from such shipboard guns often made short work of enemy ambushers.

The many hours on patrol sometimes
paid off for Task Force 1 1 6. River sailors
discovered these B-40 rockets during
their inspection of a sampan in January
1967.

185

These events foreshadowed a busy and dangerous
year for the Game Warden sailors who boarded over
400,000 vessels and inspected them for enemy per-
sonnel and contraband. In the process, the River Pa-
trol Force destroyed, damaged, or captured over 2,000
Viet Cong craft and killed, wounded, or captured over
1,400 of the enemy. The U.S. Navy suffered the loss of
39 officers and men killed, 366 wounded, and 9 miss-
ing in battle.

The Tet Offensive of 1968 fully engaged Task
Force 116. Because of their firepower and mobility,
the PBRs stiffened the defenses of numerous delta
cities and towns that were under siege by the enemy.
The river patrol boat units were key elements in the
successful allied stands at My Tho, Ben Tre, Chau
Doc, Tra Vinh, and Can Tho. The enemy prevailed
only at Vinh Long, where the Viet Cong overran the
PBR base forcing the defenders to withdraw to Garrett
County. Despite this and a few other temporary set-
backs, Tosk Force 116 reestablished firm control of the
major delta rivers by mid-year and helped cut short
the Viet Cong attacks on Saigon.

River sailors also gave critical support to allied
forces fighting to contain the enemy surge in I Corps.
From September to October 1967, River Section 521

Combat in Vietnam often came at close
quarters. PBRs, SEALs, and river assault
craft fought a pitched battle in early
1 968 with enemy forces holed up in this
village. The Navy captured 51 Viet Cong
soldiers during the engagement.

186

"Charlie" by John Steel

187

ond Hunterdon County deployed to the river areas
south of Donang and to Cau Hai Bay near Hue. PBR
units operated permanently in the northern reaches
of South Vietnam after 24 February 1968, when COM-
NAVFORV established Task Force Clearwater, under
the operational control of the Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force. The mission of the task
force was to secure the Perfume River (which gave ac-
cess to Hue from the sea) and the Cua Viet. The Task
Force eased supply efforts to American forces arrayed
along the DMZ ond holding the besieged outpost at
Khe Sanh. Home for the task force headquarters was
Mobile Base II, a floating barge complex stationed
first at Tan My and later at Cua Viet. Because heavily

armed North Vietnamese Army units were present in
this region, COMNAVFORV strengthened the 20-boat
PBR task force with monitors, armored river craft,
PACVs, landing craft, and minesweepers. Task Force
Clearwater could also call on helicopter, attack air-
craft, artillery, naval gunfire, and ground troop sup-
port from other units in the I Corps region. Convoys
bristling with weaponry were required to maintain
the line of communication with forward combat
units. The naval forces carried out equolly vital
minesweeping and patrolling operations. During
1968, Task Force Clearwater's support was crucial to
the successful defense of Khe Sanh, the recopture of
Hue, and the defeat of the enemy offensive in I Corps.

The Communists struck U.S. naval forces
when the time and circumstances were
right. This PBR, towed back to base, was
attacked by the enemy and set afire in
early 1967.

188

Chest Wound" by John Steel

Naval personnel often needed spiritual help to deal with the loneliness, privation, and horror of war. Here Navy Chaplain
Lieutenant (jg) Harry T. Jones baptizes American servicemen.

190

The pluses and minuses of the Navy's relations with the press differed little from those of the other services. Here Captain
Gray briefs reporters on Operation Came Warden.

foumalists covering the war sometimes paid a high price for their
work. Dickie Chappelle, who published a photographic piece on U.S.
naval advisors with the Vietnamese River Force for National Geo-
graphic magazine, later was killed in action.

191

Marines engage in the house to house struggle for Hue.

Although brief, the Communist seizure of Hue during the Tet Offen-
sive was especially brutal. A South Vietnamese man holds a skull, un-
earthed when the allies recaptured the city. The enemy executed
thousands of civilians.

192

Marines and sailors man the rculs of a landing craft hauling vital ammunition up the Perlume River to allied units fighting for Hue.
A Navy utility harbor craft loaded with high-explosive ammunition makes the dangerous passage to Hue.

193

A U.S. Air Force F-lOO Super Sabre and a Navy PBR hit enemy positions near Qui Nhon on the central coast. South Ko-
rean ground forces and American and Vietnamese units of the Market Time coastal patrol also took part in the operation.

194

This mobile base was deployed to the mouth of the Perfume River to provide logistic support to the Navy's Task Force Clearwater.

Navy Hospital Corpsman Leslie G. Osterman provides intravenous fluid to a Marine wounded by shrapnel.

Viet Cong sappers destroyed this heli-
copter at Can Tho on 31 January 1968.
Combat in the Mekong Delta during the
Tet Offensive was especially heavy.

A PBR sailor pumps rounds from his M-60 machine gun into an enemy position on the riverbank.

196

Vietnamese and American commandos
hand weapons to crewmen of a River Sec-
tion 541 PBR after an operation in the
Rung Sat.

Task Force 116 killed this Viet Cong sapper near Can Tho during Jet 1968. The quick response and hard fighting by the
units of the River Patrol Force enabled them to inflict grievous losses on the enemy in the Mekong Delta.

197

Riverine Assault Force

"W^ fhile the object of the Gome Warden force was
W W to reduce the enemy's logistic support, that of
the joint Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) was
to locate, encircle, and destroy Communist units in
battle. American militory leaders patterned the MRF
after the French naval assault divisions, or dinas-

An armored support patrol boat (ASPB)
of River Assault Squadron 11.

198

An armored troop carrier (ATC) of the Mobile Riverine Force cruises along a Mekong Delta river, one of many in this
strategically vital region of South Vietnam.

U.S. Army troops of the 9th Infantry Division file along a rice paddy dike.

199

Leaders of the joint Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). Army Colonel Bert A. David and Navy Captain Robert S.
Salzer relied more on cooperation than service doctrine to get the job done.

200

Amonitor, the heavily armed and armored "battleship" of the MRF. , ' • ';• ■:

Self-propelled barracks ship Benewah (APB 35), flagship of the MRF and a support base for soldiers, sailors, and assault craft.

201

An armored support patrol boat of River Assault Division 91 moves out at a fast clip ahead of the MRF to search for possi-
ble enemy ambushers or command-detonated mines. Shortly after the first units arrived in South Vietnam in January
1967, the Army-Navy force began operating in the Rung Sat.

Artillerymen of the Army's 9th Infantry Division hurry to their pontoon-mounted guns for a fire mission in support of the MRF.

202

A medical evacuation helicopter sets down on the landing pad of an armored troop carrier converted to accommodate aircraft.

Craft of the MRF move out in formation from the Mobile Riverine Base, which consisted of harbor tugs; a repair, berthing
and messing barge; barracks craft; and repair, net-laying, and tank landing ships.

203

General William C. Westmoreland, Com-
mander U.S. Military Assistance Com-
mand, Vietnam, arrives on board Be-
newah to confer with his commanders.
COMUSMACV controlled the operations
of the MRF through his subordinate
Commanding General II Field Force, Viet-
nam, and Commander Naval Forces,
Vietnam.

sauts, which performed well in the Indochina War
from 1946 to 1954. The Americans designed a forma-
tion especially suited to the Mekong Delta, where the
absence of dry land and abundance of navigable wo-
terways made it desirable to station ground troops on
board a mobile afloat base. In addition to transport-
ing infantry and artillery, the naval component was
intended to provide gunfire support for land sweeps
from heavily armed and armored river craft. As fi-
nally orgonized, the Mobile Riverine Force consisted
of an Army element, the 2d Brigade of the 9th In-
fantry Division, augmented in mid-1968 by the 3d
Brigade, and a Navy element. The MRF was under
COMUSMACV's overall direction.

The Commanding General II Field Force, Viet-
nam, exercised operational control of the Army con-
tingent while COMNAVFORV commanded the naval
component, designated the Riverine Assault Force
(Task Force 117). Commander Task Force 117, also ti-
tled Commander River Assault Flotilla 1 for purposes
of supply and administration, directed the operations
of River Assault Squadrons 9 and 11 (also assigned

204

task group numerical designations). After June 1968
Squadrons 13 and 15 joined the force. That same month,
the tosk force was reorganized into Mobile Riverine
Group Alpha with Squadrons 9 and 11, and Mobile
Riverine Group Bravo, with Squadrons 13 and 15.

Each 400-man squadron, divided further into two
river assault divisions, marshaled a powerful fleet of
five monitors. Each monitor was protected with
armor and equipped with .50-caliber, 40-millimeter,
and 20-millimeter gun mounts, two 40-millimeter
grenade launchers, and an 81 -millimeter mortar. An-
other two or three similarly armed and armored craft
served as command and control boats. A total of 26
armored troop carriers that mounted .50-caliber ma-
chine guns, rapid-fire grenade launchers, and 20-mil-
limeter cannon transported the Army troops. Also in-
stalled on the former amphibious landing craft were
helicopter landing platforms. A number of craft
mounted flame throwers or water connon to destroy
enemy bunkers. A modified armored troop carrier
functioned as a refueler for the river force. Beginning
in September 1967, to augment the firepower of these

Soldiers of the 9th Infantry Division's 2d
Brigade, the major Army component of the
MRF, disembark from an ATC and head
out in search of Viet Cong main forces.

205

A 9th Division trooper, weighted down with an M-60 machine gun, bandoliers of ammunition, and grenades, struggles to
move through the knee-deep mud common to the delta environment.

206

Medical personnel on board a monitor tend the injuries of soldiers and sailors wounded in July 1967. Many Americans
were killed or wounded during the MRF's bloody encounters with the Viet Cong, especially in enemy-initiated ambushes.

Personnel of the MRF interrogate Viet Cong prisoners taken in a cordon and search operation. The onset of night often en-
abled the enemy to slip out of even the closest of encirclements.

Viet Cong soldiers killed in battle. The heavy weapons of the MRF sometimes devastated enemy formations, such as the Viet
Cong 263d and 514th Main Force Battalions, which lost 173 men to the Americans in a single action in October 1967.

208

Evoking images of Civil War combat on the Mississippi, a battle line of monitors opens up on the enemy in the delta during 1968.

converted landing craft, each squadron was provided
with 8 to 16 newly designed assault support patrol
boats for minesweeping and escort duties.

In addition to leoding the naval combat flotilla,
Commander Task Force 117 also functioned as Com-
mander River Support Squadron 7. He was responsi-
ble for the Mobile Riverine Base from which normally
one or two infantry battalions and one river assault
squadron operated.

■ Mobile Riverine Base Composition

2 self-propelled barracks ships (APB)

1 LSI (another LST operated between the MRF

and Vung Tau)
1 specially configured landing craft repair ship

(ARL)

1 non-self-propelled barracks craft (APL)

1 repair, berthing, and messing barge (YRBM)

2 large harbor tugs (YTB)
1 net-laying ship (AN)

Mobile Riverine Base Ships, 1967-1968

APL 26 Askari (ARL 30)

Benewah (APB 35) / Caro//ne Count)/ (LST 525)

Cohoes (AN 78) CoHefon (APB 36)

Indra (ARL 37) Kemper County (LST 854)

Mercer (APB 39) ' Nueces (APB 40)

Satyr (ARL 23) Sedgwick County (LST 1123)

Vernon Couniy (LST 1161) raBM17

Whitfield County (LST 1169) YTB 84 • "

Wa5hfenawCount>'(LST 1166) FIB 85 , , . _ ' \ ;

Windham County (LST 1170) • _

Mobile Riverine Force units rototed between the
afloat base and Dong Tam, a logistic complex three
miles west of My Tho that Army engineers and Navy
Seabees built especially for the joint operation. The
base contained barracks, mess halls, repair shops,
floating crane YD 220, a C-130 airstrip, smoll dry-
docks, and waterfront facilities for the river craft. Fur-
ther, the Army based the headquarters of the 2d
Brigade, 9th Infantry Division at Dong Tam.

209

The Navy's first Mobile Riverine Force contingent
arrived in South Vietnam on 7 January 1967, when
Whitfield County disembarked River Assault Squadron
9 at Vung Tau. This and following units underwent
extensive preparation in river warfare at the Naval
Inshore Operations Training Center, Mare Island,
California, before deplo5mient to Southeast Asia. On
28 February, COMNAVFORV activated Task Force 117
under Captain Wade C. Wells. In March River Assault
Squadron 11 joined River Assault Squadron 9 at
Vung Tau. By June 1967, support ship Kemper County,
barracks ships Benewah and Colleton, and other ves-
sels had arrived in-country to round out the Navy's
MRF contingent.

MRP units had already fought minor actions
against the Viet Cong in the Rung Sat and in the
vicinity of Dong Tom. On 1 June, with the MRF up to
strength and most units acclimated to the combat
area, the force began intensive operations to find and
destroy enemy guerrilla units around Dong Tarn. The
first major battle occurred between 19 and 21 June
when the Army-Navy team trapped three Viet Cong
companies about 15 miles south of Saigon and killed
255 enemy soldiers. Another 59 Commimists died in
the area during July. Reacting to intelligence that two
Viet Cong battalions were preparing to attack Dong
Tam, the Mobile Riverine Base ships weighed anchor
and steamed 61 miles upriver to a new site. There
they joined with Vietnamese Marine, Vietnamese
Army, and U.S. Army battalions in decimating and
scattering the prospective enemy assault force. The
MRF recorded success of another sort in September
when a landing and sweep maneuver in the eastern
Rung Sat uncovered a cache of 105 rifles and ma-
chine guns, 165 grenades, 60 howitzer and mortar
shells, and 56,000 rounds of small arms ammuni-
tion. A small enemy hospital and 850 pounds of
medicine were found soon afterward.

The Viet Cong, however, eventually adjusted to
MRF tactics and struck back. During Operation Coro-
nado V in September 1967, the enemy sprang on am-
bush along a two-mile stretch of the Ba Rai River
southwest of Saigon. By the end of the four-hour en-
gagement, half of the vessels in the convoy had been
hit by enemy fire, 3 sailors were dead, and 77 were
wounded. Another six men were killed or wounded in
an ambush later that same month. Still, the MRF,

acting in conjunction with the Vietnamese Army 7th
Infantry Division, trapped elements of the Viet Cong
263d and 514th Main Force Battalions in October
and inflicted 173 casualties on these units.

From October to the end of November, the Mobile
Riverine Force searched for enemy troops reportedly
concentrated north of the Mekong between So Dec
and Dong Tam, but the enemy avoided significant
contact. Then, on 4 December, the Viet Cong triggered
an ambush against River Assault Division 112 on the
Ruong Canal northeast of Sa Dec. The river soilors
turned the tables when they fought through the am-
bush and landed troops on the enemy's flank. Soon
other American and Vietnamese combat units sur-
rounded and killed 266 Viet Cong and captured 321
small arms and 5,000 rounds of ammunition.

MRF actions during the 1968 Tet Offensive were
the key to allied military success in the delta and
earned the force the Presidential Unit Citation. Ex-
ploiting the inherent mobility and firepower of the
riverine command, COMUSMACV used it as his pri-
mary reaction force in the vast delta. During the first
week of February 1968, the MRF battled through the
streets of My Tho to help recapture the overrun city,
and then shifted to Vinh Long for several days of in-
tense combat with three Viet Cong battalions. For the
rest of the month the Army-Navy team fought around
the delta's chief city. Can Tho. The force killed 544 of
the enemy in this period of almost constant crisis.

During the first three months of 1968, the Mobile
Riverine Base traveled almost 1,000 kilometers while
conducting operations in Dinh Tuong Province and
entering new areas in Vinh Long and Phong Dinh
Provinces. In March, 10 armored troop carriers, 3
monitors, and 1 command and control boat of River
Assault Division 112 deployed to I Corps and sup-
ported oUied ground troops with gunfire on the vital
Cua Viet and Perfume rivers.

During the second quarter of the year when the
Communists mounted serious post-Tet attacks, the
riverine force decimated the Viet Cong 514th Main
Force Battalion near Cai Lay in the delta and another
formation south of Saigon. Fighting to relieve pres-
sure on the capital, the MRF inflicted 687 casualties
on besieging enemy forces.

In July and August, the Mobile Riverine Force
ranged throughout the delta with its full complement

210

A soldier of the 9th Division, whose battalion was deployed from the Mekong Delta to Saigon during the post-Tet battles
of May 1 968, races for cover under enemy fire.

Men of the 9 th Division move through the streets of My Tho in their hard fight to retal<e the city, lost in a surprise enemy
assault at the outset of the Tet Offensive. General Westmoreland credited the MRF, which operated as the American "fire
brigade," with "saving the delta."

211

MRF soldiers struggle to ford one more Vietnam waterway. Despite the MRF's success during 1968, the difficulty of deploy-
ing and sustaining the Army-Navy force in the inhospitable Mekong Delta led American leaders to consider other options.

212

Army medics and fellow soldiers help wounded troopers return to the river assault craft after a fierce battle ashore.

213

of river craft, support ships and 9th Division troops.
In the latter month, the MRF joined with other Army
and Navy units and with Vietnamese forces in a
large-scale penetration of the U Minh Forest, a long-
time Viet Cong stronghold. Although the enemy
fiercely resisted this intrusion, causing heavy allied
casualties, their military presence was maintained.
The operation heralded a subsequent campaign to
deny the Communists security in any area of the
delta. Having demonstrated their worth during two
years of combat, Mobile Riverine Force units would
be in the vanguard of this new strategic approach to
the war.

Left to right: An unidentified officer,
Colonel David, Captain Salzer. and Lieu-
tenant General Julian /. Ewell, Com-
manding General II Field Force, Vietnam,
discuss MRF operations. Because the gen-
eral believed the Army's troops could be
better employed in other operations, he
favored divorcing the 9th Division from
the MRF. New naval leaders also hoped
to use the force's assault craft in dis-
persed border interdiction patrols. As a
result, COMUSMACV disestablished the
Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force on 25
August 1 969.

214

he U.S. Navy continued its program of training
and equipping its sister service that had begun in
1950. From 1965 to 1968, however, the Americon
naval effort in Vietnam overshadowed the Viet-
namese Navy's contribution to the struggle. Further
diminishing that contribution was political in-fighting
among Vietnamese naval officers that resulted in the
removal of three successive chiefs of naval operations
during 1965 and 1966. Relative stability returned in
1967 and 1968, but the command disruption retarded
the development of leadership in the Vietnamese
Navy and this in turn hindered overall progress.

The Naval Advisory Group redoubled its efforts
to strengthen the shaky organizational, personnel,
and material base of the Vietnamese Navy. To ac-

complish this task, the group assigned advisors to
each large South Vietnomese naval vessel, each
Coastal Force and River Force group, and to the head-
quarters, ship and boat repair facilities, supply instal-
lations, and training facilities. The Naval Advisory
Group contingent increased from 235 officers and
men in early 1965 to 540 in mid-1968. Approxi-
mately half of the men were officers and the other
half enlisted.

Because the Chief, Naval Advisory Group directed
the Market Time coastal patrols and helped plan the
activation of the U.S. river patrol and riverine forces in
1965, he could not devote enough attention to his
training responsibility. Hence, in February 1966 the
American naval command appointed a Senior Advi-
sor, Vietnamese Navy Headquarters, and assigned him
responsibility for improving coordination between the

The Vietnamese-American team (left to right): Ensign Le Cuy Dang, VNN, Lieutenant Taylor Field, USN, and Lieutenant
(jg) Phu, VNN, observe maritime activity while on patrol with the Coastal Force along the littoral of South Vietnam.

215

two naval services. In October 1967 he was retitled Se-
nior Naval Advisor, assigned a larger staff, and placed
in charge of all U.S. naval advisors in the field. He
served directly under the Chief, Naval Advisory Group.

The average Americon naval advisor was dedi-
cated to preparing the Vietnamese Navy to some day
stand alone against the Communist foe. Often as-
signed to vessels or bases lacking even basic ameni-
ties, the odvisor also shared the risks of combat with
his hosts. His task wos a heavy one. Not empowered
to give orders, he could only hope to persuade his
Vietnamese counterpart that a particular course of
action was warranted. That advice often was ignored.
Aside from the natural difficulty of getting others to
accept counsel, the naval odvisor was often ham-
pered by the language barrier and differences in cul-
tures, educational levels, and personalities that sepa-
rated him from his counterpart. Furthermore, the
one-year tour completed by most advisors did not
allow them enough time to learn the job and bring
about meaningful change. Despite all this, the Naval
Advisory Group helped improve the Vietnamese
naval service in important respects.

The Vietnamese Navy, which grew from a force
of 8,242 men, 44 ships, and 200 other vessels in early
1965 to one of 17,574 personnel, 65 ships, 300 junks,
and 290 other craft in mid-1968, underwent several

Captain Allan P. Slaff, wearing three of the Vietnamese
Navy's highest medals, just awarded to him, served as the
Senior Naval Advisor during 1967 and 1968. In that ca-
pacity, he directed the actions of all Navy advisors in
South Vietnam.

organizational changes as well. In April 1965 the
Joint General Staff (JGS) decided to enhance their
control of the Vietnamese Marine Corps by making it
a separate service within the armed forces. In addi-
tion, the JGS redesignated the 1, II, III and IV Naval
Zones as Coastal Zones and, along with the newly
created III and IV Riverine Areas, placed them under
the operational control of the army commanders of
the I, II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Because of
its special riverine characteristics, the Rung Sat re-
mained in the navy's charge. Thus, with the excep-
tion of ships steaming outside of territorial waters,
most of the navy's combat forces came under army
direction. Administrative responsibility for the navy,
however, remained with the Chief of Noval Opera-
tions. Another significant reorganization occurred in
July 1965 when the JGS formally integrated the
3,500-mun, paramilitary Coastal Force into the navy.
Thereafter, the command's divisions and the old
coastal district designations were dropped and the
coastal zones became the operational sectors. In a
similar move, in October the following year, the Viet-
namese Navy was ossigned administrative responsi-
bility for the headquarters and training center of the
24 paramilitary Regional Force Boat Companies and
maintenance responsibility for their 192 vehicle and
personnel landing craft (LCVP).

216

Holding his ubiquitous swagger stick, Captain (later Admiral) Iran
Van Chon, the Vietnamese Navy's Chief of Naval Operations, listens
to American Captain Paul N. Gray. Serving as CNO from 1967 al-
most to the end of the war in Vietnam, Chon brought some stability
to an officer corps weakened by political turmoil.

Midshipmen of the Vietnamese Naval Academy at Nha Trang march to class. Despite the best efforts of U.S. advisors irom 1965
to 1968, the relative youth, inexperience, and political activism of many Vietnamese officers hampered the navy's development.

217

An American naval advisor shares a meal with his Vietnamese comrades-in-arms. Whether an advisor suc-
ceeded or not depended on his personality and that of his counterpart, their ability to communicate with
one another, and the Vietnamese unit's need for U.S. fire support and material assistance.

An American advisor and a Vietnamese soldier stand at the ready as other Coastal Force men search a vessel for Commu-
nist contraband. The sophistication of the U.S. coastal patrol effort and the technological superiority of American ships,
boats, and aircraft hurt Vietnamese morale and stifled initiative. .r , .

Submarine chaser Tuy Dong (HQ 04) of
the Vietnamese Navy tied up to the pier
at the Vietnamese Naval Shipyard in
Saigon. The United States transferred 21
ships to the Republic of Vietnam from
1965 to mid-1968.

On 1 January 1966, the Sea Force was renamed
the Fleet Command and reorganized along func-
tional lines. Flotilla I comprised the submarine
chasers (PC) and escorts in Squadron 11, the motor
gunboats in Squadron 13, and the large support
landing ships (LSSL) in Squadron 15. The minesweep-
ers in Squadron 17, also in Flotilla I, were responsible
for sea patrol, inshore patrol, river patrol, and
minesweeping duties, respectively. Flotilla II con-
trolled Squadrons 22 and 24, which consisted of the
Vietnamese Navy's landing ships and craft, coastal
oilers, and other vessels providing logistic support.

Throughout this period, the Vietnomese Navy
continued to suffer from serious deficiencies. Perhaps
the greatest was the careerism and interservice politi-
cal activity of many naval officers, which hamstmng
coordination and cooperation in operotions and low-
ered the morale and motivation of noval personnel.
The emphasis on politics disrupted the training of
sailors, many already educationally unprepared in
the technical skills essential for the operation of com-
plex vessels, weapons, and equipment. Aside from the

ST;

220

political factor, training in gunnery, seamanship, and
communications skills was hurt by the Vietnamese
stress on instruction at shore-based schools, rather
than on board ships. Unfortunately, few Vietnamese
sailors were released from operational duty to receive
training ashore. At the some time, the Recruit Train-
ing Center at Cam Ranh Bay, the Advanced Training
Center in Saigon, and the Naval Training Center at
Nha Trang, which included the Naval Academy, were
hard-pressed to hondle the great number of men en-
tering the service during this period. Some relief was
afforded by the training of Vietnamese officers and
men on board U.S. naval vessels and in the United
States. The quality of training improved somewhat as
a result of these measures and the hard work of many
Vietnamese sailors and American advisors.

The material condition of the navy raised even
more serious concerns. Officers and men in the oper-
ational units often showed little regard for the main-
tenance of their ships and craft. Compounding the
problem was the inability of the ship and boat repair
facilities to cope with the growing backlog of work or-
ders generated by the increased tempo of the war and

The Coastal Group 1 4 base at Tien Sa
south of Danang. The Viet Cong fre-
quently attacked and sometimes overran
these lightly fortified bases strung out
along the South China sea.

221

NAVY WARRIOR IRAN HONG VAN. Like most military organi-
zations in war, the South Vietnamese Navy used various means,
including widely distributed cartoon booklets, to motivate its
sailors and inspire them to acts of bravery in combat. One such
booklet told the story of a Vietnamese ''Terry and the Pirates, "
Iran Hong Van.

Petty Officer 3d Class Van, assigned to RAG 22, "hero- "Due to his eagerness ...Van joined RAG 22 to fight. . .

ically killed 20 VC, captured 18, and confiscated ... for control of the canals and rivers. While on patrol on

weapons and . . . grenades in 5 operations. " the Ben Luc River . ..in Operation Thang Long . . .

Suddenly his monitor was attacked by a VC unit, hid- "The monitor headed immediately" for the bank

den on the riverbank, which fired heavily." and Van "was ordered to go ashore and take on the

attackers."

222

Because of the "heroic action on foot" by Van, 6 VC
were killed and 3 weapons, and 5 cases of grenades
were seized.

"It was the 52d Ranger Battalion," holding along a
river bank and "desperately trying to resist an over-
whelming VC force. "

"With his .30-caliber machine gun. Van attacked the
VC, and this helped the friendly unit launch a counter-
attack and move wounded troops onto the monitor."

On 1 January 1965, on an operation in Due Hoa
Province, Van "suddenly heard a call from a friendly
unit for the help of a monitor."

"Seeing the sudden and miraculous appearance of the
monitor, the VC force went into shock. Fire from the
monitor rained down on them. "

"Another day Van's monitor, operating on the Ngang
Canal in Long An Province, suddenly spotted a VC unit
running away across a field. "

223

Van was ordered to go ashore. "He bravely searched
for VC occupying a dangerously booby-trapped and
mined position. "

The enemy lost 10 killed, 8 captured, about 10
weapons, uniforms, and supplies.

the doubling in size of the navy. The lack of skilled
workmen severely hampered operations at the Eost-
ern Repair Facility at Cuu Long near Saigon and the
Western Repair Facility at Can Tho, which handled
River Force and Coastal Force work. The same condi-
tion existed at the smaller establishments at Danang,
Cat Lo, Qui Nhon, An Thoi, and Rach Gia, which
supported the Coastal Force exclusively. A number of
these repair operations barely functioned. The situa-
tion was not much different at the larger Saigon
Naval Shipyard, the country's main industrial facility
and ship repair yard. Between 1965 and 1968, the
1,500-man skilled labor force lost 640 workers to
other higher paying wartime enterprises and to the
draft. As a result, ship overhauls fell from 23 in 1965

"The VC unit planned to run away, but Petty Officer
Tran Hong Van and his buddies pursued them hotly.

"Following all these brilliant exploits, " Van was
awarded 3 medals for bravery, 2 with silver stars, and a
commendation signed by the commander of the navy.

to 6 in 1967. Tasked to build Yabuta junks for the
Coastal Force, the yard completed 90 in 1965, 39 in
1966, and only 15 in 1967. The repair crisis was par-
tially eased by the dispatch to the yard of American
naval technicians, improved management proce-
dures by U.S. naval advisors, and the use of the Ship
Repair Facility on Guam for major overhauls.

Of the three major combat commands in the Viet-
namese Navy, the Coastal Force was most beset by
problems. By mid- 1968, hull and equipment deterio-
rotion and the disposal of inefficient sailing junks had
reduced the number of vessels in the 600-croft force by
half. Of the remainder, almost one-third were not op-
erational for lack of repairs, spare parts, supplies, or
fuel. The addition to the force of the newly constructed

224

A Vietnamese Navy I.CVP of the River
Force moves along a jungle-trimmed wa-
terway. The navy created seven more river
assault groups (RAG) from the hundreds
of craft provided through U.S. military aid.

YabutQ junks only partially offset this loss of opera-
tional vessels. The Yabuta, fiberglass-hulled to retard
damage from marine borers, was crewed by five men
and armed with .30-coliber and .50-caliber machine
guns and other automatic weapons. The craft, pow-
ered by 110-horsepower Graymarine diesel engines,
could reach speeds of 10 to 12 knots.

Personnel problems proved equally vexing. Al-
though authorized almost 4,000 men, the Coastal Force
often fell short by 700 to 800 men. Lacking the prestige
of the other combat branches and with its men under-
paid and isolated in austere bases, the junk force had
great difficulty recruiting personnel, especially those
with technical knowledge. Further, only a few of the
coastal group bases created formal training programs
to increase the skills of those men enlisted. Encouraged
by U.S. naval odvisors, the Vietnamese Navy had taken
limited steps in late 1967 and 1968 to improve the
training effort and to better the living conditions of the
junkmen, but much remained to be done.

Although the primary mission of the Coastal
Force was to curtail Communist seaborne infiltration
by patrolling waters close inshore, it registered little
success in this regard. American operations in the
outer Market Time sectors received greater attention
and this discouraged Vietnamese initiative. While the
junk force stopped and searched hundreds of thou-
sands of coastal craft, fewer than 50 percent of the pa-
trol units were on station at any one time, and rarely
at night. Still, the coastal groups did seize or destroy a
number of junks, sampans, and other craft carrying

enemy munitions and personnel and contributed to
the general deterrence role of the Market Time force.

The Coastal Force devoted most of its attention to
amphibious raids, patrols of shallow inlets and river
mouths, troop lifts, and blocking support for allied
ground sweeps. For instance, during Operation Irving
in October 1966, ground forces and junk units in II
Coastal Zone killed 681 Viet Cong troops. In addition,
the junkmen established a government presence
among the fishermen and provided them with medi-
cal services and other assistance. Sometimes the
Coastal Force sailors convinced Communist soldiers
to desert their units.

The enemy, who often attacked the 27 vulnerable
Coastal Force buses, overran the triangular-shaped
fortifications of Coastal Group 15 at Cua An Hoa in
July 1965 and of Coastal Group 16 at Co Luy in Au-
gust 1967. Other bases, however, withstood repeated
assaults. In doing so, these facilities played a part in
the allied effort that denied the enemy easy access to
the coastal regions.

From 1965 to 1968, progress was uneven for the
Fleet Command, another major component of the Viet-
nomese Navy. The Fleet Command grew, with an in-
crease of 300 personnel and the acquisition of 3 more
LSSLs, 8 PGMs, 6 LCM(M)s, 1 patrol rescue escort (PCER),
and 1 YOG. But maintenance and repoir of vessels, crew
training, and the quality of leadership remained
marginal. In contrast to the Coastal Force, the Fleet
Command vessels were overmonned, hurting shipboard
efficiency and habitability. Many of these factors de-

225

tracted ficom the command's operational readiness and
performance at sea and on the rivers. Normally, only 50
percent of the escorts and motor gunboats were avail-
able for ocean patrol, ond this effort constituted a minor
part of the total Market Time campaign. The river pa-
trol ond escort mission aided the allied cause, espeddlly
with the protection of shipping transiting the Mekong
River to Combodia. But because of inattention to defen-
sive precautions, these operations could be costly, as
demonstrated by the loss to mines in 1966 of an LSSL
and domaging of a large infantry landing ship (LSIL)
and a utility landing craft (LCU). Viet Cong mines also
took their toll of the command's MLMS fleet, which
worked to keep open the shipping channel to Saigon. In
August 1966 and again in January 1967, enemy mines
sank an MLMS in the Rung Sat. The logistic flotilla,
charged with supplying Vietnomese Navy bases
throughout the coimtry, transported 4,000 tons of cargo
and 5,000 passengers in 1966, but only 3,000 tons of
cargo and 3,000 passengers the following year. Litfle im-
proveirierit occurred In 1968.

Despite operational deficiencies, the Vietnamese
Navy's blue-water sailors had worked with their Ameri-
can naval advisors to rectify problems and increase effi-
ciency. By the end of 1968 the rivers and inshore
coastal waters were more secure than they had been at
the beginning. Further, on 15 Moy 1967, Fleet Com-
mand units began to take over sectors of the Market
Time outer barrier from U.S. ships; by the end of the
year vessels were stationed in each of the coastal zones.

As the Vietnamese Navy's primary combat arm,
the River Force was chorged with operoting with the
army to defeat the enemy in the vital Mekong Delta.
Recognizing the importance of this mission, the
Naval Advisory Group worked to procure new and re-
placement craft. The River Force received hundreds of
craft from 1965 to mid-1968, including specially con-
figured LCM 6 and LCM 8 landing craft that served
Qs monitors, command boats, troop transports,
minesweeping boats, patrol vessels, and fuel barges.
The United States also provided the river sailors with
27 American-built river patrol crdft (RFC). Unfortu-
nately, these vessels proved to be too noisy, under-
armed, and easily slowed by river vegetation.

The acquisition of all the new craft enabled the
Vietnamese Navy to create another seven river as-
sault groups. However, six of the newer groups
(28-33) operated with eight fewer craft than the nor-

226

ma\ complement of 19 river craft. The 27th RAG, a
special formation, deployed 22 boats. Fonned by the

Vietnamese Navy in June 1968, River Patrol Group 51
contained the first eight PBRs turned over by the U.S.
Navy. It was assigned duty on liie Long Tau and Dong
Nai rivers. The following montii, the 32d RAG rede-
ployed to Thua Thien north of Hue where it incorpo-
rated a six-boat detachment based there since May
1967. The other components of the River Force, the
River Transport Group, until dissolved in March 1966,
and the 28-boat River Transport Escort Group, added
to the mobility and firepower of the command.

River Assault Group Dispositions

Unit

Location

21st RAG

My Tho

22d RAG

Saigon

23d RAG

Vinh Long

24th RAG

Tan An

25th RAG

Can Tho

26th RAG

Long Xuyen

27th RAG

Soigon

28th RAG

Saigon

29th RAG

Can Tho

30th RAG

Saigon

31st RAG

Vinh Long

32d RAG

Long Xuyen

33d RAG

My Tho

The River Force did not fully employ its strength.
The political troubles of 1965 ond 1966 in the Republic
of Vietnam, in which high-ranking River Forte officers
figured prominently, damaged morale and distracted
personnel from their military mission. The navy and
the army rarely launched joint amphibious assaults
against the Viet Cong. Operotions reflected the River
Force's lack of technically skilled crewmen, the poor
maintenance and repair of river craft, and the absence
of inspired leadership. Usually, only half of the com-
mand's units were ready for combat octton, ond niany
of these boats were committed by the army to stotic
guard, resupply, troop lift, or other nonoffensive duties.
The reliance on defense over offense reflected the his-
toric Vietnamese strategy of husbanding resources
until there was clear advantage over an enemy. The
Vietnamese Navy's River Force sailors often fought
hard and bravely, killing many of the enemy and suf-
fering heavy losses of their own, but their valor and
sacrifice was not reworded with strategic success.

American-made landing craft reconfigured to serve as armed and armored troop transports proceed against the enemy in
the Mekong Delta. Interservice rivalry between the navy and the army of South Vietnam limited the number and effective-
ness of joint assault operations.

227

The shielded 40-millimeter gun of Fleet Command ship Long Dao (HQ 327), a large infantry landing ship (LSIL), pours
fire into a VC stronghold in the Rung Sat during 1968. . :

228

"he NqvqI Advisory Group and all other U.S.
Navy units in-country employed civic action to
win the support of the Vietnamese people for the
government of the Republic of Vietnam and the al-
lied couse. Wherever American forces operated,
they instituted programs to provide the local inhab-
itants with medical assistance, hygiene and sanito-
tion instruction, and English language training.
Units distributed clothes, toys, medicines, and soap
provided through the Navy's Project Handclasp and
kits for instruction in such subjects as midwifing,
agriculture, carpentry, and masonry supplied by
CARE. Chaplain Corps personnel often ministered
to Vietnamese civilions. Seabee Technical Assis-
tance Teams, renamed simply Seabee Teams, de-
voted their complete attention to the nation-build-
ing task. Assisted by local workers, the teams
constructed bridges, small dams, roads, houses for
refugees, schools, dispensaries, market places, and
municipal offices, usually in localities hotly con-

tested by the government and the Communists.
CMS Marvin Shields, the first sailor awarded the
Medal of Honor in the Southeast Asian conflict, was
a member of Seabee Team 1104. His self-sacrifice in
the line of duty during a Viet Cong attack on the
work site at Dong Xoai in June 1965 reflected the
average Seabee's dedication to the allied cause. So
well thought of by American and Vietnamese offi-
cials was the work of the Seabees that the number
of teams in the II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones
was increased to 15 by 1968.

Many sailors took action, often out of pure hu-
manitarian concern, to ease the plight of the Viet-
namese villagers caught in the upheaval of war.
The men freely donated their food rations, made fi-
nancial contributions to orphanages, and solicited
further help from friends and relatives back home.
Although their long-term value cannot be deter-
mined, the Navy's civic action programs in South
Vietnam clearly improved relations between naval
units and the population among which this war
without front lines was fought.

A sailor of the Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam, asks the Sister Superior at Tan Binh Orphanage about the needs of the
children there. He has just presented her with a monetary contribution from caring American citizens.

229

Lieutenant W. Dale Overfield (DC) pro-
vides dental care to villagers in the I
Corps region of South Vietnam. In addi-
tion to basic altruistic reasons, the U.S.
leadership felt that civic action measures
would help to lessen the hostility of Viet-
namese villagers toward the American
military forces in their midst.

A Seabee, with his M-14 rifle close at hand, uses a bulldozer to clear land for a new missionary school.

230

Vietnamese Navy Petty Officer 2d Class Phan Thi Bich Duyen helps process American-donated food, soap, clothing, and
toothpaste supplies for distribution to Vietnamese made homeless by war.

Navy Hospital Corpsman William Barnett tries to ease the fear of a Vietnamese child as he doctors her
minor cut.

Much of the material assistance provided the
Vietnamese people came by sea, as did 99 per-
cent of the ammunition and fuel and 95 percent of
the supplies, vehicles, and construction resources con-
sumed by the massive allied wor effort. With primary
responsibility for the sea line of communication to
Southeast Asia, the Navy oversaw the development of
o 7,000-mile, transoceanic lifeline to American forces
fighting ashore, steaming in the South China Sea,
and working on bases throughout the Pacific.

American merchant ship 55 American
Challenger, offloads supplies at Cam
Ranh Bay in August 1965. The Navy's
Military Sea Transportation Service
(MSTS) carried almost all the ammuni-
tion and fiiel and 95 percent of the sup-
plies, vehicles, and construction material
that reached the operational theater.

Soldiers of the Army's 11th Light Infantry Brigade form up after their sealift by troop transports to Qui Nhon, South Viet-
nam, in December 1967. The Navy operated 16 such vessels that carried over 40,000 U.S. and allied troops to war.

234

USNS Point Cruz (T-AKV 19), loaded
with CH-47 helicopters, F-5 fighter jets,
and truck trailers, arrives off South Viet-
nam in early 1 968 with other logistic
ships controlled by the Navy.

By mid-1967, the Navy's Military Sea Transporta-
tion Service operated a fleet of 527 reactivoted World
War II Reserve Fleet ships and chartered vessels under
U.S. ond foreign registry. Throughout this period,
MSTS shipping carried over 40,000 U.S. and allied
combat and support troops to South Vietnam. The al-
lied requirements for transportation were passed from
MSTS representatives in the ports of Danang, Chu
Lai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh, Vung Tau,
Phan Rang, and Vung Ro through the MSTS office in
Saigon to the MSTS Far East, headquartered in Yoko-
hama, Japan, and finally to Commander MSTS in
the United States. Many types of vessels sailed in the

235

An army truck exits USNS Comet (T-AKR 7), a revolutionary roll on/roll off ship that could be emptied of vehicles in one day.

SS Oakland, chartered by the Navy's MSTS, arrives in South Vietnam with its containerized cargo ready for immediate
unloading by giant harbor cranes.

^^^^

w0m

236

Port clearance units working at the deep-draft piers at Danang operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to keep supplies
A harbor tug navigates the crowded port of Saigon.

MSTS fleet, including converted escort carriers Core,
Card, Point Cruz (T-AKV 19), and Kula Gu/f (T-AKV 8),
which served as aircraft ferries. Corpus Christi Bay
(T-ARVH 1), formerly seaplane tender Albermarle (AV
5), operated as a helicopter repair ship for the Army.
In addition to the great number of stondard cargo
hulls, MSTS operated ships that carried cargo stowed
in easily handled containers ond new roll-on/roll-off
ships that could quickly load and unload vehicles
through rear or side ports. Arriving at Danang on 1
August 1967, Bienville was the first such container
vessel to reach South Vietnam. Fuel tankers included
the 190,000-barrel capacity Maumee (T-AO 149), the
140,000-barrel Cache (T-AO 67), and the 30,000-bar-
rel Chattahoochee (T-AOG 82); the latter was used for
storage and shuttle services in-country. .,

The Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet's
tank landing ship Caddo Parish (LST
515), one of many such ships that trans-
ported cargo to all the ports along the
South Vietnamese coast, is unloaded by
a cargo-handling vehicle.

238

MSTS also controlled as many as 16 troop trans-
ports in the Pacific during the buildup of forces in
South Vietnam. A fleet of LSTs, the number of which
increased from 17 to 42 by mid-1968, handled cargo
shuttling along the coast. In-port lighterage and termi-
nal duties were accomplished by the MSTS-contracted
Alaska Barge and Transport Company, which oper-
ated 19 tugs and 33 barges. The total MSTS effort en-
sured that the 550,000-man U.S. contingent in South
Vietnam was well supplied, armed, and prepared to
stay in the battle against the determined enemy.

The Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (SERVPAC),
which controlled or coordinated the actions of the lo-
gistic ships and shore support facilities throughout the
Pacific area, supplied the Navy in Southeast Asia.
SERVPAC 's primary subordinate commands for the
forces afloat were Service Group 1, based in San Diego
for the Eastern Pacific; Service Squadron 5 in Hawaii;
and Service Group 3, based in Sasebo, Japan, for the

Western Pacific. The latter group's Service Squadron 3
was also the Seventh Fleet's Logistic Support Force
(Task Force 73). The task force, designed for flexibility
and versatility, could concentrate a great number of
ships in Southeast Asia to provision the 100 units of
the deployed fleet with ammunition, petroleum prod-
ucts, supplies, and repairs. The task force provided the
fleet with repair parts, communications, and towing,
salvage, port service, postal, and medical support as
well as the universally desired movies that passed
from ship to ship. The replenishment of fleet combat-
ants at sea, a process constantly improved by new
equipment and techniques such as vertical replenish-
ment by shipboard helicopters, enabled the ships to
operate for long periods at Yankee and Dixie Stations,
on the Market Time patrol, and on the naval gunfire
support line. In a typical year, from 70 to 97 percent
of the deployed fleet's requirements for fuel, ammuni-
tion, and provisions were satisfied by sea transfer.

An awkward looking Army LARC (lighter, amphibious resupply cargo) of the 97 th Transportation Company drives from
the sea to shore.

239

A long-silent French gun stands guard
over Cam Rank Bay, a coaling stop of
the Russian Imperial Fleet before its date
with destiny at the Battle of Tsushima
Strait during the Russo-Japanese War.
Cam Ranh Bay, one of the world's fmest
natural harbors, was the site of a huge
U.S. logistic complex by the end of the
Vietnam War.

This task wqs eased considerably by modern, multi-
function logistic ships such as the combat stores ship
Mars (AFS 1) and fast combat support ship Sacra-
mento (AOE 1). Other vital specialized ships included
hydrographic survey ships Maury (AGS 16), Towhee
(AGS 28), and Tanner (AGS 15), and hospital ships Re-
pose and Sanctuary. These last vessels carried the most
modern equipment and a skilled naval medical staff
of 24 doctors, 29 nurses, and 250 corpsmen in addi-
tion to dental surgeons and chaploins. Medical evac-
uation helicopters generally took no more than 30
minutes to fly wounded troops from their units to the
ships, positioned close offshore. This deployment
-saved thousands of lives and eased untold suffering.
Salvage vessels such as Reclaimer (ARS 42) and fleet
tug Lipan (ATF 85) freed many grounded vessels, in-
cluding destroyer Frank Knox (DDR 742), Terrell County
(LST 1157), and infiltrating Communist trawlers. Task
Force 73's medium and light lift craft, comprising

240

241

Harbor Oearance Unit 1, recovered vessels sunk in
the inland waterways of South Yietnam.

The Service Force commander also directed the ac-
tivities of the Navy's Pacific-wide shore establishment.
This induded the Naval Ship Repair Facilities and Naval
Supply Depots in Yokdsuka, Japan; Subic Bay, Philip^
pines; and Guam; the Naval Magazines at Guam and
Subic; the Naval Ordnance Facilities at Yokosuka and
Sasebo, Japan; liie Fleet Pest Office at San FroncKco; and
tihe Headquarters Support Activity in Taiwan. The head-
quarters for area coordination, including the separate
Commanders Naval Forces, Marianas, Japan, and
Philippines, also reported to Commander Service Force.

In July 1967, the Ndvy strengthened SERVPAC's
ability to support the naval effort in Southeast Asia
when it placed under his command the Fleet Activi-
ties at Yokosuka, Sasebo, and the Ryukyu Islands; the

Nqval Base at Subic; the Naval Stations at Subic,
Guam, and Pearl Harbor; and the California Naval
Stations at San Francisco, Treasure Island, Terminal
Island, Long Beach, and San Diego. The air, subma-
rine, cruiser-destroyer, and other type commands in
the Pacific Fleet, however, continued to ensure the
readiness of their units through interaction with U.S.-
based parent commands and the Naval Ship, Air,
Ordnance, and other systems commands.

SERVPAC took care of the administrative needs of
another three commands: the Naval Construction
Battalions, U.S. Pacific Fleet; the Naval Support Activ-
ity, Danang; and the Naval Support Activity, Saigon.
COMUSM^CV, however, directed the operations of
the Seobee units and the support activities.

In contrast to the Seabee teams, which had been
in South Vietnam since 1963 to assist the counterin-

Saving destroyer Frank Knox fDDJ? 742), which ran aground on Pratas Reef during a storm in the South China Sea, was
a major accomplishment for the Pacific Fleet's salvage force.

-- ■"

""-IT -

IMHHHB

242

Army dredge Jamaica Bay lies on its side after VC swimmers mined and sank it off Dong Tarn in January 1967.

The Navy's heavy lift craft and the salvage personnel of Harbor Clearance Unit I worked night and day for over a month
to clear [amaica Bay from the constricted water approach to Dong lam.

243

Under fire from guerrillas ashore, Navy salvage personnel work to recover a Vietnamese Navy ATC sunk by the VC near
Ben Tre in April 1 970. The enemy wounded an American sailor and killed three Vietnamese sailors in this action.

surgency and notion-building programs, the naval
construction battalions were deployed to support
Navy and Marine Corps combat forces. On 19 May
1965 at Donong, the Navy activated the 30th Naval
Construction Regiment and placed it under COMUS-
MACV's III Marine Amphibious Force. This arrange-
ment lasted until 1 April 1966, when the newly estab-
lished Naval Forces, Vietnam, took over the
command responsibility. In Saigon exactly two
months later, the Navy activated the 3d Naval Con-
struction Brigade, which by the end of 1966 ran the
operations of all Seabee units in-country under COM-
NAVFORV guidance. A final command alignment oc-
curred on 1 August 1967, when the brigade head-
quarters was shifted from Saigon to Danang for
improved control of the 30th Naval Construction
Regiment and the newly activated 32d Naval Con-

struction Regiment. The former command directed
the Seabee battalions in the Danang area while the
latter controlled the construction effort around Hue
from its headquarters at Phu Bai.

The Seabee presence in South Vietnam increased
dramatically during the period, especially in the pre-
dominantly Marine I Corps Tactical Zone. Between 7
May 1965, when the 600-man Naval Mobile Con-
struction Battalion (NMCB) 10 landed at Chu Lai,
and mid- 1968, the construction force grew to over
10,000 men formed into 4 major headquarters staffs,
15 thirteen-man counterinsurgency teams stationed
country-wide, 12 battalions, and 2 maintenance
units. Besides NMCB 10, Commander Naval Con-
struction Battalions, U.S. Pacific Fleet deployed
NMCBs 3, 5, 9, and 11, and the Atlantic Fleet's
NMCBs 4 and 8 for eight-month tours of duty at Chu

244

Seventh Fleet ships crowd the harbor at Yokosuka, Japan. U.S. naval ship repair, supply, ammunition, and ordnance facili-
ties all over the Pacific supported the fleet at war in Southeast Asia.

The busy U.S. Naval Base at Subic Bay in the Philippines.

245

A Seabee of the 3d Naval Construction Brigade toils near the DMZ.

246

Work continues on the runway at Hue-Phu Bai even as a C-1 30 cargo plane lifts off.

Seabees of Naval Mobile Construction
Battalion 1 1 replace airfield matting
damaged in a North Vietnamese Army
rocket attack on the Dong Ha base near
the DMZ. Often under lire, the 10,000-
man Seabee force in Vietnam lost 57
men killed and many wounded between
1965 and 1968.

247

"Bridge Site 5, Hue, Vietnam" by John Roach

Lai and Danang during 1965 and 1966. The increase
in combat activity in northern I Corps necessitated
the deployment of additional units to Vietnam, in-
cluding the Atlantic Fleet NMCBs 1, 6, and 7, and the
newly commissioned NMCBs 40, 53, 58, 62, 71, 74,
121, 128, and 133. By July of 1968, five construction
battalions operated from Danang, two from Chu Lai,
two from Phu Boi, two from Quang Tri, and one from
Dong Ha. In addition, Construction Battalion Main-
tenance Units 301 and 302 maintained and repaired
naval base facilities at Dong Ha and Cam Ranh Bay.
Further, smaller detachments built facilities at Dong
Tom, Cu Chi, Pleiku, Long Binh, Nha Trang, and
other locations in the southern areas of South Viet-
nam. Although remaining under the operational
control of the Seventh Fleet's Commander Amphibi-

248

ous Force, Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 oper-
ated for short periods in South Vietnam, installing
pontoon piers and offshore fuel lines to support com-
bat forces ashore, and assembling special pontoon
barges for use by the Navy's river forces.

Often working under fire as they had during
World War II and the Korean War, the Seabees in Viet-
nam provided invaluable support to the allied ground
campaign. The naval units completed helicopter pads,
airfield runways, taxi strips, and hangars at Chu Lai,
Danang, and Phu Bai. They also built port facilities
and boat ramps at Danang and Cua Viet; surfaced,
resurfaced, and kept open Route 1 and other vital
roads; and erected thousands of bridges, including the
2,000-foot-long Liberty Bridge over the Thu Bon River
southwest of Danang. The Seabees also constructed

A Seabee hefts a heavy load of concrete during construction at Chu Lai. The construction battalions, many of them from
the Naval Reserve, built bridges, airfield runways, fortifications, cantonments, and storage facilities.

249

Men of Construction Battalion Mainte-
nance Unit 301, Detail Bravo, proudly
display the Presidential Unit Citation
streamer awarded their unit for excep-
tional service during the long North Viet-
namese siege ofKhe Sanh.

fortifications, observation towers, fuel storage tanks,
barracks, mess halls, storage buildings, ammunition
storage areas, and medical facilities such as the
Navy's 400-bed station hospital at Danang. The
Seabees operated stone quarries, drilled wells, and re-
paired damage from Viet Cong rocket, artillery, and
mortar fire. The Navy's construction units were espe-
cially valued during the Tet Offensive, when they pre-
pared facilities and defenses for Army divisions dis-
patched to I Corps, repaired a crucial bridge across the
Perfume River to Hue, and helped reopen land com-
munications to the besieged Marine base at Khe Sanh.
These accomplishments were not without cost. From
1965 to 1968, 57 Seabees were killed and hundreds
were wounded in the line of duty.

250

Navcd Support Activities

Over the span of several years, the Naval Support
Activity, Danang, became the Navy's largest
overseas logistic command. But in March of 1965
when Marine combat troops moved ashore into I
Corps, the support establishment was rudimentary.
The port of Danang contained only three small piers,
three LST ramps, and a stone quay that were inacces-
sible to oceongoing vessels; even smaller craft had
trouble approaching. The scorcity of lighterage ond
the heavy weather that often buffeted the harbor
made ship-to-craft cargo transfers hazardous and in-
efficient. Warehouses, open storage areas, cargo han-
dling equipment, and good exit routes from the port
were limited.

From March to July 1965, III Marine Amphibious
Force troops delivered supplies to the units in the field
while the Seventh Fleet ron port operations. Soon, the
fleet dispatched Naval Beach Group 1, Cargo Han-
dling Battalions 1 and 2, nucleus port crew, Mine
Force, Service Force, underwater demolition team,
and explosive ordnance disposol units to Donang.
The Navy also took charge of the offloading, storage,
and delivery of supplies common to all the allied
forces in I Corps. Additional responsibilities included
harbor defense and the transshipment of cargo to the
smaller ports in the region. The fleet also managed
logistic operations at these locations.

The Navy took formal control of the I Corps lo-
gistic establishment oh 15 October 1965, when it es-
tablished Navol Support Activity, Danong. During
the next several years, the command created subordi-
nate naval support activity detachments at Chu Lai,
Hue, Tan My, Dong Ha, Cua Viet, Phu Bai, and Sa
Huynh. These detachments decentralized the support
function and improved the logistic flow.

The navol commonder of NSA Danang had great
resources at his disposol to accomplish his mission.
Logistic vessels included LCM 3, LCM 6, and LCU
landing craft; harbor utility craft (YFU); small harbor
tugs (YTL); open lighters (YC); refrigerated barges
(YFRN); Army craft; and a refrigerator ship. While
base facilities were under construction, the fleet de-
ployed to Danang LSTs, an LSD, and on attack trans-
port (APA), the latter for quartering and messing NSA
personnel. The harbor defense unit used landing

craft, picket boats, ond 16-foot Boston Whalers to
monitor and protect the maritime traffic. A small
craft repair facility and a floating drydock (AFDL)
helped keep NSA vessels in working order. Over 130
rough terrain and warehouse forklifts and 20 cranes
eased cargo handling.

The logistic establishment at Danang functioned
with growing efficiency by mid-1968 as it built new
port and shore facilities. Seabees, initially using ma-
terials pre-stocked long before the war in Advanced
Base Functional Component packages, constructed
three deep-draft piers for oceangoing ships, two 300-
foot wooden piers, an LST causeway, ond the Bridge
Cargo Complex that consisted of o 1,600-foot-long
wharf, 300,000 cubic feet of refrigerated storage
space, and 500,000 square feet of covered storage
space. Amphibious fuel lines were loid along the sea
floor to storage tanks ashore dt ked Beach, north of
the dty, and the Marine air facility at Marble Moun-
tain to the south.

During 1965 the logistic operation at Danang
suffered from lack of suitable or sufficient harbor
craft, cargo handling equipment, and port personnel.
Management and planning of the logistic flow
needed refinement, as ships arrived en masse with
cargo improperly stowed and packaged. Storage
areas ashore were limited by space and access; Fi-
nally, the harsh Northeast Monsoon made cargo op-
erations at Danang and throughout I Corps haz-
ardous and difficult during the winter months.

From 1966 to 1968, however, new resources and
management procedures dramotically improved the
situation. By July 1968 the Naval Support Activity
bundled 350,000 tons of cargo each month for the
200,000 allied troops in I Corps. Danang had become
the largest fuel complex in South Vietnam, capable
of holding over 500,000 barrels. The station hospital
begun in 1965 had treated over 21,000 casualties,
44,000 nonbattle patients, and one million outpa-
tients flowing in from the hostile and disease-ridden I
Corps environment.

The outlying NSA detachments proved godsends
during the Tet Offensive, when they ossumed the lo-
gistic support of the sometimes isolated allied forceis.
The units at Dong Ha and Cua Viet on the Cua Viet
River pushed supplies and ammunition through to
the 3d Marine Division holding the line at the DMZ

251

Cargo is offloaded from US. landing craft at one ofDanang 's austere port facilities early in 1966. The Navy, responsible for sup-
plying all American forces in I Corps, mounted a herculean effort from 1965 to 1968 to improve the logistic capacity ofDanang.

The Cua Viet Detachment of Naval Sup-
port Activity (NSA), Danang. served as a
forward logistic base for allied forces ar-
rayed along the DMZ. The Cua Viet base
proved vital during Tet 1 968 when the
enemy severed road links to the front.

252

253

By late 1967, Danang had become the world's largest naval logistic complex.

Allied supply vessels tied up to the three deep-draft piers built by Seabees for NSA Danang. The Navy also established the
open cargo storage area with soil dredged from the harbor bottom.

254

Navy medical personnel rush a wounded man from a helicopter landing pad to the emergency receiving area of the U.S.
Naval Hospital at Danang. ■ - , : ■ iy r , . ; - -.•

255

Quonset buildings, first developed by the Navy in World War II, are assembled to form a 400-bed naval hospital at Danang.

Communist 122-millimeter rockets, often
used in attacks on airftelds, barracks,
and even the naval hospital in Danang.
Marine troops discovered these weapons
before the enemy could launch them.

256

while the Ton My detachment assisted the troops
locked in combat at Hue. The support establishment
at Chu Lai supplied the 1st Marine Division while the
one at So Huynh supplied Army troops near Due Pho.
Naval Support Activity, Danang, thus helped the
Americon and other combat contingents withstand,
and eventually roll back the enemy's 1968 onslaught.

In contrast to Danang, a logistic establishment
olready existed at Saigon when mojor U.S. forces
came ashore in South Vietnam in 1965. The Head-
quarters Support Activity, Saigon, gradually turned
over most of its responsibilities for common support of
the other services to the Army, but the command con-
tinued to provide valuable assistance. During a single
month in 1965 the octivity's Saigon port operotion of-
floaded over 330,000 tons of cargo from 96 ships and
transshipped 40,000 tons to other coastol centers.
Throughout the year HSAS divisions acquired 2.7 mil-
lion feet of storage space, managed 54 bachelor offi-
cer and enlisted quarters, oversaw 318 construction
contracts, and distributed 60,000 books and maga-
zines from the activity library to outlying bases. The

Saigon Station Hospital's 109 medical personnel con-
tinued to treat thousands of patients.

Naval Support Activity, Saigon, which the Navy
activated on 17 May 1 966, two days after HSAS ceased
operations, was charged with providing logistic sup-
port to naval units in the II, III, and IV Corps Tactical
Zones. The newly created NAVFORV directed the oper-
ations of NSA Saigon. The support activity supplied
the Navy's Coastal Surveillance Force, River Patrol
Force, Riverine Assault Force, and the various special-
ized headquarters, offices, and detachments operating
in the three southern corps areas. NSA Saigon pro-
vided the commands with ammunition, weapons, and
communications equipment; transported cargo and
personnel; repaired and maintained ships and craft;
stocked spare parts; and built bases and facilities. Fi-
nally, NSA saw to the quartering, messing, payroll,
and recreational needs of the naval officers and en-
listed personnel in Vietnam.

The Saigon activity developed subordinate sup-
port bases for the combat forces similar to those of
NSA Danang. NSA Soigon detachments at Qui Nhon,

The busy port of Saigon, which served both the Vietnamese civilian and allied military communities in the southern re-
gions of South Vietnam. Naval Support Activity, Saigon, handled the Navy's supply, ship repair, construction, payroll, and
administrative needs.

257

Captain Archie C. Kuntze, the first Com-
manding Officer ofNSA Saigon, visits a
Catholic mission. The atmosphere in
wartime Saigon sometimes inspired mis-
deeds and the Navy, like other U.S. agen-
cies, did not escape scandal. In late 1966
the Navy court-martialed Captain Kuntze
and found him guilty of "wrongfully and
dishonorably abusing his office. " He re-
tired from the service soon afterward.

YFR 890 carries fresh provisions from Saigon to Task Force 116.

258

The burgeoning demand for logistic support along the central coast of South Vietnam in the fall of 1967 induced the
Navy to upgrade the NSA Saigon detachment at Cam Ranh Bay to a Naval Support Facility

NhQ Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, An Thoi, Cat Lo, and
Vung Tau primarily served the Market Time opera-
tion, although the last two bases were home to other
naval combat units as well. The concentration of the
Task Force 115 headquarters, naval air units, and
other large contingents at Cam Ranh Bay required
greater command authority and logistic resources. As
a result, in September 1967, NSA Saigon upgraded the
detachment to the Naval Support Facility, Cam Ranh

Bay. Detachments were also established at Can Tho
(later moved to nearby Binh Thuy), Nha Be, Vinh
Long, Sa Dec, My Tho, Ton Chau, and Long Xuyen.
These units saw to the special needs of the Task Force
116 PBR commands. NSA Saigon, Detachment Dong
Tam, supplied only the Mobile Riverine Force naval
units.

To perform its work, NSA Saigon operated many
logistic support vessels, including repair and mainte-

259

A C-47 Skytrain cargo plane ofNSA
Saigon's "Air Cofat" heads for an up-
country Navy base. HU-1 6 Albatross am-
phibians and C-45 Beachcrafts also
helped supply outlying naval units.

No units in Vietnam were beyond the enemy's reach. Lieutenant Commander Carl R. Parrick, Commanding Officer ofNSA's air
detachment, stoically points to a VC bullet hole in the C-47 flown by him and his copilot, Lieutenant Donald R. McGanigle.

260

nance ships Tutuila (ARG 4), Markab (AR 23), and Kr-
ishna (ARL 38); LSTs; and barges used for berthing cmd
messing personnel and for providing fuel, water, sup-
plies, and repairs. The support activity also ran an air
tronsportation service, nicknomed "Air Cofot" (the
unit operated from a building once owned by the
French Cofat cigarette compony). The naval unit flew
C-47, C-117, TC-45I, HU-16, and H-46 aircraft from
Ton Son Nhut Airfield near Saigon. By mid-1968 NSA
Saigon had developed its logistic support system to
such a degree that naval combat operations were

rarely constrained by the lack of supply. By August, the
2,500-man activity transported 6,000 to 8,000 tons of
cargo each month by water to forces in the field. Air
Cofat delivered another 300,000 to 400,000 pounds of
supplies and 3,500 passengers. The repair and mainte-
nance vessels kept the 487 in-country combat and sup-
port craft ready for operations throughout the southern
corps areas and on the coast. NSA Saigon's skill in
maintaining the flow of logistics to the naval combat
forces helped them take the steam out of the enemy's
attacks in the capital region during 1968.

261

CHAPTER FOUR

RAMATIC CHANGES IN THE COURSE

of the war characterized 1968. The enemy's bloody country- wide Tet Offensive of
February and March and the follow-up ottacks during the spring influenced Ameri-
can decision-making in several important ways. The Johnson administration, con-
vinced that the allied military struggle was faring badly and buffeted by growing
domestic opposition to the American role in the war, ordered the gradual with-
drawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia. At the same time, the administration
began diplomatic talks in Paris with the Vietnamese Communists in hopes of
achieving a negotiated settlement of the long conflict. U.S. leaders decided that
their ability to deal from o position of strength depended on an enlargement and
improvement of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces as U.S. forces departed the the-
ater. This "Vietnamization" of the war became the cornerstone of American policy.

The SEALOSDS Campaign

s U.S. forces prepared the South Vietnamese military to assume complete re-
sponsibility for the war, they also worked to keep pressure on the enemy. In
fact, from 1968 to 1971, the allies exploited the Communists' staggering battle-
field losses during the Tet attacks by pushing the enemy's large main force units
out to the border areas, extending the government's presence into Viet Cong
strongholds, ond consolidating control over population centers.

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of
Naval Operations, calls on South Viet-
namese President Nguyen Van Thieu in
Saigon during August 1968. Even as they
spoke, Washington leaders were planning
to exploit the enemy's enormous battle-
field losses during Tet.

The new team. On 30 September 1968, Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. (left), replaced Rear Admiral Kenneth L Veth
(right) as Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam. Present for the ceremony were (left to right) General Creighton W.
Abrams, the new Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker; and Ad-
miral John S. McCain, Jr., the new Commander in Chief, Pacific.

264

The SEALORDS Operational Theater

265

A North American OV-10 Bronco of Light Attack Squadron (VAL) 4 takes off from Binh Thuy Airfield.
An aircraft-mounted 7.62 minigun opens up on the Viet Cong below.

266

Admiral Zumwalt, an intellectually sharp and dynamic flag officer,
was the driving force behind the SEALORDS strategy that called for
the deployment of combined-arms patrol forces along the border with
Cambodia and deep into enemy base areas.

A young but determined PBR sailor is ready for action at his M-60 machine gun

The Navy in particular spearheaded a drive in
the Mekong Delta to isolate and destroy the weak-
ened Communist forces. The SEALORDS (Southeast
Asia Lake, Ocean, River, and Delta Strategy) program
was a determined effort by U.S. Navy, South Viet-
namese Navy, and allied ground forces to cut enemy
supply lines from Cambodia and disrupt operations
at base areas deep in the delta. It was developed by
Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., appointed COM-
NAVFORV in September 1968.

When Admiral Zumwalt launched SEALORDS in
October 1968 with the blessing of the new COMUS-
MACV, General Creighton Abrams, allied novol
forces in South Vietnam were at peak strength. The
U.S. Navy's Coastal Surveillance Force operated 81

American and Vietnamese bluejackets
patrolling on the Vinh Te Canal, only a
short distance from Cambodia, keep a
sharp eye out for the enemy. A significant
feature of the SEALORDS strategy was its
stress on the integration of American and
Vietnamese operations.

268

Swift boats, 24 Coast Guard WPBs, and 39 other ves-
sels. The River Patrol Force deployed 258 patrol and
minesweeping boats; the 3,700-man Riverine Assault
Force counted 184 monitors, transports, and other ar-
mored craft; and Helicopter Attack Light Squadron 3
flew 25 armed helicopters. This air component was
soon augmented by the 15 fixed-wing OV-10 Bronco
aircraft of Light Attack Squadron (VAL) 4, activated
in April 1969. The lethal Bronco flown by the "Black
Ponies" of VAL-4 carried 8 to 16 5-inch Zuni rockets,
19 2.75-inch rockets, 4 M-60 machine guns, and a
20-millimeter cannon. In addition, five SEAL pla-
toons supported operations in the delta. Comple-
menting the American naval contingent were the
Vietnamese Navy's 655 ships, assault craft, patrol
boats, and other vessels. To focus the allied effort on
the SEALORDS campaign, COMNAVFORV appointed
his deputy the operational commander, or "First
SEALORD," of the newly activated Task Force 194. Al-
though continuing to function, the Game Warden,
Market Time, and Riverine Assault Force operations
were scaled down and their personnel and material
resources increasingly devoted to SEALORDS. Task
Force 115 PCFs mounted lightning raids into enemy-
held coastal waterways and took over patrol respon-

sibility for the delta's larger rivers. This freed the PBRs
for operations along the previously uncontested
smaller rivers and canals. These intrusions into for-
mer Viet Cong bastions were possible only with the
on-call support of naval aircraft ond the heavily
armed riverine assault craft.

In the first phase of the SEALORDS campaign al-
lied forces established patrol "barriers," often using
electronic sensor devices, olong the waterways paral-
leling the Cambodian border. In early November
1968, PBRs and riverine assault craft opened two
canals between the Gulf of Siam at Roch Gia and the
Bassac River at Long Xuyen. South Vietnomese
paramilitary ground troops helped naval patrol units
secure the transportation routes in this operational
area, soon named Search Turn. Later in the month.
Swift boats, PBRs, riverine ossault craft, and Viet-
namese naval vessels penetrated the Giang Thanh-
Vinh Te canal system and established patrols along
the waterway from Ha Tien on the gulf to Chau Doc
on the upper Bassac. As a symbol of the Vietnamese
contribution to the combined effort, the allied com-
mand changed the name of this operation from Foul
Deck to Tran Hung Dao I. Then in December U.S.
naval forces pushed up the Vam Co Dong and Vam

U.S. naval vessels, covered by a "Cobra" attack helicopter, proceed along a canal in the Barrier Reef operational area.
Close support by aircraft was an absolute necessity for patrols inland.

269

On 6 December 1968, the first day of Operation Giant Slingshot, naval forces move in formation up the Vam Co Dong. The
combined use of Navy PBRs, ASPBs, ATCs, and monitors and Army landing craft reflected the new tactical approach.

Searching suspicious water craft continued to be a PBR mission.

270

A river craft, employing a high-powered water hose, washes away enemy bunkers discovered along the Vam Co Dong.
This method was much more effective and less costly than using explosives.

"Hominy Station— Firefight and Ambush-Swift Boat in Rung Sat" by John Steel

271

A PBR lands South Vietnamese Popular Force militiamen on a Mekong River island in a search for caches of Communist munitions.

This cache ofB-40 rockets, mortar rounds, AK-47 rounds, and other munitions discovered by the men of the Navy's River
Division 534 and the Army's 1st Cavalry Division reflected the success of Giant Slingshot against the enemy supply effort.

272

Co Toy rivers west of Saigon, against heavy enemy
opposition, to cut infiltration routes from the "Par-
rot's Beak" areo of Cambodia. The Giant SHngshot
operation, so named for the configuration of the two
rivers, severely hampered Communist resupply in the
region near the capital and in the Plain of Reeds.
Completing the first phase of the SEALORDS pro-
gram, in January 1969 PBRs, assault support patrol
boats (ASPB), and other river craft established patrol
sectors along canals westward from the Vam Co Toy
to the Mekong River in Operation Barrier Reef. Thus,
by early 1969 a patrolled waterway interdiction bar-
rier extended almost uninterrupted from Toy Ninh
northwest of Saigon to the Gulf of Siam.

The enemy fought hard against the
SEALORDS strategy. PER 864, mined in
January 1969, was only one of a number
of Navy river craft attacked on the Cam-
bodian frontier.

273

Allied Navies on the Offensive

'he new year witnessed the strengthening of the
border patrol barriers and the expansion of
SEALORDS into three regions: I Corps, the area north
of Saigon, and the remotest reaches of the Mekong
Delta. In April, Task Force Clearwater's I Corps efforts
were enhanced by Operation Sea Tiger in which Task
Force 115 Swift boats. River Division 543 PBRs, Viet-
namese Coastal Group 14 junks, and River Assault
Group 32 units battled to secure the Cua Dai and Hoi
An rivers in Quang Nam Province. Sioon afterward, in
June, navol river forces begon patrolling the vital
Saigon River from Phu Cuong to Dau Tieng, the latter
in the hotly contested Michelin Rubber Plantation.
This operation, designated Ready Deck, tied in with
the Giant Slingshot interdiction effort to the west.

PCF 43, weapons at the ready, proceeds
at high speed into a Mekong Delta water-
way. Formerly used only on the coastal
patrol, these Swift boats adapted well to
river operations, j f

274

275

i-'

In the Mekong Delta proper, Swift boat, PBR,
riverine assault craft, SEAL, and Vietnamese ground
units struck at the Viet Cong in their former
strongholds, which included the Co Mau Peninsula,
the U Minh Forest, and the islands of the broad
Mekong River system. From 7 to 18 April, ground, air,
and naval units from each of the American services,
the Vietnamese Navy, and the Vietnamese Marine
Corps conducted Silver Mace II, a strike operation in
the Nam Can Forest on Co Mau Peninsula. The
enemy avoided heavy contact with the allied force,
but his logistical system was disrupted. After raiding
and harassing operations like Silver Mace II, the com-
bined navies often deployed forces to secure a more
permanent Vietnamese government presence in vital
areas. In June 1969, for example, the U.S. Navy an-
chored a mobile pontoon base in the middle of the Cua
Lon, a river in the Co Mau region. This operation, lo-

U.S. naval vessels operate from Sea Float
to contest Viet Cong control of the sur-
rounding Ca Mau Peninsula. Sea Float •
was formed with connected pontoon
barges anchored in the Cua Lon River.

276

Commander Paul A. Yost, USCG (future
Coast Guard commandant), whose unit
operated from Sea Float, talks with a
local woodcutter. U.S. naval leaders be- '
lieved that the presence of allied forces in
the area would induce such civilians to
support the government in Saigon. This
assumption proved overly optimistic.

beled Sea Float, was made difficult by heavy Viet
Cong opposition, strong river currents, and the dis-
tance to logistic support facilities. Still, Sea Float de-
nied the enemy a safe haven even in this isolated
corner of the delta. The allies further threatened the
Communist "rear" area in September when they set
up patrols on the Ong Doc, a river bordering the
dense and isolated U Minh area. Staging from an ad-
vance tactical support base at the river's mouth, U.S.
and Vietnamese PBRs of Operation Breezy Cove re-
peatedly intercepted and destroyed enemy supply
parties crossing the waterway. , ..

277

Hospital Corpsman Daniel F. Lee, as-
signed to Sea Float, examines a Viet-
namese child. Few civilians in the remote
Ca Mau region of Vietnam had ever re-
ceived modern medical care.

By October 1969, one year after the start of the
SEALORDS campaign, Communist military forces in
the Mekong Delto were under heavy pressure. The
successive border interdiction barriers delayed and
disrupted the enemy's resupply and troop replace-
ment from Cambodia. The roiding operations hit vul-
nerable base areas and the Sea Float deployment put
allied forces deep into what had been a Viet Cong
sonctuary. In addition, American and Vietnamese
forces captured or destroyed over 500 tons of enemy
weapons, ammunition, food, medicines, and other
supplies. Furthermore, 3,000 Communist soldiers
were killed and 300 were captured at a cost of 186 al-
lied men killed and 1,451 wounded.

278

Navy EOD personnel explode a Communist mine found in May 1969 on the Ong Doc, a river in the U Minh Forest. Later
that year, in Operation Breezy Cove, the allies established a permanent presence on the river.

279

A South Vietnamese sailor, dressed for comfort if not safety, mans a .30-caliber machine gun during a river patrol on the
Cai Lon Canal in the U Minh Forest.

A South Vietnamese marine, after dis-
embarking from a supporting river as-
sault craft, moves inland for a patrol of
the Co Mau.

280

Sweating in the tropical heat, naval ordnancemen load rockets into a pod slung under an OV-10 Bronco ofVAL-4.

281

282

A specially configured LCM fires a volley of 5-inch rockets into enemy positions in the Mekong Delta during late 1969.

Admiral Zumwalt, who often flew to sites of recent battle, speaks to weary but proud combat veterans of the River Patrol
Force in the later months of 1 969. When it became clear that the United States was withdrawing from the war, naval offi-
cers maintained morale by stressing one's patriotic duty.

¥ietiiaiHizcitloii of Mmml
Operations

The overall composition of the SEALORDS task
force in South Vietnam reflected the growing
role of the Vietnamese Navy in the war. The newly
elected administration of President Richard M. Nixon
formally adopted as U.S. policy the Vietnamization
program early in 1969. The naval part of that pro-
cess, termed ACTOV (Accelerated Turnover to the
Vietnamese), embodied the incremental transfer to
Vietnam of NAVFORV's river and coastal combatant
fleet and the logistic support establishment. ACTOV
was more than the provision of material, however,
for the Vietnamese Navy needed training in the op-
eration, maintenance, and repair of the U.S. equip-
ment and in the efficient functioning of the supply

An American PBR sailor instructs his
Vietnamese counterpart in the operation
of the twin-mounted, .50-caliber ma-
chine guns. American leaders hoped U.S.
forces could hand over responsibility for
the war to a South Vietnamese military
fully trained and equipped to carry on.

284

system. Leadership skills at all command levels re-
quired improvement as did the general morale of
naval personnel before the Vietnamese Navy would
be able to fight on alone. Spearheaded by the 564 of-
ficers and men of the Naval Advisory Group, early in
1969 the U.S. Navy integrated Vietnamese sailors
into the crews of American ships and craft. When
sufficiently trained, the Vietnamese bluejackets and
officers relieved their American counterparts, who
then rotated buck to the United States. As entire
units came under Vietnamese Navy command, con-
trol of the various SEALORDS operations passed to
that naval service as well.

The allied push into Cambodia during the spring
of 1970 brought the SEALORDS forces into o unique
operational environment. At 0730 local time on 9
May, 10 days after ground troops crossed the border,
a combined Vietnamese-American naval task force

steamed up the Mekong River to wrest control of that
key waterway from North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
forces. The flotilla, led by a Vietnamese naval officer,
was composed of American PCFs, ASPBs, PBRs,
HAL-3 and VAL-4 aircraft, Benewah, Askari, Hunterdon
County, YRBM 16, YRBM 21 and 10 strike assault boats
(STAB) of Strike Assault Boat Squadron 20, a fast-re-
action unit created by Admiral Zumwalt in 1969. The
Vietnamese contingent included riverine assault craft
of many types, PCFs, PBRs, and marine battalions.
Naval Advisory Group personnel sailed with each
Vietnamese vessel. By the end of the first day, Viet-
namese naval units reached the Cambodian capital
of Phnom Penh, while to the south the combined
force stormed enemy-held Neak Luong, a strategic
feny crossing point on the river. For political reasons,
no U.S. personnel were allowed past Neak Luong,
midway to Phnom Penh. Although the American

A no-nonsense Admiral McCain,
Commander in Chief, Pacific, stabs
the air with his cigar as he
discusses naval operations in South
Vietnam with Admiral Zumwalt
(left) and Commodore Chon.

A Vietnamese Popular Force unit prepares to move ashore from a PBR and set up a night ambush along the Vinh Te Canal.

A monitor of the Vietnamese Navy's River
Assault Group 81 moves along the vital
Cho Gao (rice) Canal in December 1 969.
Increasingly, the Vietnamese Navy re-
lieved American units ofSEALORDS oper-
ational commands.

286

PBRs of River Division 514 maneuver to
set up a nighttime ambush on the Vinh
Te Canal in October 1 969. Using new
tactics and sophisticated sensors in Oper-
ation Duffle Bag, American units made it
increasingly difficult for the enemy to
move supplies into the delta.

component pulled out of Cambodia by 29 June, the
Vietnamese continued to guard the Mekong and
evacuate to South Vietnam over 82,000 ethnic Viet-
namese jeopardized by the conflict.

The generally good performance of the Viet-
namese Navy during the allied sweep into Cambo-
dia motivated the transfer of significant operational
responsibilities to the Vietnamese. In March 1970
the barrier along the Cambodian border was turned
over to the Vietnamese Navy, which renamed the
operation Iran Hung Dao I. In May, Giant Slingshot
and Sea Tiger became Tran Hung Dao II and Tran
Hung Dao VII. The allied navies also launched Op-
eration Blue Shark, a seven-month effort designed
to strike at the Viet Cong command, communica-
tion, and logistics network (or infrastructure) in the
mangrove swamps at the mouth of the Mekong
River system, on the river islands, and along the

287

. . ; "Incident at Old Nam Can" by R. G. Smith

Zippo" monitor uses flame to destroy riverbank foliage that might conceal an enemy ambush.

An Army chemical detachment sprays de-
foliants on dense vegetation along the
Rach Tra Canal.

river banks all the way to the Cambodian border.
Coastal Surveillance Force PCFs landed SEALs and
LDNN for swift, deadly attacks on the usually sur-
prised enemy. The units often followed up on intelli-
gence gathered by navol intelligence liaison officers
(NILO) assigned to many of South Vietnam's
provinces and operational areas.

In July the Vietnamese Navy assumed sole re-
sponsibility for the Ready Deck operation, which was
given a Iran Hung Dao designator like the other for-
mer SEALORDS areas. Also in July, the U.S. Navy
ceased its combat activity on I Corp's Cua Viet and
Hue rivers. The Americans then transferred the last
combatant vessels of Task Force Clearwater to the
Vietnamese. A final turnover of river craft at the end
of 1970 enabled the Vietnamese Navy to take charge
of the Search Turn, Barrier Reef, and Breezy Cove ef-
forts deep in the Mekong Delta. Except for continued

289

support by HAL-3 and VAL-4 aircraft and SEAL de-
tachments, the U.S. Navy's role in the SEALORDS
campaign ended in April 1971, when Solid Anchor
(previously Sea Float and now based ashore at Nam
Can) became a Vietnamese responsibility.

The Vietnamese Navy, which grew from 18,000
men in the fall of 1968 to 32,000 men at the end of
1970, instituted organizational changes to accommo-
date the new personnel, material, and operational re-
sponsibilities. The Vietnamese grouped their riverine
assault craft in riverine assault interdiction divisions
(RAID) and their PBRs into river interdiction divisions
(RID) and river patrol groups (RPG). They also aug-
mented the existing RAGs and coostal groups, the
latter now consolidated into 20 units for lack of suffi-
cient patrol junks.

This dramatic change in the nature of the al-
lied war effort reflected the rapid but meosured
withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. naval
forces. NAVFORV strength dropped from a peok of

A sailor guides a remotely operated drone
minesweeper from a patrol minesweeper.
The Navy tested various types of boats
and equipment in the combat laboratory
of South Vietnam.

290

The sailors of Strike Assault Boat
Squadron 20, a unit designed for quick-
reaction river operations, run their spe-
cially designed STAB at high speed on the
Mekong River.

Into Cambodia. Vietnamese Commander Do Kiem, commander of the IV Coastal Zone, points out objectives to officers of
the Cambodian Navy who are working with him in combined coastal operations. The good performance of the Viet-
namese Navy in Cambodia buoyed the hopes of U.S. naval leaders for the Vietnamization program.

292

38,083 personnel in September 1968 to 16,757 at
the end of 1970. As Admiral Zumwalt transferred
resources to the Vietnamese Navy, he disestablished
U.S. naval commands and airlifted personnel
home. With the redeployment of the Army's 9th In-
fantry Division and the turnover of 64 riverine as-
sault craft in June 1969, the joint Mobile Riverine
Force halted operations. When the Riverine Assault
Force (Task Force 117) stood down on 25 August
1969, it became the first major naval command de-
activated in Vietnam. By December 1970, COM-

When the allies advanced into Cambodia
in May 1 970, Vietnamese forces captured
this huge cache of weapons, ammuni-
tion, and supplies. The Cambodian oper-
ation put the enemy on the defensive and
bought more time for Vieinamization.

293

NAVFORV had transferred to Vietnam the remain-
ing river combatant craft in his command, which
included 293 PBRs and 224 riverine assault craft.
That month, the River Patrol Force was disestob-
lished and the Task Force 116 designator reassigned
to Commonder Delta Naval Forces, a new head-
quarters controlling SEAL and naval aircraft units
still in-country. ;

Bluejackets of the Vietnamese Navy
board a U.S. Navy transport on their
way to training in the United States.
Between 1968 and 1970, the personnel
strength of the navy grew by one-
third and the new recruits needed
much training.

294

Vietnamese sailors practice fire fighting in "boot camp. "

Enlisted men listen to instruction on ship nomen-
clature at the U.S. Naval Training Center in San
Diego, California. The Vietnamese handled train-
ing in basic seamanship well.

295

R&R (rest and recuperation) at Disneyland. As
sailors everywhere, these Vietnamese men train-
ing in California soaked up the local culture.

296

The bare metal screen hull of a ferro-
cement junk being buill for the Viet-
namese Coastal Force.

Civilian workers at the Saigon Naval Shipyard apply the last touches of paint to a finished ferrocement boat.

Task Force 117 releases its assault craft to the Vietnamese Navy.

Vietnamese Navy Operational Commands, July 1970

Task Fleet 21 SEALORDS Operations

Units Operations

Task Force 210 Special

Task Force 21 1 Amphibious

Task Force 212 Tran Hung Dao I

Task Force 213 Coostal

Task Force 214 Giant Slingshot

Tosk Force 215 Fleet Command

Task Force 216 Ready Deck

Task Force 217 4th Riverine Area

Task Fleet 22 Non
Units

Task Force 221
Task Force 222
Task Force 223
Task Force 224
Task Force 225
Task Force 226
Task Force 227
Task Force 228

SEALORDS Operations

Operations
1st Coastal Zone
2d Coastal Zone
3d Coastal Zone
4th Coastal Zone
3d Riverine Area
4th Riverine Area
Rung Sat Special Zone
Capital Military District

298

National ensigns change with the transfer of eight PBRs and six LCMs.

Black-bereted River Patrol Force sailors, proud but subdued, salute as they turn over 80 PBRs to the Vietnamese Navy.

Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enter-
prise steams off Indochina. Air opera-
tions focused on Laos and South Vietnam
during 1969 and 1970.

Seventh Fleet operations during the post-Tet years
also reflected the diminishing American role in
the war. The prohibition against bombing North Viet-
nam, which went into force on 1 November 1968,
limited the number of lucrative targets available to
Task Force 77 to those in Laos, South Vietnam, and
eventually Cambodia. Aerial operations in those
countries also were limited by the seasonal Southwest
Monsoon, which lasted from May to September. And
beginning in 1970, the Navy mandated stringent
measures to conserve fuel, ammunition, and aircraft
to cut operating costs. As a result, the monthly aver-
age during 1968 of three ottack carriers deployed at
Yankee Station decreased to two ships from 1969 to
1971. Similarly, the 1968 monthly average of be-
tween 5,000 and 6,000 attack sorties in Southeast
Asia dropped to between 3,000 and 4,000 sorties from
November 1968 to mid-1970. From then until the end
of 1971, naval air units averaged 1,000 to 2,500

300

"Launch" by R. G. Smith

strike sorties in Laos and South Vietnam. In this
three-year period, the Navy dropped over 700,000
tons of ordnance on the enemy, while losing 1 30 air-
craft and many of their crews.

While the air campaign in Southeast Asia ta-
pered off, the fleet continued to concentrate forces
against the Communists in critical areas. The great
weight of effort was directed toward interdiction of
the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, the primary logistical
artery of the Communist armies fighting in South
Vietnam. Throughout the Laotian Panhondle (the
Steel Tiger operating theater) naval attack squadrons
bombed and mined North Vietnamese truck convoys;
vehicle parks; fuel, supply, and ammunition storage

areas; bridges; roads; antiaircraft positions; and sur-
face-to-air missile sites. To increase the effectiveness
of the interdiction campaign, in November 1969 the
joint Navy-Air Force team initiated Commando Bolt.
This operation directed newly deployed EA-6B elec-
tronic countermeasures aircraft, precision-guided
bombs, and sensitive ground and air sensor detection
systems against the routes leading south from the
Ban Karai and Mu Gia passes of Laos. The American
air forces also inaugurated a series of Commando
Hunt operations in the panhandle and continued the
Barrel Roll campaign in northern Laos.

Although minor in comparison with the actions
in Laos, the Navy's close air support operations in

301

302

"Marine Dive Bombers at Twilight" by John Steel

Boatswain's mates handle a new load of bombs on board Ranger. Economy measures compelling the fleet to conserve
ammo and fuel coincided with a lessened demand for air operations.

303

Carrier sailors take advantage of a lull in
operations to catch some sleep and sun.

South Vietnam's I Corps served the allied cause well.
Often constituting one-fourth to one-third of the
naval attack sorties in Southeast Asia during 1969,
the monthly missions in South Vietnam usually did
not total over 500 in 1970 and 1971, when the Amer-
ican ground presence in the region was greatly re-
duced. Nonetheless, often hard-pressed units of the
3d Marine Division and the Army's 101st Airborne
Division benefited from the air support provided by
the carrier task force.

The fleet swiftly marshaled forces for several key
operations. For instance, three attack corners de-
ployed to Yankee Station in May 1970, when the
Navy freed the Air Force from some bombing re-
sponsibilities in Laos, allowing the latter service to
focus on Cambodia. Again, in March 1971, Task

304

An A-6A Intruder drops a load of bombs with "retardation tails" designed to slow the weapons' descent. This allowed the
aircraft to pass over low-level targets before the bombs exploded. '\''.,'^".\..^..'~:-r.:..-':-S:::

Two Communist trucks, after bypassing a destroyed vehicle, try to hide from a Navy photo plane Hying over the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

305

Force 77 deployed Ranger, Kitty Hawk, and Hancock to
the Gulf of Tonkin to bock up the South Vietnamese
advance into Laos, known as Operation Lam Son
719. Bucking heavy antiaircraft and surface-to-air
missile fire, naval aviators flew 5,000 strike sorties
that month, often dropping their ordnance within a
few yards of South Vietnamese ground troops fight-
ing for survival in Loos.

In addition to strike operations, the fleet con-
tinued to carry out the Yonkee Team aerial recon-
naissance program in Laos and the Blue Tree effort
in North Vietnam. Although bombing operations
had ceased in the North, the naval aircraft covering
the photographic planes were authorized to defend
them with force. In a number of instances, escort-
ing F-4 Phantoms destroyed surface-to-air missile
sites that launched weapons against the reconnais-
sance group. The number of combat support sorties,
the great majority of which were aerial reconnais-
sance missions, equaled or surpassed the attack sor-
ties, reflecting the importance of intelligence gath-
ering to the allied war effort in Southeast Asia.
These naval aviation units produced valuable in-
formation on Communist troop movements into
South Vietnam, the extensive infiltration system in
Laos and North Vietnam, and the Communist bloc
maritime resupply effort.

'LCDR Caldwell V.F. 213 After Mission" by John Steel

306

Allied Snrface W«rfiire

The Seventh Fleet also made less use of its am-
phibious arm, although early in this period the
naval ARG/SLF team carried out amphibious land-
ings in the pattern of previous years. ARG/SLF Alpha
and ARG/SLF Bravo, naval gunfire support ships.
Market Time craft, and troops of the South Viet-
namese Army's 23d Infantry Division carried out
Bold Mariner, the largest amphibious operation of
the Vietnam War. Between 13 Januory and 9 Febru-
ary 1969, the combined force sealed off the Batangan
Peninsula by air, land, and sea and methodically
screened over 12,000 Vietnamese. The process identi-
fied 256 Viet Cong troops, including the entire C-95th
Sapper Company. The allies killed another 239 Viet
Cong. In May, following unproductive operations in
February and March, the Seventh Fleet's amphibious

units landed on Barrier Island south of Hoi An and
killed or captured 178 enemy soldiers. Four other ac-
tions mounted between May and August on the I
Corps coast produced almost as many Marine as
Communist casualties, primarily because of the nu-
merous enemy mines and booby traps in the opera-
tional areas. On 7 September, the ARG/SLF team
launched the final operation of the year. Defiant
Stand, when it once again struck at the enemy on
Barrier Island. This time, the one U.S. Marine and
two South Korean Murine battalions committed to
the battle killed 293 Viet Cong troops and captured
121 weapons at a cost of 59 allied casualties.

During the remaining months of 1969, the Sev-
enth Fleet Amphibious Force was fully employed with
the withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division from South
Vietnam. Americon vessels transported over 18,400
troops ond 24,000 tons of equipment to Okinawa and

A Navy corpsman bandages the wound
of a Marine hit during a 1969 battle
in South Vietnam. Most amphibious
actions that year succeeded in killing
large numbers of the enemy, but
at a high cost to the allies.

307

Alerted for action, a Marine races onto the deck of amphibious assault ship Okinawa (LPH 3). His infantry unit and the
ship are part of the Seventh Fleet's Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force deployed off the coast of South Viet-
nam for quick-reaction operations.

308

A Marine UH-1 gunship fires rockets at a
Viet Cong position southwest ofDanang.
To lower American casualties but keep
pressure on the enemy, U.S. leaders in-
creasingly relied on air strikes rather than
more costly infantry sweeps.

Navy Lieutenant Commander Frederick
E. Whitaker (CHC) delivers a sermon
amid the destruction of war. While these
Marines knew that the United States was
withdrawing from the war, they faced
bloody combat near the DMZ every day.
The chaplains worked especially hard in
this period to keep spirits up.

the United States. In keeping with the Vietnamization
of the conflict, Washington withdrew both ARG/SLFs
from South Vietnamese waters, placing them in an
alert status. Thereafter, CINCPAC Admiral lohn S. Mc-
Cain, Jr., and COMUSMACV General Abrams needed
Joint Chiefs of Staff authorization to initiate combat
landings in South Vietnam. Although throughout
1970 and 1971 the fleet's amphibious forces were pre-
pared for the evacuation of Americans from the main-
land and other contingencies, thot need did not arise.

The changing U.S. role in the war and the rela-
tively low level of enemy combat activity in the
coastal regions also influenced the noval gunfire sup-
port mission in the post-Tet years. The combat action
was heaviest in Cambodia during 1970 and in Laos
during 1971. Consequently, the naval command lim-

310

Going home. In Operation Keystone Robin Charlie, men of the 111 Marine Amphibious Force board amphibious transport
dock ship Dubuque (LPD 8) at Danang in April 1 971 .

A Marine eagerly awaits the docking of
amphibious cargo ship Tulare (LKA 1 12),
which will carry him and his buddies to
Okinawa, Japan, and finally, to the United
States. The fleet was heavily involved dur-
ing 1970 and 1971 with troop withdrawal.

Before her withdrawal from the war in 1969, New Jersey {BB 62) dropped accurate and devastating fire on North Viet-
namese Army bunkers, guns, and troops.

A 5-inch rocket blasts from the shallow-draft, inshore fire support ship St. Francis River off Vietnam.

312

Coast Guard high-endurance cutters like
Rush were ideally suited to open-ocean
patrol, so they served on the outer barrier
of the Market Time coastal surveillance
operation.

ited the number of ships it mode available to the
fleet's Naval Gunfire Support Unit. The Navy also
withdrew many ships with large-caliber guns. Battle-
ship New Jersey (BB 62), which added her devastating
16-inch guns to the firepower on the gun line during
late 1968 and early 1969, returned to the United
States. Generally, 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 4 to 10 de-
stroyers, and 2 rocket ships provided support early in
1969. By 1971, an average of three ships steamed off-
shore, one in I Corps and the others aiding Viet-
namese operations in the Co Mau and U Minh areas.
The 454,000 rounds fired by the task unit in 1969
was half the total expended in 1968. The figure
dropped further to 234,000 rounds in 1970 and
114,000 rounds In 1971. Although Seventh Fleet com-
manders assigned fewer ships to the Naval Gunfire
Support Unit during these years, they were prepared
to deploy powerful surface combatants into South
Vietnamese waters on short notice.

The lessened need for naval gunfire support
partly reflected the success, after years of effort, of the
Market Time antiinfiltration campaign. The com-

t _ ,.54!

^^^^^^^^^^

Of-

313

A Lockheed P-3 Orion patrol plane heads for a trawler spotted in waters off South Vietnam. Aircraft were a key compo-
nent of Market Time.

314

Admiral Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, listens to men of the Seventh Fleet
discuss racial tensions. The Navy in the
Far East, like American society at large,
experienced racial turmoil during the
early 1970s. Measures that Zumwalt in-
stituted helped alleviate a number of
problems.

bined effect of allied air, sea, and inshore patrols, am-
phibious operations in the coastal regions, ground
force strength in the populoted lowlands, and the
availability of Laos and Cambodia as resupply bases
apparently limited Communist attempts at seaborne
infiltration during most of 1968 and 1969. No trawlers
were discovered penetrating the territorial waters of
the Republic of Vietnam until August 1969, when the
Communists lost uninhibited access to the Cambodian
port of Sihanoukville. The ouster of the Sihanouk gov-
ernment and the allied push into Cambodia in the
spring of 1970 totally closed this point of entry to the
Communists. Between 24 August 1969 and the end of
1970, the allies detected 15 trowlers, about one each
month, heading for the South Vietnamese littoral, nor-
mally in the Mekong Delta region. Task Force 1 15 de-
stroyed one of these resupply ships, whose 60 tons of
munitions were recovered by U.S. Navy and Viet-
namese Navy divers. Thirteen other ships aborted their
missions upon discovery. Only one trawler penetrated
the screen to complete a resupply operation.

315

American bluejackets on R&R from the war explore the Emerald Buddha Temple in Bangkok, Thailand.

Waiting for their turn to go home, or "return to the world," the NAVFORV staff members listen in 1971 to a USO country-
western band.

316

Navy men in Vietnam sought a respite from the war in different, and sometimes bizarre, ways as is clear from this friendly
interaction of a sailor and a rock python.

317

¥ietiicii!iizatioii Completed

onfldent of the coaistal patrol's effectiveness,
Commander Coastal Surveillance Force began

early the Vietnomization of the Market Time effort.
The ACTOV program of the Navy and the SCATTOR
(Small Graft Assets, troining, and Turnover of Re-
sources) plan of the Coast Guard entailed the phased
transition of the Vietnamese Navy into complete
control of the inshore barrier, then the high seas sur-
face patrol, and finally a coastal radar network in-
tended to reploce the American air surveillance ef-
fort. In September 1970, as Task Force 115 turned
over the last of the PCFs and WFBs, the Vietnamese
Navy took charge of the inner barrier. Throughout
1971, the American naval command transferred
seagoing ships, harbor control and mine craft, and
logistic support croft of many types, including Coast
Guard cutters Yakutat (WHEC 380), Bering Strait
(WHEC 382), Castle Rock (WHEC 383), and Cook Inlet
(WHEC 384), each equipped with S-inch guns; radar
escort picket Camp (DER 251); Garrett County, recon-
figured as a small craft tender; and refrigerated stor-
age craft ITRS89.

Despite the natural complications of a turnover
process, the combined coostal patrol continued to
perform successfully in 1971. Of the 11 Communist
ships detected attempting infiltration during the year,
only one delivered its cargo to the Viet Cong in An
Xuyen Province, the usual destination of the trawlers.
Another nine ships fled after being sighted by the al-
lied patrol. The remaining vessel was tracked and
sunk in coastal waters oh 8 April through the coordi-
nated effort of Coast Guard cutters Morgenthau
(WHEC 722) and Rush (WHEC 723), the U.S. Navy's
gunboat Antelope (PG 86) and air potrol units, and
the Vietnamese Navy's motor gunboat Kien Vang
(PGM 603).

An efficient logistic establishment was as impor-
tant as a ready combat force to the future perfor-
mdhce of the Vietnamese Novy. Sooh after the
turnover of combatant craft got underway, the U.S.
Navy prepared its support establishment for even-
tual tronsfer to the allied naval service. Under AC-
TOVLOG (Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese,
Logistics), A.dmiral Zumwalt oversaw not only the
turnover of U.S. installations, but also the expansion

of the Vietnamese base, transportation, mainte-
nance and repair, supply, and personnel housing in-
frdsto(rtiures to acajinmpdafe the planned doubling
in size of &e navyi The Americans modernized exist-
ing facilities and constructed new bases, coastal
radar sites, and housing for Vietnamese sailors and
their families.

Coinciding with the tvimover of river and coastal
fighting vessels in 1969 and 1970, the Navy trans-
ferred many of the bases from which they operated.
The first change of command occurred at My Tho in
November 1969. Then, in the last three months of
1970, COMNAVFORV placed the Phu Cuong, Long
Binh, Kien An, Chau Doc, Tan Chau, and Ha Tien
Operating Bases under Vietnamese control. The
transfer of Sa Dec and Chu Lai the following spring
completed the process. During this same period, the
Vietnamese Navy took over the six Advanced Tactical
Support Bases established on the Vam Co Dong and
Vam Co Toy rivers for the Giant Slingshot operation
and two more on the Cua Viet in I Corps. In addition,
the allied naval service ossumed control of the har-
bor defense posts of the Stable Door effort, the three
existing coastal radar sites, and Market Time's
coastal surveillance centers.

Meanwhile, the Navy deployed Seabee detach-
ments throughout South Vietnam to construct logistic
facilities at new and existing bases. Once the Seabees
completed this work and U.S. leaders felt the Viet-
namese could totally support their combat units, the
Americans transferred the bases to their allies. In this
manner, beginning in the spring of 1971, Rear Admi-
ral Robert S. Salzer, the new COMNAVFORV, relin-
quished control of Cat Lo and An Thoi, two of seven
primary Logistic Support Bases that provided allied
navol forces with major vessel overhauls and other
supply assistance. In the same period, the Viet-
namese took charge of Ben Luc and Rach Soi, two
secondary or Intermediate Support Bases. These in-
stallations handled minor craft overhauls and pro-
vided units with maintenance, administrative, finan-
cial, and supply support. The next incremental
transfer occurred in September when the Dong Tarn
Logistic Support Base and eight Intermediate Support
Bases were Vietnamized. The allies completed the last
major phase of the ACTOVLOG program in April
1972 when the Vietnamese Navy took over the for-

318

Seabees of Naval Mobile Construction
Battalion 62 pave a highway south of
Danang in 1970. As part of the Viet-
namization program, American units
upgraded the country's transportation
system.

mer centers of American naval power in South Viet-
nam, the Logistic Support Bases ut Nho Be, Binh
Thuy, Cam Ranh Bay, and Danang.

The Navy's other Vietnamization projects lasted
until the total withdrawal of American forces from
South Vietnam in March 1973. Construction und
turnover of the last of 16 coastal radar sites (one on
board a station ship) was completed in August 1972.
Further, COMNAVFORV erected over 4,500 shelters for
Vietnamese Navy personnel and their families. Ameri-
can planners hoped that these better living conditions
would strengthen the morale of Vietnamese sailors. U.S.
personnel completely restructured and streamlined the
allied navy's supply system, with special attention de-
voted to the Naval Supply Center at Saigon. After an

319

Seabees construct shelters for the families of Vietnamese sailors to improve their living standards and thereby raise morale.

Lieutenant Peter M. Swartz holds a pig, symbol of the pig-raising enterprise on Phu Quoc Island that he and the Viet-
namese and Americans flanking him developed to improve the incomes and protein intake of Vietnamese Navy personnel.
U.S. Navy men also helped develop a poultry industry.

320

An American bluejacket instructs a Viet-
namese trainee on board Seventh Fleet
tank landing ship Windham County
(LST 1 1 70). Vietnamese recruits, coming
from a nonindustrialized society, some-
times had difficulty learning the opera-
tion of complex machinery or equipment.

Vietnamese naval officer aspirants try to comprehend instruction they are getting from U.S. personnel. The language bar-
rier often made communication difficult.

321

Petty Officer 1st Class Leroy Massey, a naval advisor on board Pham Ngu Loo (HQ 15), observes a General Quarters drill.
Lieutenant James P. McGrath, the advisor with Coastal Group 26, watches his counterpart communicate with headquarters.

322

intensive $8 million effort with the help of American
civilians, the Naval Advisory Group improved man-
agement procedures, developed a skilled work force,
and modernized the industrial plant at the Saigon
Naval Shipyard. By early 1973, the Vietnamese facil-
ity had finished building 58 ferrocement junks, recon-
ditioned hundreds of newly acquired river craft, and
achieved the ability to overhaul all of the Vietnamese
Navy's seagoing ships in-country, a major goal of the
advisory program.

By 1973, both the logistic establishment and the
combat arm of the Vietnamese Navy possessed the
material resources to carry on the fight alone. The
42,000-man naval service marshaled a force of

1,500 ships and craft for warfare on the rivers and
canals, in coastal waters, and far out to sea. The sup-
ply, training, and repair facilities were structured to
man and support the operational navy for a long-
term struggle.

Despite these advantages, the Vietnamese Navy
still was burdened with the old problems of poor
leadership, low morale, and lack of dedication on the
part of many personnel. The departing Americans in
the Naval Advisory Group concluded that the rela-
tively young, recently expanded, and still developing
Vietnamese Navy had the potential to add great
strength to the defense of South Vietnam, but only if
given the time to mature.

A Vietnamese naval officer.
The success or failure of the
Vietnamization program de-
pended to a great extent on
the ability of Vietnamese offi-
cers to inspire, guide, and
above all, lead the armed
forces. In that regard, there
was scant cause for optimism.

'5 S/

323

The war goes on. A Vietnamese Navy
river patrol craft cruises up the Phu
Cuong River near Saigon late in 1 972.

Rear Admiral James B. Wilson, the last COMNAVFORV, confers with members of the Vietnamese-American team (left to
right): Wilson; Captain Ngo Xuan Son, Commander Fleet Command; Lieutenant Commander Le Van Thu, Commanding
Officer of Ngo Quyen (HQ 1 7); and Captain Warren C. Hamm, Senior Naval Advisor, Fleet Command.

324

A Vietnamese trainee is perhaps thinking about his future and that of the navy after the Americans are gone. Only time
would tell if all the new equipment and training provided by the United States could compensate for the Vietnamese
Navy's long-standing problems with leadership, morale, and professional development.

325

Countering the Easter Offensive

The U.S. Navy gave its sister service some of this
additional time when the fleet deployed into
Southeast Asian waters to help stem the Communist
Easter Offensive that begun on 30 March 1972. This
massive, three-pronged enemy attack, which broke
across the DMZ, through the Central Highlands, and
toward Saigon from the north, sparked an immediate
American response. Seventh Fleet cruisers and de-
stroyers steamed into the coastal waters off I Corps
and added their 6-inch and 5-inch guns to the South
Vietnamese defense of Quang Tri and Thua Thien
Provinces. Each day, between 15 and 20 U.S. ships
poured fire into the ranks of the North Vietnamese di-
visions striking for Hue. Navy ond Marine Corps spot-

The 6-inch guns of guided missile light
cruiser Oklahoma City, the Seventh
Fleet flagship, fire a salvo at North Viet-
namese gun positions in Quang Tri
Province during April 1972. The fleet 's
naval gunfire took a heavy toll of enemy
tanks and troops caught along the coast.

}

326

The gun crew in one of Oklahoma City's
forward turrets loads another 100-pound
projectile into the breech of a 6-inch gun.
On one night alone in April 1972, the
ship fired over 1,000 rounds at the
enemy.

ters ashore or in the air called in heovy bombard-
ment. On occasion gunfire support ships fired directly
at enemy troops and tanks on the beach. Expending
thousands of rounds each month, 1 17,000 in June
alone, the fleet surface force was a prime factor in the
successful South Vietnamese defense of Hue ond sub-
sequent counterattack to retake overrun areos.

The Seventh Fleet Amphibious Force also came to
the assistance of the South Vietnamese by threaten-
ing the enemy's rear along the coast. On 13 May, in
order to frustrate Communist attack plans, Marine
helicopters from the amphibious ready group's Oki-
nawa (LPH 3) landed South Vietnamese marines
miles behind Communist lines in I Corps. On 24 May
and ogain on 29 June, the amphibious tosk group de-
ployed South Vietnamese troops on the enemy's ex-
posed coastal flank and rear. These actions and

strikes by naval air and gunfire support units eventu-
ally helped force the North Vietnamese to retreat.

The successful South Vietnamese drive to retake
lost ground in Quang Tri Province was also aided by
a logistic lifeline set up across the beach. With Route
1 vulnerable to attack, the fleet installed a five-sec-
tion causeway on the coast east of Quong Tri City.
South Vietnamese LCUs and LCMs used the cause-
way, emplaced by Alamo (LSD 33) in mid-July, to land
critical supplies. Aided by a Navy-Marine amphibi-
ous group advisory team, the Vietnamese delivered
over 200 tons of ammunition and materiel to the
front line forces before seasonal heavy weather in
September curtailed the operation.

The U.S. naval forces still operating in support of
the Market Time coastal surveillance patrol con-
tributed to the allied defense as well. In April 1972,

327

The tracked landing vehicles from tank landing ship Cayuga County (LST 1186) snake toward shore as they prepare to
land South Vietnamese marines behind enemy lines in Quang Tri Province. . -

Covered by the guns of heavy cruiser Newport News, amphibious vehicles return from the beach, where they have just
landed 1,200 South Vietnamese marines in a feint operation.

328

P-3 Orion aircraft based in the Philippines helped
South Vietnamese units detect and turn back three of
four Communist trawlers sent south. A combined sur-
face patrol force intercepted and sank the fourth ship.

Of even greater importance to the nationwide
South Vietnamese defensive effort was the Navy's
campaign against North Vietnam, where the enemy
launched and supplied the Easter Offensive. On 2
April 1972, soon after it became apparent that a
major Communist effort was underway, President
Nixon ordered his Pacific forces to strike by air and
sea that region of North Vietnam nearest to the DMZ.
By 9 May, the entire country, excluding a buffer zone
30 miles deep along the Chinese border and a num-
ber of sensitive targets, had been opened to Navy and
Air Force attock.

During April, the first month of operations, the
Seventh Fleet resumed the interdiction campaign
that ended in November 1968. Task Force 77 swelled
to include five carriers, Constellation, Kitty Hawk, Han-
cock, Coral Sea, and Saratoga (CVA 60). The addition
of Midway to the task force in May would make this
the largest concentration of carriers in the Gulf of
Tonkin during the war. The air squadrons, massed
for multiaircraft strikes in Operation Freedom Train,

A Grumman E-2C Hawkeye airborne
early warning plane lifts off carrier Con-
stellation to take part in air operations
over Vietnam in April 1 972. In Operation
Freedom Train, naval air forces pum-
meled North Vietnamese armor and in-
fantry units, especially around the DMZ.

329

U.S. Marine advisors, Majors William R. Hart and Joseph /. O'Brien, discuss operations. During the Communist
1972 Easter Oifensive, American advisors were key links between hard-pressed South Vietnamese forces and U.S.
air and naval gunfire support units. The presence of U.S. advisors also helped stiffen South Vietnamese resolve.

North Vietnamese vehicles knocked out by

the attack aircraft of Constellation 's
VA-146 litter a road junction north of An
Loc in III Corps. The dogged resistance of
the South Vietnamese armed forces, com-
bined with devastating American air power,
frurtrafed the enemy's plans in 1972.

hit key military and logistic facilities at Dong Hoi,
Vinh, Thanh Hoo, Haiphong, and Hanoi. Smaller
flights ottacked enemy troop units, supply convoys,
and headquarters in the areas around the DMZ. Also
taking part in Freedom Train were the fleet's gun
cruisers and destroyers, which ranged the southern
North Vietnamese coastline, shelling transportation
routes, troop concentrations, shore defenses, and
Communist logistic installations. Joseph Strauss (DDG
16) and Richard B. Anderson (DD 786) opened this re-
newed operation on 5 April when they fired on the
Ben Hal Bridge in the northern half of the DMZ. Then
on the 16th, for the first time in the war, cruiser Okla-
homa City and three destroyers obliterated targets on
the Do Son Peninsula, which guarded the approaches
to Haiphong.

V'"

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332

Linebacker

The nature of the campaign changed in May
when President Nixon ordered the virtual isola-
tion of North Vietnam from external Communist
support. Aside from the obvious military rationale,
the President sought by this action to end North Viet-
namese intransigence at the stalled Paris negotia-
tions. For the first time in the long Southeast Asian
conflict, all of the Navy's conventional resources
were brought to bear on the enemy. On 9 May, in
Operation Pocket Money, Coral Sea's A-6 Intruders
and A-7 Corsairs dropped magnetic-acoustic sea
mines in the river approaches to Haiphong, North
Vietnam's chief port. Shortly thereafter, the other
major ports were mined as well. Over 85 percent of
the country's military imports passed through these

Coral Sea ordnancemen affix sea mines
to a VA-94 A-7E Corsair II. Shortly after-
ward, in Operation Pocket Money, naval
air forces mined the approaches to the
port of Haiphong, closing it to shipping.
Later the Navy mined all the other major
ports of North Vietnam.

333

Before the U.S. mining operation, mer-
chant ships, such as this Soviet
freighter bound for Haiphong with a
cargo of trucks, landing craft, and other
war material, kept Hanoi's war effort
well supplied.

ports. Washington gave foreign ships three days to
depart the country, after which the mines armed
themselves. Despite this advance notice, 32 foreign,
mostly Communist, ships elected to remain trapped
in North Vietnamese waters.

The fleet's surface combatants also helped deny
the enemy unhindered use of the inland coastal
areas. On 10 May the 8-inch guns of heavy cruiser
Newport News bombarded targets near Haiphong from
a position off Do Son, while guided missile cruisers Ok-
lahoma City ond Providence and three destroyers sup-
pressed the enemy's counterbattery fire from the
peninsula. Normally three or four U.S. ships made up
the surface action group that cruised along the coast
reody to provide air-spotted or direct fire. From April

334

.4-6 Intruder pilots ofVA-1 65 prepare for a Linebacker strike mission in North Vietnam.

An F-4{ Phantom 11 screams past A- 7 Corsairs lining up for a shot from Constellation's starboard catapult in May 1972.

335

Navy attack planes carrying full loads of ordnance head for targets in the North. The Navy flew an average of 4,000 sor-
ties each month during Linebacker.

An A-7 pulls out of a dive as its bombs knock out sections of the Hai Duong rail and highway bridge, engulfed in smoke below.

336

"Strike" by John Steel

Post-strike photography of the
"Dragon's Jaw" bridge at Thanh Hoa,
destroyed by Air Force "smart bombs" in
May 1972. This and other targets that
the Navy and Air Force had difficulty
knocking out with conventional weapons
during Rolling Thunder fell to new preci-
sion-guided munitions.

337

F-4 pilot Lieutenant Randall H. Cunning-
ham (left) and his radar intercept officer,
Lieutenant (jg) William P. Driscoll, de-
scribe how they became Navy "Aces" on
10 May 1 972 to Secretary of the Navy
John Warner and CNO Admiral
Zumwalt.

through September, the cruiser destroyer group fired over
111,0(X) rounds at the enemy, destroying or damaging
thousands of bunkers and buildings: knocking out tanks,
trucks, and artillery sites; killing 2.000 troops; and sink- ,
ing almost 200 coastal logistic craft and 4 motor toipedo
boats. In August, Newport News, destroyer Rowan (DD
782), and naval air units sank two of the PT boats that
attacked the American ships off Haiphong.

The North Vietnamese fought back hard. Earlier
in the year Higbee (DD 806) became the first U.S.
naval vessel attacked by enemy MiGs, one of which
dropped a bomb on the destroyer's stern, wounding
four sailors. While Communist coastal batteries hit
16 ships offshore in 1972, no ship was sunk then or
at any time in the Southeast Asian conflict. In July,
Warrington (DD 843) struck what was determined to
be a wayward U.S. mine that caused extensive dom-
oge to the ship. Naval leaders later decided to scrap
the already obsolete destroyer rather than spend
money on her repair. These few human and mate-
rial casualties suffered by the Seventh Fleet con-

338

Nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser Long Beach (CGN 9) turns hard to port as the ship steams through Far East-
ern waters. Long Beach and guided missile cruiser Chicago (CG 1 1) were positioned in the Gulf of Tonkin to protect
the fleet and aircraft over the North with their Talos surface-to-air missiles. On one occasion, a Chicago Talos de-
stroyed a MiG over land.

339

trasted with the great punishment absorbed by the
North Vietnamese.

From May through December 1972, no large
merchant vessels entered or left North Vietnamese
harbors. An attempt by the Communists to lighter
cargo to shore from ships in international waters was
foiled when fleet ships and aircraft, including Marine
helicopter gunships, intercepted and destroyed the
shuttling craft. The deployed American fleet even cur-
tailed the enemy's intracoastal movement.

Complementing this effort at sea was the massive
aerial offensive by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force
nomed Linebacker. In contrast to the earlier Rolling
Thunder campaign, in Linebacker Washington gave
operational commanders authority to choose when,
how, and in what order to strike and restrike targets.
Commanders could adjust to changing weather and
the enemy's defenses and concentrate their aerial fire-
power to best effect. As a result, American air
squadrons interdicted the road and rail lines from

Chicago's Senior Chief Radarman Larry
Nowell at his radar console. In August
1 972, Nowell was awarded the Navy Dis
tinguished Service Medal for directing
Navy and Air Force fighters against
enemy MiGs, 12 of which the Americans
shot down.

340

A South Vietnamese marine, M-79
grenade launcher in hand, mounts a
lookout on top of the citadel in Quang Tri
City, which marine and airborne forces
seized after months of bloody fighting in
September 1972.

Having proved their mettle in battle, these South Vietnamese marines exude confidence and esprit de corps.

341

China and devastated North Vietnamese v/armaking
resources, including munition stockpiles, fuel storage
facilities, power plants, rail yards, and bridges.

Using Boeing B-52 bombers and new, more accu-
rate ordnance, such as laser guided bombs and ad-
vanced V/alleye bombs, the Air Force and the Navy
hit targets with great precision and destructiveness.
For instance, the U.S. air forces destroyed the Thanh
Hoa and Paul Doumier bridges, long impervious to
American bombing, and the Hanoi power plant deep
in the heart of the populated capital city. They also
knocked out targets as close as 10 miles to the center
of Hanoi and 5 miles from Haiphong harbor. Between
9 May and the end of September, the Navy flew an
average of 4,000 day-and-night attack sorties each
month, reaching a peak of 4,746 in August. This rep-
resented over 60 percent of the American combat sup-
port sorties during the some five-month period.

The North Vietnamese ottempted to counter the
American onslaught. Emiploying thousands of anti-
aircraft weapons and firing almost 2,000 surface-to-

Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Re-
public of Vietnam, is welcomed by Vice
Admiral [ames L. Holloway III, Comman-
der Seventh Fleet, on board his flagship
Blue Ridge (LCC 19) in June 1972. In
October, Thieu, upset over the terms of a
cease-fire agreement being negotiated by
Washington and Hanoi, refused to en-
dorse them. The North Vietnamese also
grew intransigent.

Seaman Isagani C. Rojo, assigned to de-
stroyer escort Sample (DE 1048) operat-
ing with Task Force 77 in the Gulf of
Tonkin, is lost in reflection. American air
and naval forces stood by during Novem-
ber and early December as American
diplomats worked unsuccessfully to per-
suade the Communists to sign a cease-
fire document.

air missiles in this period, the enemy shot down 28
American aircraft. In one day alone, the Communist
air force challenged U.S. aerial supremacy by sending
up 41 interceptor aircraft. On that day, 10 May, Navy
pilot Lieutenant Randy Cunningham and his radar in-
tercept officer Lieutenant (jg) William Driscoll became
the war's only Navy "aces," adding three kills to the
two already credited to them. American air units de-
stroyed 1 1 North Vietnamese aircraft that day, but lost
6 of their own. The Navy's ratio of kills to losses had
improved by the end of air operations on 15 January.
1973, when the total stood at 24 MiGs destroyed in air-
to-air combat for the loss of 2 naval aircraft. During the
Linebacker campaigns, the fleet's SAR units rescued 30
naval air crewmen downed for various reasons in the
North Vietnamese theater of operations.

By the end of September 1972, the North Viet-
namese diplomats in Paris were much more

343

A Boeing B-52 bomber takes off from Andersen Air Force Base on Cuam and heads for North Vietnam to take part in the
Linebacker II aerial assault on Hanoi.

amenable to serious negotiation than they were at the
end of March. Ailied air, naval, and ground forces
had repulsed the Communist offensive in South Viet-
nam and in I Corps e^^n regained much lost ground.
After drastically reducing the enemy's reinforcements
and munitions infiltrated into the South, the U.S. air
and naval campaign in the North gradually de-
stroyed Hanoi's ability to prosecute the war.

Believing that a negotiated settlement of the
Southeast Asian conflict was within reach in Paris, on
11 October the Nixon administration ordered U.S. Pa-
cific forces to cease bombing in the vicinity of Hanoi.
Then on the twenty-third, Washington restricted al-
lied strikes to targets below the 20th parallel. Never-
theless, negotiations with the North Vietnomese
again bogged down in Paris while the enemy
strengthened the air defenses of the capital and
Haiphong and restored the rail lines to China. The
Communists once more stockpiled war reserves.

In response to these developments. President
Nixon ordered a massive air assault by Air Force B-52
bombers, tactical aircraft, and the Navy's carrier at-

tack units against military targets deep within Hanoi
and Haiphong. On 18 December the joint attack, des-
ignated Linebacker II, fell on the enemy capital. That
night and on succeeding nights of the operation, wave
after wave of B-52 bombers and supporting aircraft
struck Hanoi, hitting command and communication
facilities, power plants, rail yards, bridges, storage
buildings, open stockpiles, truck parks, and ship repair
complexes. Because of the precision of the air crews
and their weapons, there was minimal damage to
nonmilitary property. The North Vietnamese met the
Linebacker II attack with 1,250 surface-to-air missiles,
which brought down 15 of the big American bombers
and 3 supporting aircraft; antiaircraft defenses and
MiG interceptors destroyed another 4 carrier planes.

The loss of six B-52s on 20 December alone, how-
ever, called for a change in tactics and more reliance
on technologically superior equipment. Thereafter,
the American air forces employed the most advanced
precision-guided weopons and electronic counter-
measure, target finding, and other equipment. They
also concentrated on the destruction of the enemy's

344

An aerial intelligence photo of badly
damaged Radar Command Station 1 1 in
Hanoi after a Linebacker II air attack.
The heavy attacks on Hanoi and
Haiphong by Air Force and Navy aircraft
between 18 and 29 December 1972 fi-
nally induced the North Vietnamese lead-
ership to sign a cease-fire agreement.

missile defense network, including command and
control facilities, missile assembly and transportation
points, ond the missile batteries themselves. To
spread thin Communist defenses, the American com-
mand broadened the operational arena to include
not only Hanoi, taut Haiphong, Thai Nguyen, Long
Dun Kep, and Long Dang. This redirection of effort
succeeded. By 29 December, the last day of
Linebacker II, U.S. forces had neutralized the enemy's
surface-to-air missile system while reducing friendly
losses to a minimum. Not surprisingly, at year's end
the North Vietnamese resumed serious discussions in
Paris. On 15 January 1973, both sides ceased combat
operations in the North.

''iiUJcJE OUiHIES

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mmm kmn mmi buildings

345

Withdraw

|n 27 January 1973, U.S., South Vietnamese,
'North Vietnamese, and Viet Cong representa-
tives finally signed the long-sought cease-fire ogree-
ment at Paris. Under its provisions, the Communists
agreed to release all American prisoners of war
within a space of two months in exchange for U.S.
military withdrawal from South Vietnam and the
U.S. Navy's clearance of mines from North Viet-
namese waters.

During February and March, U.S. aircraft
touched down at Gia Lam Airfield in Hanoi to repa-
triate 138 naval aviators, some of whom had been
prisoners in North Vietnam since 1964. The men were
flown to reception centers in the Pacific and the
United States, where they received a joyous welcome
from families ond friends. The repatriation program,
appropriately named Operation Homecoming, en-
sured that the men received extensive medical, psy-
chological, and emotional support for the transition

This exhibit, set up in a Pentagon corri-
dor during the war, depicts the environ-
ment of a Hanoi prison cell, similar to
those which held 1 78 Navy men, some as
long as eight and one-half years. Most of
these men were tortured and 36 died
while in captivity.

346

Navy A-6 pilot Commander Kenneth L.
Coskey and Lieutenant Commander
Richard McKee, the bombardier-naviga-
tor, shortly before the North Vietnamese
shot down their plane. McKee was res-
cued, but Coskey spent the next four
years and seven months in the infamous
Hoa Lo (Hanoi Hilton) Prison.

A smiling Coskey and his Air Force escort
stride across the tarmac of Hanoi's Gia
Lam Airfield toward a waiting American
transport plane sent to repatriate Ameri-
can prisoners.

347

Former prisoners Lieutenant Commander
Edward A. Davis and Lieutenant Com-
mander Larry Spencer, on board an
American transport flying them to Clark
Air Force Base in the Philippines, enjoy
their first taste of freedom.

from captivity to freedom. Another five men captured
in the war were released eariier by the North Viet-
namese while two escaped. Thirty-six naval aviators
died while in the hands of the Communists, whose
treatment of American prisoners was always harsh
and often bestial. The Navy listed over 600 naval
flight crew personnel missing and presumed dead at
the end of the conflict.

In these same two months, the Navy closed down
all remaining base facilities, offices, and commands
in South Vietnam. Advisors, the first noval personnel
to deploy to Vietnam in 1950, were also the last to
leave. The men gathered in Saigon for flights home.
On 1 1 February, the Coast Guard disestoblished the
office of the Senior Coast Guard Officer, Vietnam,
and airlifted out all of its personnel. Soon afterward,
the fleet air reconnaissance and communications de-
tachments at Danang relocated to Cubi Point in the
Philippines. Finally, on 29 March 1973, the Naval

348

Advisory Group and Naval Forces, Vietnam, were for-
mally disestablished. Thereafter, only 9 Navy and
Marine Corps officers assigned to the U.S. Embassy's
Defense Attache Office and 156 Marine embassy
guards remained in South Vietnam.

The last provision of the cease-fire agreement that
directly related to the Navy entailed removal of the
U.S. sea mines loid along the North Vietnamese coast
and the Mark 36 Destructors dropped into inland wa-
terways. On 28 January, following months of exten-
sive preparation and training, the Seventh Fleet's
Mine Countermeasures Force (Task Force 78), led by
Rear Admiral Brian McCauley, sailed from Subic Bay
and shaped course for a staging area off Haiphong.
On 6 February, one day after Commander Task Force
78 met in the city to coordinate actions with his North

Air Force Colonel Robinson Risner (wav-
ing) and Navy Captain James B. Stock-
dale, stalwart leaders of the Americans
imprisoned in Hanoi, emerge with their
escorts from an Air Force transport in the
Philippines.

349

Vietnamese opposite, Colonel Hoang Huu Thai, Oper-
ation End Sweep got underway. Ocean minesweepers
Engage (MSO 433), Force (MSO 445), Fortify (MSO 446),
ond Impervious (MSO 449) swept oreas off the coast
near Haiphong while being escorted by guided missile
frigate Worden (DLG 18) and destroyer Epperson (DD
719). By the end of the month, amphibious ships New
Orleans (LPH 11), Dubuque (LPD 8), Ogden (LPD 5),
Cleveland (LPD 7), and Inchon (LPH 12) had joined the
force off North Vietnam. These ships carried 31 CH-53
Sea Stallion helicopters from the Navy's Helicopter
Mine Countermeasures Squadron 12 and from Marine
helicopter squodrons HMM-165 ond HMH-463. These
aircraft towed minesweeping sleds and other devices
to carry out aerial mine countermeasures along the
inland waterways and the shallow port areas. A total
of 10 ocean minesweepers, 9 amphibious ships, 6 fleet
tugs, 3 salvage ships, and 19 destroyer types served
with Task Force 78 during the six months of Opera-
tion End Sweep.

The Americans began airborne minesweeping in
the primary shipping channel to Haiphong on 27
February and in the ports of Hon Gai and Cam Pha
on 17 March. During the early part of April, MSS 2, an
old, decommissioned LST, filled with foam and other

buffers and crewed by a few daring volunteers, made
eight check runs up the Haiphong channel to ensure
that no mines threatened the vital waterway. Mean-
while, U.S. naval instructors trained 50 North Viet-
namese personnel to conduct minesweeping opera-
tions on rivers and inland waterways. Further, U.S.
C-130 tronsport aircraft flew into Cat Bi Airfield to
transfer minesweeping gear to the North Vietnamese.
Airborne and ocean .sweeping operations continued in
the Haiphong and northern ureas until 17 April,
when U.S. leaders temporarily withdrew the task force
to persuade the North Vietnamese to adhere to the
terms of the Paris agreement. Convinced that Hanoi
had received the intended message, on 18 fune Wash-
ington restarted Operation End Sweep. The task force
returned to the anchorage off Haiphong. In little more
than a week. Admiral McCauley declared the opera-
tion to clear the water approaches to Haiphong and
the harbors of Hon Gai and Cam Pha completed. Af-
terward, the American flotilla worked the coastal
areas off Vinh in southern North Vietnam. Finally, on
18 July 1973, with Operation End Sweep finished, the
Seventh Fleet departed North Vietnamese territorial
waters. Thus ended the U.S. Navy's long, arduous, and
costly deployment off the Indochina Peninsula.

Proceeding in formation are
ocean minesweepers Illusive
(MSO 448), Enhance (MSO
437), and Leader (MSO 490),
which took part in Operation
End Sweep, the 1973 mine
clearance of North Vietnamese
waters, . :. . ■ . , •

350

North Vietnamese Colonel Hoang Huu
Thai, flanked by an assistant, discusses
the mine clearance of North Vietnam's
waters during a meeting with Americans
on board New Orleans (LPH 11).

Mine Countermeasures Sweep Areas

351

Bespeckled Rear Admiral Brian McCauley, Commander Mine Countermeasures Force (Task Force 78), is flanked by the crew
of the Navy CH-53A Sea Stallion helicopter that carried out the first airborne sweep of a minefield in North Vietnam's waters.

A Marine CH-53 helicopter tows a minesweeping sled through the unique rock formations of North Vietnam's Fai Tsi
Long Archipelago.

352

The sun casts an eerie glow over ocean minesweeper Force (MSO 445), an Operation End Sweep participant that caught
fire and sank at sea shortly after this photo was taken in Subic Bay during February 1 973.

MSS 2 completes a check sweep for mines on the river approach to Haiphong, North Vietnam's primary port.

353

CHAPTER FIVE

CITDT

HL iir"^ URING THE PERIOD FROM 29 MARCH

1973 to 30 April 1975, the Defense Attach^ Office (DAO), Saigon, administered
the American military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. Limited by the Paris
Agreement to 50 or fewer military personnel, the activity was staffed predomi-
nantly by civilians and contractors. The DAO was responsible for providing sup-
plies and material to the 42,000-man Vietnamese Navy, which operated 672 am-
phibious ships and craft, 20 mine warfare vessels, 450 patrol craft, 56 service
craft, and 242 junks. The quality of personnel in the naval service remained ade-
quate over the two-yeor period. A drastic cut in U.S. financial support, however,
hurt the novy's overall readiness. The U.S. Congress appropriated only $700 mil-
lion for fiscal year 1975, forcing the Vietnamese Navy to reduce its overall opera-
tions by 50 percent and its river combat and patrol activities by 70 percent. To
conserve scarce ammunition and fuel, Saigon laid up over 600 river and harbor
craft and 22 ships. The enemy did not target the woterways during 1973 and
1974, but such would not be the case in 1975 when the coastal areas of South
Vietnam became the war's main operational theater.

Mm^i^L i.Ta€fa '''"'i ; m. . "'t Corps and Corps

he final test of strength between the Republic of Vietnam and its Communist
antagonists, which many observers had long predicted, occurred in the early
months of 1975. Seeking to erode the government's military position in the vul-

Thick black smoke billows from the petroleum storage facility at Nha Be that was sabotaged by the Communists in 1974.
The loss of these fuel stocks only added to South Vietnam's economic and military woes. The events of 1975 would bring
the final calamity to the Republic of Vietnam.

356

nerable II Corps area, on 10 March Communist
forces attacked Ban Me Thuot, the capitol of isolated
Darlac Province, and routed the South Vietnamese

troops there. The debacle convinced President
Nguyen Van Thieu that even the strategic Pleiku and
Kontum Provinces to the north could not be held and
must be evacuated. Accordingly, on the 15th, govern-
ment forces and thousands of civilian refugees began
an exodus toward Tuy Hou on the coast but that de-
generated into a panicked flight when the enemy in-
terdicted the main road. The enemy dispersed or de-
stroyed many of the South Vietnamese II Corps units
in this catastrophe.

These events set off a chain reaction as the de-
moralized South Vietnamese troops abandoned port
after port olong the South Vietnomese coast to
swiftly odvoncing North Vietnamese forces. Learn-
ing of the disaster in II Corps and confused by con-
tradictory deployment orders from Saigon, the de-
fenders of I Corps also began to crack. Giving up
Hue on 25 March, Vietnomese troops retreated in
disorder toward Danang. The Vietnamese Navy res-
cued thousands of men cut off on the coast south-
east of Hue, but heavy weather and the generol con-
fusion limited the sealift's effectiveness. On the
previous day (24 March) government units evacu-
ated Tarn Ky and Quang Ngai in southern I Corps
and also streamed toward Danang. Simultoneously,
the navy transported elements of the 2d Division
from Chu Lai to Re Island 20 miles offshore. With
five North Vietnamese divisions pressing the rem-
nants of the South Vietnamese armed forces and
hundreds of thousands of refugees into Danang,
order in the city disintegrated. Looting, arson, and
riot ruled the city as over two million people sought
a way out of the ever-closing trap.

During this period of growing chaos in South
Vietnam, the U.S. Navy readied for evacuation opera-
tions. On 24 March, the Military Sealift Command
(MSC), formerly the Military Sea Transportation Ser-
vice, dispatched the following tugs, pulling a total of
six borges, from Vung Tau toward Donong:

Asiatic Stamina

Chitose Mam

Osceola

Pawnee

Shibaura Mam

On 25 March, the following ships were alerted for
imminent evacuation operations in South Vietnam:
SS American Racer

SS Green Forest

SS Green Port

SS Green Wave

SS Pioneer Commander

SS Pioneer Contender
SS Transcolorado
USNS Greenville Victory
USNS Sgt. Andrew Miller
USNS Sgt. Tmman Kimbro

Noncombatants were chosen for the mission be-
cause the Paris Agreement prohibited the entry of
U.S. Navy or other military forces into the coimtry.

With the arrival at Danang of Pioneer Contender
on 27 March, the massive U.S. sea evacuation of I
and II Corps began. During the next several days
four of the five barge-pulling tugs and Sgt. Andrew
Miller, Pioneer Commander, and American Challenger
put in at the port. The vessels embarked U.S. Con-
sulate, MSC, and other American personnel and
thousands of desperate Vietnamese soldiers and civil-
ions. When the larger ships were ftlled to capacity
with 5,000 to 8,000 passengers, they individually
sailed for Cam Ranh Bay further down the coast. By
30 March order in the city of Danang and in the har-
bor had completely broken down. Armed South Viet-
namese deserters fired on civilians and each other,
the enemy fired on the American vessels and sent
sappers ahead to destroy port facilities, and refugees
sought to board any boat or craft ofloat. The hun-
dreds of vessels traversing the harbor endangered the
safety of oil. Weighing these factors, the remaining
U.S. and Vietnamese Navy ships loaded all the peo-
ple they could and steamed for the south. MSC ships
carried over 30,000 refugees from Danang in the
four-day operation. American Challenger stayed off-
shore to pick up stragglers until day's end on 30
March, when the North Vietnamese overran Danang.

In quick succession, the major ports in 11 Corps
fell to the lightly resisted Communist advance. Ham-
pered by South Vietnamese shelling of Qui Nhon, Pio-
neer Commander, Greenville Victory, Korean-flag LST
Boo Heung Pioneer, and three tugs were unable to load
evacuees at this city, which fell on 31 March. The
speed of the South Vietnamese collapse and the

357

enemy's quick exploitation of it limited the number
of refugees rescued from Tuy Hon and Nho Trang. Be-
fore the latter port fell on 2 April, however, Boo Heung
Pioneer and Pioneer Commander brought 11,500 pas-
sengers on board and put out to sea.

Initially, Cam Ranh Bay was chosen as the safe
haven for these South Vietnamese troops and civil-
ians transported by MSC. But, even Cam Ranh Bay
was soon in peril. Between 1 and 4 April, many of
the refugees just landed were reemborked for further
passage south and west to Phu Quoc Island in the
Gulf of Siam. Greenville Victory, Sgt. Andrew Miller,
American Challenger, and Green Port each embarked
between 7,000 and 8,000 evacuees for the journey.
Pioneer Contender sailed with 16,700 people filling
every conceivoble space from stem to stern. Crowd-
ing and the lack of sufficient food and water among
the 8,000 passengers on board Transcolorado led a
number of armed Vietnamese marines to demand
they be discharged at the closer port of Vung Tou.
The ship's master complied to avoid bloodshed, but
this crisis highlighted the need for the Navy to pro-
vide better security.

As the magnitude of the colamity in I and II
Corps became apparent, the Seventh Fleet deployed
elements of the Amphibious Force (Task Force 76) to a
position off Nha Trang. Because of the political re-
strictions on the use of American military forces in
South Vietnam and the availability of MSC resources,
however, Washington limited the naval contingent,
then designated the Refugee Assistance Task Group
(Task Group 76.8), to a supporting role. For the most
part, this entailed command coordination, surface es-
cort duties, and the dispatch of 50-man Marine secu-
rity details to the MSC flotilla at sea. By 2 April, the
task group — Dubuque, Durham (LKA 114), Frederick
(LST 1184), and the Task Force 76 flagship Blue Ridge
(LCC 19) — was monitoring operations at Cam Ranh
Bay and Phan Rang. That same night the first Ma-
rine security force to do so boarded Pioneer Contender.
A second contingent was airlifted to Transcolorado on
the fourth. Dissatisfied with the condition of recep-
tion facilities on Phu Quoc and ill-tempered after the
arduous passoge south, armed passengers in
Greenville Victory forced the master to sail to Vung
Tau. Guided missile cruiser Long Beach (CGN 9) and
escort Reasoner (DE 1063) intercepted the ship and

stood by to oid the crew, but the voyage and debarka-
tion of passengers proceeded uneventfully. In addi-
tion. Commander Task Group 76.8 immediately con-
centrated Dubuque, guided missile destroyer Cochrane
(DDG 21), storeship Vega (AF 59), and the three ships
of Amphibious Ready Group Alpha at Phu Quoc to
position security detochments on each of the MSC
vessels and to resupply the refugees with food, water,
and medicines. Naval personnel also served as trans-
lators to ease the regisfration process. By 10 April, all
ships at Phu Quoc were empty, thus bringing to o
close the intracoastal sealift of 130,000 U.S. and
South Vietnamese citizens. With stabilization of the
fighting front at Xuan Loc east of Saigon, as the
Communists prepared for the final offensive, the
need to evacuate by sea diminished. By the 14th all
naval vessels had departed the waters off South Viet-
nam and returned to other duties.

Eagle Pull

Meanwhile, the Seventh Fleet focused its atten-
tion on Cambodia, in imminent danger of
falling to the Communist Khmer Rouge guerrillas.
Since 1970, the United States had aided the govern-
ment of President Lon Nol in its struggle with the in-
digenous enemy and with North Vietnamese forces
arrayed along the border with South Vietnam. The
American support included a bombing campaign
launched from Navy carriers and Air Force bases as
far away as Guam and the delivery to Phnom Penh
of arms, ammunition, and essentiol commodities
through airlift and Mekong River convoy. Material
assistance to the 6,000-man Cambodian Navy in-
cluded the transfer of coastal patrol croft, PBRs, con-
verted amphibious craft for river patrol and mine
warfare, and auxiliary vessels. Despite this aid, by
early 1975 the Communists in Cambodia controlled
every population center but Phnom Penh, the capi-
tal. As the enemy tightened their ring around the
dty, the resistance of Cambodian government forces
began to crumble.

Concluding that it was only a matter of time be-
fore all was lost in Cambodia, American leaders pre-
pared to evacuate American and allied personnel
from Phnom Penh. Fleet commanders revised and up-
dated long-standing plans and alerted their forces for

358

Sodden with rain from a tropical downpour, South Vietnamese troops and civilian refugees fleeing by boat from
the North Vietnamese onslaught approach amphibious cargo ship Durham (LKA 114) off the port ofPhan
Rang in April 1975. ^ . • \ : .

The deck and superstructure of the Military Sealift Command's SS Pioneer Contender, en route Phu Quoc Island, teems
with refugees.

U.S. Marines, deployed on board Pioneer Contender to maintain order, pass supplies up the ladder to needy refugees.

360

this special mission, designated Operation Eagle Pull.
On 3 March 1975, Amphibious Ready Group Alpha
(Task Group 76.4), and the 31st Marine Amphibious
Unit (Task Group 79.4) embarked and arrived at a des-
ignated station off Kompong Som (previously Si-
hanoukville) in the Gulf of Siam. By 11 April, the force
consisted of amphibious ships Okinawa, Vancouver, and
Thomaston (LSD 28), escorted by Edson (DD 946), Henry
B. Wilson, Knox (DE 1052), and Kir!< (DE 1087). In addi-
tion, Hancock disembarked her normal complement of
fixed-wing aircraft and took on Marine Heavy Lift He-
licopter Squadron (HMH) 463 for the operation. Antici-
pating the need to rescue as many as 800 evacuees,
naval leaders decided that they needed all of the
squadron's 25 CH-53, CH-46, AH-IJ, and UH-IE heli-
copters and Okinawa's 22 CH-53, AH-IJ, and UH-lEs
of HMH-462. The amphibious group also carried the
2d Battalion, 4th Marines, which would defend the
evacuation landing zone near the U.S. Embassy, and
reinforced naval medical-surgical teams to care for
any casualties. Land-based U.S. Air Force helicopters
and tactical aircraft were also on hand to back up the
naval effort. Commander U.S. Support Activities
Group/ 7th Air Force was in overall command of the
evacuation operation.

On 7 April 1975. the American command put
Amphibious Ready Group Alpha on three-hour alert
and positioned the force off the Cambodian coast. In

the early morning hours of 12 April Washington or-
dered execution of the daring mission. At 0745 local
time, Okinawa began launching helicopters in three
waves to carry the 360-man Marine ground security
force to the landing zone. One hour later, after
traversing 100 miles of hostile territory, the initial
wave set down near the embassy and the Marines
quickly established a defensive perimeter.

Within the next two hours, U.S. officials assembled
the evacuees and quickly looded them on Okinawa and
Hancock helicopters. Because many already had left
Cambodia by other means prior to the 12th, the evac-
uees numbered only 276. The group included U.S. Am-
bassador lohn Gunther Dean, other American diplo-
matic personnel, the acting president of Cambodia,
senior Cambodian government leaders and their fami-
lies, and members of the news media. In all, 82 U.S.,
159 Cambodian, and 35 other nationals were rescued.

By 1041 all the evacuees hod been lifted out, and
little more thon one-half hour later the ground secu-
rity force also was oirborne and heading out to sea. At
1224 all aircraft and personnel were safely on board
Amphibious Ready Group Alpha ships. Although one
Khmer Rouge 75-millimeter shell landed near the em-
bassy landing zone, no casualties were suffered during
the entire operation. The following day, task group
helicopters flew the evacuated personnel to Thailand
and the naval force set sail for Subic Bay. Thus

Guided missile destroyer Henry B. Wilson, part of the Navy-Marine task group that successfully evacuated Americans
and others from the besieged Cambodian capital ofPhnom Penh.

361

through detailed planning, preparation, and precise
execution, the joint evacuation force successfully ac-
complished the military mission in Cambodia.

The experience gained in Operation Eagle Pull
and in the refugee evacuations from South Viet-
nam's I and II Corps served the fleet well when the
Republic of Vietnam, after 20 years of struggle, col-
lapsed under the Communist onslaught. During the
latter half of April, U.S. naval leaders prepared ships
and men for the final evacuation of American and
allied personnel from South Vietnam. The ships of
the MSC flotilla were cleaned, restocked with food,
water, and medicine; and deployed off Vung Tau in
readiness. Marine security detachments embarked in

A plane hit by enemy fire burns on the
tarmac of Tan Son Nhut Airfield as Com-
munist forces close in on Saigon during
the last days of the Republic of Vietnam.

362

Air Force personnel give the thumbs-up
sign to the crew of one of their
HH-53B helicopters, a detachment of
which operated from carrier Midway
during Operation Frequent Wind, the
evacuation of Saigon.

each of the vessels and prepared to disorm boarding
refugees and ensure order. Rincon (T-AOG 77) stood
by to provide fuel to Vietnamese and American ships
making the exodus from South Vietnam's waters.

The Seventh Fleet also marshaled its forces in the
Western Pacific. Between 18 and 24 April 1975, with
the loss of Saigon imminent, the Navy concentrated
off Vung Tau a vast assemblage of ships under Com-
mander Task Force 76.

Tiask Force 76 "
Blue Ridge (command ship) : -
Task Group 76.4 (Movement Transport Group
Alpha): Okinawa; Vancouver; Thomaston; Peoria
(LST 1183)

J Task Group 76.5 (Movement Tronsport Group
Bravo: Dubuque; Durham; Frederick
Task Group 76.9 (Movement Transport Group
Charlie): Anchorage (LSD 36); Denver (LPD 9);
Duluth {L?D 6); Mobile {LKA 115)

The task force was joined by Hancock and
Midway, carrying Navy, Marine, and Air Force heli-
copters; Seventh Fleet flagship Oklahoma City; am-

363

An HH-53 helicopter lifts a Vietnamese Air Force F-5 jet, one of thousands of aircraft provided to its allies by the United
States, onto the deck of Midway.

364

phlbious ships Mount Vernon (LSD 39), Barbour County
(LST 1195), and Tuscaloosa (LST 1187); and eight de-
stroyer types for naval gunfire, escort, and area de-
fense. The Enterprise and Coral Sea carrier ottack
groups of Task Force 77 in the South China Sea pro-
vided air cover while Task Force 73 ensured logistic
support. The Marine evacuation contingent, the 9th
Marine Amphibious Brigade (Task Group 79.1), con-
sisted of three battoHon landing teams, four heli-
copter squadrons, support units, and the deployed se-
curity detachments.

After a dogged defense at Xuan Loc, the South
Vietnamese forces defending the approaches to
Saigon finally gave way on 21 April. With the out-
come of the conflict clear. President Thieu resigned
the same day. On the 29th, North Vietnamese and
Viet Cong forces closed on the capital, easily pushing
through the disintegroting Republic of Vietnam
Armed Forces. Although U.S. and South Vietnamese
leaders had delayed ordering an evacuation, for fear

While a ship's boat stands by to rescue
survivors, a UH-1 B helicopter that could
not land on Seventh Fleet carriers for lack
of deck space thrashes the sea with its
rotor blades.

365

Frightened and miserable refugees from Saigon are landed by helicopter on board Midway.

Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, one-time Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam, and Vietnamese Lieutenant General
Ngo Quang Truong head below decks.

366

of sparking a premature collapse, the time for deci-
sion was now at hand.

At 1108 local time on 29 April 1975, Commander
Task Force 76 received the order to execute Operation
Frequent Wind (initially Tulon Vise), the evacuation of
U.S. personnel and Vietnamese who might suffer as a
result of their past service to the allied effort. At 1244,
from a position 1 7 nautical miles from the Vung Tau
Peninsula, Hancock launched the first helicopter wave.
Over two hours later, these aircraft landed at the pri-
mary landing zone in the U.S. Defense Attache Office
compound in Saigon. Once the ground security force
(2d Battalion, 4th Murines) established a defensive
cordon, Task Force 76 helicopters began lifting out the
thousands of American, Vietnamese, and third-coun-
try nationals. The process was fairly orderly. By 2100
that night, the entire group of 5,000 evacuees had
been cleared from the site. The Marines holding the
perimeter soon followed.

The situation was much less stable at the U.S. Em-
bassy. There, several hundred prospective evacuees
were joined by thousands more who climbed fences

Peace at last. Enterprise bluejackets,
flanked by newly operational ¥-14 Tom-
cats, relax on the flight deck as their ship
and Coral Sea depart the now quiet wa-
ters of South Vietnam.

367

and pressed the Marine guard in their desperate at-
tempt to flee th^eity. Marihe Qrid Air Force heli-
copters, flying ot: night through ground fire over
Saigon and the surrounding area, had to pick up
evacuees from dangerously constricted landing zones
at the embossy, one atop the building itself. Despite
the problems, by 0500 on the morning of 30 April,
U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin and 2,100 evacuees
had been rescued from the Communist forces closing
in. Only two hours after the last Marine security force
element was extracted from the embassy, Commvmist
tanks crashed through the gates of the nearby Presi-
dential Palace. At the cost of two Marines killed in an
earlier shelling of the Defense Attache Office com-
pound and two helicopter crews lost at sea, Task Force
76 rescued over 7,000 Americans and Vietnamese.

Meonwhile, out at sea, the initial trickle of
refugees from Saigon had become a torrent. Viet-
namese Air Force aircraft loaded with air crews and
their fomilies made for the naval task force. These in-
coming helicopters (most fuel-starved) and one T-41
trainer complicated the landing and takeoff of the Ma-
rine and Air Force hdic^pteiis shuttling evacuees. Ships
of the task force recovered 41 Vietnamese aircraft, but
another 54 were pushed over the side to make room
on deck or ditched alongside by their frantic crews.
Naval small craft rescued many \^etnamese from sink-
ing helicopters, but some did not survive the ordeol.

This aerial exodus was paralleled by an outgoing
tide of junks, sampans, and small craft of all types

bearing a large number of the fleeing populotion.
MSG tugs Harumi, Chitose Maru, Osceola, Shibmra
Maru, and Asiatic Stamina pulled barges filled with
people from Saigon port out to the MSG flotilla. There,
the refugees were embarked, registered, inspected for
weapons, and given a medical exam. Having learned
well from the earlier operations, the MSG aews and
Marine security personnel processed the new arrivals
with relative efficiency. The Navy eventually trans-
ferred all Vietnamese refugees taken on board naval
vessels to the MSG ships.

Another large contingent of Vietnamese was car-
ried to safety by a flotilla of 26 Vietnamese Navy and
other vessels. These ships concentrated off Son Island
southwest of Vung Tau with 30,000 sailors, their fami-
lies, and other civilians on board.

On the afternoon of 30 April, Task Force 76 and
the MSG group moved away from the coast, all the
while picking up more seaborne refugees. This effcnrt
continued the following day. Finally, when this
human tide ceased on the evening of 2 May, Task
Force 76, carrying 6,000 passengers; the MSG flotilla
of Sgt. Truman Kimbro, Sgt. Andrew Miller, Greenville Vic-
tory, Pioneer Contender, Pioneer Commander, Green For-
est, Green Port. American Challenger, and Boo Heung Pio-
neer, with 44,000 refugees; and the Vietnamese Navy
group set sail for reception centers in the Philippines
and Guam. Thus ended the U.S. Navy's role in the 25-
year American effort to aid the Republic of Vietnam
in its desperate fight for survival.

268

Appendix A

Hospital Corpsman Third Class
Donald E. Ballard, United States Navy

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and be-
yond the call of duty on 16 May 1968 while serving as a Corpsman with Com-
pany M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 3d Marine Division in connection with opera-
tions against enemy aggressor forces in the Republic of Vietnam. During the
afternoon hours, Company M was moving to join the remainder of the 3d Battal-
ion in Quang Tri Province. After treating and evacuating two heat casualties, Petty
Officer Ballard was returning to his platoon from the evacuotion landing zone
when the company was ambushed by a North Vietnamese Army unit, employing
automatic weapons and mortars, and sustained numerous casualties. Observing a
wounded Marine, Petty Officer Ballard unhesitatingly moved across the fire-swept
terrain to the injured man and swiftly rendered medical assistance to his comrade.
Petty Officer Ballord then directed four Marines to carry the casualty to a position
of relative safety. As the four men prepared to move the wounded Morine, an
enemy soldier suddenly left his concealed position and, after hurling a hand
grenade which landed near the casualty, commenced firing upon the small group
of men. Instantly shouting a warning to the Marines, Petty Officer Ballard fear-
lessly threw himself upon the lethal explosive device to protect his comrades from
the deadly blast. When the grenade failed to detonate, he calmly arose from his
dangerous position and resolutely continued his determined efforts in treating
other Marine casualties. Petty Officer Ballard's heroic actions and selfless concern
for the welfare of his companions served to inspire all who observed him and pre-
vented possible injury or death to his fellow Marines. His courage, daring initia-
tive, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of extreme personal danger, sus-
tain and enhance the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Lieutenant Vincent R. Capodanno,
Chaplain Corps, United States Naval Reserve

or conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and be-
yond the call of duty as Chaplain of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine
Division (Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force, in connection with operations against
enemy forces in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 4 September 1967.
In response to reports that the 2d Platoon of M Company was in danger of being
overrun by a massed enemy assoulting force, Lieutenant Capodanno left the rela-
tive safety of the Company Commond Post and ran through an open area roked
with fire, directly to the beleaguered platoon. Disregarding the intense enemy
small-arms, outomatic-weapons, and mortar fire, he moved about the battlefield
administering last rites to the dying and giving medical aid to the wounded.
When an exploding mortar round inflicted painful multiple wounds to his arms
and legs, and severed a portion of his right hand, he steadfastly refused all medi-
cal aid. Instead, he directed the corpsmen to help their wounded comrades and,
with calm vigor, continued to move about the battlefield as he provided encour-
ogement by voice and example to the valiant Marines. Upon encountering o
wounded corpsman in the direct line of fire of an enemy machine gun positioned
approximately fifteen yards away. Lieutenant Capodanno rushed forward in a
daring attempt to aid and assist the mortally wounded corpsman. At that instant,
only inches from his goal, he was struck down by a burst of machine gun fire. By
his heroic conduct on the battlefield, and his inspiring example. Lieutenant
Capodanno upheld the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He
gallantly gave his life in the cause of freedom.

Hospital Corpsmctrz Third Class
Wayne M. Caron, United States Navy

or conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and be-
yond the call of duty on 28 July 1968 while serving as Platoon Corpsman with
Company K, 3d Battolion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division during combat opera-
tions agoinst enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnom. While on a sweep through
an open rice field in Quong Nam Province, Petty Officer Caron's unit started re-
ceiving enemy smoll-arms fire. Upon seeing two Marine casualties fall, he immedi-
ately ran forward to render first aid, but found that they were dead. At this time,
the platoon was taken under intense small-orms and automotic-weopons fire, sus-
toining odditional casualties. As he moved to the aid of his wounded comrades,
Petty Officer Caron was hit in the arm by enemy fire. Although knocked to the
ground, he regained his feet and continued to the injured Marines. He rendered
medical assistance to the first Marine he reached, who was grievously wounded,
and undoubtedly was instrumental in saving the man's life. Petty Officer Coron
then ran toward the second wounded Marine, but was again hit by enemy fire,
this time in the leg. Nonetheless, he crawled the remaining distance and provided
medical aid for this severely wounded man. Petty Officer Caron started to make
his way to yet another injured comrade, when he was again struck by enemy
small-arms fire. Courageously and with unbelievable determination, Petty Officer
Caron continued his attempt to reach the third Marine until he himself was killed
by an enemy rocket round. His inspiring valor, steadfast determination, and self-
less dedication in the face of extreme danger sustain and enhance the finest tradi-
tions of the United States Noval Service.

Captain Michael J. tstocin, United States Navy

or conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and be-
yond the call of duty on 20 and 26 April 1967 as a pilot in Attack Squadron
One Hundred Ninety-Two, embarked in USS Ticonderoga (CVA 14). Leading a
three-plane group of aircraft in support of a coordinated strike against two ther-
mal power plants in Haiphong, North Vietnam, on 20 April 1967, Captain (then
Lieutenant Commander) Estocin provided continuous warnings to the strike
group leaders of the surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats, and personally neutral-
ized three SAM sites. Although his aircroft was severely domaged by an exploding
missile, he reentered the target area and relentlessly prosecuted a Shrike attack in
the face of intense antiaircraft fire. With less than five minutes of fuel remaining
he departed the target area and commenced in-flight refueling which continued
for over one hundred miles. Three miles aft of Ticonderoga, and without enough
fuel for a second approach, he disengaged from the tanker and executed a precise
approach to a fiery arrested landing. On 26 April 1967, in the support of a coordi-
nated strike against the vital fuel facilities in Haiphong, he led an attack on a
threatening SAM site, during which his aircraft was seriously damaged by an ex-
ploding SAM; nevertheless, he regained control of his burning aircraft and coura-
geously launched his Shrike missiles before departing the area. By his inspiring
courage and unswerving devotion to duty in the face of grave personal danger.
Captain Estocin upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Lieutenant Thomas G. Kelley, United States Navy

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond
the coll of duty on the afternoon of 15 June 1969 while serving as Commander
River Assault Division 152 during combat operations against enemy aggressor
forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Lieutenant Kelley was in charge of a column of
eight river assault craft which were extracting one company of United States Army
infantry troops on the east bank of the Ong Muong Canal in Kien Hoa Province,
when one of the armored troop carriers reported a mechanical failure of a loading
ramp. At approximately the same time, Viet Cong forces opened fire from the op-
posite bank of the canal. After issuing orders for the crippled troop carrier to raise
its ramp manually, and for the remaining boats to form a protective cordon around
the disabled craft. Lieutenant Kelley, realizing the extreme danger to his column
and its inability to clear the ambush site until the crippled unit was repaired, boldly
maneuvered the monitor in which he was embarked to the exposed side of the pro-
tective cordon in direct line with the enemy's fire, and ordered the monitor to com-
mence firing. Suddenly, an enemy rocket scored a direct hit on the coxswain's flat,
the shell penetrating the thick armor plate, and the explosion spraying shrapnel in
all directions. Sustaining serious head wounds from the blast, which hurled him to
the deck of the monitor. Lieutenant Kelley disregarded his severe injuries and at-
tempted to continue directing the other boats. Although unable to move from the
deck or to speak clearly into the radio, he succeeded in relaying his commands
through one of his men until the enemy attack was silenced and the boats were
able to move to an area of safety. Lieutenant Kelley's brilliant leadership, bold ini-
tiative, and resolute determination served to inspire his men and provided the im-
petus needed to carry out the mission after he was medically evacuated by heli-
copter. His extraordinary courage under fire and his selfless devotion to duty
sustain and enhance the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Joseph R. Kerrey,
United States Navai Reserve

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond
the call of duty on 14 March 1969 while serving as a SEAL Team Leader during
action against enemy aggressor (Viet Cong) forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Acting
in response to reliable intelligence, Lieutenant (jg) Kerrey lead his SEAL Team on a
mission to capture important members of the enemy's area political cadre known to
be located on an island in the bay of Nha Trang. In order to surprise the enemy, he
and his team scaled a 350-foot sheer cliff to place themselves above the ledge on
which the enemy was located. Splitting his team in two elements and coordinating
both, Lieutenant (jg) Kerrey led his men in the treacherous downward descent to the
enemy's camp. Just as they neared the end of their descent, intense enemy fire was di-
rected at them, and Lieutenant (jg) Kerrey received massive injuries from a grenade
which exploded at his feet and threw him backward onto the jagged rocks. Although
bleeding profusely and suffering great pain, he displayed outstanding courage and
presence of mind in immediately directing his element's fire into the heart of the
enemy camp. Utilizing his radioman. Lieutenant (jg) Kerrey coiled in the second ele-
ment's fire support which caught the confused Viet Cong in a devastating cross fire.
After successfully suppressing the enemy's fire, and although immobilized by his mul-
tiple wounds, he continued to maintain calm, superlative control as he ordered his
teom to secure and defend an extraction site. Lieutenant (jg) Kerrey resolutely directed
his men, despite his near-unconscious state, until he was eventually evacuated by he-
licopter. The havoc brought to the enemy by this very successful mission cannot be
overestimated. The enemy who were captured provided critical intelligence to the al-
lied effort. Lieutenant (jg) Kerrey's courageous and inspiring leadership, valiant fight-
ing spirit, and tenacious devotion to duty in the face of almost overwhelming opposi-
tion sustoin and enhance the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Lieutenant Clyde E. Lcissen, United States Navy

ror conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the
call of duty on 19 June 1968 as pilot and aircraft commander of a search and res-
cue helicopter, attached to Helicopter Support Squadron Seven, Detachment One Hun-
dred Four, embarked in USS Preble (DLG 15), during operations against enemy forces in
North Vietnam. Launched shortly after midnight to attempt the rescue of two downed
aviators, Lieutenant (then Lieutenant, Junior Grade) Lassen skillfully piloted his air-
craft over unknown and hostile terroin to a steep, tree-covered hill on which the sur-
vivors had been located. Although enemy fire was being directed ot the helicopter, he
initially landed in a cleor areo near the base of the hill, but, due to the dense under-
growth, the survivors could not reach the helicopter. With the aid of flare illumination,
Lieutenant Lassen successfully accomplished a hover between two trees at the sur-
vivor's position. Illumination was abruptly lost as the last of the flares were expended,
and the helicopter collided with a tree, commencing a sharp descent. Expertly righting
his aircraft and maneuvering clear. Lieutenant Lassen remained in the area, deter-
mined to make another rescue attempt, and encouraged the downed aviators while
awaiting resumption of flare illumination. After another unsuccessful, illuminated, res-
cue attempt, and with his fuel dangerously low and his aircraft significantly damaged,
he launched again and commenced another approach in the face of the continuing
enemy opposition. When flare illumination was again lost. Lieutenant Lassen, fully
aware of the dangers in clearly revealing his position to the enemy, turned on his land-
ing lights and completed the landing. On this attempt, the survivors were able to make
their way to the helicopter. Enroute to the coast, Lieutenant Lassen encountered and
successfully evaded additional hostile antiairaaft fire and, with fuel for only five min-
utes of flight remaining, landed safely aboard USS Jouett (DLG 29). His courageous and
daring actions, determination, and extraordinary airmanship in the face of great risk
sustain and enhance the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Lieutenarit Thomas R. Norris,
United States Naval Reserve

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above
and beyond the call of duty while serving as a SEAL Advisor with the Strategic
Technical Directorote Assistance Team, Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam. During the period 10 to 13 April 1972, Lieutenant Norris
completed an unprecedented ground rescue of two downed pilots deep within
heavily controlled enemy territory in Quang Tri Province. Lieutenant Norris, on
the night of 10 April, led a five-man patrol through 2,000 meters of heavily con-
trolled enemy territory, locoted one of the downed pilots at daybreak, and re-
turned to the Forward Operating Base (FOB). On 11 April, after a devastating
mortor and rocket attack on the small FOB, Lieutenant Norris led a three-man
team on two unsuccessful rescue attempts for the second pilot. On the afternoon
of the 12th, a Forward Air Controller located the pilot and notified Lieutenant
Norris. Dressed in fishermen disguises and using a sampan, Lieutenant Norris
and one Vietnamese traveled throughout that night and found the injured pilot
at dawn. Covering the pilot with bamboo and vegetation, they began the return
journey, successfully evading a North Vietnamese patrol. Approaching the FOB,
they came under heavy machine gun fire. Lieutenant Norris called in an air
strike which provided suppression fire and a smoke screen, allowing the rescue
party to reach the FOB. By his outstanding display of decisive leadership, un-
daunted courage, and selfless dedication in the face of extreme danger. Lieu-
tenant Norris enhanced the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

377

Seaman David G. Ouellet, United States Navy

'or conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above ond be-
yond the call of duty while serving with River Section 532, in combat against
the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. As the forward machine gunner on River
Patrol Boat (PBR) 124, which was on patrol on the Mekong River during the early
evening hours of 6 March 1967, Seaman Ouellet observed suspicious activity near
the river bank, alerted his Boat Captain, and recommended movement of the
boat to the area to investigate. While the PBR was making o high-speed run
along the river bank. Seaman Ouellet spotted an incoming enemy grenade
falling toward the boat. He immediotely left the protected position of his gun
mount and ran oft for the full length of the speeding boat, shouting to his fellow
crew members to take cover. Observing the Boat Captain standing unprotected on
the boat, Seaman Ouellet bounded onto the engine compartment cover, and
pushed the Boat Captain down to safety. In the split second that followed the
grenade's landing, and in the face of certain death. Seaman Ouellet fearlessly
placed himself between the deadly missile and his shipmates, courageously ab-
sorbing most of the blast fragments with his own body in order to protect his ship-
mates from injury ond death. His extraordinary heroism and his selfless and
courageous actions on behalf of his comrades at the expense of his own life were
in the finest tradition of the United States Noval Service.

Hospital Corpsman Second Class
David a. Ray, United States Navy

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond
the call of duty while serving as a corpsman with Battery D, 2d Battalion, 11th
Marines, 1st Marine Division, at Phu Loc 6, near An Hoa, Quang Nam Province, in the
Republic of Vietnam, on 19 March 1969. During the early morning hours, an esti-
mated battalion-sized enemy force lounched a determined assault against the Battery's
position, and succeeded in effecting a penetration of the barbed-wire perimeter. The
initial burst of enemy fire caused numerous casualties omong the Marines who had
immediately manned their howitzers during the rocket and mortar attack. Undaunted
by the intense hostile fire. Petty Officer Ray moved from parapet to parapet, rendering
emergency medical treatment to the wounded. Although seriously wounded himself
while administering first aid to a Marine cosualty, he refused medical aid and contin-
ued his life saving efforts. While he was bandaging and attempting to comfort another
wounded Morine, Petty Officer Ray was forced to battle two enemy soldiers who at-
tacked his position, personally killing one and wounding the other. Rapidly losing his
strength as a result of his own severe wounds, he nonetheless managed to move
through the hail of enemy fire to other casualties. Once again, he was faced with the
intense fire of oncoming enemy troops and, despite the grave personal danger and in-
surmountable odds, succeeded in treating the wounded and holding off the enemy
until he ran out of ammunition, at which time he sustained fatal wounds. Petty Officer
Ray's final act of heroism was to protect the patient he was treating. He threw himself
upon the wounded Marine, thus saving the man's life when an enemy grenade ex-
ploded nearby. By his determined and persevering actions, courageous spirit, and self-
less devotion to the welfare of his Marine comrades. Petty Officer Ray served to inspire
the men of Battery D to heroic efforts in defeating the enemy. His conduct throughout
wQs in keeping with the finest tiaditions of the United States Naval Service.

Construction Mechanic i nird Class
Marvin G. Shields, United States Navy

For conspicuous gallantry and Intrepidity at the risk of his life above and be-
yond the call of duty while serving with United States Navy Seabee Team 1104
at Dong Xoai, Republic of Vietnam, on 10 June 1965. Although wounded when
the compound of Detachment A-342, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st
Special Forces came under intense fire from an estimated reinforced Viet Cong
regiment employing machine gun, heavy weapons and small arms, Shields con-
tinued to resupply his fellow Americans with needed ammunition and to return
the enemy fire for a period of approximately three hours, at which time the Viet
Cong launched a massive attack at close range with flame throwers, hand
grenades and small-arms fire. Wounded a second time during this attack, Shields
nevertheless assisted in carrying a more critically wounded man to safety, and
then resumed firing at the enemy for four more hours. When the Commander
asked for o volunteer to accompany him in an attempt to knock out an enemy
machine gun emplacement which was endangering the lives of all personnel in
the compound because of the accuracy of its fire, Shields unhesitatingly volun-
teered for this extremely hazardous mission. Proceeding toward their objective
with a 3.5-inch rocket launcher, they succeeded in destroying the enemy machine
gun emplacement, thus undoubtedly saving the lives of many of their fellow ser-
vicemen in the compound. Shields was mortally wounded by hostile fire while re-
turning to his defensive position. His heroic initiative and great personal valor in
the face of intense enemy fire sustain and enhance the finest tradition of the
United States Naval Service.

Rear Admiral James B. Stockdale^
United States Navy

For conspicuous gallantry and Intrepidity at the risk of his life above and be-
yond the call of duty on 4 September 1969 while senior naval officer in the
Prisoner of War camps of North Vietnam. Recognized by his captors as the leader
in the Prisoners of War resistance to interrogation and in their refusal to partici-
pate in propaganda exploitation, Rear Admiral (then Captain) Stockdale was sin-
gled out for interrogation and attendant torture after he was detected in a covert
communications attempt. Sensing the start of another purge, and aware that his
earlier efforts at self-disfiguration to dissuade his captors from exploiting him for
propaganda purposes had resulted in cruel and agonizing punishment, Rear Ad-
miral Stockdale resolved to make himself a symbol of resistance regardless of per-
sonal sacrifice. He deliberately inflicted a near-mortal wound to his person in
order to convince his captors of his willingness to give up his life rather than ca-
pitulate. He was subsequently discovered and revived by the North Vietnamese
who, convinced of his indomitable spirit, abated in their employment of excessive
harassment and torture toward all of the Prisoners of War. By his heroic action, at
great peril to himself, he earned the everlasting gratitude of his fellow prisoners
and of his country. Rear Admiral Stockdale's valiant leadership and extraordi-
nary courage in a hostile environment sustain -and enhance the finest traditions
of the United States Naval Service.

Engineman Second Class Michael E. Thornton,
United States Navy

or conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and be-
yond the call of duty while participating in a daring operation against enemy
forces in the Republic of Vietnam on 31 October 1972. Petty Officer Thornton, an
assistant U.S. Navy advisor, along with a U.S. Navy lieutenant serving as senior
advisor, accompanied a three-man Vietnamese Navy SEAL patrol on an intelli-
gence-gathering and prisoner-capture operation against an enemy-occupied
naval river base. Launched from a Vietnamese Navy junk in a rubber boat, the
patrol reached land and was continuing on foot toward its objective when it sud-
denly came under heavy fire from a numerically superior force. The patrol called
in naval gunfire support and then engaged the enemy in a fierce firefight, ac-
counting for many enemy casualties before moving back to the waterline to pre-
vent encirclement. Upon learning that the senior advisor had been hit by enemy
fire and was believed to be dead, Petty Officer Thornton returned through a hail
of fire to the lieutenant's last position, quickly disposed of two enemy soldiers
about to overrun the position, and succeeded in removing the seriously wounded
and unconscious senior naval advisor to the water's edge. He then inflated the
lieutenant's life jacket and towed him seaward for approximately two hours until
picked up by support craft. By his extraordinary courage and perseverance, Petty
Officer Thornton was directly responsible for saving the life of his superior officer
and enabling the safe extraction of all patrol members, thereby upholding the
highest traditions of the United States Naval Service

loatswam

Mats Hrst Class J(
United States Nai

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the
call of duty as a member of River Section 531 during combat operations on the
Mekong River in the Republic of Vietnam. On 31 October 1966, Petty Officer Williams
was serving as Boat Captain and Patrol Officer aboard River Patrol Boat (PBR) 105 ac-
companied by another patrol boat when the patrol was suddenly taken under fire by two
enemy sampuns. Petty Officer Williams immediately ordered the fire returned, killing the
crew of one enemy boat and causing the other sampan to take refuge in a nearby river
inlet. Pursuing the fleeing sampan, the U.S. patrol encountered a heavy volume of small
orms fire from enemy forces, at close range, occupying well-concealed positions along
the river bank. Maneuvering through this fire, the patrol confronted a numerically supe-
rior enemy force aboard two enemy junks and eight sampans augmented by heavy au-
tomotic weapons fire from ashore. In the savage bottle that ensued, Petty Officer
Williams, with utter disregard for his own safety, exposed himself to the withering hail of
enemy fire to direct counterfire and inspire the actions of his patrol. Recognizing the
overwhelming strength of the enemy force, Petty Officer Williams deployed his patrol to
await the arrival of armed helicopters. In the course of this movement he discovered an
even larger concentration of enemy boats. Not waiting for the arrival of the armed heli-
copters, he displayed great initiative and boldly led the patrol through the intense enemy
fire and damaged or destroyed fifty enemy sampans ond seven junks. This phase of the
action completed, and with the arrival of the armed helicopters. Petty Officer Williams
directed the attack on the remaining enemy force. Although Petty Officer Williams was
aware that his boats would become even better targets, he ordered the patrol boats'
search lights turned on to better illuminate the area and moved the potrol perilously

383

dose to shore to press the attack. Despite a woning supply of ammunition the pa-
trol successfully engaged the enemy ashore and completed the rout of the enemy
force. Under the leadership of Petty Officer Williams, who demonstrated unusual
professional skill and indomitable courage throughout the three-hour battle, the
patrol occounted for the destruction or loss of sixty-five enemy boats and inflicted
numerous casualties on the enemy personnel. His extraordinary heroism and ex-
emplary fighting spirit in the face of grave risks inspired the efforts of his men to
defeat a larger enemy force, and are in keeping with the finest traditions of the
United States Naval Service.

Appendix 6
Secretaries of the Navy
and

Key U. S. Naval Officers, 1950-1975

Secretaries of the Navy

Francis P. Matthews 25 May 1949-31 Jul 1951

Dan A. Kimball 31 Jul 1951-20 Jan 1953

Robert B. Anderson 4 Feb 1953-2 May 1954

Charles S. Thomas 3 May 1954-31 Mar 1957

Thomas S. Gates, Jr. 1 Apr 1957-7 Jun 1959

William B. Franke 8 Jun 1959-20 Ian 1961

John B. Connally Jr. 25 Jan 1961-20 Dec 1961

Fred H. Korth 4 Jan 1962-1 Nov 1963

Paul H. Nitze 29 Nov 1963-30 Jun 1967

Paul R Ignatius 1 Sep 1967-20 Jan 1969

John H. Chafee 31 Jan 1969-4 May 1972

John W. Warner 4 May 1972-9 Apr 1974

J. William Middendorf II 20 Jun 1974-20 Jan 1977

Chiefs of Naval Operations

Admiral Forrest P. Sherman 2 Nov 1949-22 Jul 1951

Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, Acting 22 Jul 1951-16 Aug 1951

Admiral William M. Fechteler 16 Aug 1951-17 Aug 1953

Admiral Robert B. Carney 17 Aug 1953-17 Aug 1955

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke 17 Aug 1955-1 Aug 1961

Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr. 1 Aug 1961-1 Aug 1963

Admiral David L. McDonald 1 Aug 1963-1 Aug 1967

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer 1 Aug 1967-30 Jun 1970

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. 1 Jul 1970-30 Jun 1974

Admiral James L. Holloway III 1 Jul 1974-30 Jun 1978

Commanders in Chief, Pacific

Admiral Arthur W. Radford 30 Apr 1949-10 Jul 1953

Admiral Felix B. Stump 10 Jul 1953-31 Jul 1958

Admiral Harry D. Felt 31 Jul 1958-30 Jun 1964

Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp 30 Jun 1964-31 Jul 1968

Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. 31 Jul 1968-1 Sep 1972

Admiral Noel A. M. Gayler 1 Sep 1972-30 Aug 1976

Commanders in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Admiral Arthur W. Radford 30 Apr 1949-10 Jul 1953

Admiral Felix B. Stump 10 Jul 1953-13 Jan 1958

Admiral Maurice E. Curts 13 Jan 1958-1 Feb 1958

Admiral Herbert G. Hopwood 1 Feb 1958-31 Aug 1960

Admiral John H. Sides . 31 Aug 1960-31 Sep 1963

Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp 30 Sep 1963-26 Jun 1964

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer 26 Jun 1964-30 Mar 1965

Admiral Roy L. Johnson 30 Mar 1965-30 Nov 1967

Admiral John J. Hyland 30 Nov 1967-5 Dec 1970

Admiral Bernard A. Clarey 5 Dec 1970-30 Sep 1973

Admiral Maurice F. Weisner 30 Sep 1973-12 Aug 1976

Commanders Seventh Fleet

Vice Admiral

Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Rear Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral

Arthur D. Struble
Harold M. Martin
Robert Briscoe
Joseph J. Clark
Alfred M. Pride
Stuart H. Ingersoll
Wallace M. Beakley
Frederick N. Kivette
Charles D. Griffin
William A. Schoech
Thomas H. Moorer
Roy L. Johnson
Paul P. Blackburn, Jr.
Joseph W. Williams, Acting
John J. Hyland
William F. Bringle
Maurice F. Weisner
William P. Mack
James L. HoUowoy III
George P. Steele

19 May 1950-28 Mar 1951

28 Mar 1951-28 Mar 1952
28 Mar 1952-20 May 1952

20 May 1952-1 Dec 1953

I Dec 1953-19 Dec 1955
19 Dec 1955-28 Jan 1957
28 Jan 1957-30 Sep 1958
30 Sep 1958-7 Mar 1960
7 Mar 1960-28 Oct 1961
28 Oct 1961-13 Oct 1962
13 Oct 1962-11 Jun 1964

II Jun 1964-1 Mar 1965
1 Mar 1965-7 Oct 1965
7 Oct 1965-13 Dec 1965
13 Dec 1965-6 Nov 1967
6 Nov 1967-10 Mar 1970
10 Mar 1970-18 Jun 1971
18 Jun 1971-23 May 1972
23 May 1972-28 Jul 1973
28 Jul 1973-14 Jun 1975

U.S. Naval Command in South Vietnam

Chiefs of the Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group,

Vietnam

Commander John B. Howlond

Commander James B. Cannon
Captain Samuel Pattie
Captain James D. Collett
Captain Harry E. Day
Captain Kenneth S. Shook
Captain Theodore T. Miller
Captain John J. Flachsenhar
Captain Henry M. Easterling
Captain Joseph B. Drachnik
Captain William H. Hardcastle

Aug 1950-Dec 1950
Dec 1950-Feb 1954
Feb 1954

Mar 1954-May 1955
May 1955-Apr 1956
Apr 1956-Mar 1957
Mar 1957-Jan 1958
Jan 1958-Iul 1960
Jul 1960-Dec 1961
Dec 1961-Jan 1964
Jon 1964-May 1964

Chiefs of the Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam

Captain William H. Hardcastle 15 May 1964-10 May 1965

Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward 10 May 1965-1 Apr 1966

Chiefs of the Naval Advisory Group/Commanders Naval Forces,

Vietnam

Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward 1 Apr 1966-27 Apr 1967

Rear Admiral Kenneth L. Veth 27 Apr 1967-30 Sep 1968

Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. 30 Sep 1968-14 May 1970

Vice Admiral Jerome H. King 14 May 1970-5 Apr 1971

Rear Admiral Robert S. Salzer ' 5 Apr 1971-30 Jun 1972

Rear Admiral Arthur W. Price, Jr. 30 Jun 1972-25 Aug 1972

Rear Admiral James B. Wilson 25 Aug 1972-29 Mar 1973

Appendix C

Carrier Deployments to Southeast Asia^ 1964-1975

Inclusive dates indicate a carrier's departure from homeport for the Western Padiic and

return to homeport.

Compiled by Aviation History Branch, Naval Historical Center

1964

Kitty Hawk (CVA 63) with CVW-11
Oriskany (CVA 34) with CVW-16
Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31) with CVW-19
Bennington (CVS 20) with CVSG-59
Ticonderoga (CVA 14) with CVW-5
Constellation (CVA 64) with CVW-14
Kearsarge (CVS 33) with CVSG-53
Ranger (CVA 61) with CVW-9
Hancock (CVA 19) with CVW-21
Yorktown (CVS 10) with CVSG-55
Coral Sea (CVA 43) with CVW-15

1965

Midway (CVA 41) with CVW-2
Bennington (CVS 20) with CVSG-59
Oriskany (CVA 34) with CVW-16
Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31) with CVW-19
Independence (CVA 62) with CVW-7
Hornet (CVS 12) with CVSG-57
Ticonderoga (CVA 14) with CVW-5
Kitty Hawk (CVA 63) with CVW-1 1
Enterprise (CVAN 65) with CVW-9
Hancock (CVA 19) with CVW-21
Ranger (CVA 61) with CVW-14

1966

Yorktown (CVS 10) with CVSG-55
Intrepid (CVS 11) with CVW-10

Constellation (CVA 64) with CVW-15
Oriskany (CVA 34) with CVW-16
Kearsarge (CVS 33) with CVSG-53
Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA 42) with CVW-1
Coral Sea (CVA 43) with CVW-2
Ticonderoga (CVA 14) with CVW-19
Bennington (CVS 20) with CVSG-59
Kitty Hawk (CVA 63) with CVW-11
Enterprise (CVAN 65) with CVW-9

1967

Hancock (CVA 19) with CVW-5
Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31) with CVW-21
Hornet (CVS 12) with CVSG-57
Constellation (CVA 64) with CVW-14
Intrepid (CVS 11) with CVW-10

17 Oct 1963-
1 Aug 1963-
28 Jon 1964-

20 Feb 1964-
14 Apr 1964
5 May 1964-
19 fun 1964-
5 Aug 1964-

21 Oct 1964-
23 Oct 1964-
7 Dec 1964-

-20 Jul 1964
10 Mar 1964

-21 Nov 1964
-11 Aug 1964
-15 Dec 1964
-1 Feb 1965
-16 Dec 1964
6 May 1965
-29 May 1965
-16 May 1965
1 Nov 1965

6 Mar 1965-23 Nov 1965
22 Mar 1965-7 Oct 1965
5 Apr 1965-16 Dec 1965
21 Apr 1965-13 Jan 1966
10 May 1965-13 Dec 1965
12 Aug 1965-23 Mar 1966
28 Sep 1965-13 May 1966
19 Oct 1965-13 lun 1966
26 Oct 1965-21 Jun 1966
10 Nov 1965-1 Aug 1966
10 Dec 1965-25 Aug 1966

6 Jan 1966-27 Jul 1966
4 Apr 1966-21 Nov 1966

12 May 1966-3 Dec 1966
26 May 1966-16 Nov 1966
9 Jun 1966-20 Dec 1966
21 Jun 1966-21 Feb 1967
29 Jul 1966-23 Feb 1967
15 Oct 1966-29 May 1967

4 Nov 1966-23 May 1967

5 Nov 1966-19 Jun 1967
19 Nov 1966-6 Jul 1967

5 Jan 1967-22 Jul 1967

26 Jan 1967-25 Aug 1967

27 Mar 1967-28 Oct 1967
29 Apr 1967-4 Dec 1967
11 May 1967-30 Dec 1967

387

Forrestal (CVA 59) with CVW-17

Oriskany (CVA 34) with CVW-16
Coral Sea (CVA 43) with CVW-15
Kearsarge (CVS 33) with CVSG-53
Ranger (CVA 61) with CVW-2
Kitty Hawk (CVA 63) with CVW-11
Yorktown (CVS 10) with CVSG-55
Ticonderoga (CVA 14) with CVW-19

1968

Enterprise (CVAN 65) with CVW-9

Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31) with CVW-S

America (CVA 66) with CVW-6

Bennington (CVS 20) with CVSG-59

Constellation (CVA 64) with CVW-14

Intrepid (CVS 11) with CVW-10

Hancock (CVA 19) with CVW-21

Coral Sea (CVA 43) with CVW-15

Hornet (CVS 12) with CVSG-57

Ranger (CVA 61) with CVW-2

Kitty Hawk (CVA 63) with CVW-1 1

1969

Enterprise (CVAN 65) with CVW-9
Ticonderoga (CVA 14) with CVW-16
Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31) with CVW-5
Kearsarge (CVS 33) with CVSG-53
Oriskany (CVA 34) with CVW-19
Hancock (CVA 19) with CVW-21
Constellation (CVA 64) with CVW-14
Coral Sea (CVA 43) with CVW-15
Ranger (CVA 61) with CVW-2

1970

Shangri-La (CVS 38) with CVW-8

Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31) with CVW-5

America (CVA 66) with CVW29

Oriskany (CVA 34) with CVW-19

Hancock (CVA 19) with CVW-21

Ranger (CVA 61) with CVW-2

Kitty Hawk (CVA 63) with CVW-1 1

1971

Ticonderoga (CVS 14) with CVSG-59
Midway (CVA 41) with CVW-5
Oriskany (CVA 34) with CVW-19
Enterprise (CVAN 65) with CVW-14
Constellation (CVA 64) with CVW-9
Coral Sea (CVA 43) with CVW-IS

1972

Hancock (CVA 19) with CVW-21
Kitty Hawk (CVA 63) with CVW-11
Midway (CVA 41) with CVW-5
Saratoga (CV 60) with CVW-3
Ticonderoga (CVS 14) with CVSG-53
America (CVA 66) with CVW-8

6 Jun 1967-15 Sep 1967

16 fun 1967-31 Jan 1968
26 Jul 1967-6 Apr 1968

17 Aug 1967-6 Apr 1968
4 Nov 1967-25 May 1968

18 Nov 1967-28 Jun 1968
28 Dec 1967-5 Jul 1968
28 Dec 1967-17 Aug 1968

3 Jan 1968-18 Jul 1968
27 Ian 1968-10 Oct 1968
10 Apr 1968-16 Dec 1968
1 May 1968-9 Nov 1968

29 May 1968-31 Jan 1969

4 Jun 1968-8 Feb 1969
18 Jul 1968-3 Mar 1969
7 Sep 1968-18 Apr 1969

30 Sep 1968-13 May 1969
26 Oct 1968-17 May 1969
30 Dec 1968-4 Sep 1969

6 Jan 1969-2 Jul 1969

1 Feb 1969-18 Sep 1969
18 Mar 1969-29 Oct 1969
29 Mar 1969-4 Sep 1969
14 Apr 1969-17 Nov 1969

2 Aug 1969-15 Apr 1970
11 Aug 1969-8 May 1970
23 Sep 1969-1 Jul 1970
14 Oct 1969-1 Jun 1970

5 Mar 1970-17 Dec 1970
2 Apr 1970-12 Nov 1970
10 Apr 1970-21 Dec 1970
14 May 1970-10 Dec 1970
22 Oct 1970-3 Jun 1971
27 Oct 1970-17 Jun 1971

6 Nov 1970-17 Jul 1971

11 Mar 1971-6 Jul 1971
16 Apr 1971-6 Nov 1971
14 May 1971-18 Dec 1971

11 Jun 1971-12 Feb 1972
1 Oct 1971-30 Jun 1972

12 Nov 1971-17 Jull972

7 Jan 1972-3 Oct 1972
17 Feb 1972-28 Nov 1972

10 Apr 1972-3 Mar 1973

11 Apr 1972-13 Feb 1973
17 May 1972-29 Jul 1972
5 Jun 1972-24 Mar 1973

Oriskany (CVA 34) with CVW-19
Enterprise (CYAN 65) with CVW-14
Ranger (CVA 61) with CVW-2

5 lun 1972-30 Mar 1973
12 Sep 1972-12 Jun 1973
16 Nov 1972-23 Jun 1973

1973

Constellation (CVA 64) with CVW-9 5 Jan 1973-11 Oct 1973

Coral Sea (CVA 43) with CVW-15 9 Mar 1973-8 Nov 1973

Hancock (CVA 19) with CVW-21 8 May 1973-8 Jan 1974

Midway (CVA 41) with CVW-5 11 Sep 1973-31 Dec 1973

Oriskany (CVA 34) with CVW-19 18 Oct 1973-5 Jun 1974

Kitty Hawk (CVA 63) with CVW-11 23 Nov 1973-9 Jul 1974

1974

Midway (CVA 41) with CVW-5 1 Jan 1974-31 Dec 1974

Ranger (CVA 61) with CVW-2 7 May 1974-18 Oct 1974

Constellation (CVA 64) with CVW-9 21 Jun 1974-22 Dec 1974

Enterprise (CVAN 65) with CVW-14 17 Sep 1974-20 May 1975

Coral Sea (CVA 43) with CVW-15 5 Dec 1974-2 Jul 1975

1975

On 30 Jun 1975, all carriers with the designation CVA or CVAN were changed to
CV or CVN to reflect the multimission capability of the carrier.

Midway (CV 41) with CVW-5 1 Jan 1975-31 Dec 1975

Hancock (CV 19) with CVW-21 18 Mar 1975-20 Oct 1975

Kitty Hawk (CV 63) with CVW-1 1 21 May 1975-15 Dec 1975

Appendix D
Aircraft Tailcodes, 1964-1975

Carrier Air Wings Miscelloneous Carrier Squadrons*

CVW-1

VAP-62

CVW-2

VAP-61

CVW-3

VFP-63

CVW-5

VFP-62

CVW-6

VAW-11

CVW-7

VAW-12

CVW-8

VAW-13

CVW-9

VAW-33

CVW-10

VAW-111

CVW-1 1

VAH-l/RVAH-1

CVW-1 4

VAH-3/RVAH-3

CVW-15

VAH-4

CVW-1 6

VAH-5/RVAH-5

CVW-1 7

RVAH-6

CVW-19

VAH-7/RVAH-7

CVW-21

VAH-9/RVAH-9

RCVW-4

VAH-11

RCVW-12

RVAH-12

CVSG-50/RCVSG-50

RVAH-13

CVSG-51/RCVSG-51

RVAH-14

CVSG-52

VAH-2

CVSG-53

VR-30

CVSG-54

VRC-40

CVSG-55

VRC-50

CVSG-56

VQ-1

CVSG-57

VQ-2

CVSG-58

VSF-1

CVSG-59

VAQ-130

CVSG-60

HM-12

*Some of the individual squadrons, such as VAQ, VAW, and RVAH designated units, lose their as-
signed tailcodes in the late 1960s or early 1970s and use the tailcodes of their assigned Carrier Air
Wing. Tailcodes for Marine Corps squadrons that deployed on board carriers are not included in
the list.

Appendix E
Enemy Aircraft Shot Down by Naval
Aviators in Southeast Asia, 1965-1973

17 lun 1965
17 Jun 1965
20 Jun 1965

20 Jun 1965

12 Jun 1966

21 Jun 1966
21 Jun 1966

13 Jul 1966
9 Oct 1966
9 Oct 1966

20 Dec 1966
20 Dec 1966
24 Apr 1967
24 Apr 1967
1 May 1967
1 May 1967
19 May 1967
19 May 1967
19 May 1967

Shot

Down

MiG-17

MiG-21

MiG-17

AN-2

MiG-17

Aircraft

Type

F-4
F-4
A-1
A-1
F-8
F-8
F-8
F-4
F-8
A-1
F-4
F-4
F-4
F-4
F-8
A-4
F-8
F-8
F-8

Squadron &

Carrier No.

VF-21
41

VA-25
41

VF-21 1
19

VF-161
64

VF-162
34

VA-176
11

VF-114
63

VF-213
63

VF-114

VF-114
63

VF-21 1
31

VA-76
31

VF-21 1
31-

VF-211
31

VF-24
31

Pilot &

NFO

CDR Louis Page
LCDR John C. Smith, Jr.

LT Jack E. D. Batson, Jr.
LCDR Robert B. Doremus

LT Clinton B. Johnson

LTJG Charles W. Hartman III

CDR Harold L. Marr

LT Eugene J. Chancy

LT Philip V. Vampatella

LT William M. McGuigan
LTJG Robert M. Fowler

CDR Richard M. Bellinger

LTJG William T. Patton

LT H. Dennis Wisely
LTJG David L. Jordan

LT David A. McRae
ENS David N. Nichols

LT H. Dennis Wisely
LTJG Gareth L. Anderson

LCDR Charles E. Southwick
ENS James W. Laing

LCDR Marshall O. Wright

LCDR Theodore R. Swartz

CDR Paul H. Speer

LTJG Joseph M. Shea

LCDR Bobby Qyde Lee

391

Date

19 May 1967
21 Jul 1967
21 lul 1967
21 Jul 1967

10 Aug 1967

10 Aug 1967
26 Oct 1967
30 Oct 1967

14 Dec 1967
26 Jun 1968
9 Jul 1968
10 Jul 1968
29 Jul 1968
1 Aug 1968
19 Sep 1968

28 Mar 1970
19 Jan 1972
6 Mor 1972
6 May 1972
6 May 1972
6 May 1972

Shot

Down

MiG-17
MiG-17
MiG-17
MiG-17
MiG-21
MiG-21
MiG-21
MiG-17
MiG-17
MiG-21
MiG-17
MiG-21
MiG-17
MiG-21
MiG-21
MiG-21
MiG-21
MiG-17
MiG-17
MiG-21
MiG-21

Aircraft

Type

F-8
F-8
F-8
F-8
F-4
F-4
F-4
F-4
F-8
F-8
F-8
F-4
F-8
F-8
F-8
F-4
F-4
F-4
F-4
F-4
F-4

Squadron &

Carrier No.

VF-24
31

VF-211
31

VF-142
64

VF-143
64

VF-142
64

VF-162
34

VF-51
31

VF-191
14

VF-33
66

VF-53
31

VF-51
31

VF-111
11

VF-142
64

VF-96
64

VF-111
43

VF-51
43

VF-114
63

Pilot &

NFO

LT Phillip R. Wood

CDR Marion H. Isaacks

LCDR Robert L. Kirkwood

LCDR Ray G. Hubbard, Jr.

LTJG Guy H. Freeborn
ENS Robert J. Elliot

LCDR Robert C. Davis
LCDR Gayle O. Elie

LTJG Robert P. Hickey, Jr.
LTJG Jeremy G. Morris

LCDR Eugene R Lund
LTJG James R. Borst

LT Richard E. Wyman

CDR Lowell R. Myers

LCDR John B. Nichols III

LT Roy Cash, Jr.

LT Joseph E. Koin, Jr.

CDR Guy Cane

LT Norman K. McCoy

LT Anthony J. Norgi

LT Jerome E. Beaulier
LT Steven J. Barkley

LTJG Randall H. Cunningham
LTJG WiUiam P. Driscoll

LT Garry Lee Weigand
LTJG William C. Freckleton

LCDR Jerry B. Houston
LT Kevin T. Moore

LT Robert G. Hughes
LTJG Adolph J. Cruz

LCDR Kenneth W. Pettigrew
LTJG Michael J. McCabe

Shot Aircraft Squadron & Pilot &

Date Down Type Carrier No. NFO

8 May 1972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-96 LT Randall H. Cunningham

64 LTJG William P. Driscoll

10 May 1972 MiG-21 F-4 VF-92 LT Curt Dose

64 LCDR fames McDevitt

10 May 1972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-96 LT Matthew J. Connelly III

64 LT Thomas J. J. Blonski

10 May 1972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-51 LT Roy A. Morris, Jr.

43 LT Kenneth Lee Connon

10 May 1972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-96 LT Matthew J. Connelly III

64 LT Thomas J. J. Blonski

10 May 1972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-96 LT Randall H. Cunningham

64 LTJG William P. Driscoll

10 May 1972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-96 LT Randall H. Cunningham

64 LTJG William P. Driscoll

10 May 1972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-96 LT Randall H. Cunningham

64 LTJG William P. Driscoll

10 May 1972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-96 LT Steven C. Shoemaker

64 LTJG Keith Virgil Crenshaw

18 May 1972 MiG-19 F-4 VF-161 LT Henry A. Bartholomay

41 LT Oran R. Brown

18 May 1972 MiG-19 F-4 VF-161 LT Patrick E. Arwood

41 LT James M. Bell

23Moyl972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-161 LCDR Ronald E. McKeown

41 LT John C. Ensch

23 May 1972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-161 LCDR Ronald E. McKeown

41 LT John C. Ensch

lljunl972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-51 CDR Foster S. Teague

43 LT Ralph M. Howell

lljunl972 MiG-17 F-4 VF-51 LT William W. Copeland

43 LT Donald R. Bouchoux

21Junl972 MiG-21 F-4 VF-31 CDR Samuel C. Hynn, Jr.

60 LT William H. John

10 Aug 1972 MiG-21 F-4 VF-103 LCDR Robert E. Tucker, Jr.

60 LTJG Samuel B. Edens

11 Sep 1972 MiG-21 F-4 VMFA-333 MAJ Lee T. Lassiter

66 CAPT John D. Cummings

28 Dec 1972 MiG-21 F-4 VF-142 LTJG Scott H. Davis

65 LTJG Geoffrey Hugh Ulrich

12 Jan 1973 MiG-17 F-4 VF-161 LT Victor T. Kovaleski

41 LT James A. Wise

Source: United States Naval Aviation, 1910-1980. Washington: Deputy Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (Air Warfare)/Commander Naval Air Systems Command, 1981.

Glossary of Abbreviations

and Terms

ACTOV

Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese

ACTOVLOG

Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese,

Logistics

Destroyer Tender

Ammunition Ship

Store Ship

AFDL

Small Auxiliary Floating Drydock (non-

self-propelled)

AFS

Combat Store Ship

AGC

Amphibious Force Flagship

AGS

Surveying Ship

AGSS

Auxiliary Submarine

Hospital Ship

Cargo Ship

AKA

Attack Cargo Ship

AKD

Cargo Ship, Dock

AKL

Light Cargo Ship

AKR

Vehicle Cargo Ship

AKS

Stores Issue Ship

AKV

Aircraft Ferry

Antonov Transport

Net Laying Ship

Oiler

AOE

Fast Combat Support Ship

AOG

Gasoline Tanker

APA

Attack Transport

APB

Self-propelled Barracks Ship

APD

High-speed Transport

APL

Barracks Craft (non-self-propelled)

APSS

Transport Submarine

Repair Ship

ARG

Amphibious Ready Group

ARG

Internal Combustion Engine Repair Ship

ARL

Landing Craft Repair Ship

ARS

Salvage Ship

ARVH

Aircraft Repair Ship (Helicopter)

ARVN

Army of Vietnam

ASPS

Assault Support Patrol Boat

ASW

Antisubmarine Warfare

ATC

Armored Transport Craft

ATF

Fleet Ocean Tug

Seaplane Tender

Battleship

Heavy Cruiser

CAG

Guided Missile Heavy Cruiser

CAPT

Captain

Coastal Division

CDR

Commander

CEC

Civil Engineer Corps

CGN

Guided Missile Cruiser (nuclear-powered)

CHC

Chaplain Corps

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CIDG

Civilian Irregular Defense Group

CINCPAC

Commander in Chief, Pacific

CINCPACAF

Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force

CINCPACFLT

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

CLG

Guided Missile Light Cruiser

Construction Mechanic

CNO

Chief of Naval Operations

COMNAVFORV

Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam

COMUSMACV

Commander U.S. Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam

CTF

Commander Task Force

CTG

Commander Task Group

CTU

Commander Task Unit

Aircraft Carrier

CVA

Attack Aircraft Carrier

CVAN

Attack Aircraft Carrier (nuclear-powered)

CVS

Antisubmarine Warfare Support Aircraft

Carrier

CVSQ

Carrier Antisubmarine Warfare Air Group

Australian Destroyer

DAO

Defense Attache Office

Dental Corps

Destroyer

DDG

Guided Missile Destroyer

DDR

Radar Picket Destroyer

Destroyer Escort

DER

Radar Picket Escort Ship

DLG

Guided Missile Frigate

DMZ

Demilitarized Zone

ENS

Ensign

EOD

Explosive Ordance Disposal

FOB

Forward Operating Base

HAL

Helicopter Attack Light Squadron

Helicopter Squadron

HMH

Marine Heavy Lift Helicopter Squadron

HMM

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

HMR

Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron

Vietnamese Navy (derived from the Viet-

namese Hai Quari)

HSAS

Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon

394

IFS

Inshore Fire Support Ship

lUWU

Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit

ICS

loint Chiefs of Staff

JGS

loint General Staff

LARC

Lighter, Amphibious Resupply Cargo

LCC

Amphibious Command Ship

LCDR

Lieutenant Commander

LCM

Landing Craft, Mechanized

LCM(M)

Landing Craft, Mechanized (Minesweeper)

LCPL

Landing Craft, Personnel, Large

LCU

Landing Craft, Utility

LCVP

Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel

LDNN

South Vietnamese Naval Commandos

(derived from the the Vietnamese Lien

Doi Nguoi Nhia)

LKA

Amphibious Cargo Ship

LPD

Amphibious Transport Dock

LPH

Amphibious Assault Ship

LPSS

■Amphibious Transport Submarine

LSD

Landing Ship, Dock

LSIL

Landing Ship, Infantry, Large

LSM

Landing Ship, Medium

LSMR

Landing Ship, Medium, Rocket

LSSL

Landing Support Ship, Large

LST

Landing Ship, Tank

Lieutenant

LTJG

Lieutenant (junior grade)

LVT

Landing Vehicle, Tracked

MAAG

Military Assistance Advisory Group

MACV

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MAI

Major

MiG

Russian-made Fighter Aircraft

MLMS

Minesweeping Launch

MRF

Mobile Riverine Force

MSB

Minesweeping Boat

MSG

Military Sealift Command

MSF

Minesweeper, Fleet

MSO

Minesweeper, Ocean

MSS

Minesweeper, Special

MSTS

Military Sea Transportation Service

NAG

Naval Advisory Group

NAVFORV

Naval Forces, Vietnam

Nurse Corps

NHC

Naval Historical Center

NILO

Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer

NMCB

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion

NSA

Naval Support Activity

NVA

North Vietnamese Army

PACV

Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle

PBR

River Patrol Boat

Submarine Chaser

PCE

Escort

PCER

Rescue Escort

PCF

Fast Patrol Craft

Patrol Gunboat

PGH Patrol Gunboat Hydrofoil

PGM Motor Gunboat

PIRAZ Positive Identification Radar Advisory
Zone

POL Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants

POW Prisoner of War

PT Motor Torpedo Boat

PTF Fast Patrol Boat

RAG River Assault Group

RAID Riverine Assault Interdiction Division

RCVSQ Readiness Carrier Antisubmarine Warfare
Air Group

RCVW Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing

RID River Interdicton Division

RPC River Patrol Craft

RPG River Patrol Group

RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade

R&R Rest and Recuperation

RVAH Reconnaissance Attack Squadron

RVN Republic of Vietnam

RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

SAM Surface to Air Missile

SAR Search and Rescue

SC Submarine Chaser

SC Supply Corps

SCATTOR Small Craft Assets, Training, and Turnover
of Resources

Seabee Naval Construction Battalion Personnel

SEAL Naval Commando

SEALORDS Southeast Asia, Lake, Ocean, River,

Delta Strategy

SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SERVPAC Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

SLF Special Landing Force

SS Steamship

SS Submarine

STAB SEAL Team Assault Boat

STAB Strike Team Assault Boat

STAT Seabee Technical Assistance Team
STCAN/FOM French-designed River Patrol Craft

T Prefix for USNS

UDT Underwater Demolition Team

USA U.S. Army

USAF U.S. Air Force

USCG U.S. Coast Guard

USMC U.S. Marine Corps

USN U.S. Navy

USNR U.S. Naval Reserve

USNS U.S. Naval Ship

VA Attack Squadron

VAH Heavy Attack Squadron

VAL Light Attack Squadron

VAP Heavy Photographic Squadron

VAQ Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

VAW Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron

395

Vv-

V icL \_uriy

VSF

A n 1~i CI 1 Hm T"! n A P^<^V^t■or ^<^ll/^HF^^n

Fighter SQUodron

WPR

VV i D

o-i-iuuL v_uuoi ouaru v-uiier

V rr

Light Photographic Sc^uadron

WHFr

V^UUoL vJUUiU muIl CllUUruZlCC v^LtlLtri

VrK

Refrigerated Covered Lighter (self-pro-

I V-

wpen L.ignier

pelled)

YFBN
I n\iN

ixtjinyciuLcu k-uvcicu LiynLcr ^^nonscir-pro-

V JVi/\

Marine Attack Squadron

V JVir

Marine Fighter Sc^uadron

HnrHnr Utility/ Prnft- /'coif r^mr^£illcl^^^

V INAJr

vieniuniese Air rorce

VMS

/AU^iiiuiy iviunji iviixicoWctrtJd

VMM

V ic LilCllIiCaC iNUVy

YOG

("iiTNnlinp Rnrnp I'splf-nrnnpllpfi^

Patrol Squadron

YRBM

Repair, Berthiing, and Messing Barge

Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron

(nonself-propelled)

Air Transport Squadron

YTB

Large Harbor Tug

VRC

Air Transport Squadron

YTL

Small Harbor Tug

396

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398

Photo Credits

Most illustrations in this book are Official U.S.
Navy, Army, or Marine Corps Photographs now in the
custody of the Notional Archives and Records Adminis-
tration's Still Pictures Branch. These are identified below
by numbers preceded by 80G, USN, K, or KN in the case
of Navy photographs; SC or CC for Army photographs;
and USMC for Marine Corps photographs. Other Na-
tional Archives photographs have identifying numbers
preceded by the code NARA.

The Naval Historical Center is the second most com-
mon source of illustrations. Those with numbers preceded
by NAH are held by the Center's Naval Aviation History
Branch. Artworks from the Navy Art Collection are cred-
ited NAVART. The Center's Photographic Section main-
tains views whose identifying numbers are preceded by
NH, plus many photographs, currently uncataloged, that
are identified by the code NHC. A surname in parentheses
following the NHC code identifies images provided
through the courtesy of the following individuals: Ken-
neth L. Coskey, Paul N. Gray, Ulysses S. G. Sharp, Peter M.
Swartz, Charles A. Thompson, and Joseph W. Williams.

The U.S. Naval Institute's excellent pictorial collection
was also extensively used in illustrating this book. Pho-
tographs provided by the institute are identified by the code
USNl. Photographs held in other repositories or in private
collections are identified by initials or surnames. These in-
clude: U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center (USMCHC); A. D.
Baker III Collection; Shelby L. Stanton Collection; and sin-
gle images provided by Dino A. Brugioni, Glen E. Helm,
Peter Mersky, Bruce Roberts, and Charles f . Smith.

Finally, many illustrations Irom the collections cited
above were either obtained through the courtesy of third
parties or were originally provided to the credited organiza-
tion by another person or institution. These additional
sources, many of which are also given primary credit for
other images, are recognized by an auxiliary citation in
parentheses following the basic citation.

The text pages on which illustrations appear are fol-
lowed by identification numbers (if available) and other ap-
propriate location or source information, as specified above.

Cover: K79759

Dedication: K31389, v

The Early Years, 1950-1959: facing 1, 80G652364;
3, NH74148 (Service Presse Information); 4, NH79378 (Ser-
vice Presse Information) and NH79398 (Service Presse Infor-
mation); 5, NH79396 (Service Presse Information); 6, NARA
306NT94DD-1; 7, NH84166; 8, 80G649031 and 80G649029;
9, 80G652356 and 80G647031; 10, NHC; 11, NHC

The Era of Growing Conflict, 1959-1965: facing

13, USNl 109224; 15, USN1053884; 16, USN1056560 and
USN1056872; 17, USN1057700 and USN1056093: 18,
USN1064014 and USN1064027; 19, USN1066584 and
KN7746; 21, SC600082; 22, USN1082572; 23, USN1142267
and USNl 105768; 24, NH93782 and NH93772; 25, USNl
(U.S. Army photo); 26, NHC and USNl 104729; 27,
USN1109927F; 28, NHC and USN1082640; 30, USNl 105078
and NHC; 31, USN1112057B; 32, SC598684 and
USN1105261; 33, Stanton; 34, Stanton and USN1110430;
35, KN7267 and Stanton; 37, USN1106609 and
USN1112720F; 38, NAH002806 and CC26860; 39,
USN1083809; 40, USN1109198; 41, NH93957; 42,
USN1108879; 43, USN1105761 and USN1059385; 45,
USN1081421E; 46, USN1117280; 47, USN1106530; 48,
USN1112496 and USN1110196B; 49, KN12809 and
KN9907; 50, NHC; 51, NHC; 52, NH95612 and NH95613;
54, USN1105251C and NHC; 55, USN1110371B; 56, NARA
306PS644902; 57, NH93964 and NH93965; 58,
USN1086472, USN1100094, and USN1112651; 59,
USNU 10183; 60, USNll 10198 and USNll 11483

The Years of Combat, 1965-1968: facing 63,
K40159; 64, USN1109988A and USN1113625; 66,
USN1111788A-D; 68, NH93803 (Sharp); 69, KN14823; 70,
USN1130950; 71, K31318 and NAVART; 72, USN1127420
and K54021; 73, USNl (U.S. Air Force photo); 74, K31345;
75, NHC and USN1130687; 76, K33437; 77, USN1125104
and USN1119673; 78, USNl; 79, USN1115458; 80,
USN1120428; 81, USNl; 83, USN1121148 and USN1142184;
84, USNl (U.S. Air Force photo 94841USAF) and USNl (U.S.
Air Force photo 98035USAF); 86, USNl; 87, USNll 1031 7A
and USN1111691A; 88, NAH002771 and NAH002794; 89,
USN1110429; 90, USN1113591 and NH74367; and 91,
USN777478 and USN1111798, 92, USN1113919; 93,
K31296 and K31549; 94, USN1116261; 95, NAH002799
(U.S. Air Force photo), 96, USN1117189; 97, USNl 11 7294;
98, K33638; 99, USN1121716; 100, USN1118356 and
USN1121705; 101, K34228; 102 USN1119650; 103, K36498
and NAVART; 104, USN1142140; 105, K31319; 106,
USN1121628 and USN1122495; 107, USN1123793 and
NAH002824; 108, USNl 143453 and NAH002793; and 109,
NAH002798 and NAH002783; 110, K42702; 111,
USN35945; 112, USN1121902; 113, NAH002817; 114, USNl;
115, NAVART; 116, USNl (U.S. Air Force photo 96327USAF)
and Brugioni; 117, USN1130691 and NAH002819; 118,
USNl (U.S. Air Force photo) and USN1133555; 119, USNl
(Jerry L. Means); 120, USNl; 121 K31422; 122,
USN1113996B and USN1113997A; 123, USN1115808
(USNl); 124, SC642772 (Stanton) and USN1113903B; 125,
USN1113909D; 126, USN1116342 (Stanton); 127, K31448;

399

128, K66945; 129, USMC A410927 (USNI); 130, USNI and
USMC A184966 (USNI); 13L USMC A188404 (USMCHC);
132, NAVART and NAVART; 133, USMC A422068 (USM-
CHC); 134, K30914; .13_5, USN1115154 and K31168; 131,
USNI 142182; 137, USNI (Jerry L. Means); 138, K31127;
139, USN1122633 and USN1113593; 140, USNI; 142,
K35031 and USN1128251; 141, Baker; 144, USN114803C;
146, USNI (Jerry L. Means) and NHC (U.S. Coast Guard
photo); 147, K31141; 148, USN1116905 and USN1116751;
149, USNI (Larry Turrguist); 150, USN1116663; 152.
USN1128072 and K31466; L53, Stanton; 154, USN1116783
and USN1150501; 155^ USN1112715 and Stanton; 156,
USN1115833 and USN1115738; 157, K31111 (Baker) and
NAVART; 159, USN1117130 and USNI (U.S. Coast Guard
photo); 160, NHC and NHC; 16L USNI; l£2 SC604608
(Stanton); 163. Stanton; 164. USNI 124156 and NHC; 166.
K31134; 16L Mersky (USN1133439); 168. USN1114746 and
Stanton; 169, NAH002823; 170, NAVART; IZL NAH00281S;
172, NHC; 173, K42785 and NAVART; 174, NHC and NHC;
175, Roberts and USN1134785; IZL USN1118186 and
K35205; 178, USNI; 179, USNI 124307 (USNI) and USNI;
180, NHC; 18L USN1124202; 182. USN1119610 and
K42565; 18_3. NHC and Stanton (U.S. Army photo); 184.
NHC and NHC; 185. NHC and NHC; 186, USNI (J, D. El-
dridge); 18L NAVART; 188. NHC; 189, NAVART; 190, USMC
A188646; m, NHC (Gray) and USNI 113763; 192, USMC
A371377 (USMCHC) and Stanton; 193, USMC A190492
(USNI) and NHC; 194. USNI; 195. USN1140319 and NHC;
196, Stanton and NHC; 19L NHC and Stanton; 198. NHC;
199, K39673 and K39680; 200, NHC; 20L K42756 and
USNI 125097; 2Q2, CC44735 (Stanton) and Stanton; 203,
USNI 129083 and USNI 140087 (Baker); 204, NHC; 205.
Stanton; 206, Stanton; 20L USNn26271 and USNI 126270;
208, Stanton; 209, USNI (J. D. Eldridge); 211, SC646412
(Stanton) and USNI; 212. CC48359 (Stanton); 211 NHC
and NHC; 214, NHC; 215, USN1113538A; 216, NHC; 21L
NHC (Gray) and USN1128782; 218. USNI; 219,
USN1113911F; 220, USN1120135; 22L USN1126261; 222-
24, Stanton; 225, NHC; 22L USN1115687B; 228, NHC and
USNI 129498 (Baker); 229, NHC; 230, USMC A370084 and
K31102; 23L NHC; 232, K31165; 231 CC31775 (Stanton);
234, CC45355 (Stanton); 235, CC47174 (Stanton); 236.
NHC and NHC; 23L NHC and Stanton; 238, NHC; 239.
Stanton; 24Q, USNI; 24L Stanton; 242. NHC (Williams);
243, NHC and NHC; 244, NHC (Thompson); 245,
USNI 166466 and K49289 (Baker); 246. USNI 142227; 247,
K58629 and NHC; 248. NAVART; 249, USN1114212B; 250,
USN1133361; 252, USN1114736A and NHC; 253,
USNI 120032 and USNI; 254. USNI 142225 and K45700;
255, USNI; 256, USN1114736E and USMC A373105 (USM-
CHC); 257, USN1114332C; 258, USN1111327 and NHC;
259. Stanton; 260, USNI and USNI

Winding Down the War, 1968-1973: facing 261
K31145; 264, USNI 134390; 266, USNI 142473 and NHC;
267, K73285 and K66853; 26.8, USNI 142485; 269, NHC:
270. NHC and USNI 139450; 2_Z1., K69363 (USNI) and
NAVART; 272, K46431 and NHC; 273, NHC; 274,
USNI 139473; 225, NAH002801 and USNI; 276, NHC; 27Z
NHC; 2Z8, NHC; 2Z9, NAH002790; 280, USNI and
USNI 139096 (USNI); 28L NHC and NHC; 282. NAVART
and NAVART; 281 USNI 142484 and USNI 143855; 284,
USNI; 285. USN1143851; 286, USN1142488 and
USNn42077; 28L USNI 142490; 288. NAVART and K84314;
289. Stanton (U.S. Army photo); 290, USNI 142475; 291.
USN1146259, USN1146266, and USN1146263; 292, NHC
(Swartz); 291 USNI; 294, K50360; 295, USNI 135109 and
K55626; 296, USN1135086 and USN1135114; 29L NHC
and USNI 142730 (Baker); 298, USNI; 299, NHC and
USN1142504; 300, USN1142131; 301, NAVART; 302,
NAVART; 301 NAH002774; 304, NHC; 305. NHC and
USNI 144308 (USNI); 306, NAVART; 307, K31151; 308,
USN1139816 (USNI); 309, USNI (U.S. Marine Corps photo)
and USNI (U.S. Marine Corps photo); 310, USMC A192848
(USMCHC); 311, USN1148564 and USN1148563; 312,
NH90639 and USNI 140642; 311, K87349; 31_4, NHC and
USN1142782; 315, USN1148744; 316, K81363 and NHC;
317, NHC; 319, K85794; 120, USN1145375 and NHC
(Swartz); 321 USNI 145799 and NHC; 322, NHC and USNI;
323, NHC; 324, USNI 154698 and USNI 154743 (USNI); 325,
NHC; 326, KN20292; 321, USNI 15 1598; 328, USNI 15 1900
(USNI) and USN1151899 (USNI); 329, USN1151646; Sm
Helm; 331, USN1154736 (USNI); 332, USN1151635; 311
K99976; 334. USNI (Stu Whelan); 331 USN1151549 and
USNI 151 723; 336. K93903 and NAH002777; 33L NAVART
and NAH002804; 338. USNI 169272; 339, Smith; 340,
USN1152528; 341, USNn54673 (USNI) and USN1154732
(USNI); 342, K94833; 341, USN1152782; 344, NARA
342KE63192; 345. USN1173246; 346. USN1145768 (USNI);
347, NHC (Coskey) and NHC (Coskey); 348. NAH002775;
349, USN1155662; 150, KN21011; 351 USN1155759; 352,
K98531 and USN1156535; 351 K98083 and USN711573

The Final Curtain, 1973-1975: facing 355,
NAH002785; 356. Stanton; 359, K107629 (Stanton); 360.
USNI 162062 and USNI 162063 (USNI); 361 KN16376; 362.
USMC A150966 (USMCHC); 361 USNI (Fred Nickel); 364.
USNI (Fred Nickel); 365. USNI; 366. USNI (Fred Nickel) and
USN711641; 367, K108919; 370, USN1143780; 371.
USN829183; 322, NHC; 371 USNI 171933; 324, NHC; 375,
USN1143782; 326, NHC; 322. USN832877; 378, NHC; 379,
NHC; 380. USN1119884; 381, USN1173116; 382.
USN1157421; 381 USN1132154

400

Index

Abrams, Creighton W., 264, 268. 310
ACTOV program, 284. US
ACTOVLOG program, 118
Advanced Base Functional Component

packages, 251
Advisors to South Vietnamese Navy. See
also Naval Advisory Group
to Coastal Force, 21, 215_, 21£ 222
on combat operations, 2Q
development of Vietnamese Navy,
10-n

during Easter Offensive, 327
mortaring of Pleiku compound by Viet
Cong, 61

number allowed in-country, 10, 20,
215

problems with language and culture,

27. 216, 218
risks to, 216
to River Force, 215
Rung Sat operations, 281
in SEALORDS campaign, 285
Senior Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

Headquarters, 21.S-16
Senior Naval Advisor, 216, 124
supply management by, 25
training role, 25, 322, 323
Vietnamization activities, 323
withdrawal of, ."^48-49
Air cover, 121 i/O, 27S
Aircraft

aerial refueling of, 23

amphibian, HU-16 Albatross, 80, 260,

261
attack, 1S8

A=I Skyraider, 78, 80, 92

A-1H Skyraider, 25, 53, 59, 61 '70, 15Q

A-II Skyraider, M

A-4 Skyhawk, 53, 54, 58, 59, 61 70,

80, 90, im
A-4C Skyhawk, 55, 8L 93, 98, 209,

A-A-E, 92

A=6 Intruder, ZO, HT, 305. 333, 335,
347

AzzfiA Intruder, 12

A=7 Corsair 11, ZO, 80, 333, 335, 3^6

AD-5Q (EA-IF) Skyraider, 40
bombers, B-52, 342, 3M
electronic countermeasures/air early
warning

E=2 Hawkeye, ZQ

E-2C Hawkeye, 125

EA-IF Skyraider, 12

EA-6B, 301
enemy MiGs, 338, 539, 3AQ

interceptors, 343

MiG-15. 82

MiG-17. 82, S4

MiG-19, 82

MiG-21. 82, M, 113

shot down, 75, 113, 114, 339, 343,
391-93
escort, 47, 70, 80
fighters

E=4 Phantom II, 70, 82. Ji6, 306,
338

F-4B Phantom, 59, 6i, 6a £1 96,
111

F-4C Phantom, Z3
F-4 1 Phantom II, 3iS
F-5 fighter jet, 235, 2M
F6F Hellcat, 1 3

E=8 Crusader, 46, 51 80, 75, Z9, 82,

94, LL3
F-8D Crusader, 42
F-8U, 16

F-14 Tomcats, 367

F-lOO Super Sabre, IM

fixed wing, 79, 82

OV-in Bronco, 266, 269, 2S1

SB-2C Helldivers, 3
in fleet replacement pool, 56
helicopters, 92, IZO, 171, 188, i96, 239

AH-IG Cobra. 269. 309

AH-IJ, 361

armed, 269

CH^6 Sea Knight, 76, 261
CH-47, 235

rH-53 Sea Stallion, Z6, 350, 352,

361
H-34, 20
H^6, 261
HH-3E, 80
HH-53B, 363, 3M
medical evacuation, 133, 135, 203,

240
Seawolf, 275
Sikorsky, 3j 20
SH-3 Sea King, 70
SH-3A Sea King, 79, SO
UH-1 gunship, 309
UH-IB Iroquois, 167, J69, 275, 365
UH-IE, 361

UH-2 Sea Sprite, ZO, SO
UH-34 Sea Horse, 38, 76, 119, 120,
121

UH-46 Sea Knight, 74, Wl
landing on flight decks, 93
losses, 82, 89, 101, 107, 196, 301
number provided by U.S., 1 56
patrol

C-47, 151

O-IE Bird Dog, 137, 141, 151

P=r2 Neptune, 151
E=3 Orion, 56, 151 314, 329
E=5 Marlin seaplanes, 151
SP-7.H Neptune, 156
SP-5M Marlin seaplane, LS5

reconnaissance, 86, 27
A3D-2P Sky-warriors, 40
F8U-1P Crusaders, 40
RA-3B Skywarrior, 3£ 40, 47, ZQ
RA-5C Vigilantes, 47, ifi, ZQ, 93,
RF-8A Crusader, 44 4L 59, za 9i
SP-5B Marlin seaplane, 36, 31

S=2 tracker, ZS

shot down, 46, 4Z 53, 54, 82, 116, 343

tailcodes, 320

tankers

KC-135, Z3
trainers

T-7.8 Trojan, 25
T^l, 36S
transports

C-45 Beachcraft, 260
C-47 Skytrain, 260, 261
C-117, 261
C-130, 209, 247, 350
TC^SJ, 261
Aircraft interceptor teams, 40
Air defenses, enemy 82, 90, 342^3
Air Early V^farning Squadron 13, 40
Airfields. See also individual airfields
attacks on, 256
construction and repair, ^47
in Laos, 20
Marine Corps, 251
in North Vietnam, 82, 84, 97
in South Vietnam, 4Q, 89, 151 169.

251,266
in Thailand, 94
Air Force (U.S.), 304
aircraft, 73, 124
airfields, 9_4

in Linebacker operation, 340
Nape Pass attack, 59
reconnaissance, 84, 111
in Rolling Thunder campaign, 73, 94,
97, 340
Air patrol, 15, 318

Air operations, lessened demand for, 303
Air strikes, 337

on airfields, 97, 112

alpha, 86, 89

anti-SAM, 89, 306

on barracks by U.S., 61 109, 112

on bridges, 88, 101, 112, IIZ 3M 33L
.342

on electric power plants, 101, 112, 342
industrial, 97, 112

401

Linebacker operations, 334-36. 338.

340. 342, 343
on petroleum storage and distribution

systems, 94-96, 342
on roilyards and rail lines, 26, 97_, 101,

im. 336. 342
restrictions on, 300, 344
retaliatory

Barrel Roll missions, 52
in North Vietnam, iZ 53, 61
in Laos, 42
sorties flown, 89, 300-301, 3Q£ 124
342

in South Vietnam by U.S„ 65, 22
targets, 89, 332, 33L 342
on Viet Cong, 266
Air support, 167, 1££ 266, 301-2. 306,
327. Ul

Air transportation, "Air Cofat," 260, 261
Alamo (LSD 331 222
Alaska Barge and Transport Company,
233

Albermarle (AV 51 23S
Allied operations. 5ee also Combined op-
erations; Vietnamization of naval
operations
amphibious assaults, 125, 126, 1 27-29
coastal, 292

Easter Offensive response, 126=32
ground forces, 268

Market Time, 143, 144, 149, 156, 158,

225, 327, 122
naval offensive operations, 274- 83
riverine assaults, 210. 214, ZM
river patrols, 171 , 1 78
SEALORDS campaign, 267, 268, 269,

270, 284
strength of, 268
surface warfare, 307-1 7
Alvarez, Everett, Jr., 53, 54
American Challenger (SS), 233, 357, 358,
168

American Racer (SS), 357
Amphibious Construction Battalion 1,
248

Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet, 64, 65

Commander, 123, 24S

in Easter Offensive, 327

evacuation role, 358, 363, 365-68

withdrawal of 3d Marine Division, 302
Amphibious Force, Western Pacific, 7
Amphibious Group 1, 2
Amphibious landings. 5ee also Amphibi-
ous Ready Group; Marine Corps
units

Alpha unit, 121

Army role in, 123, 12£ 122

beach surveys for, 12

Beau Charger operation, L41

Blue Marlin operations, 127

Bold Mariner operation, 3QZ

Bravo unit, 123

casualties, 125, 126, 128, 130, 132. 134
at Chu Lai, 125, L2S
combat elements, 1 19-22, 125
commanders, 119. 125, 130 .

Dagger Thrust operation, J 22, 1 26-27
at Danang, 123, 124, 132
Deckhouse operations, 129, 133, 141
Defiant Stand operation, 307
deployment to South China Sea, 1 23
in DMZ, 133, 134
Double Eagle operation, 12S
Easter Offensive response, 3?li
feint operation, 328
focus of 122
at Hue, 134

Jackstay operation, 128-29, 122

naval gunfire support of, 141

operational control of, 123

ordnance, 123, 12S

Osage operation, 122

Pershing operation, 124

Piranha operation, 1 25-26

post-Tet actions, 102

reconnaissance, 123

in South Vietnam, 1 1 9- 36

South Vietnamese armed forces role in,

125-, 126, L22=22
success of, 125, 122
suspension of, 134

Starlite operation, 123, 125, 126, 130,

141, 142
target areas, 126=22
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), 20, 42,
308

against 1st Viet Cong Regiment,
1 27-28

Bold Mariner operation, 302
at Chu Lai, 125
commander, / 19
Defiant Stand operation, 302
in DMZ, 133

Easter Offensive operations, 327

evacuation role, 358. 361

enemy killed, 114

forces, 1 1 9-20

heliborne operations, 134

operational control of, 121
Amphibious units, 16
Anchorage (LSD 36), 363
Andersen Air Force Base, 344
Anderson, George W., 3L 36
An Loc, 322
Antelope (PG 861 31S
An Thoi, 148, 149, 224
Antitank weapons carriers, 122
An Thoi, 22, 252
Antisubmarine warfare, 25
An Xuyen Province, 151. 318
API 26^ 2m

Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force, lh2
ambush by Viet Cong, 210
Army component of, 199, 202, 204,

205-6, 209, 210, 214
arrival in South Vietnam, 21Q
bases, 20L 204, 202
casualties, 207, 210
cordon and search operation, 207
disestablishment of, 214, 223
effectiveness of, 212
enemy casualties, 208. 210

fire support for. 2Q2
first major battle, 210
flagship, 2ill

intensity of conflict, 210, 213
landing and sweep maneuver, 210
leaders, 200. 204, 209
logistic support for. 252
medical support for. 207, 713
model for, 198, 204
munitions confiscated by, 210
naval gunfire support by, 210
Navy component of, 204, See also

Riverine ,Assault Force
objecfives, 198, 2nZ 204
operational control, 204
ordnance, 205, 206
organization, 204-5
Presidenfial Unit Citation, 21Q
Rung Sat operations, 202, 210
South Vietnamese units with, 210, 214
Tet Offensive actions, 210, 21 1
vessels, 198-99, 201-3. 205. 207, 209,

2 10, 2 14
Army units (U.S.)

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 123,

124. 127. 222
9th Infantry Division, 178, ISO, J 99,

202, 206, 211, 214, 293
2d Brigade, 204, 205, 2D9
3d Brigade, 204
11th Light Infantry Brigade, 224
101st Airborne Division, 168, 304
199th Light Infantry Brigade, 1S2
casualUes, 119
chemical detachment, 289
dredge operated by, 24 1
helicopter transportation companies,

logistic support for, 257
military police, iQ
reconnaissance, 137, 141
Special Forces, 33, 34, 35, L£9
Arromanches, 3
Asheville (PG 84L 150, IM
Asiatic Stamina, 357, 368
Askari (ARL 30), 202
Attack Carrier Striking Force

aerial interdiction campaigns, 65, 70,
76 , 8Z, 92, 9L 112-14, See also
Rolling Thunder bombing cam-
paign
aircraft, ZQ, 306

air support operations, 6L 301-2, 304,

306, 365
Barrel Roll operation, 59, 70, 101
Blue Tree operation, ZQ, 306
Commander, 66, 80
Commando Bolt operation, 301
Commando Hunt operations, 301
Easter Offensive response, 122
effectiveness of, 114
evacuation role, 365
Freedom Train operation, 329, 112
in Gulf of Tonkin, JOS, 306, 322
ground support operations, 20
Lam Son 719 operation, 306

402

post-Tet operations, 300-6

reconnaissance, Si ZQ, .306

sorties tlown by, 304. 306

Steel Tiger operation, ZD

targets, 97, Hi Hi 300, 30L 306

Tet Offensive and, 102

Tiger Hound operation, ZQ

vessels, 6a za Z6 , m soa 206, 32a

at Yankee Station, 300
Yankee Team operation, 306
Aviators

"Aces," 3M M3
attitudes of, 90, LUl
enemy aircraft shot down by

(1965-1973), 391-93
killed or missing, 46-47, 53, 54,, 82,

348

losses in accidents, 96, 9£ 101
prisoners of war, 46-47, 53. 54, 82, 92,
346, 141

Bac Giang, 96

Bai Thuong, 82, 112

Bangkok, Thailand, 316

Ban Kara! pass, 301

Ban Me Thuot, 357

Barbour County (LST 1195), 365

Barnett, William, 232

Barracks, 256, 257, il 56, &1

Ba Rai River, 21Q

Barrier Island, 301

Bases

advanced tactical support, 277, 31S

Coastal Force, 30, 221

Dong Ha, 24L 24S

floating, 163, MT, 188, 195, 20L 204,

209, 27 6-7 8
Little Creek, Virginia, 35
logistic support, 251, 252, 318, 112
maintenance and repair of, 24S
in Philippines, i9
pontoon, 2Z6

mobile riverine, 20L 204, 209
support, 2Q1
Soc Trang, 40

transfer to South Vietnam, 21S
Bassac River, 173, 180, 26.9
Batangan Peninsula, 125-26, 302
Baton Rouge Victory (SS), 128
Beachmaster, 121
Belle Grove (LSD 21 163
Benewah (APB 35L 20L 20£ 209, 210,

2&5
Ben Goi, L2Z
Ben Hai Bridge, 222
Ben Hal River, 6
Ben Luc, MS

Bennington (CVS 20), 20, 102, UN

Ben Thuy, 53

Ben Tre, 186, 244

Bering Strait (WHEC 382), 31B

Bien Hoa Airbase, 56

Bienville, 238

Biet Hai commandos, 31, 22

Bigelow (DO 942), lAl

Binh Dinh Province, 151

Binh Thanh Thon, 12

Binh Thuy 163, 167, 259, 266, 313

Binh Xuyen sect, J 1

Blackburn, Paul R, 66_

"Black Virgin" mountain, 64

Bluegill (SS 242), 25, 40

Blue Ridge (LCC 19L 24Z 358, 363

Boat and craft types

amphibious landing craft, L 4i 20,
122. 188, 193, 205, 209, 226,
2S1

mechanized landing craft, 28, 128.
170. 180, 225, 251. 283. 299.
ill

personnel, 149, IZQ
personnel, large, 152, 2S1
utility landing craft, 226, 251, 327
vehicle and personnel, 28, 216, 225

assault boats, SEAL team, 170, 1 73,
186, 21£

Boston whalers, 149, 251

command and control boat, 210, 226

French, 4

fuel barges, 21

helicopter landing platforms, 205
hydrofoil gunboats, 150, L54
junks, 22, 23, 30, 143, 157, 180,224
ferrocement, 297, 323
minesweeping

boats and launches, 2L 170, 171,

IZZ 180, ML 188. 220, 226.

269, 290, 318
motorized, 4

motor torpedo boats, 33, 35, 51, 318.
See also Swatow motor gunboats
motor, 220, 225, 226, 318
P-4, 51, 52, 53
patrol, 1, 24,27, 159, 2M, 262
air cushion vehicle (PACV), 167,

168. 1S8
armored support, J 98, 2D2
assault support, 209, 213, 273, 225
fast patrol craft (PCF, or Swift), 36,

46, 147, 148. 149, 151, J 57, i60,

214 276, 282, 285, 287, 318
gunboats, 150, 154
Nasty class PTFs, 33, 35, 36, 45, 52,

IZS

rescue escort, 225

STCAN/FOM, 26
picket boats, 150, 251
river. See also River patrol boats

armored monitor, 28, 205

armored patrol, 1, 1S8

assault craft, 280, 285, 29L 223

monitors, 188, SQL 207, 209, 210,
226, 269, 270, 286, 2S&

Zodiac craft, 32, 123.
sampans, 166. 170, 180, 183, 185, 225,

275
support

armored troop carrier, 199, 203. 205,

210, 227
harbor control craft, 318

harbor utility craft, 1 93. 251

lift craft, light, 24J

lift craft, medium and light, 240

refrigerated barges, 251, 31 8

small-craft tender, 318

transports, 26.9
trimarans, armored, 1 70
Boat Divisions 101-105, 148, 142
Boat Squadron L 149
Bo De River, 15L 2Z5
Bois Beileau, 1

Bombing campaigns, 63, 5ee also Opera-
tions; Rolling Thunder campaign
accuracy of aircraft for, 12
command arrangements for, 68
control and coordination of, 65
northern limits of, ZS

Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31), 83, 90, 98,
111, 114

Booby traps, 307

Boo Heung Pioneer, 357, 358. 36S

Borneo, 15

Boxer (CVA 21), 3, 5

Bridges

bombing of, 88, HZ, UL 332, 33L
Ml

construction and repair of, 248, 250

"Dragon's [aw," 337, 342

Liberty, 248

Paul Doumer, 342
Bringle, William F, 47, 65, 113
Bryant, Anita, Wl
Bucklew, Phillip S., 2Z
Buddhist demonstrations and self-immo-
lations, 42
Bull, Ronald P., Z9
Bunker, Ellsworth, 264

Cache (T-AO 67), 238

Caddo Parish (LST 515), 21S

Cai Cai, 34

Cai Lay, 210

Cai Lon Canal, 2SQ

California Naval Stations, 242

Ca Mau Peninsula, 36, 144, 15L L58,

275. 276, 278, 280, 313
Cambodia

bombing campaign in, 304

combat action in, 310, 315

combined-arms border patrol, 267, 26S

combined coastal operations vrith
South Vietnamese Navy,
292

Defense Minister, 16

evacuation of American and allied

personnel, 358, 361-62
first official naval visit, 20
infiltration of arms and supplies from,

36, 315
under Sihanouk, 161, 315
South Vietnamese offensive into, 285,
287,224
Camp (DER 251), 175, 318
Cam Pha, 101, 112, 350
Cam Ranh Bay, 22

403

base maintenance and repair, 2A&

burial at sea in, 1 IS

Coastal Surveillance Force at, 253

evacuation to, -^.S7. 35S

destruction of port facilities, iSI

dredging in, 2U

fall of, 358

harbor entrance control post, 149.

historical importance of, 240

logistic complex, 240. 259, 312

mine clearance forces at, 1 70

naval air units at, 255

Recruit Training Center, 221

supplies offloaded at, 2.1?
Can, Lieutenant (South Vietnamese), 21
Canals, 269, 2Z3, 280, 286. 28L 2M
Canberra (CAG 2}, 139, M3
Can The, 22, 28, 163, 169, 186

logistic support detachment at, 7.59

Mobile River Force at, 21Q

river assault groups, 226

Tet Offensive combat at, 19£

Western Repair Facility, 224
Cape Doc, 52
Cape Ke Ga, 122
Capitaine (AGSS 336), 2i
Capodanno, Vincent R., 321
Card (T-AKV 40), 39, 238
CARE, 229

Cargo Handling Battalions 1 and 2, 251
Caroline County (LSI 525), 202
Caron, Wayne M., 372
Carrier

air cover, 121

air wings, 53, ZQ

ammunition transfer to, 104

antisubmarine support, 15, 2Q

attack, 56, 300, 304

Attack Squadron 23, 22

Attack Squadron 144, S4

battle group, 15

deployments to Southeast Asia
(1964-1975), 387-S9

Division 9, 66

escort, 60, 238

Essex-dass, ZO

fires, 96, 99-101, IDI

flight deck/flight deck crewmen, 106,
111. 304

force, 70-86

forresfaZ-class, ZO

French, 3

helicopter, 15

light, 1

motor torpedo boats attacked by, 96
nuclear-powered, ZL 91 104, IIL 3011
in Pierce Arrow operation, 52,
planes catapulting from, 4S, 54, 33.S
refueling of, 16, 103
search and rescue operations from, Sl2
in South China Sea, iS, 53
tail hook recovery of aircraft, 102
weather balloon release from, 83
Carrier task force

77. 5ee Attack Carrier Striking Force
air operations (1969-1970), 30(1 304

armed reconnaissance missions, 52

battle groups, 14

deployment points, 13,, 70, 19

in French Indochina War, 5

in Gulf of Tonkin, 53, 54, MS

for Laotian crises, 15, 46

ordnance, 75, 76

ordnancemen, ?06

reconnaissance, 52

in Rolling Thunder campaign, 60

at Yankee Station, 46, 304
Carronade (IFS H, 240, 141
Castle Rock (WHEC 383), 21S
Casualties

airmen, 46-47, 53, 54, 82

in amphibious landings, 125, 126.
128, 3Q7

burial at sea, IZS

in carrier fires, 96, 9£ 101

enemy 125, L26, 128, 130, Ul, 143,
171. 186, 197, 210, 278, 307, 338

journalists, 12J

in Linebacker operations, 338, 340

Marines, 125, 128, 302

in riverine assaults, 207, 210

river patrol, 186, IS2

in salvage operations, 7.44

Seabees, ML 250

in SEALORDS campaign, 278

SEALS, IZS

South Vietnamese troops, 128, 226,
244

Special Forces soldier, 159
treoted at station hospitals, 251

Cat Bi, 82, 112, 350

Catholic mission, 25S

Cat Lo, 149, 224. 259, 318

Cau Hal Bay, 188

Cayuga County (LST 1186), 32S

Cease-fire agreements, 15, 342. 343, 345,
346, 349, 350, 355

Central Highlands, 40, 326

Chaplain Corps, 190. 229, 240, 3.10, 321

Chappelle, Dickie, 191

Chattahoochee (T-AOG 82), 238

Chau Doc, 186, 269, MS

Chicago (CG ll), 339, 340

Chief, Naval Advisory Group, 215, 216

Chiefs of Naval Operations, 3L 36, 264,
315. 385

China, 1, 97, 151

China Lake, California, SS

Chitose Maru, 35L 36S

Cho Gao Canal, 286

Chon, Commodore, 285

Chu Lai, L25, 128, 149, 15L 244, 248,
249. 251, 257, 318, 352

Civic action, 229-32, 320. See also Coun-
terinsurgency measures

Civilian Irregular Defense Group pro-
gram, 31, 33

Civilians, enemy execution of, 122

Clarion River (LSMR 409), 140. 141

Clark Air Force Base, 3A8

Cleveland (LPD 7], 35Q

Coastal districts, 22

Coastal Divisions

(11-15). 149. 151. 162

(24), 20
Coastal Flotilla L L5Q
Coastal Force (South Vietnamese). See
also South Vietnamese Navy units

advisors (U.S.) to, 2L 25, 215. 'zL9

amphibious landing operations, 126

bases, 30, 221

Biet Hai commandos, 31, 32
Coastal Group 15,, 225
Coastal Group 16, 225
development of, 22
dispositions, 22

enemy assaults on bases of, 225

enemy killed by, 225

integration into South Vietnamese

Navy, 216
Market Time operation, 144, 149, 158.

225

morale and motivation, 219
objectives, 22, 30, 219, 225
operational performance/problems,

149, 223-25
ordnance, 30, 225
repair facilities, 224
size of force, 224
training, 32, 225

vessels, 2_2, 23, 144. 224. 225, 221
Coastal interdiction. 5ee Market Time

operation
Coastal patrol, combined, 65, 162
Coastal radar sites, 318, 319
Coastal Squadron L 149. 150
Coastal surveillance centers, 22, 142
Coastal Surveillance Force
at Cam Ranh Bay, 252
effectiveness of, 162, 315
logistic support of, 149, 257. 259
Market Time operations, 149, 151
ordnance, lAl

SEALORDS campaign, 268-69, 274,
287, 289

turnover of vessels to South Vietnamese
Navy, 318

vessels, HZ, 149, 150, 274, 287, 282
Coastal zones, 216, 225, 292, 228
Coast Guard (U.S.)

Activities, Vietnam, 149, 162

coastal interdiction role, 144. 146. 149,

150. 313
divisions, 149
gunfire support by, 132
operational chain of command, 149
SCATTOR program, 318

Senior Coast Guard Officer, Vietnam,
348

squadrons, 149, 150
Co Chien, ISO
Cochrane (DDG 21), 358
Cohoes (AN 78), 209
Colleton (APB 36}, 209, 210
Co Luy, 225
Combat air patrol, 52
Combined operations. See Allied operations;
Vietnamization of naval operations

404

Corner (T-AKR 71, 2M
Commanders

Amphibious Force, 1 2?.

Amphibious Ready Group, 112

Amphibious Task Force, 24S

Carrier Division 9, 6£

Coastal Squadron i 15Q

Coastal Surveillance Force, 318

Coast Guard Activities, Vietnam. 149,
162

Delta Naval Forces, 294
III Marine Amphibious Force, Lfi2
Marine Special Landing Force, 1 12
Mine Countermeasures Force, 3lS2
Naval Construction Battalions, 23, 744
Naval Forces, lapan, 242
Naval Forces, Marianas, 242
Naval Forces, Philippines, 242
Naval Forces, Vietnam, 144, 162, 188,

20£ 210, 244, 26£ 268. 269, 293,

218. 319, 3M 3S6
River Support Squadron 7, 209
Service Force, 242 ■
Seventh Fleet, iZ fii 66, 113, 1 19,

133, 162. 164, 342. 3S6
Task Force 76. 363, 362
Task Force 77, 66, SQ
Task Force 115, 142

Task Force 117 (River Assault Flotilla 1),

204. 209
Task Unit Za8,.9, 143
U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam, 22, 40, 65, 94. L26, 14Z
162. 204. 242. 264. 268, 310
U.S. Support Activities. 361
Commanders in Chief. Pacific, 43, 51. 65.

68, 264, 285,310,385
Commanders In Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet,
385

Commanding General II Field Force, Viet-
nam, 204. 214

Commandos, 3132, 289. 5ee also SEAL
units

Communications, 59, 151, 250
Communists, 1 82, .301 . 5ee a/50 China;

North Vietnam; Viet Cong
Comstock (LSD 191 163
Constellation (CVA 64), 53. 54, 55, 94. 96,
101, 208. 329, 332. 33i
Carrier Air Wing 14, S3
Reconnaissance Attack Squadron 12,

WS
VA-146. 112
Construction Battalion Maintenance
Units

Presidential Unit Citation, 250

(301) . 248. 250

(302) . 248
Con Thien. 133
Cook (APD 1301, 39

Cook Inlet (WHEC 3841 ilS
Coontz (DLG 81 96

Coral Sea (CVA 43), 14, 59, 61, 64. 87. 97,
98, 101, liL 329, 333. 365, 3£1
Air Wing 15, 61
Core (T-AKV 131 22

Coronado, California, training center,
163

Corpus Christi Bay (T-ARVH H 238

Coskey, Kenneth L.. 347

Counterguerrilla conflict. 22

Counterinsurgency measures, 20
civic action programs, 31
Coastal Force development, 22, 12
Counterinsurgency Education and

Training Program, 26
effectiveness of, 45
expansion of, 45-46
nation-building program, 33, 62, 147,
244

renewal in Laos (1964), 59. 61

retaliatory air strikes, 47, 52, 53, 61, 63

Taylor mission and, 31

teams, 244

vessels, 33
Court martial, 2S&
Cousins, Ralph W., 66
Crockett (PG 881 I SO
Cruiser-Destroyer Group, 132
Cruiser-destroyer rocket ship group, 141
Crumpton, Frances L., 41
Cua An Hoa, 225
Cua Dai, 224

Cua Viet, 143, 188. 210, 25L 289, 318
Cua Viet base, 251, 252
Cubi Point, 348
Cu Chi, 248

Cunningham, Randall 11, 338. 343

Currituck (AV Zl LIS

Cuu Long, Eastern Repair Facility, 224

Damone, Vic, 102

Danang, 39, 51
breakdown of order in, 357
Bridge Cargo Complex, 251
cargo tonnage handled at, 251
coastal interdiction efforts at, 151
coastal surveillance centers, 22, 149
Coast Guard Division 12 at, 142
departure of U.S. forces firom, 311. 348
fuel complex, 251
harbor pilots, 253
internment of POWs at, 96
logistic support at, 149. 238, 251-57,
319

Marine landing at, 6£ 65, 123, 12£ 132
minesweeping units at, 170
Naval Advisory Detachment at, 46
Naval Construction Regiment (30th),
244

naval gunfire support, lAQ
Naval Support Activity, 162, 251-57
nurses serving at, 13A
open cargo storage area, 254
patrol boats based at, 45
port clearance operations, 237
port facilities, 251, 252
River Patrol Force, 163, 16L L88
rocket attacks on Viet Cong, 309
Seabee activities in, 244, 248, 251. 254,
319

SEAL teams in. 1 75

station hospital. 250. 2iL 2S± 25A
Danang Bay, 7, 2Q
Dang Phong, 112
Darlac Province, 3S2
Dau Tieng, 274
David, Beri: A., 2m 21A
Davis, Edward A., 34R
Dean, John Gunther, 261
Defoliation of vegetation, 289-
Demilitarized Zone, 92, 133, 134, 141 142,
246. 247, 251, 252, 257, 326, 329. 332
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 112
Dengler, Dieter, 92
Denver (LPD ?1 363

Desoto Patrol. 48-53. 61 See also Gulf of

Tonkin
Destroyer Division 30, 3
Destroyer Division 192. 51
Diem. See Ngo Dinh Diem
Dien Bien Phu, battle of, 5
Dinh Tuong Province, 21D
Distinguished Service Medal recipient,

340

Dixie Station, ZQ, 89, 150, 239
Do Kiem, 222

Dong Ha, 133, 247, 24S, 251
Dong Hoi, 61, 109, 332
Dong Nai, 226

Dong Tam, 167, 209, 210, 243, 248, 259,
318

Dong Xoai, 222

Do Son, 334

Drachnik. Joseph B., 23

Dredges, 241^ 24J

DriscoU, William P., 338, 343

Dubuque (LPD 81 31L 350, 358, 363

Due Pho, 252

Dulles, John Foster, 10

Duluth (LPD 61 363

DuPont (DD 941), 141

Durham (LKA 114). 358. 359. 263

Easter Offensive, 326-32, 344

Edson (DD 946), 361

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 5, 7, 10

Electric power plants, bombing of 98, 101

Electronic countermeasures, 2Q
coastal radar stations, 318, 319
in Linebacker operations, 344-45
search radars, 150. 151
sensor detection systems, 201
surface radar, 166, 1 70

Ely Paul, Z

Emerald Buddha Temple, 316

Encirclement operations, 147, 207

Engage (MSO 433), 350

Enhance (MSO 448), ISQ

Enterprise (CVAN 631 7L 93, 104, 111,

300, 365, 362
Epperson (DD 719), 35D
Escort Division 72, 26
Escort sorties, 59
Essex (CVA 91 5
Estocin, Michael J., 222

405

Evacuation

of Americans, 41-42. ?•^0

of Cambodia, 358, 361-67.

of civilians, 147, 281

enemy interdiction of routes for, 3.S7

of I Corps and II Corps, 355-58. :^S9-6n

number of refugees, 368

of Saigon, 363, 368
Ewell, lulian ]., 214
Excel (MSO 439), 20
Exercises, 15, 25, 44
Explosive ordnance disposal units, 152,
179, 251, 279

Fai Tsi Long Archipelago, 352

Fall crisis (1961), 4Q

Felt, Harry D„ 41

Field, Taylor, 2L5

Figliter Squadron 2jL 64

Fighter Squadron 53, 46

Fighter Squadron 114. 117

Fire fighting, 282, 23S

Fire support mission, 202

Fires, ship, 96, 99-101, 107. 3S1

Flagstaff (PGH 1), I5D

Flak suppression missions, 59

Fleet Activities, 242

Fleet Post Office, 242

Floyd County (LST 762), 163

Force (MSO 445), 35CL 3S1

Forrestal (CV 59), 99-101. IQZ

Fortify (MSO 446), 350

France

aircraft carriers, 3

Dien Bien Phu battle, 5zfi

landing craft, 4

river patrols, i

U.S. military aid and advisory assis-
tance to, L 3, 4
Frank Knox (DDR 742), 240, 242
Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA 421 SQ
Frederick (LST 1184), 358, 363
French Armed Forces, 7, 198. 204
French Union, 3

Gallup (PG 851 15Q
Galveston (CLG 31 139. 141
Game Warden operation. See also River
Patrol Force

air support for, 16L 169, iZL 188

boarding and inspection of vessels, IBfi

deployment of units for, 1£3

force, 167

initiation of, 17L ISO
objective, 17L 128
ordnance, 167
press briefing on, L9J
SEAL operations, 169
SEALORDS campaign and, 269
success of, 180-81
Garretf County (LST 786), 166, MZ, 186,
318

Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostilities, 6, IQ

Geneva Conference, 2Q

George K. Mackenzie (DD 836), 99, IDS

Gia Lam, 82, 346, 341

Giang Thanh-Vinh Te canal system, 269

Government of South Vietnam

allied presence and civilian support of,
277

overthrow of Diem, 42

under Thieu. 26£ 242, 356, 365
Grayback (LPSS 574), 121
Gray, Paul N., 164, 217
Green Bay iSS), LS3
Green Forest (SS), 357, 268
Green Port (SS), 357, 358, 368
Greenville Victory (USNS), 35L 358, 368
Green Wave (SS), 357
Griffin, Charles D., 11
Ground fire suppression, 80
Ground support mission, ZQ
Ground troop support, 188
Guam, 59

Andersen Air Force Base, HA

Naval Magazine, 242

Naval Ship Repair Facility, 224, 242

Naval Supply Depot, 242
Gulf of Siam, 20, 25, 36, 3Z ii& 269,

273, 358, 361
Gulf of Tonkin, 3

incidents, 48-55

PIRAZ, SJ

Task Force Z2 in, 60, 80, 108, 306, 339,
343

weather in, 82

Hai Duong, 112, 336
Haiphong

bombing campaign limits, 89, 344

military supplies from, 97, 334

mineiaying in harbor by U.S., 333-34

minesweeping operations, 350, 3.')3

Naval Amphibious Base, 2

sealift to Saigon, 6, 8

targets in, 96, 112, 332, 334, 342, MS
Ham Luong, 180
Hamm, Warren C, 324
Hancock (CVA 191 19, 20, 39^0, 59, 61,
96, 306, 329, 36L 363

Air Wing 2L 61
Hanoi

airfield, 84, 346, 341

bombing targets in, 73, 82, 25, 96, 9Z,
98, 112, 332, 342, 344. 34S

electric power plant, 98, 101, 342

petroleum facility, 95, 96

Radar Command Station \1, 345
Hanson (DD 832), 142
Harbor clearance, 237. 241. 242
Harbor Clearance Unit 1, 242, 241
Harbor defense units, 251, ZS3
Harbor entrance control posts, 149. 318
Harkins, Paul D., 22
Harnett County (LST 821), 166
Hart, William R., 331
Harumi, 368
Ha Tien, 269, 318

Ha Tlnh, 113

Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon,

40-^1. 257
Headquarters Support Activity, Taiwan,

242

Heath, Donald R., 9
Heatherton, joey, 102
Heavy Photographic Squadron 61, 39, 4Q
Helicopter units. See also Aircraft, heli-
copters

Attack Light Squadron 1, idZ
Attack Light Squadron 3, 167, 169,

269. 275, 285, 289
losses during evacuations, 368
Mine Countermeasures Squadron 12,

350

Support Squadron L 167
Henrico (APA 451 65
Henry B. Wilson (DDG 71 143, 361
Herrick, [ohn 49, 51, 52
Higbee (DD 806), 338
Hissem (DER 4001 LSI
Boa Lac, 82, 91
Hoang Huu Thai, 350, 3S1
Hobart (HMAS), (D 39), L41
Ho Chi Minh, L 4, 6, 10, 13
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 13, 4Z, 65, 161, 301
Hoi An, 12Z, 302
Hoi An River, 274
HoUoway James L., Ill, 342
Hominy Station, 2ZJ
Hon Gai, 53, 101, 112. 350
Hon Matt, 51
Hon Me, 5L 52
Hon Nieu, 31
Hope, Bob, 102
Howland, John B., 1
Hue, 134

airfield, 247

ammunition transport to, 2 93
Bridge Site 5, 24S

civilians executed by enemy forces at,
192

construction effort by Seabees, 244
Easter Offensive by North Vietnam,

326, 327
fall of, 357

inland waterways, 163
logistic support activity in, 251, 257
Marine struggle for, 192
recapture of, 143. 188
Seabee construction activities in, 25Q
"Street Without Joy "131
Hue River, 289

Humanitarian activities, 229-30
Hunterdon County (LST 838), 166, 188,
285

Hyland, John J., 119, 133, 164

Illusive (MSO 448), 35Q
Impervious (MSO 449), 350
Inchon (LPH 121 350
Indochina War

French naval assault divisions, 198,
204

406

pressure for U.S. intervention in, Z
rationale for U.S. involvement in, 1
risks of U.S. intervention in, 5
surrender of French interests in, fi
Indra (ARL 37), 209
Infiltration

aerial interdiction of routes, 78, S& 89,

111-12, :m . 306
Blue Shark operation and, ?.S7
from Cambodia, 36, 223
coastal interdiction of. 143-61. 242.

315, 329, 334-35
coastal shelling of supply caches, 14i
halt in bombing campaign and, 97,

IXS

Laotian routes, 92
Market Time operation, 65j 126
of North Vietnamese into South Viet-
nam, 6L 64, 65, m
river patrol interdiction of, 277
by Route L S8
ships detected, 31S
supply train, 2Z, 111-12
by waterways, 113, 1 71
Inland waterways, 163^ IZtt IZZ 179,

349. See also individual rivers
Inshore Undersea Warfare Surveillance
Group h Western Pacific
Detachment, 144
Inshore Undersea Warfare Units
(1-5), 149
(51), L52

Intelligence collection, 59. See also Recon-
naissance
for 34A program, 48
development by advisors, 25
importance of, 306
for Market Time operation, LSI
by naval intelligence liaison officers,
289

quality of, 4L 12Z 128, 289

transport submarines for, 36
Intrepid (CVS ll), 101
Iwo lima (LPH 2), 120. 125

Jackson, Dempster M., 50
lamaica Bay, 2A1
[apan, ship repairs in, ZS
Jennings County (LST 846), 161 166. ML
L8i

John R. Craig (DO 885), 51

Johnson, Ivor A., IS

Johnson, Lyndon B.. 45, 49, 53, 5£ 59,

61, 63, 89, 112, 118. 161, 263
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 310
Jones, Harry T., im
Joseph Strauss (DDG 161, ^

Kelley, Thomas G., 374

Kemper County (LST 854), 209, 210

Kennedy John E, 15, 12, 20, 22, 3L 32, i4

Kep, 8Z 91

Kerrey, Joseph R., 375

Ke Sat, 112

Khe Sanh, 102, ill. 188. 250
Khmer Rouge guerrillas, 358, 361
Kien An, 82, 112, 318
Kien Vang (PGM 603), 318
Kim Quy (HQ 605), 24
King, Robert R., 22
Kirk (DE 1087), 361

Kitty Hawk (CVA 63). 46, 47, 75, 106. 111.
306, 329
Carrier Air Wing IL 1 12
Klusmann, Charles F., 46-47, 92, 94
Kompong Som, 361
Kontum Province, 357
Korean War, Z2
Knox (DE 1052), 361
Krishna (ARL 381 261
i<:ii/QGu;f(T-AKV8),238
Kuntze, Archie C, 2M
KyHoa (HQ 09), 24

Each Chao Estuary, S3
La Fayette, 1
Lang Dang, 345

Lang Son rail and highway bridge, 101
Laos

aircraft shot down in, 42
attack sorties flown in, 301
bombing campaign in, 59, 61, 63, 65,

70, 92, 9L ML 304
coalition government, 20
combat action in, 310
crises in, 1.3-20

expansion of operations into, 45-47
infiltration routes in, 92, 316
infrastructure improvements by

Seabees, 20
Lam Son 719 operation, 306
negotiations and cease-fire, L5
panhandle, 45, 65, 97, 301
renewed counterinsurgency campaign

in, 59, 61

Steel Tiger operation in, 65, ZQ, 97, 301
Wattay airfield, 20
weather in, 82

Yankee Team reconnaissance program,
46, 2Q
Lassen, Clyde E., 376
LCM X 251
LOW 6, 251

Leader (MSO 490), 20, 350
Le Guy Dang, 215
Lee, Bobby C, UA
Lemnitzer, Lyman L., 43
Le Van Thu, 124
Lexington (CVA 16}, 16
Liberty Bridge, 7.48

Light Attack Squadron 4, 26£ 269, 285, 289
Light Photographic Squadron 63, SZ
Linh Dong, S6
Lipan (ATF 85}, 240

Logistic and administrative support. 5ee
also Medical support; Military Sea
Transportation Service; Naval Sup-
port Activity
administrative support, 242, 2.'i7

aircraft used for, 247, 260, 2£1
ammunition, 23.1. 239, 24.'^, 251
bases, 235, 240. 25L 252, 25Z 259,

318, 319
for bombing campaigns, 65
cargo handling by, 2.?6. 238. 251, 257,

261

communications, 257

control and coordination of, 239, 242.

248, 251
at Danang, 149, 238, 251-57
deficiencies in, 251
demand for, 2.59
development of, 233, 251
during Easter Offensive, 327
enemy interdiction of ISA
during evacuation, 365
fuel, 233, 238, 239, 248, 251
in I Corps, 162, 248, 251
infrastructure expansion, 318
for Market Time operation, 149. 239,

259

ordnance, 76, 245. 257

port clearance, 237, 241, 243

replenishment at sea, 239

of river forces, 248

roll on/roll off ship, 236, 238

at Saigon, 25L 259, 261

salvage activities, 243, 244

Seabees' contribution to, 244, 246-50,

251, 254
to Sea Float, 2ZZ
sealift, 234

ship/small craft repair, 239, 244, 245.
251, 252

subordinate detachments, 235, 240,

251, 257, 252
supplies, 233, 239, 245, 257, 261
during Tet Offensive, 250, 251, 251
transfer to South Vietnam, 31S
troop transport, 147, 234, 235, 239
vehicles, 233, 23£ 238
vertical replenishment of supplies, 74,

76, 232

vessels, 235, 236, 211 238, 240, 25L
258. 259, 261
Logistic Support Force, Western Pacific, 2,
56. See also Mobile Logistic Support
Force

Long Beach (CGN 9), 339, 358
Long Binh, 248, 318
Long Dao (HG 327), 22E
Long Dun Kep, 345
Long Ngoc, 1 1 ?.

Long Tau River, 170, 177, 178. 181. 182.
226

Long Xuyen, 22, 226, 259, 262

Lon Nol, 16. 358

Lowe (DER 325), 1A£

LST 629, 32

157 630, 39

Lynn, Doyle W., 42

McCain, John S., Jr., 264, 285, 3Ifl
McCauley Brian, 349, 350, 352

407

McGarrigle, Donald R., 2m
McGrath, (ames P., 122
McKee, Richard, lAl
McMahon, Donald F., 122
McNamara, Robert S., 41, id
Maddocks, William ]., Ill
Maddox (DD 731), 49-50. 5L 5i 96
Mahan (DLG 11), 18, 4Q
Major, Linden. 21
Man/ey (DD 940), 141
Mansfield (DD 728), 141 142
Mapmaking program, 4Q
Marble Mountain air facility, 251
Mare Islond, California, training center,

163. 210
Marine Corps

advisors. 131

air strikes, .^09

casualties, 125, 128, 30L MS
Easter Offensive operations, 326-27,
ill

evacuation role of, 360. 362-63, 365.
367

[ackstay operation, 121
Khe Sanh outpost, 1Q2
Marble Mountain air facility, 251
withdrawal from Vietnam, 249
Marine Corps units

1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison

Company, 121, lAl
1st Marine Division, 130, 252
Aircraft Wing, LIO
3d Marine Division, 130, 131, 251,

257. 304, 3QZ
4th Marines, 2d Battalion, 361, 362
9th Marines

3d battalion, 64
Amphibious Brigade, 365
Expeditionary Brigade, 65
Amphibious Forces

III Marines, 125, 127, 129, 130, 162.

188. 244. 251. Ill
31st Marine Amphibious Unit, Ml
battalion landing teams, 15, 65, 113
equipment, 126, 127
expeditionary brigades, 20
first ground combat unit deployed, 64,

ground-air teams, 2Q

heavy lift helicopter squadrons, 361

medium helicopter squadrons, 65, IIS

165th, 35Q

362d, 38, 39

463d, 35D
naval gunfire support of, 1A2
naval personnel serving in, 121
reconnaissance, 1 37
South Korean, 307

Special Landing Force, 20, 42, 65, 119,
1Q&

against 1st Viet Cong Regiment,

Bold Mariner operation. 307
commander, 119
Defiant Stand operation, 3QZ
heliborne operations, 134

Markab (AR 23L 2M
Market Time operation

aircraft surveillance, 150-51, 314

area encompassed by, 146

bases, 149

Bold Mariner operation. 307
casualties, 159

coastal surveillance centers, 318
Coast Guard role in, 144. 146. 149 ,

150. 3U
communications, 151
coordination of, 147. 1 49
Easter Offensive defense, 327. 329
effectiveness of, 150, 15L Ml. 313,

315

harbor defense and surveillance,

149-50, 152-53
intercepted or destroyed vessels, 151.

157. 158. 161
joint forces in, 194
logistic support for, 149, 239, 259
munitions captured or destroyed, 151,

158

naval gunfire support by, 144, 147. 158
objectives, 65, 126. 143
operational control of, 149, 715
ordnance, 147, 149, 150, ISI
organization of, 1 4 . 3-44
resources, tactics, and operating proce-
dures, 126, 146-47, 149, 150. 151,
152, 155, 156, 157
SEALORDS campaign and, 269
South Vietnamese Navy role in, 143,

144, 149, 156. 158, 225, 318
tasks, 14L 151

transfer to South Vietnam, 318

Mars (AFS 1), 24Q

Martin, Graham, 368

Martinez, Alexander, 122

Massey, Leroy, 322

Material assistance program, 1

Maumee (T-AO 149), 238

Maury (AGS 16), 240

Medal of Honor recipients, 229, 369-84

Medical support
of amphibious landings, 121
casualties treated, 42, 251
of civilians, 230, 232, 228
corpsmen, 121, 295, 213, 240, 2ZS,

307, 372, 379
dental care, 230, 24Q
doctors, 240
fleet medical units, Z
helicopters, medical evacuation, 1 33.

135^203, 240. 255
hospital ships, L 121 134-36, 240
number of medical personnel. 42, 252
nurses, 41 42, 136, 240
Purple Hearts awarded for, 41
for riverine assault groups, 207, 211
rocket attacks on facilities, 256
station hospitals, 41 42, 250, 251 255,
256, 251

Mekong Delta, 162, 165, 227
food transport through, 22
helicopter squadrons in, 38, 162

large landing support ship in, 23
Mobile Riverine Force on. 123
naval gunfire support in, L32
offensive operations. 276. 2H3
patrol operations, 167. 315
raiding operations, 36, 133. 282
River Force mission in. 226
SEAL team dropoff. lU
Special Forces camp, 13
terrain, 2Q£

Tet Offensive combat in, 1 9£
waterways. 163
Mekong River

combined-service operations on, 285
islands, 276

mangrove swamps, 2S2

U.S. naval operations on. 20
Mercer (APB 3^ 209
Merchant ships, 152, 153, 178, 211, 334,
340

Michelin Rubber Plantation. 274
Midway (CVA 41), 15, 48, 64, 66, 82, 86,

91 363, 364, 363, 366
Military aid and assistance
to France, 1 3
to Cambodia, 358
to South Vietnam, 20, 355
Military Assistance Advisory Group, In-
dochina
Navy Section, 1 3
Military Assistance Advisory Group, Viet-
nam
Chiefs of, 386
disestablishment, 2Q
Navy Section, 10, 11 20, 23, 386
strength of, 20, 41
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
65, 352

administrative and logistic support, 41
Commander, 22, 40, 65
Naval Construction Battalions, 33
naval gunfire support, 132
strength of, 20
Military Sealift Command, 357, 360.
367.-63

Military Sea Transportation Service, 7,
39, 162
chain of command, 235
fleet, 233, 235. 236, 238, 239
in-port lighterage and terminal, 239
supplies carried by. 213

Miller, Henry L.. 59

Mine Countermeasures Force. 349, 352
Mine Division 112, 120
Mine Force, 251

Mine Squadron 11 Detachment Alpha,

170. 12Z
Minelaying operations, 33.3-34
Minesweeping operations, 170. 177. 179.

209. 290. 346, 349-51, 354
Minesweeping Division

71st, 32

73d, 36

93d, 16, 20
Missing in action, 186
Mobile (LKA 115), 363

408

Mobile Logistic Support Force, 6i 121.

239. 240, 242, 3£5
Mobile Riverine Group Alpha. 205
Mobile Riverine Group Bravo, 205
Mobile Riverine Force. See Army-Navy

Mobile Riverine Force
Mobile training teams, 25^ M
Moc Hoa, LS2
Montagnards, 33
Moorer Thomas R, 264
Morganthau (WHEC 722). 31S
Morton (DD 948), 53
Mount Katmai (AE 16), MS
Mount McKinley (AGC ZL 65
Mount Vernon (LSD 391 365
MSB 45. ITS
MSB 49. 178, im
MSB 54, U&
MSS 2, i5J
Mu Gia Pass. S9. 301
Munitions, 257

captured, 15L 158, 185, 210, 256, 272,
278. 293, 307. 315

conservation of, 5fl3

rounds expended, 137, 139-43, 313,
327, 338

stockpiles, 6H

transport, f9.3
Mutual Defense Assistance Program, L 7
Myers, Lowell R., 113
My Tho, 22, 163, 180, 184 209, 2ia 21 L
226, 259, 31S

Nam Can Forest, 276, 22Q
Nam Dinh, 97, 112
Nam Tha, 2Q
Nape Pass, 52

National Defense Reserve Fleet auxiliary
ships, 56

Naval Advisory Group, 144, 147, 149,

162. 215. 229. 285, 323, 348^9, 3B6
Naval Beach Group L Z, 20, 251
Naval Construction Battalions, U.S. Pa-
cific Fleet. 242, 244, 248
Naval Construction Brigade (3d), 162.

244, 246
Naval Construction Regiment
30th, 244
32d, 244

Naval Forces, Vietnam, 136, 144, 149,

162, 244, 257, 284. 290. 349
Naval gunfire support

by 34A boat force, 5L 52

of amphibious landings, 121, 137, 141,
142, 301

concentration of ships for, 14Q

Bold Mariner operation, 2QZ

in Easter Offensive, 326-27, JJJ

effectiveness of, 141

enemy casualties, 141, 142

forms of operations, L41

ground fire suppression, 80

of I Corps province, 137, 141, 210

logistic support for, 239

in Market Time operation, 144, 141

in Mekong Delta, 132
ordnance and rounds used, 137,

1 39-43
operational control of. 137
reconnaissance, 141
from Riverine Assault Force, 204. 210
of river patrol operations, ISS
ships assigned to, 137-40, 141, 142,

143. 1I&
in post-let years, 310. 313
targets, 1 38-40, 141. 142, 143
during let Offensive, 141. 1 43
Naval Gunfire Support Unit. 137-38. 141.
143. 31.3

Naval Inshore Operations Training Cen-
ter, 210

Naval Magazines, 242

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion. 5ee
also Seabees

(I) , 24S
(3L2M
(41, 244
(5L 244
(61 248
(Zl 248
(81244
(91 244
(10), 20, 244

(II) . 244, 247
(40), 248
(53), 24S
(58), 248
(62), 248, 112
(71), 248
(74), 248
(121), 248
(128), 248
(133), 248

Naval Operations Support Group, 36
Naval Ordnance Facilities, 242
Naval Ordnance Test Station (China

Lake), 58
Naval Postgraduate School, 25
Naval Research and Development Unit,

Vietnam, 162
Naval Reserve, Medal of Honor recipi-
ents, 3ZL 375, 3Z2
Naval Ship Repair Facilities, 242
Naval Supply Depots, 242, 319
Naval Support Activity
air detachment, 260
control of, 251
Danang, 162, 242, 251-57
Saigon, 162, 242, 257, 258, 259-61
subordinate detachments, 251, 2 57
Naval Support Facility, Cam Ranh Bay,
259

Naval War College, 25
Navasota (AO 106), L5
Neak Luong, 285
Nelson, Robert T., 158
New jersey (BB 62), 76, Z8, 312. 313
New Jersey (dredge), 241
New Orleans (LPH 111 350, iSJ
Newport News (CA 148), 142, 143. 328,
334,338

Ngo Dinh Diem, 9, 10, LL M, 2L 42

Ngo Quang Truong, 366

Ngo Quyen (HQ IZL 32A

Ngo Xuan Son, 12A

Nguyen Cao Ky, 3M

Nguyen Hal Chi, 1312

Nguyen Ngoc Long (HQ 230), 23

Nguyen Van Tan, 2&J

Nguyen Van Thieu, 264, 242, 356, 365

Nha Be, 163, 167, 170, 17L IM 18L

259. 282, 319. 3S£
Nha Trang

construction battalions at. 24S

evacuation of. 358

logistic support. 253

Naval School, H, 21 Z, 221

port security, 149, 151, 161
Ninh Binh, 26

Nixon, Richard M., 329, 333, 344

Nolting, Frederick E., 1_8

Norodom Sihanouk, 161

Norris, Thomas R., 377

North Vietnam

air defenses, 82, 90, 342-43, 344, 345
air strikes in, 334-35, 338. 340
barracks bombings by U.S., 61, 109,
112

bombing campaigns in, 60, 6L 63, 73,

8S. See also Rolling Thunder
coast (map), 44

coastal batteries, 77, 78, 116, 141, 338

direct U.S. action against. 43, 51, 52,
53, 329, 332. 5ee also Bombing
campaigns; Operations

Easter Offensive, 326=32

expansion of operations into, 45^7

logistic facilities, 332

military leader, 330

minesweeping operations, 346, 349-51

missile battery, 84, 116

ordnance, 82, 84, 90, H6

panhandle, 45, 113

petroleum storage and distribution sys-
tem, 53, 94-96

prohibition against bombing in, 300,
344

radar facility, 52
railyards, 96

reconnaissance over, 48-49. 70, 306
security posts, 52
spring offensive (1961), 14
subversive operations, 13, 63. See also
Sabotage

supply depot damage assessment, 86

torpedo attack on U.S. destroyer,
49-50. 51

weather in, 82
North Vietnamese Army units

Khe Sanh siege, 250

infiltration by, 61, 129, 133

shelling by U.S. See Naval gunfire sup-
port

North Vietnamese Navy
boats and ships, 51, 52
rocket attack on Dong Ha base, 2 47
Transportation Group 125. 143

409

Noweil, Larry, 340
Nueces (APB 401, 209
Nui Bq Den, 64
Nurses

number serving, 116

Purple Hearts awarded to, 41

Oakland (SS), 2M
Obi Island, 151
O'Brien (DD 725), ZZ
O'Brien, Joseph ]., 13J
Offensive operations, allied navies in,
275-8.-^

Officer in Charge of Construction, Viet-
nam, 162
Ogden (LPD 5L 35Q
Ogier, Herbert L., 49
Okinawa, Japan, 15, 59, 30L 211
Okinawa (LPH 3), 308, 32L ML 363
Oklahoma City (CLG a 40, 137, 326. 327,

332, 334, 363
Old Nam Can, 2SS
Ong Doc, 2ZL 2Z2
Operation plans

34A, 45^6, 48, 5L 52, 53, 61
Operations. See also Game Warden oper-
ation; Market Time operation;
Rolling Thunder campaign;
SEALORDS campaign

Barrel Roll, 59, 6L 63, 65, ZQ, 97, 301

Barrier Reef 269, 2Zi 252

Beau Charger, lAl

Blue Marlin 1 and II, 122

Blue Shark, 28Z

Blue Tree, ZQ, 89, 306

Bold Mariner, 3QZ

Breezy Cove, 2_ZL 279, 289

Commando Bolt, 301

Commando Hunt, 301

Coronado V, 7.10

Dagger Thrust, 222, 1 26-27

Deckhouse, 129, 133, Ul

Defiant Stand, 302

Double Eagle, 12S

Duffle Bag, 2SI

Eagle Pull, 358, .361-62

End Sweep, 350, 3.'^3

Flaming Dart L 61

Flaming Dart II, 61

Foul Deck, 269

Freedom Train, 329, 332

Frequent Wind, 363, 3 67

Giant Slingshot, 270, 272, 2Z3, 2Z4,
287, 298, aiS

Homecoming, 346-47

Iron Hand, 82

Irving, 225

Jackstay 128, 13Z 111
Keystone Robin Charlie, 3lLI
Lam Son 719, 206

Linebacker, 334-36, 338. 340, 342. 343
Niagara, 111
Osage, 129

Passage to Freedom, 6=9
Pershing, L24

Pierce Arrow, S2
Piranha, 126
Pocket Money 333
Ready Deck, 2Z4, 284, 289, 228
Sea Dragon, 76, 78, 113, 137, HL 141,
1£1

Sea Float, 276, 278, 220
Search Turn, 269, 289
Sea Tiger, 274, 2S2
Silver Mace II, 276
Solid Anchor, 220
Stable Door, 15.0, ISZ 318
Stariite, 123, 125, 126, 130, 1A2
Steel Tiger, 65, ZQ, 91, 301
Talon Vise, 367
Tiger Hound, Za 9Z
Tran Hung Dao L 269, 287, 22S
Tran Hung Dao II, 2B1
Tran Hung Dao VII, 287
Yankee Team, 46, 47, 6L 63, ZQ, 306
Ordnance

automatic weapons, i69. 170, 180,
210

7 , 62-m illi mptp r machine guns, 162
30-caliber machine guns, 26, 225,
21^0

50-caliber machine guns, 26, 28,
123. 147, 149, 150, 166, 167,
205, 225, 2SA

M-60 machine guns, 166, 296, 206,
267, 269
bombs, 207, 209, IQi

250-pound, 75, Z6

500-pound, 76, 127, 228

1,000-pound, Z6, 22

2,000-pound, Z6

general purpose, 75, 76, 106

napalm, 75, Z6

number used, 89

precision-guided, 301, 337, 342, 344
with retardation tails, 3QS
Walleye TV-guided glide, 58, Z6_. 342
enemy 82, 84, 226, 210, 256, 307,

fire arrow, 1 84

fires/accidental explosions involving,

99-101, 141
flamethrowers, 25, 184, 205, 2SS
grenade launchers, 266, 269, 1 70

40-millimeter, 180, iSi

M-79. 341

rapid-fire, 205
grenades, 161, 206, 210

rocket-propelled, 180
gun mounts

20-millimeter, 205

50-caliber, 20-miIlimeter, 205
guns

3-inch, 50-caliber, L5Q
5-inch, 38-caliber, ST, 137. 150, 318,
326

5- inch, 54-caliber, 137, 141

6- inch, 47-caliber, 13Z, 139, 326,

327

ZA2 minigun, 266, 302

8-inch, 55-caliber, 76, 13Z, 242, 326,

334

1 4.5 millimeter, 5i
20-millimeter. 28, 33, 56, Z6, 205,
269

37-millimeter. 5L 90, 116
40-millimeter, 2& 33, 150, 22S
57-millimeter, 116
85-millimeter, 1X6
100-millimeter, 216
105-millimeter howitzer L25

mines, 76, 98, UL UZ 252, 30L 33S
contact, Soviet-made. 178, 2ZS
magnetic-acoustic sea, 333
Mark 36 Destructors, .349

missiles

BuUpup air-to-ground, 58, 75. Z6

SA-2 surface-to-air, 84

Shrike air-to-ground antiradar, 56.

5Z, 75, Z6
Sidewinder air-to-air. 56, 75, Z6, 2 23,

111

Sparrow air-to-air, 56, 75, Z6
Standard, 75

surface-to-air, 82, 116, 342-43,

344-45
Talos surface-to-air, 339
Terrier surface-to-air, 18
testing at China Lake, SS
mortars

81-millimeter, 14Z, 149, 150, 205
rifles, 210

M-14, 230

recoilless, 178, LSQ
rockets, 28L 309

2.75-inch, 75, 76, 167, 269

5-inch Zuni, 75, 76, 88. 94, 99, 240,
141, 269, 283

122-millimeter, 180, 256

B-40, 285, 272

launchers, 162

number used, 82
small arms, 167, 180
stocks, 52

Thompson submachine gun, 30, ISZ
water cannon, 205, 7.71
white phosphorus shells, 142

Ordnancemen, 282. 333

Oriskany (CVA 34), 96, 99, 200, 101, 208.
Ill

Orleck (DD 886), 238, 141
Osceola, 351 368
Osterman, Leslie G., 2_25
Ouellet, David G., 3ZS
Overfield, W. Dale, 230
Ozboum (DD 846), 141

Pacific Fleet

Commander, J_9

Passage to Freedom operation, fi=Z
PACV Division 101 161 MS
Paris Agreement, 356, 357
Paris diplomatic talks, 263, 333, 34.3^4.

5ee also Cease-fire agreements
Parke, Everette A., 16
Patrick, Cari R., 2£Q

410

Parsons (DD 949), SI
Pathet Lqo, li 2a &1

capture of American personnel, 46-47.
92

escape of POVVs from, 92^ 24

spring offensive (1961), 14
Paul Doumer Bridge, 342
Pawnee, 3.S7
PBR 864, 212
PCF43,22A
PCF 77, im
Pearl Harbor, 44^ 4A

Camp Smith headquarters,

Naval Station, 242
Peona (LST 1183), 363
Perch (APSS 313), 35, 36. 12L L25
Perfume River, 188, J91, 295, 210, 25Q
Persons, Henry S., 2Z
Pham Ngu Lao (HQ 15), 122
Phan Rang, 358, 359
Phan Thi Bich Duyen, 23J
Phan Thief, 122
Philippine Sea (CVA 47), 5
Philippines, 15, 39, 78, 329, 148
Phnom Penh, 26, 20. 285. 358, Ml
Phong Dinh Province, 210
Phu Bai, 244, ML 248, 251
Phu Cuong, 2Z4, 318, 324
Phuc Yen Airfield, 82, 84
Phu Dien Chau, 113

Phu, Lieutenant (jg), (South Vietnamese),
225

Phu Ly, 96, W£

Phuong Can Highway bridge, S8
Phu Qui, ammunition depot, 61
Phu Quoc Island, 248, 320, 358, 2£Q
Phu Thu, 127

Pioneer Commander (SS), 35Z, 358, 3fiS
Pioneer Contender (SS), 357, 358, 360, 368
PIRAZ (positive identification radar advi-
sory zone), 80, 81
Plain of Jars, 46, 42
Plain of Reeds, 34, 167, 268, 222
Plane captain, LQS
Pleiku Province, 6L 248, 356
Point Cruz (T-AKV 191 235, 238 .
Point Defiance (LSD 311 222
Point Gammon (WPB 82304), 151
Point Clover (WPB 82307), LSS
Point Crey (WPB 82324), 159
Port calls, 18

Presidential Unit Citations, 210, 250
Prichett (DD 561), 14J
Princeton (LPH 51 38, 39^0. 121
Prisoners of war, American

airmen, 46-47. 53, 54, 82, 92, 346. 247

deaths in captivity, 346, 34S

escapees, 92, 94, 348

Hanoi prison cell environment, 346, 347

release of, 346=49
Prisoners of war, Communist, 96, 171,

274, 207
Project Handclasp, 222
Providence (CLG 61, 40, ML 143, 334

Quang Khe, 53, 61
Quang Nam Province, 224
Quang Ngai City, 128, 151, 352
Quang Tri City, 39, 133, 248, 322
Quang Tri Province, 326, 327, 328, Ml
Queenfish (SS 393). 25
Qui Nhon

boat repair facilities, 224

logistic support at, 7.57

port security, 249, 153

protection of, L23_, 124

sabotage of American quarters at, 61

South Vietnamese shelling on, 352

troop transport to, 214

Roch Gia, 259, 167, 224^ 269

Rach Sol, lis

Rach Tra Canal, 2M

Racial tensions, 315

Radar picket stations, 80, 81

Radford, Arthur W., 7

Railroads and railyards, air strikes on,
96, 97, 117.

Ranger (CVA 61), 48, 59, 61 87, 94, m,
303. 306

Ray, David R., 329

Reasoner (DE 1063), 358

Reclaimer (ARS 421 240

Reconnaissance

aircraft shot down, 46-47
armed, 48, 59, 94, 98, 113
Blue Tree operation, ZQ, 89, 306
bomb damage assessment, 86, 345
Desoto Patrol, 48, 51
over Central Highlands, 40
of enemy supply train, 9L IQS
high-altitude, 42
of Ho Chi Minh Trail, 305
over Laos, 59, ZQ, 306
low-level aerial, 46
of missile battery, 84
missions flown by U.S. Navy, 42
for naval gunfire support, 141
over North Vietnam, 48-49, ZO, 84,
306

tactical, 70, 82

Yankee Team program, 46, 306
Red Beach, 251

Refugee Assistance Task Group, 358
Re Island, 15L 357
Religious services, 190, 229
Repose (AH 161, 121. 234. 235, 240
Republic of Vietnam, 6, 20. See also South
Vietnam

Rescue operations, 36, 92. 5ee also Search
and rescue
North Vietnamese sailors, 96
U.S. aviators, 347
Rest and recuperation, 200, -202, 296,
316-17

Richard B. Anderson (DD 786), 3, 332
Richard Edwards (DD 950), S3
Rincon (T-AOG 771, 363
Risner. Robinson, 343
River assault groups, 20, 282

(32). 2Z4
River Divisions

51-55, dispositions, 163, ISO

514, 287

534, 272, 2Z4
Riverine Assault Force, 162 5ee a/50
Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force

arrival in South Vietnam, 210

casualties, 210

Commander, 204. 209

deactivation, 223

Division 91 202

Division HZ 21Q

escort duties. 202

logistic support of, 252

minesweeping duties, 202

offensive actions by, 7.76

organization, 205

SEALORDS campaign and, 262

Squadron 9, 204-5, 210

Squadron H. 298, 204-5. 210

Squadron 13.. 205

Squadron 15, 205

strength of force, 269

training, 210

vessels, 210, 285
River patrol boats (PBR), 2_24

capabilities, 1££

crew, 166

loss of, 18L ISS

Mark L 166

Mark II, 166-67

offensive actions, 277, 285. 286

ordnance, 166, 180, 2S4

on patrol, 282, 224

in SEALORDS Campaign, 270-72, 273.
28£

SEAL team use of, 120
size of force, 181
strength of force, 268-69
training, 163, 226, 284
transfer to South Vietnam, 223-24, 299
River Patrol Force, 162. See also Game
Warden operation
Army operations with, 168, 178, ISO
boats and craft, 166. 167, 188
boat damage and loss, 180, 18L 1S8
casualties, 1 80
commander, 264, 162
disestablishment of, 224
dispositions, 163
effectiveness, IM, 285, 12Z
enemy killed or captured, m. 186. 122
enemy craft destroyed, damaged, or

captured, 1S6
floating bases for, 163, 267, 282, 188.

195

in I Corps Tactical Zone, 186. 1S8
Jackstay operation, 171
logistic support of, 257, 258, 252
minesweeping operations, 170,

177-79, 188
morale, 283

operational procedures, 181
ordnance, 166, 180, 284, 285, IM 2£1
organization of, 163

411

Rung Sat swamp operations, 164, 169.

17L lia 127
SEALORDS campaign, 262
SEAL teams under. Mi 168,. 170, 122,

173, 174

South Vietnamese operations witli,

171. 178
support ships, 163. 1 66 , 1 9^
Task Force Clearwater, 186, 188, 125
tasl^s, 1.8D

Tet Offensive and, IM, 13£
transfer of PBRs to Vietnamese Navy,
222

River Patrol Squadron S. See River Patrol
Force

River Section 511, 180
River Section 521, 186, 188
River Section 541, 127
Roach, John

"Bridge Site 5, Hue," 2M
Rogers (DD 876), 96_, lOR
Rojo, Isagani C, 343
Rolling Thunder campaign, ZQ, 340

,A.ir Force role, 7X 24, 22

aircraft lost in, 82

aircraft shot down, 113-14, 1 16

aircraft used in, 87-S8, 93, 94. IQS,
LU

airmen killed, missing or taken pris-
oner, 92, 24
carrier fires during, 96, 99-101, UH
coastal shelling, 113
command arrangements, 6£
duration of, 60, 82, i 10, liS
frequency of operations, 89, 113
enemy aircraft shot down, 82
enemy boats destroyed, 91^ 96, 113
halt (temporary) in, 89, 92, 9L 102,

112, US
initiation of, 60, 61, S7
mining of rivers and waterways, 98,
ill

Navy role in, 61, 73, 91

northern limits of, 86. 89, 101, 112,

objectives, 6i 7J, 86, 112-13
ordnance used, 89, £2, 94, 106, 109,
117. US

reconnaissance, 94 98, 108, 113, 11£

route pockages, §5, 89, 24

search and rescue operations, 80, 22

sorties flown, 89, 102

success of, 96, 113-15. J IS

support, 10.3-104

targets, S9, £L 92, 94-97, 101, 207,

109, 111, 112-13, 117
types of attacks, 89
Ron River, 52

Route packages, 85, 89, 24
Route L 88, 248, 322
Route lA, 112
Rowan (DD 782), 338
Royal Australian Navy, 137, 141
Royal Laotian Army, 14
Royal Laotian Government, 13
Rung Sat swamp, 17A

allied operations in, 129 , 2SJ
enemy effectiveness in, 1 78
Game Warden operation, 121
mines in, 226

Mobile Riverine Force operations in,
21fi

naval support fire in, 141

patrol operations in, 164. 170. / 97

SEAL operations in, 162

SEALORDS campaign, 221

South Vietnamese Navy operations in,
216, 228

Tet Offensive operations in, 228

transfer of operations to South Viet-
nam, 228
Ruong Canal, ?.10
Rupertus (DD 851), 93
Rush (WHEC 723), 313, 318
Rusk, Dean C, 56
Ryukyu Islands, 242

Sabin, Lorenzo S., 6-7. 9

Sabotage

American quarters in Qui Nhon, 61
of Brink Bachelor Officers Quarters, 41
mining of merchant vessels, 1S2=S3
of petroleum storage facility, 2S&
of U.S. Embassy, 52

Sacramento (AOE 11, 74, 103, 104, 240

Sa Dec, 163. 2m 259, 318

Sa Huynh, 25L 252

Saigon

administrative and logistic support in,

40-41, 142
Advanced Training Center, 221
"Air Cofgt," 260, 261
boat repair yard, 25
Buddhist demonstrations and self-im-
molations, 42
cargo offloaded at, 257
Defense Attache Office, 355, 36Z
Easter Offensive, 326
embassy bombing in, 52
evacuation of, 363, 366, 367-68
fall of, 362, 363, 365, 367-68
Headquarters Support Activity, 40-il,
257

Independence Day celebration, 18, 20
logistic lines to, 180, 237
Military Sea Transportation Service in,
32

Naval Shipyard, 2, U, 22, 25, 220,

224, 297, 323
Naval Supply Center, 25, 31 9
Naval Support Activity, 162, 257, 258,

259-61
nurses serving at, 12£
river assault groups, 22, 210, 226
sealift of refugees from-Haiphong, 6, 2
show-the-flag visits by U.S., 3, 2&
Tan Son Nhut Airfield, 40, 15L 156,

261
terrain, 1 29
U.S. Embassy, 36S
Saigon River, 3, 177, 224

Saigon Station Hospital, 4L 4Z iZ, 257
St. Francis River (LSMR 525), m Mi, 312
Saint Paul (CA 73), 20, Z6, 77, 132, 141
Salisbury Sound (AV 13), ?55
Salvage activities, 243. 244
Salzer Robert S., 200. 214, 318
Sample (DE 1048), 243
Samuel hi. Moore (DD 747), 99
Sanctuary (AH 17i, 12L 134, 24Q
Sangley Point, Philippines, Naval Air Sta-
tion, 151, 314
Saratoga (CVA 60), 222
Sasebo, Japan, 239, 242
Sather Richard C, 53
Satyr (ARL 23), 209
SCATTOR program, 318
Seabees, 162. 246 See also Naval Con-
struction Brigade; Naval Mobile
Construction Battalions

airfield repair, 247

camps built for Special Forces, 33, 34

casualties, 247, 250

Civilian Irregular Defense Group pro-
gram, 3L 33

counterinsurgency teams, 244, 248

in I Corps Tactical Zone, ?.44

infrastructure improvements in Laos,
20

joint operation with Army engineers,
209

"nation building" work, 33, 229, 230,
242. 244

operational control of, 2 42. 2 44

ordnance. 230

port construction, 251

structures built by, 248-49. 318

Technical Assistance Teams, 31, 33

under fire, 247, 248

Vietnamization work, 318, 319

well drilling, 33, 34
Sealift, 162, 234, 352
5ea/ion (APSS 315), 35, 36
SEALORDS campaign

air support of, 266, 269, 225

Barrier Reef operational area, 269,
273, 289

Breezy Cove operation, 277, 279, 2S2
Cambodian border patrol barriers,

267. 268. 273, 274, 278
casualties, 22S

combined-arms patrol forces, 267, 268.

269, 270, 284
effectiveness of, 278, 287
electronic sensor devices, 269
end of U.S. Navy role in, ?.89-90
enemy killed or captured during, 228
evacuation of Vietnamese civilians,

282

firefight and ambush, 221
Foul Deck/Tran Hung Dao I operation,
269

Giant Slingshot operation, 270, 272,

273. 274, 228
in I Corps, 274

munitions captured or destroyed, 228
night ambushes by, 286, 287

412

operational commander, 269
operational theater, 265
ordnance, 266, 271
Ready Deck operation. 274, 284, 289,
298

river patrol operations, 270. 273. 274,
278

Search Turn operational area, 26_9, 289
South Vietnamese control of, 285. 286,

287, 289-90. 228
strategy, 26Z 268, 270, 223
strength offerees, 268-69
vessels used in, 270, ITL 273, 285
Zumwalt's role in, 267. 268
SEAL teams, 36^ 121

boats and craft used by, 170. iZ3
camouflaged, llA
casualties, i/5
Detachment GOLF, 162
minelaying operations, 1 80
offensive operations, 2Z6
operational control of, 294
purpose, 31

river operations, 170, 171. 1 73. 174,
186

SEALORDS campaign, 269, 287, 282
with special operations force, 169, J 75
Team L 1^
Team 2, 162
value of, 1 72
Search and rescue

aircraft used for, 70, 7£ 8Q
Coordinator, 80
on land, 82

in Linebacker operations, 343
losses, 82

North Station, 80, 26

recoveries of U.S. pilots, 47, 79, 82

South Station, 80
Seawolf squadron, 167, 169, 121
Secretaries of the Navy, 338, 385
Sedgwick County (LST 1123), 202
Sentry 24

Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Z2S

commander, 242

commands served by, 242

Danang port operations, 251

subordinate commands, 232
Service Group L 2.39
Service Group 3, 2.39
Service Squadron 3, 239
Service Squadron 5, 239
Seventh Fleet, 3

air units, 40, 47, 63, 65

augmentation in 1964-1965, 56

combined operations with Vietnamese
Navy units, 3.6

Commander, iZ 65, 66, 113, 133, 162,
164. 342

Danang port activities, control of, 251
evacuation of American noncombat-

ants, 42
flagship, 20. 2& 226, MZ 365
in Hong Kong harbor, 11
Laotian operations, 15-16, 20, 47
reconnaissance operations, 42

show-the-flag visits, 3, 38, 40
shows of force, 13^ 46, 48
training exercises, IS
Vietnamese sailors serving in, 25
Sgt. .Andrew Miller (USNS), 35L 358, 36S
Sgt Truman Kimbro (USNS), 35Z, 36S
Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant, 6S
Shea, Joseph M., L14
Shibaura Maru, 357, 368
Shields, Marvin G., 229, 380
Ship types. See also Carriers
amphibious, 15, 125, 361

assault ship, 38, 39, 119, 120, in,

125. 308
cargo ship, 311, 359
dock landing ship, 6, 119, 120, 128,

251. 322
infantry landing ship, large, 226,
22S

landing platform dock ship, 120,
350

landing support ship, large, 23, 220,

225, 226
landing ship, L 350
landing ship, medium, 21
rocket landing ship, medium, 137.

140, 141, 313
tank landing ship, 6, 8, 2L 119,

163. 166. 167, 203, 209, 238,

239, 251, 261, 321, 328
transport dock, 119, 31 1

attack, 6

cargo, 6

transport, 251
battleships, 76, 78, 312, 113
cruisers, 78, 113, 13L 14L 313, 326,
332

escort, 60, 35S

guided missile, 40, 138, 334, 335,
358

guided missile, heavy, 20, 76, 137,
142. 143, 328, 334, 338

guided missile, light, 38, 137, 40,
138, ML 143, 326, 327, 3S2

cutters

WHEC high-endurance, 150, 313,
318

WPB 82-foot, 146, 149, 151, i58,
J 59, 269, 318
destroyer types

destroyer, 3, 49-50. 5L 56, dft 76,
77, 78, 83. 96, 99, 103, 108,
113, 137, 138, 141, 142, 149,

240, 313, 326, 332, 334, 338,
350

escort, 3,21,36, 37, 60, 230, 226,

343, 361
guided missile, 40, 14L 143, 358,

361

guided missile frigate, 18, 78, 81, 96,
35Q

radar picket escorts, 146, 149, 175,
318

submarine chaser, 22Q
Are support ships, inshore, 137, 140,
141, 3J2

gunboats, 21
minesweepers, 36, 1 49
fleet, 24

ocean, 20, 3L 35a 3S2
submarines, 15. 25. 40. 56

transport, 35, 36, 12L 12R
support ships, 163, 166, 181, 21Q

aircraft ferry 39, 235, 238

attack transport, 119. 251

ammunition ship, 1(28

barracks, 201, 203, 209, 21fl

cargo, 6, 56

combat stores ship, 240

fast combat, 7£ im, 104

fleet tug, 240, 25Q

floating crane, 209

floating drydock, 251

harbor tug, 203, 209, 237, 251

hospital ship, 7, 121, 134-36, 240

hydrographic survey, 240

naval gunfire, 123

net-laying ship, 203, 209

oiler, L ii, 220

open lighter, 251

passenger, 56

provision, 7

refrigerator, 251

repair berthing, and messing barge,

203, 209. 2£1
repair ship, 7, 203, 209, 238, 259.

261

salvage ship, 7, 240, 350
seaplane tender, 15L 155, 238
storeship, 358
tanker, 56, 238

transport, 6, 39, 18L 226, 236, 238,
239

trawlers (enemy), 143, 150, L58, 240,
314, 315, 318, 322
Shore establishment, 242
Show-the-flag visits, 3, 38, 4Q
Shows of force, 13, 46, 48
Sides, lohn a, 12
Sihanouk. 5ee Norodom Sihanouk
Sihanoukville, 16L 315, 361
Slaff, Allan P., 216
Smith, R. G,

"Incident at Old Nam Can," 28&

"Launch," 301
Sniper, ?.^9
Soc Trang, 38
Sol-Rap, 2B2
Son Island, LSI
Son Jay, 82

South China Sea, 15, 20, 48, 53, 6L 65,
83

amphibious forces deployed to, 123
antiinfiltration patrols, 313, 314, 315
carrier task force deployed to, 5, 13
show of force in, 13
Southeast Asia

attack sorties flown in, 300-301
deployment of U.S. forces to, 20
gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from,
263

413

mainland, 14j dZ
maps, 2^ 14

Naval Command in, fi5=fiS
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. iO,
15

South Korea

ground forces in Vietnam, 194, .^07

invasion by North Korea, 1
South Vietnam

aircraft losses over, S2

airfields, 40. 89

amphibious landings in, 1 1 9-.^6
anti-Communists in, L 2
attack sorties flown in, '^01
bombing by U.S. in, 92, SM
civic action by U.S. in, 229-12
Communist insurgency in, 2Q
elections, 12A

evacuation of, 41-42. 356-58. 'i.';9-60
evacuation to, 6=2
fall of, 356, 357-58, 367.-6S
ground support mission, 20
Independence Day celebration, IS
infrastructure improvements, 3 1 9
legal basis for U.S. support of, 53
map, 14 S

Naval Academy, 217

Naval Command in, 162

pig-raising enterprise, 320

poultry industry, 320

president, 264

show-the-flag visits to, 40

terrain, 126, 127, UL 163, 206, 212

Tet Offensive in, 102, 134

weather in, 82
South Vietnamese Air Force

evacuation role, 364

mechanics, 25
South Vietnamese Armed Forces

aircraft provided to, 364

amphibious landings, 125, 126,
1 7.7-28

casualties, 128

Chief of the General Staff, U

direct support from U.S. Navy, 36^4

equipping and training by U.S., 10,
263 ■

interservice rivalry, 222

Joint General Staff, 216

joint operations with U.S., 125, 121

morale, 3.56

Popular Force militiamen, 269, 272,
2M

Regional Force, 128
South Vietnamese Army

7th Infantry Division, 7.10

23d Infantry Division, 302

river assault operations with U.S., 21Q
South Vietnamese Marine Corps

Easter Offensive, defense against, 327,
12S

morale, 34 1

in Quang Tri City, 34d

river assault operations with U.S., 210,
2SQ

as a separate service, 216

strike operations against Viet Cong,
276

training, 25
South Vietnamese Navy

advisors. See .Advisors to South Viet-
namese Navy

amphibious assaults, 226

casualties, 226. 244

Cambodian offensive by, 285, 287

cartoon booklet, 222^^

Chief of Naval Operations, 2 1 7

coup d'etat against Diem, 22

development of, 10-1 1

effectiveness of, 27, 215_, 225

growth of, 20, 216, 290, 2M

leadership problems, 228, 285, 323,
325

logistic support for, 220, 226

losses of ships, 226

in Market Time operations, 143, 144,

149, 156. 226
material condition of, 221, 224. 226
minesweeping operations, 128
morale and motivation of, 220,

222-24. 226, 285, 319.

320. 323, 325. 355
operational commands, 298-99
operational performance of, 27, 226,

287, 222

organizational structure and changes,

IL 216-17, 220
political in-fighting, 215, 217, 220-21.

22S

repair facilities, 224

river patrol, U, 175, 280

in SEALORDS campaign, 268, 269,

285, 286, 287, 228
shelters constructed for personnel and

families of, 319, 320
ships and boats, 20, 22, 2£ 43, 175,

178, 226, 244, 285, 286, 318
size of force, 20, 36, 216, 269, 323, 355
strike operations against Viet Cong, 276
supply management, 25
training, 217, 220, 285, 294, 295, 296,

321, 325

transfer of responsibility from U.S. to,

287, 298-99
U.S. liaison with, 147
South Vietnamese Navy units. See also
Coastal Force
Coastal Division 24, 3D.
Coastal Group 26, 122
Fleet Command, 220, 225-26, 228, 224
Flotilla L 220
Flotilla II, 220

Lien Doi Nguoi Nhai (frogmen), H, 46
Regional Force Boat Companies, 216
river assault groups, 22, 28, 225, 226,
2R6

River Force, 22, 25, 26, 27, 2S, 215,

224, 225, 226
riverine assault interdiction divisions,

220

river interdiction divisions, 220
River Patrol Groups, 226, 220

River Transport Escort Group, 22, 226

River Transport Group, 22, 226

Sea Force. 21, 2^ 142, 220
Souvanna Phouma, 20, 46
Special communications beach jumper

units, 121
Speer, Paul H., UA
Spencer, Larry, 348
Starlight scopes, L&2
Steel, lohn

"Air Coverage From Above." I2f2

"Charlie," LSZ

"Chest Wound," 1S2

"Destroyer Pulling Alongside for Re-
plenishment," IQi

"F4 Air Strike 250 LB Frags," dfi

"Firefight — Swift on Soi-Rap," 2S2

"Hominy Station — Firefight and Am-
bush — Swift Boat in Rung Sat,"
211

"LCDR Caldwell V.F 213 After Mis-
sion," 306

"Marine Dive Bombers at Twilight,"
302

"Mekong Delta — SEAL Team Dropoff —

Night Ambush," 123
"Mission Accomplished," 115
"River Assault Group — Nha Be," 2S2
"Strike," 321
"Swift Boat 16Z 151
"Trip Grenade — fackstay," 122
"V.C. Harvest— Danang," 112

Stewart Seacraft Company, 149

Stkketi (DD 888), 3

Stockdale, James B., 53, 349, 381

5torme5 (DD 780), lAl

Strategic Hamlet Program, 33

Strike Assault Boat Squadron 20, 285.
291

Subic Bay 39, 59, 96-97, 242. 245, 349,
353, 361

Submarine hunter-killer group, 2Q
Support. 5ee also Logistic and administra-
tive support; Medical support; Naval
gunfire support

for amphibious landings, 119

communications, 80

electronic countermeasures, 20
Surveillance missions, 36
Swartz, Peter M., 32Q
Swartz, T. R., 114
Swatow motor gunboats

attack on U.S. destroyers, 26

camouflaged, 91

capabilities and armament, 51, 2Q
hit/sunk by Task Force 77, 92, 96, 338
retaliatory air strike by U.S., 52, 53

Tactical Zones, 215
I Corps

amphibious operations in, 128, 133,
302

cessation of U.S. Navy combat activ-
ity in, 282
civic action in, 230

414

Clearwater Task Force in, ZZ4
combat activity, 24S
commander of forces in, J 3/2
defeat of enemy offensive in, IBS
Easter Offensive, 326, 32L 344
enemy infiltration of, Idl
evacuation of, 356-58, ^S9-f,n
ground presence (U.S.) in, 304
logistic support in, 162. 248, 251,

252. 318
Market Time resources in, 143
Marine heliborne operations, 134
medical support in, 134
naval gunfire support in, 137, 141.

210, 313
Seabee presence in, 244, 2.S0
SEAL operations in, 1 70
SEALORDS campaign, 2Z4
river patrols in, L86
sorties flown in, 304
weather, 251

II Corps, 123, 12L 161 162, 170, 257,

332, 356-58, 359-fin

III Corps, 162, 257

IV Corps, 162, 252
Taiwan, 242

Tom Ky 12L 128, 352
Tarn Quan, 222, 12Z
Tan An, 226

Tan Binh Orphanage, 222

Tan Chau, 259, ilS

Tank, M-48, 122

Tan My, 188, 251, 257

Tanner (AGS 1^ 240

Tan Son Nhut Airfield, 40, IM, 156, 26L
362

Task forces

7JL See Vietnam Patrol Force
Zi See Mobile Logistic Support Force
Z6. See Amphibious Force, Seventh
Fleet

TL See Attack Carrier Striking Force
ZS, See Mine Countermeasures Force
115 See Coastal Surveillance Force
m. See River Patrol Force, 162
117. See Riverine Assault Force
Clearwater, 188, 195, 289

Taylor, Maxwell D., 20, 3L ^

Toy Ninh, 2Z3

Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission,
10

Terrell County (LST 1157), 240
Tet Offensive

and amphibious landings, L34

coastal interdiction efforts and, 117,
141. Ifil

enemy casualties, 197. 263, 264

enemy ships sunk, 151

initiation of, 102, 134

against Khe Sanh Marine outpost, 102

enemy execution of civilians during,
L22

follow-up attacks, 263
logistic support during, 251, 252. 257
Mekong Delta combat intensity, i26
naval gunfire support during, 141

riverine assault operations during,

210, 211. 228
river patrol operations during, 15L

167. ISfi
Seabee activities during, 250
Task Force Z2 and, 102
and U.S. strategy in Vietnam, 263. 26A
Thailand, 19, 20, 361
Thai Nguyen, 345

Thanh Hoa, 51, 82, 96, 112, 337, 342
Thomaston (LSD 28), 120, 36L 363
Thornton, Michael E., 3S2
Thua Thien, 2_26, 326
Thu Bon River, 248

Ticonderoga (CVA 14), 40, 46, 51, 53, 54.

Ill
Tien Sa, 221
Tinnin, Eugene, 1 ZS
Toledo (CA 133), 20
Tonkin, 5

Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 53
Topeka (CLG 8), 137
Tortuga (LSD 26), 8, 163, 121
Towhee (AGS 28), 240
Tracked landing vehicles, 12J, 122, 22S,
328

Training of U.S. personnel

Counterinsurgency Education and
Training Program, 36

Green Berets, 15

in river warfare, 210
Training of Vietnamese personnel

by advisors, 25

Biet Hai commandos, 32

blue-water surveillance operations, 36,
37, 39

"boot camp," 295, 236

combined operations with Vietnamese
Navy units, 36, 39, 285

deficiencies in, 220-21, 225

facilities, 22, 221

General Quarters drill, 322

language barriers, 321

for minesweeping operation, 350

mobile training teams, 25

shipboard, 22L 285, 221

at shore-based schools, 221

in U.S., 25, 22L 294, 295, 226
Tran Hong Van, cartoon booklet, ?.?.7.-7.4
Transcolorado (SS), 357, 358
Tran Van Chen, 212
Ira Vinh, 186

Tucumcari (PGH 2), 150, 154
Tulare (IKA 112), 311
Tunny ((APSS 282), 121
Turner loy(DU 951), 52
Tuscaloosa (LST 1187), 365
Tututla (ARG 41, 261
Tuy Dong (HQ 04), 22Q
Tuy Hoa, 30, 356, 358

Udorn, 20

U Minh Forest, 214, 2Z6, 277, 279, 280,
313

Underwater Demolition Teams, 121. 251

(12), 20
Union (AKA 106), 65
U.S. .Ambassador 264. 361
U.S. Embassy

bombing in Saigon, 57

in Cambodia, 361

evacuation of, 368

Marine Corps personnel left in Viet-
nam, 349

U.S. Naval Training Center, San Diego, 235

Vam Co Dong, 269, 270, 27L 273, 318
Vam Co Tay, 182, 269, 273, 318
Vancouver (LPD 2), 65, 120, 36L 263
Van Hoa, 101
Vega (AF 59), 358
Vernon County (LST 1161), 209
Vertical replenishment, 74, 76
Veth, Kenneth L., 264
Vientiane, 20

Viet Cong, 30, 39, 41. 6L 152
1st Regiment, 125, 127-28, L3Q
263d Main Force Battalion, 208, 210
514th Main Force Battalion, 208, 210
aircraft destroyed by, 19fi
air strikes on, 266

ambushes on inland waterways, 180,

184, 185, 207. 210, 213
attack on Seabee work site, 222
attacks on Coastal Force bases, 221
barracks bombing in Saigon, 4L 56
C-95th Sapper Company, 302
captured, 186, 307
casualties, 130, 232, 14L IZL IIL

208, 210, 225, 302
embassy bombing in Saigon, 52
fire arrow attack on bunker, 184
hospital, 210

infiltration into South Vietnam, 64, 65,
121

logistical support, 276, 282

mining of inland waterways, 170, 178,
180. 226, 279

Mobile River Force actions against, 210

mortaring of Pleiku advisors' com-
pound, 61

munitions confiscated from, 158, 210

night attacks, 183

offensive actions against, 7.74-83

rocket attacks on, 309

sabotage, 243

sappers, 196, 307, 352

screening of Vietnamese for, 302

ships sunk by, 2 78. 244

thatched-roof hut as ambush position,
184

Viet Minh, L 4, 5, 6
Vietnam. See Republic of Vietnam
Vietnamization of naval operations. See
also Withdrawal of U.S. forces
ACTOV process, 284, 318
ACTOVLOG, 318
advisors' role, 322, 323
authorization to initiate combat land-
ings, 310

415

Barrier Reef operation, 289

base transfers, 318-19

Breezy Cove operation, 289

coastal radar sites, 319

disestablishment of U.S. naval com-
mands, 293

infrastructure expansion, 318

logistic establishment, 318-19, 323

Market Time operation. 318

morale-building measures, 319

Ready Deck operation, 289

SCATTOR plan, 318

Seabees construction prelects for, 318,
319, 320

SEALORDS campaign, 268, 269, 284,

285, 286, 287, 289, 292
Search Turn operation, 289
training for, 284-85, 293, 321, 322.

323, 325

transfer of vessels to South Vietnam,
289, 293-94, 298, 299, 318
Vietnam Patrol Force, 147
Vinh, 53, 82, 96, 111, 112, 113, 117
Vinh Long, 22, 163, 167, 169, 186, 210,

226, 259
Vinh Thanh Hoa, 332
Vinh Son, 51, 52, 113
Vinh Te Canal, 268, 2%6, 287
Vo Nguyen Giap, 330
Vu Con, 61
Vung Mu, 127

Vung Ro Bay, 65, 149, 151, 152
Vung Tau, 21, 22, 39, 42, 138, 149, 167,
259, 357, 358, 362, 363, 367

Wages, C. J., Fr., 281
Wainwright (DLG 28), 78, 81
Walt, Lewis W., 130
Walton (DE 361), 36
Ward, Norvell G., 144
Warner, John, 338
Warrington (DD 843), 338
Washtenaw County (LST 1166), 209
Wasp {CV,\ 18), 5

Waterways. See Inland waterways
Weather

effect on operations, 82, 111, 113, 137,
300

and evacuation of South Vietnam, 357
forecasting, 83
and logistic flow, 251, 327
We!S5 (APD 135), 39

Wells, Wade C, 210

Westmoreland, William C, 125, 162,
204,21]

Whitaker, Frederick E., 310

White River {ISUR 536), 140, 141

Whitfield County (LST 1169), 209, 210

Williams, lames £., 383-84

Wilson, James B., 324

Windham County (LST 1170), 209, 321

Wiseman (DE 667), 36

Withdrawal of U.S. forces
3d Marine Division, 307
advisors, 348-49
Amphibious Ready Group, 310
cease-fire agreements, 342, 343, 345,

346, 349, 350
disestablishment of commands, 348
minesweeplng operations, 346,

349-51, 354
and morale, 320
POW release and, 346^8

ships, 313

Special Landing Force, 310
troop and equipment transport, 307,
311

Wood, Phillip R, 214
Warden (DLG 18), 350
Wortman, Harry, 2 2 9
Wright, Marshall O., 2 24
Wulzen, Donald W., 65

Xleng Khouong, 47
Xom Bang, 61
Xuan Loc, 358, 365

Yakutat (WHEC 380), 318

Yankee Station, 46, 70, 71, 78, 80, 101,

239, 300
YD 220, 209
Yen Bai, 82
KFi? 889, 319
Y¥R 890, 258

Yokosuka, Japan, 242, 245
Yorktown (CV 10), 64
Yost, Paul A., 277
YRBM 16, 285
YRBM 17,209
YRBM21,2&S
YTB 84, 209
YTB 8S, 209

Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr., 264, 267, 268, 283,
285, 290, 293, 325, 318, 338

«• U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1994 304-208

416

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